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This thesis is a study into the rationality of antitrust analysis. Antitrust analysis consists of the 
determination and interpretation of antitrust rules and the assessment of evidence in the 
application of antitrust law. The main statutory antitrust laws are taken as given in this study. 
Thus, the focus of this study is the determination of rules and the assessment of evidence 
associated with deciding antitrust cases. The antitrust laws are the legal rules regulating 
actions that restrict competition between businesses in the market place. Broadly speaking, 
the antitrust laws cover cooperation between businesses that restricts the competitive pressure 
among them, practices that might exclude competitors from competing fiercely in the market 
place, and mergers and acquisitions that restrict competition.  
From the perspective of rationality, this study aims to shed some light on the state of play 
after more than a century of intellectual debates on the proper interpretation of antitrust rules, 
how to assess different types of evidence in antitrust cases, and, in particular, the use of 
economic analysis as evidence in antitrust cases. Modern decision theory has established a 
standard that can be used to analytically assess the rationality of antitrust analysis. Thus, the 
standard used for assessing the rationality of antitrust analysis in this study is how antitrust 
analysis would have been performed by a rational decision maker following the principles of 
rationality established in modern decision theory.  
This study is directed at antitrust analysis as such, independently of jurisdiction. 
However, for practical purposes, US federal antitrust law and EU competition law are used as 
a basis for the analysis. This is appropriate since, firstly, the two regimes are, at the time of 
writing, the two main antitrust jurisdictions in the world in terms of international research and 
scrutiny. Secondly, the two systems, although similar in many respects, are subject to both 
substantive and procedural differences that make them useful to illustrate key issues that are 
relevant for assessing the rationality of antitrust analysis. One such crucial difference is the 
adversarial nature associated with US antitrust law procedure and the inquisitorial nature 
associated with EU competition law procedure.         
This study is devoted to three main research questions: What is a rational antitrust 
analysis? Do the assessment principles and procedures applied in antitrust analysis facilitate 
rational antitrust decisions? How can the assessment principles and procedures applied in 
antitrust analysis be made more rational? The assessment principles and procedures used in 
antitrust analysis are the subjects for this study. This means that the assessment of rationality 
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in antitrust analysis herein will focus on the ability of the assessment principles and 
procedures applied in antitrust analysis to yield rational decisions. The assessment principles 
applied in decision making cannot be scrutinized properly independently of the organization 
of the assessment procedure the decision making is performed within. For instance, if one 
operates with a factual presumption of anticompetitive effects in deciding an antitrust 
violation, the performance of this presumption is dependent on whether the decision 
procedure is designed such that this presumption actually becomes refuted when it should. A 
general analysis of the interdependencies between the assessment principles and the 
organization of the procedure in achieving rational antitrust decisions is the most important 
contribution to research that follows from this study. This study does not, however, seek to 
determine the rationality of all substantive antitrust rules and their associated decisions. That 
would be a far too ambitious a task.           
Research in law and economics has provided many seminal contributions on the 
application of decision theory in legal analysis in general and in antitrust analysis in 
particular. Thus, this study might most aptly be considered as a contribution to the field of law 
and economics, in particular to the law and economics of antitrust. However, this study raises 
general issues that might be of interest to researchers in law and legal reasoning in general, 
legal theory, and other areas of law, such as evidence law, who may not have any particular 
interest in law and economics or antitrust.        
Chapter Two provides the reader with a basic introduction to the substantive antitrust 
laws and procedures in the US and EU. It is a descriptive chapter that is not meant to be a part 
of the research provided by this study. Chapter Two sets the stage for the research in the 
subsequent chapters by introducing terms and concepts crucial for this study. Furthermore, it 
will make this study self-contained in the sense that it will not be necessary to consult external 
antitrust law literature to understand the research in this study. Finally, a key purpose of 
Chapter Two is to highlight some key differences between US antitrust law and EU 
competition law. These differences will be crucial in discussing the rationality of antitrust 
analyses, and thus for the research in this study.      
Chapter Three offers a more precise description of the various components of antitrust 
analysis and a basic framework for assessing the rationality of antitrust analysis. This 
framework will inform the remaining research in the study by contextualizing the research 
addressed in the subsequent chapters. In addition, this chapter also raises some independent 
research questions. The chief research questions of this chapter are: What is a rational 
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antitrust analysis? Can and should the principles of rationality guide antitrust analysis?  The 
last question is essential in determining the value of proceeding with the study of rationality 
in antitrust analysis.           
Chapter Four discusses rationality in the determination of the antitrust rules and how 
this coincides with how antitrust rules are actually determined. This is a natural starting point 
for the study of rationality in antitrust analysis because antitrust analysis starts with 
determining the relevant rule to apply to the fact in question. Chapter Four also discusses 
whether the principles of legal reasoning applied in antitrust and the antitrust procedural 
framework are likely to facilitate the production and evolution of rational antitrust rules. The 
chapter also indicates possible improvements that can be made in the antitrust assessment 
principles and decision procedures to promote the facilitation of rational rules. The chief 
research questions of this chapter are: Are the current antitrust rules likely to be rational? Are 
we likely to observe an evolution towards rational antitrust rules? What can be done to 
promote more rational antitrust rules? 
Chapter Five addresses rationality in the assessment of antitrust evidence. It provides 
precise directions for a rational assessment of antitrust evidence, including the rational 
gathering of evidence. The rational assessment of antitrust evidence will be compared to how 
antitrust evidence is assessed according to the assessment principles and procedures actually 
used in evidence assessment. The chief research questions of this chapter are: How should 
antitrust evidence be rationally assessed? Do the assessment principles and procedures in 
antitrust analysis promote rational evidence assessments? The normative question of this 
chapter is: How can the assessment principles and procedures used in antitrust analysis be 
improved to promote rational evidence assessments?  
Chapter Six addresses rationality in the assessment of economic models in antitrust 
analysis. This issue is covered in a separate chapter because the use of economic models in 
antitrust analysis is such a broad topic and raises so many issues that it deserves a separate 
discussion. Economic models are relevant as a theory in the determination of rational antitrust 
rules. However, in individual cases, the use of economic models and economic experts is of 
particular relevance in the assessment of evidence. A study of economics as such and a broad 
critical assessment of economic theory as a scientific discipline are beyond the scope of this 
study. Nevertheless, Chapter Six addresses the informative value of economic models in the 
rational assessment of such models in antitrust analysis. The first research question of this 
chapter is: How should economic models be rationally assessed in antitrust analysis? This 
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will set the stage and for the next research question: Do the antitrust assessment principles 
and procedures applied in antitrust analysis facilitate a rational assessment of economic 
models? This includes questions such as whether the most informative economic models will 
be brought to the table, and whether these models will be assessed according to their 
informative value. Chapter Six also addresses the normative question: How can the rationality 
in the assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis be improved?          
Finally, Chapter Seven summarizes all the major conclusions following from this study.   
The central aims of the thesis are to provide guidance on how rational antitrust analysis 
can be performed, how the assessment principles and procedures used in actual antitrust 
analysis are likely to correspond or diverge from a purely rational analysis, and how the 
assessment principles and procedures used in antitrust analysis may be improved to be 
performed more rationally. In addition to the intrinsic academic research value of such an 
assessment, this will be of value to antitrust decision makers by offering information about 
how to use rationality to support their analyses and decisions. This thesis also includes 
suggestions for improvements that are of interest to legislators and other policymakers. 
Furthermore, the thesis will be of value for antitrust practitioners who want to present 
arguments based on rationality. Indeed, argumentation based on rationality should be a virtue 
in legal argumentation, both regarding law and evidence assessment. The particular role of 
rationality in antitrust analysis is illustrated by a famous quote by one of the most influential 
antitrust scholars of the 20th century, Robert H. Bork: “Antitrust policy cannot be made 
rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law – 
what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give.”1  
Rationality is not the only means of presenting arguments in law. Unfortunately, this 
study may also provide ideas for practitioners who want to exploit irrationalities to achieve 
their goals in the application of antitrust law. A defense for this is that the study, hopefully, 
will contribute more to revealing and refuting irrational arguments than to their use.                      
                                                 
1 Bork (1978) 
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2 The antitrust legal framework 
2.1 Introduction and motivation  
This chapter offers a survey of antitrust law and procedure in the US and EU. This study is, 
however, not the place to give a comprehensive description of all the details of antitrust law 
and procedure. This can be met by the enormous and ever increasing body of literature 
covering the antitrust laws and procedures of the various jurisdictions.2 This chapter will 
introduce terms and concepts crucial for this study. Furthermore, this chapter provides the 
reader with a sufficient antitrust law background to benefit from this study without the need to 
consult external antitrust law and procedure literature. A final purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight substantive and procedural issues that are of particular relevance for this study, 
including some key differences between US antitrust and EU competition law that are likely 
to influence the outcome of the antitrust analysis.  
This chapter will start with a description of the substantive antitrust rules, and then 
proceed with the procedural aspects of antitrust with a primary attention given to issues 
related to evidence assessment.         
2.2 The substantive antitrust rules  
An introduction to a law should always introduce the reader to the purpose of the law as early 
as possible. Antitrust law is no exception. Before discussing the purpose of antitrust law, the 
rules will briefly be described on a surface level to provide the reader with some background 
when describing the purpose of antitrust. Then, in light of this discussion of the purpose of the 
law, a description of the main provisions in antitrust law follows.       
2.2.1 Antitrust rules on the surface 
In the US there are several acts that constitute the body of federal antitrust laws. The most 
famous of those are the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton act of 1914. The Sherman Act 
Section 13 prohibits anticompetitive conspiracies, while Section 24 prohibits monopolization. 
The Clayton Act covers the prohibition of anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions in 
addition to the prohibition of some particular restrictions on competition.5 These rules are 
enforced by the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice. The Fair Trade 
                                                 
2 Hovenkamp (2005) has been used as the primary guide to US Antitrust law and Whish (2009) as the primary 
guide to EU competition law. There is, however, excellent coverage of the topic from other authors.    
3 15 USC 1. 
4 15 USC 2. 
5 The Clayton Act covers so-called interlocking directorates and bundling practices. Price discrimination was 
included in the Clayton Act with the amendments from the Robinson Patman Act of 1936. 
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Commission (FTC) was created with the FTC act of 1914. The FTC act gives the FTC the 
powers to intervene against unreasonable restraints of competition. In addition, the FTC has 
overlapping powers with the Antitrust Division to enforce the Clayton Act. In addition to the 
public enforcement there is a substantial private enforcement in US.   
The EU competition rules are more recent than the original US antitrust laws. The US 
antitrust laws were an influential inspiration to EU competition law. The EU competition 
rules can be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).6 TFEU 
Article 101 prohibits anticompetitive cooperation between undertakings while TFEU Article 
102 prohibits abuse of dominance by undertakings. Despite some differences, TFEU Articles 
101 and 102 can be considered as parallels to the Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2. In addition 
to the prohibitions, the Merger regulation7 addresses mergers and acquisitions that restrict 
competition. The EU competition rules are enforced by the European Commission and the 
competition authorities of the member states with TFEU Article 103 as the legal basis. These 
provisions are supplemented by detailed regulations on enforcement and procedure. Council 
Regulation 1/20038 contains for instance rules on the enforcement of TFEU Articles 101 and 
102. In addition to this notices, guidelines and best practices are issued by the European 
Commission. Although the enforcement of the EU competition rules are mainly public, 
private enforcement is possible.           
2.2.2 The purpose of antitrust law 
There is a quite broad consensus among economists that the pursuit of efficiency should be 
the purpose of antitrust law.9 Competition facilitates a selection towards the most efficient and 
innovating firms. Furthermore, competition creates a pressure towards a price level that 
reflects marginal costs. As a result, the prices will serve as a signal of real economic costs, 
promoting efficiency in the use of resources in the society as a whole. The arguments for the 
link between competition and efficiency rely heavily on economic models. The use of models 
in antitrust analysis will be explored further in Chapter Six.  
Competition is not a particularly suitable policy to obtain a desirable distribution of 
wealth if the purpose of distribution is to distribute from those with much wealth to those with 
                                                 
6 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Official Journal C 115 of 9 May 2008. 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22.  
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25.  
9 See Hovenkamp (2005b), Chapters 1 and 2, for a discussion.   
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less wealth.10  On its face it might perhaps appear that competition is a suitable tool for such a 
distribution. Competition will reduce the profits obtained by presumably rich producers and 
promote lower prices for presumably less rich or even poor consumers. This reasoning is not 
always correct, though. First, lower prices through competition will benefit all consumers, 
rich and poor. Competition, as such, does not promote redistribution from rich to poor 
customers. The rich consumers will probably, in monetary terms, gain more from the lower 
prices as they buy more units and consume more. Furthermore, a rich person might be 
presumed to have a higher willingness to pay than a poor person. If a supplier in the absence 
of competition could price discriminate between the buyers, he would charge a high price to 
the rich and a low price to the poor. If competition eliminates this possibility, the customers 
who paid most before competition would gain most, which would be the richest persons. In 
addition, the presumption that the suppliers are rich while the customers are poor often fails to 
be correct. In the supply of maid services, it is, for instance, natural to assume that the 
suppliers of such services are quite poor, while the customers are quite rich. In the latter case, 
more competition, with resulting lower prices might result in redistribution from poor to rich.  
Thus, antitrust laws are likely to be an imprecise policy instrument to promote a fair 
distribution of wealth. The economic argument for antitrust law would then be that 
competition should be used to promote efficiency to make the economic surplus as large as 
possible. The wealth from this surplus could be distributed fairly through other policies, such 
as tax policy. Some economists have argued that pursuing consumer interests by applying a 
consumer welfare standard11 in the application of competition law might promote economic 
welfare better than using economic surplus itself as a standard due some systematic 
assessment failures.12 The reasons are, among others, that consumers are more dispersed and 
less effective in advocating their interests. A consumer welfare standard might correct for 
this. Using a consumer welfare standard might also work better to obtain efficiency if the 
decision makers fail to consider the correct counterfactual situation when applying the 
competition law.13 However, it is probably safe to say that it is still not enough research and 
                                                 
10 See Farrell and Katz (2006).  
11 A consumer welfare standard means that for welfare to be considered improved then consumers must be better 
off.  
12 See Farrell and Katz (2006) for a survey of such arguments 
13 An example of this is to assume that a firm might enter into one of two mutually exclusive profitable mergers 
that both increase economic welfare. The last merger increases economic welfare most in addition to increasing 
consumer welfare, while the first is detrimental to consumer welfare and most profitable. If this last merger is 
not used as a counterfactual when assessing the first merger it might be approved as it increases welfare 
compared to the status quo. By using a consumer welfare standard the first merger would be prohibited. This 
would create incentives to realize the second merger.       
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experiences to conclude that a consumer welfare standard promotes economic welfare better 
than using total economic surplus itself as the standard.14                        
  Despite the economists’ recommendations on what the purpose of antitrust law should 
be, this purpose must be derived from the sources that are relevant to interpreting laws 
according to the accepted methodology of determining and interpreting the law. The main 
principles of interpreting the law on the basis of the relevant legal sources are shared by most 
jurisdictions, although the relevance and weight of the different kinds of legal sources might 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.      
In the US, there are no statutes that explicitly state the purpose of the antitrust laws. 
The main source to derive the purpose of law is to interpret the statutory text itself. The 
legislative intent and the history behind the law are also relevant. There is no unified consent 
on the legislative purpose of the federal US antitrust law. The US antitrust laws were, to some 
extent, a codification and criminalization of former common law rules that mainly had the 
purpose of preventing unreasonable trade practices. Some states already had antitrust 
legislation before the arrival of federal laws.  However, the codification and criminalization at 
the federal level which came with the Sherman Act in 1890, has a history that can shed light 
on the purpose of the US antitrust laws. The high prices and market power due to cartels and 
monopolies, such as the powerful railway cartels at that time, is pointed to as one explanation. 
Small businesses’ fear of big and potentially more efficient business is another explanation.15 
The first explanation is compatible with an efficiency explanation of the antitrust laws, while 
the protection of small businesses from competition from bigger more efficient firms might be 
detrimental to efficiency and economic welfare, and can be better explained as a result of 
interest group influence. The two purposes are contradictory. While protection from higher 
prices from cartels benefits consumers, the protection of inefficient firms might lead to higher 
prices detrimental to customers. Thus, a law that serves both those objectives at once is not 
possible.  
An important legal source in addition to the statutes themselves is the case law 
developed by the Supreme Court. Due to the relatively wide imprecise drafting of the 
statutory antitrust laws in the US, the courts have had broad discretion over the more specific 
details of the antitrust rules. In this task, it would be difficult for the courts to not say anything 
about the purpose of the antitrust laws. The US Supreme Court has, on several occasions, 
                                                 
14 This opinion is shared by Farell and Katz (2006), but that opinion is naturally based on the research available 
in 2006.   
15 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 48 f.  
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expressed its views on the purpose of the antitrust laws. A well-known statement that does not 
come directly from the Supreme Court, but which is approved by the Supreme Court, is the 
statement of Judge Learned Hand of The Federal Appeal Court (2. Cir) in the Alcoa case.16 
Here, Judge Learned Hand stated that the main purpose of the antitrust laws was to promote 
competition with economic efficiency as secondary purpose.17 In Brown Shoe18 from 1962, 
the court clearly distinguished between the protection of competition and the protection of the 
competitors. The antitrust laws’ job is to protect competition and not competitors. Thus, any 
eventual legislative intent for the antitrust law to protect small competitors as a purpose in 
itself was rejected by the Court in Brown Shoe. In GTE Sylvania19 from 1977, the Supreme 
Court stated that the purpose of antitrust laws is to maximize consumer welfare. It is not fully 
clear whether the maximization of consumer welfare simply means maximization of 
economic welfare or if this also implies some distributional purpose of antitrust. 
Maximization of consumer welfare in GTE Sylvania might be interpreted as the maximization 
of total economic welfare.20 The improvement of consumer welfare can be considered as 
necessary for economic welfare to increase. Even it is possible to imagine that there is a 
tradeoff between overall economic welfare and consumer welfare in some static economic 
models, this might be more difficult to imagine in a dynamic perspective. The issue is not 
resolved by the various court decisions after GTE Sylvania, although some of them might be 
interpreted as if consumer welfare is something else distinct from total economic welfare.21    
The EU competition rules can be found in the TFEU with a basis in the EU-treaty.22 
The TFEU and EU-treaty are international treaties and must be interpreted in that context. 
This means that the competition provisions in the TFEU, in principle, should be interpreted 
according to the principles of international law. However, the EU-system is so unique that it 
is sometimes considered a system of law separate from both national law and international 
law. The Vienna Convention23, Article 31, governs the methodology of law used by the ICJ24. 
                                                 
16 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d. 416 (2.cir) (1945).   
17 See Hylton (2003) p. 189 f.  
18 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
19 Continental T.V. Inc v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
20 See Orbach (2011), Hovenkamp (2005) p. 7 and Hylton (2003) p. 40 f. 
21 The purpose of the US antitrust law is however still briskly debated. There are different opinions, and there are 
various interpretations of what is meant by consumer welfare, see Orbach (2011) and Hovenkamp (2005) § 2.3. 
Some have interpreted the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines to adhere to a so-called consumer welfare standard 
in the application of the law, see Whinston (2006). As we will be discussed below, one should be careful to give 
determining weight to enforcement guidelines as enforcement authorities might be subject to bias towards 
avoiding type-2 errors. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines are described further below.   
22 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union Official Journal C 115 of 9 May 2008. 
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. Entered into force 27. January 1980. 
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Article 31 is usually considered as the basis for the interpretation of international treaties, 
including the EU-treaty and TFEU. Parties in an international treaty can agree upon a 
methodology to interpret the treaty. However, this is not done for the EU-treaty and TFEU. 
Thus, the Vienna Convention can be used as a starting point in the interpretation of the EU-
treaty and TFEU.25 The Vienna Convention, Article 32, Paragraph 1 states that  
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
 
 It follows from Paragraph 2 that preambles and annexes are included in the context. In 
the preamble of the EU-treaty, it is stated that the parties to the agreement are  
 
determined to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into 
account the principle of sustainable development and within the context of the 
accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental 
protection, and to implement policies ensuring that advances in economic integration 
are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields.  
 
The purpose of the EU competition rules must also been seen in the context of article 3 of the 
EU-treaty, which, in Paragraph 1, states that“The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values 
and the well-being of its peoples”, and, in Paragraph 2 states that  
 
The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.  
 
Thus, the EU competition rules are intended as a tool to promote growth, wealth and stability 
for EU citizens, economic integration and a competitive economy. It is stated in Protocol 27 
to the treaty and TFEU that the internal market set out in Article 3 includes a system ensuring 
that competition is not distorted.  
The history of the treaty is also important to interpret the purpose of the treaty. It is 
especially important for the EU-treaty and TFEU because the present treaties have evolved 
from previous treaties. The present EU-treaty unifies the former EC-treaty and the former EU-
                                                                                                                                                        
24 International Court of Justice. 
25 Arnesen (1995) p. 24. 
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treaty of 1992, also called the Maastricht treaty. The EC-treaty regulated the economic 
cooperation and can be traced back to the Coal and Steel Union, which was the predecessor to 
the EC. The cooperation on coal and steel was extended to the first EC-treaty of 1957, also 
known as the treaty of Rome. TFEU Articles 101 and 102 were numbered as Article 85 and 
86, respectively, in the Rome treaty. Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome treaty were renumbered 
as Articles 81 and 82, respectively, in the Amsterdam treaty of 1997, and kept these numbers 
in the Nice treaty of 2001. The EC treaty was the economic pillar of EU cooperation, while 
the Maastricht treaty regulated the cooperation on foreign affairs and security policy. All of 
the cooperation is now merged into the present EU-treaty and TFEU. The competition rules, 
however, have their base in the EC-treaty and the application of the competition provisions 
dates back to 1957. Thus, events back to at least 1957 are relevant for assessing the purpose 
of the EU Competition rules.  
The EU-treaty and TFEU are more extensive than most international treaties. The 
treaty gives the EU bodies legislative powers, gives the European Commission enforcement 
powers, and gives the European Courts judicial powers to resolve disputes between the 
European Commission and the countries, between the European Commission and private 
parties, and between member states.26 It follows from the Vienna Convention Article 32, 
Paragraph 3, that subsequent practice shall be taken into account as context in the 
interpretation of the treaty. This means that the practice of EU bodies, and in particular, 
decisions of the European Courts are relevant in the interpretation of the EU-treaty and 
TFEU, including the competition provisions and their purpose. Regarding the purpose of the 
competition rules the ECJ stated in Metro I27 that  
 
the requirement contained in articles 3 and 85 of the EEC treaty that competition shall 
not be distorted implies the existence on the market of workable competition, that is to 
say the degree of competition necessary to ensure the observance of the basic 
requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the treaty, in particular the 
creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a domestic market.  
 
In the annual report of 2002, the European Commission stated that the purpose of EU 
competition policy is to “to bring the benefits of effective competition to the consumer and at 
                                                 
26 In addition the court can provide preliminary rulings concerning, inter alia, the interpretation of the EU-
treaties when such issues are to be assessed in national courts, cf. TFEU Article 267.   
27 Metro SB-Groβmarkte GmbH, & Co KG v Commission Case 26/76 ECJ [1977].  
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the same time to enhance the competitiveness of European industry.” 28 Thus, it follows that 
promoting competition is a tool to promote welfare, especially consumer welfare, in 
accordance with the purpose of the treaty. However, a recent statement in GlaxoSmithKline29 
seems to have confused this issue a little. Here, the ECJ stated that TFEU, Article 101, “aims 
to protect not only the interest of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the 
market, and in so doing, competition as such”. The purpose of protecting competition and 
consumers is clear and uncontroversial, but is it a purpose to protect competitors as such? 
This would not always benefit consumers and increase economic welfare as described above. 
The solution to this dilemma is not clear at the time of writing.     
                 The protection of consumers has a special role in the application of EU competition 
law. The role of consumers is implemented in the text of TFEU Article 101. It follows from 
paragraph 3 of TFEU Article 101 that, for a condition for an anticompetitive cooperation 
covered by the first paragraph to be legal on efficiency grounds, the consumers must be 
allowed a fair share of the benefits. This last requirement is the application of a consumer 
welfare standard, which means that not only must economic welfare be improved, but, in 
addition, consumers cannot be worse off. The same standard is assumed to apply in the 
application of TFEU Article 102 and in the merger control.30 A debated question is whether 
consumer welfare is the purpose of the EU competition rules. It seems likely that the purpose 
of the EU competition rules is to achieve the superior goal of the treaty, which is, among 
others, economic welfare and competitiveness and protection of consumer interests. It cannot 
be deduced from the consumer welfare standard in the application of law that consumer 
welfare has to be the single purpose of the law. As discussed above, pursuing consumer 
welfare in the application of the law might be considered as a better way to pursue other goals 
such as economic welfare.        
2.2.3 Prohibition of anticompetitive cooperation 
Sherman Act, Section 1 states that  
 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.  
                                                 
28XXXIInd Report on Competition Policy, SEC(2003) 467, final para. 2, 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annual_reports/2002/en.pdf. 
29 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission Case C-501/06 etc. ECJ [2010]. 
30 See Whish (2009). However, it will be difficult to apply this standard if the competition rules have a partial 
purpose to protect competitors as such. 
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The text itself is quite imprecise and the potential scope of agreements and cooperation types 
that are covered is quite wide. On its face all agreements regarding trade can be interpreted to 
be covered by the prohibition. As soon as an agreement between, for instance, buyer and 
seller is legally binding, this is an obstacle to making a similar agreement with somebody 
else. This was clearly not the intention behind Sherman Act, Section 1, and it is not 
interpreted in this way. Thus, it is up to the courts to interpret and assess what is covered by 
Section 1. The division of practices that are prohibited per se and those practices that are 
prohibited as a rule of reason evolved early in the application of the law in the courts. The US 
guidelines on cooperation between competitors31 (horizontal cooperation) states, in Section 
3.2, that  
 
Agreements of a type that always or almost always tends to raise price or to reduce 
output are per se illegal. The Agencies challenge such agreements, once identified, as 
per se illegal. Types of agreements that have been held per se illegal include 
agreements among competitors to fix prices or output, rig bids, or share or divide 
markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce.  
 
Thus, conduct with a great potential of harm to competition is prohibited per se. No actual 
anticompetitive effects need to be proved. This will typically apply to price fixing between 
competitors and agreements where competitors divide markets between them to avoid 
competition. These are examples of hardcore cartels. For an action that is prohibited 
according to a rule of reason, actual harm must be proven, which means that the negative 
effects on competition must be proven to be sufficiently likely. Agreements between 
competitors that are not in the category of hardcore cartels will be scrutinized according to the 
rule of reason standard. The same applies to agreements between entities that are not 
competitors, but still potentially might harm competition, such as restrictions imposed on 
contract parties in the vertical chain (vertical agreements). A typical vertical agreement is an 
exclusivity agreement where some seller is given the right to exclusively sell a product.      
That an action that is prohibited per se means, in principle, that the action is prohibited 
with no further inquiry.  However, in recent practice, the distinction between per se violations 
and rule of reason violations has blurred.32 It appears to always be possible to argue that some 
conduct is outside the per se prohibition due to efficiencies in the specific case. On the other 
                                                 
31Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors issued by Federal Trade Commission and US 
Department of Justice (04/2000). 
32 Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 57. See also, Gavil (2008).  
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hand, the scope of a rule of reason inquiry is dependent on the conduct in question. 
Sometimes it is enough with a “structured rule of reason”, which also known as “truncated 
rule of reason” and a “quick look approach” to establish a presumption of anticompetitive 
effects.33 The scope of the inquiry into the actual circumstances depends on the general 
confidence in the anticompetitive effects of the conduct. Thus, the separation between per se 
and rule of reason has evolved into a more sliding scale of presumption rules, reducing the 
importance of placing some conduct in the per se or rule of reason category. This will be 
discussed this in more detail in Chapter Four.  
TFEU, Article 101, Paragraph 1 states that  
 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market.  
 
As with Sherman Act section 1 the text itself is quite broad. It covers both horizontal and 
vertical agreements. A non-exhaustive list of types of cooperation that might restrict 
competition is included in TFEU Article 101. Instead of distinguishing between per se 
prohibitions and rule of reason prohibitions, TFEU Article 101, distinguishes between those 
types of cooperation that restrict competition by object and those that restrict competition by 
effect. The European Commission’s guidelines on the application of TFEU 101 (3),34 Section 
21, states that  
 
Restrictions of competition by object are those that by their very nature have the 
potential of restricting competition. These are restrictions which in light of the 
objectives pursued by the Community competition rules have such a high potential of 
negative effects on competition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of applying 
Article 81(1) to demonstrate any actual effects on the market. This presumption is based 
on the serious nature of the restriction and on experience showing that restrictions of 
competition by object are likely to produce negative effects on the market and to 
jeopardise the objectives pursued by the Community competition rules.  
 
For a cooperation to restrict competition by object, it is thus not required that the parties to an 
agreement have some intent to restrict competition. Those who restrict competition by object 
                                                 
33 See Gavil (2008). 
34 Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 97-118. 
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are those who have so high a potential of negative effects on competition that it is not 
necessary to demonstrate actual effects. This will typically be the hardcore cartels mentioned 
above. A restriction by object in TFEU, Article 101, is a factual presumption. TFEU, Article 
101, Paragraph 3 states that cooperation covered by Paragraph 1 is not prohibited if it is 
necessary to create efficiency and consumer gains, and does not substantially eliminate 
competition. Even for those types of cooperation that restrict competition by object, relevant 
gains are an available defense. The European Commission has issued guidelines on the 
assessment of both horizontal agreements35 and vertical agreements.36 
 Conduct considered to restrict competition by object has strong parallels to 
restrictions considered per se illegal in US antitrust law. With the evolution of per se rules 
into presumption rules, the assessment principle is the same. However, this does not mean 
that the presumption rules are identical in the two systems. This will be further addressed in 
Chapter Four.    
2.2.4 Prohibition of abuse of dominance 
US Sherman Act, Section 2, states that  
 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty[…].  
 
As for Sherman Act, Section 1, the provision is broad. A finding of illegal monopolization 
normally requires qualified market power (monopoly power).37 Illegal monopolization covers 
exclusionary behavior that must be distinguished from competition on the merits. In other 
words, illegal monopolization is about  
 
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.38   
 
                                                 
35 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements  
Official Journal C11, 14.1.2011, p. 1. 
36 Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices.  Official 
Journal L 102, 23.4.2010, p.1-7. 
37 Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 227. 
38 United States v. Grinnel Corp, 384 US 563, 570-71 (1966). See also Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 227. 
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Sherman Act, Section 2, also explicitly includes attempted monopolization. A finding of 
attempted monopolization does not require the same level of monopoly power. It is, however, 
required that the alleged person has engaged in anticompetitive conduct with a specific intent 
to monopolize and with a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.39 Thus, in the 
US it is possible to be convicted for an unsuccessful attempt to monopolize as long as success 
was sufficiently likely. In addition to the broad provision in Sherman Act section 2, the 
Clayton Act provides some more specific prohibitions on assumed anticompetitive behavior. 
With the amendment in Robinson Patman Act, Clayton Act got a specific provision 
addressing price discrimination.40 To scrutinize further what monopoly power is, and the 
specific behavior that might constitute monopolization, the corresponding provision in EU 
should be discussed first.     
TFEU, Article 102, states that  
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.  
 
This means, briefly, that the abuse of a dominant position is illegal. It is not illegal to possess 
a dominant position, but the abuse of that position is illegal. An undertaking might possess a 
dominant position alone (single dominance) or together with other undertakings (collective 
dominance). The European Court of Justice used the following test to determine dominant 
position in United Brands by stating that a dominant position  
 
relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers 
and ultimately of its consumers.41  
 
Thus, the question of dominant position is a question of whether an undertaking can act 
independent of competitors, customers, and consumers. The question of collective dominance 
is a question of whether the undertakings have opportunity and incentive to behave as a single 
undertaking with dominant position. This usually requires economic analysis.  
                                                 
39 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan 506 US 445, 456,459 (1993). See Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 228. 
40 15 USC § 13(a). 
41 United Brands v. Commission Case 27/76 [1978].  
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The assessment of dominant position is similar to the assessment of monopoly power 
under US antitrust law. In both sets of rules market shares have traditionally served as factual 
presumptions, where market shares of more than 50 percent are considered as a presumption 
of dominance and monopoly power. Economic analysis such as the assessment of entry 
barriers, competitors’ ability to react on price changes, buyer power, and other characteristics 
of the market in question might refute the presumption derived from market shares. A 
difference between US antitrust law and EU competition law is, however, the explicit 
regulation of attempted monopolization in the US. Conviction of attempted monopolization 
does not require monopoly power, as described above.            
A general and abstract answer to what actions constitute abuse in EU competition law 
or what is monopolizing conduct under US antitrust law is almost considered as a holy grail 
by antitrust experts.42 As described above the, US test of monopolization is  
 
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.43  
 
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the European Court of Justice stated on abuse that   
 
the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking 
in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where , as 
a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question , the degree of competition is 
weakened and which , through recourse to methods different from those which condition 
normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators , has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of 
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.44  
 
The challenge on both sides of the Atlantic is to distinguish between normal competition and 
anticompetitive behavior. Thus, competition on the merits must be separated from 
anticompetitive behavior. Several theorists have tried to develop general tests based on 
economic theory that separate competition on the merits and anticompetitive behavior.45 
TFEU, Article 102, provides some non-exhaustive examples of which conduct can constitute 
an abuse such as bundling and price discrimination. This can be compared to the special 
provisions in the US Clayton Act. However, first and foremost, it is court precedence that 
                                                 
42 See Whish (2009) p. 193 f. 
43 United States v. Grinnel Corp, 384 US 563, 570 -71 (1966).  
44 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities Case 85/76 [1979]. 
45 See OECD (2005) and Østbye (2008) p. 99 f. 
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determines the content of abusive conduct in the EU, and correspondingly monopolizing 
behavior in the US. Conduct that has typically been under scrutiny are foreclosing rebates, 
predatory pricing (low prices to squeeze out competitors), price discrimination, refusal to 
deal, and various restrictions imposed on contracting partners such as exclusivity. The 
European Commission has provided enforcement guidelines on TFEU, Article 102.46 Similar 
guidelines are not in force in the US. The guidelines that were developed under the Bush-
administration were withdrawn by the Obama-administration.47              
A question that has been raised, especially in the EU, is whether there is some conduct 
that is considered per se illegal as abuse of dominance. This means in other words whether 
there are some actions that are considered as abuse of dominance without the need for any 
analysis of effects. In the US, this topic has not got the same attention as the per se violations 
are isolated to the hard core cartels. Whish (2009) points out that some court decisions can be 
interpreted to establish the existence of per se violations of TFEU, Article 102.48 Some rebate 
schemes might, for instance, be considered to be a per se violation when they are offered by 
dominant firms. It appears, however, more likely that there are no per se violations of TFEU 
article 102, though some conduct is subject to a strong presumption of illegality.49 A well-
known example is that dominant firms’ pricing below average variable costs is presumed 
illegal. Parties can always argue that their behavior is efficient and benefits consumers or that 
there are other objective justifications for their behavior.       
As described above, the EU prohibition of abuse of dominance and the US prohibition 
on monopolization have strong similarities. However, there are important differences. One 
important difference is that TFEU, Article 102 covers so-called exploitative abuse, and not 
only anticompetitive behavior. Exploitative abuse involves the direct exploitation of market 
power such as charging supra-competitive prices and suppressing innovation. Exploitative 
abuses are included in the examples of abuse given in TFEU Article 102. Though exploitative 
abuses are covered by TFEU Article 102, actual decisions concerning such abuses are 
scarce.50 When it comes to the regulation of monopoly prices, this is normally better 
addressed by economic sector regulations tailored to those sectors vulnerable to such abuses, 
                                                 
46 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7–
20.  
47 Press release of May 9, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm.   
48 Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion 
(CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB). Case 311/84 ECR [1985] 3261. See also Whish (2009) p. 190 f.  
49 See Bailey (2010) for the same point of view. 
50 Whish (2009) p. 199 f. 
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which are sectors characterized by natural monopoly. For instance, sector regulations are in 
place in the telecom markets and electricity transmission markets.  
Another difference between the EU prohibition on abuse of dominance and the US 
prohibition on monopolization is, as explained above, the explicit coverage of attempted 
monopolization in US law. As mentioned above, the requirement of monopoly power is not 
necessary for conviction for attempted monopolization. Furthermore, one can be convicted for 
unsuccessful monopolization as long as the intent was present and there was a dangerous 
probability of success. In EU law, dominant position must always be established, and either 
actual harm to competition or capability of harm to competition must be proved. Unsuccessful 
attempts are not covered. However, attempts might be included in the various member states’ 
systems of sanctions. An attempt to act in violation of TFEU, Article 102, can be made a 
separate offence in national law.    
Even if the coverage of attempted monopolization is included in US law on the 
contrary to EU law, the barrier to apply the monopolization provision seems higher in the US. 
This might partially be a question of enforcement priorities in addition to a question of law. 
The public interest in enforcing Sherman Act, Section 2, seems less in the US than enforcing 
TFEU, Article 102, in the EU, at least in recent decades. This is, however, dependent on the 
political regimes.51                    
2.2.5 Regulation of mergers and other concentrations 
The US Clayton Act, Section 7,52 states that  
 
No person […] shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital … where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.  
 
The most practical condition for a merger to be prohibited is that it substantially lessens 
competition. This is the so-called SLC-test. The prohibition covers mergers, acquisition and 
some other concentrations with the same effects, which will all be referred to as mergers in 
this study. The prohibition covers both horizontal and vertical mergers, and the authorities 
have issued guidelines both on the handling of horizontal mergers53 and on the handling of 
                                                 
51 In a press release of 11. May, 2009, Assistant Attorney General Christine A. Varney expresses a more hostile 
practice toward monopolization practices, cf. http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm.   
52 15 USC 18. 
53 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (August 19, 2010). 
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non-horizontal mergers.54 The enforcement of horizontal mergers has traditionally had a much 
higher priority than the enforcement of non-horizontal mergers.  
As a starting point it is in principle no requirement for the acquisition of control for a 
merger to be covered by the prohibition. However, Clayton Act, Section 7, states that  
 
[t]his section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely for investment and 
not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring 
about, the substantial lessening of competition.  
 
Acquisitions for pure investment purposes that are not an attempt to substantially 
lessen competition are, therefore, not in violation of Clayton Act, Section 7. For the 
acquisition of minority shares, it must therefore be proved that the acquisition is not just a 
pure investment, but leads to a substantial lessening of competition.  
A regulatory framework specifically targeted at controlling mergers, acquisitions and 
other concentrations was originally not a part of the EU Competition law,55 but was left to the 
national jurisdictions of the member states. This was a serious drawback for the community-
wide control with restraints on competition. After a long political process, the first EU merger 
regulation entered into force with Regulation 4046/1989, amended in 1997 with regulation 
1310/97.56 The merger regulation framework was substantially revised leading to the present 
merger regulation (EMR) that entered into force May 1, 2004.57 The EMR is based on a 
separation of jurisdiction between the European Commission and the member states. The 
jurisdiction of the European Commission is, as a starting point, restricted to mergers with a 
community dimension, which are mergers with sufficient cross border effects. The 
community dimension is, inter alia, reflected by thresholds based on the turnover of the 
merging parties and cross-border turnover, cf. EMR, Section 1. For these mergers, the 
European Commission has, as a starting point, exclusive jurisdiction.                 
   The EMR is restricted to mergers leading to changes in control on a non-transitory 
basis. This is the control criterion and is a difference to the US counterpart. The EMR, Article 
2, Paragraph 3 states that   
 
                                                 
54 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (06/14/1984). 
55 Some mergers were challenged according to the prohibitions, though.  
56 OJ [1997] L 180/1. 
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22.  
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A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common 
market.   
 
The condition for a merger to be incompatible with the common market is that the merger 
significantly impedes effective competition. This is the so-called SIEC-test. This covers, in 
particular, mergers that create or strengthen a dominant position, which was the main criterion 
in the former merger regulation. While the European Commission formerly could only 
intervene against mergers that created or strengthened a dominant position, it is now possible 
to intervene against mergers that significantly impede competition in other ways. According 
to the economic theory of oligopoly there might be mergers that restrict competition without 
creating or strengthening a dominant position.  
With the SIEC-test, the standard in the EU came closer to the SLC-test used in the US 
and some would probably argue that the two tests are essentially the same. The European 
Commission has issued guidelines on the handling of horizontal,58 and non-horizontal 
mergers.59         
The types of mergers that have the greatest potential of harming competition are the so-
called horizontal mergers. A horizontal merger is a merger between competitors. These kinds 
of mergers may restrict competition either because the merged company strengthens its 
unilateral market power or because the merger makes it easier for the firms in the market to 
coordinate their behavior in collusion (coordinated effects). Both effects are recognized in 
both EU and US guidelines on horizontal mergers.  
In addition, non-horizontal mergers may restrict competition. A vertical merger, which 
is a merger between firms on different levels in the production chain, might also result in both 
increased unilateral market power and facilitate coordinated effects. A vertical merger might, 
for instance, give the merged entity reduced incentives to supply competitors with necessary 
inputs. A vertical merger might also restrict competition by increasing entry barriers. The 
reason is that the new company may have to enter at more levels on the value chain as a result 
of reduced opportunities to buy from or sell to the merged entity.  
Conglomerate mergers, which are mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical, may 
also restrict competition. A merger between two companies selling complementary products 
                                                 
58 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings Official Journal C 31, 05.02.2004, p. 5-18. 
59 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings Official Journal C 265 of 18/10/2008. 
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might, for instance, increase the merged entity’s incentives to make products incompatible 
with competing products. A merger between a game console producer and a game software 
developer might, for instance, give the merged entity incentives to not produce games 
compatible with other consoles. Both vertical and conglomerate mergers are covered in the 
US and EU guidelines on non-horizontal mergers.              
The standard for assessing mergers in both the EU and US is related to whether the 
merger sufficiently lessens competition. Mergers might create genuine efficiencies, and 
hereby increase welfare. In both jurisdictions there is an efficiency defense.60 Recital 29 in the 
EMR preamble states that  
 
[i]n order to determine the impact of a concentration on competition in the common 
market, it is appropriate to take account of any substantiated and likely efficiencies put 
forward by the undertakings concerned. It is possible that the efficiencies brought about 
by the concentration counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the 
potential harm to consumers, that it might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, 
the concentration would not significantly impede effective competition, in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position. The Commission should publish guidance on the 
conditions under which it may take efficiencies into account in the assessment of a 
concentration.  
 
If the merger generates efficiencies, this may counteract the negative effects on competition, 
and, thus, the harm to consumers. This principle is also followed in the US and is 
implemented in the merger guidelines.  
2.3 Antitrust procedure and antitrust evidence assessment 
2.3.1 The role of the procedure     
The procedure is supposed to resolve the case at issue subject to certain principles and ideals 
described in more detail below. By “resolving the case” in the context of this study,  
“reaching an antitrust decision” is meant. The procedure provides the frames for the actual 
antitrust analysis. Parties advocating their own interests are more or less involved in 
presenting arguments to the adjudicators, hoping for a decision in accordance with their 
interests. These parties are usually represented by lawyers, often supported by economic 
experts. The procedure involves both determining the rule to be applied in the case and 
determining the facts on which the rule is to be applied.  
                                                 
60 See for instance Whish (2009) p. 863 f. 
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Determining the rule 
The substantive antitrust rules described above determine what has to be proved in an antitrust 
case.  However, it may be that the exact rule that is to be applied in the case in question is not 
indisputably established. The parties, supported by their own interests, might have different 
opinions on what the correct rule is and will present arguments for what the correct rule is. 
The decision maker must decide what rule to apply in the case.  
The statutory antitrust provisions and the interpretation of these statutes by the means 
of valid methods of jurisprudence and legal reasoning should determine the antitrust rules. 
However, the properties of the procedure and the incentives of the decision maker might also 
influence the decision maker’s determination of the rule. This will be scrutinized in more 
detail in Chapter Four.  
The rule determines to which factual situations the rule applies, which is the factual 
conditions necessary to establish an antitrust violation. The question as to whether these 
factual conditions are present with a sufficient degree of confidence is the topic of evidence 
assessment.  
Determining the facts 
The legal procedure provides the framework surrounding the assessment of evidence. The 
procedural rules may have a big impact on the evidence assessment. Most jurisdictions have 
extensive rules on procedure. The procedural rules include issues such as the organization of 
the procedure, disclosure of evidence, amount of evidence, rights to contradiction, rules on 
admissible evidence, rules on standard of proof, and rules on burden of proof, among others. 
Each of these rules may have crucial influence on the assessment of evidence. Thus, taking 
into account the properties of the procedure is a necessary background to study the assessment 
of evidence in a legal context and the context of why the assessment of evidence may deviate 
from rationality.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter describe the procedural framework for 
antitrust analysis, with primary attention given to the assessment of evidence. How the 
procedural characteristics are likely to affect the evidence assessment will be scrutinized 
further in Chapter Five and Six.  
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2.3.2 Organization of the procedure 
Procedural rules 
In most jurisdictions, there are three main categories of procedural rules: administrative 
procedure, civil procedure, and criminal procedure. These procedural rules are supported by 
some specialized procedural rules for antitrust.  
The administrative procedure regulates the procedure when government enforcement 
authorities administratively enforce the law to reach an administrative decision. In the US, 
this procedure is regulated by the Administrative Procedure Act. The administrative 
procedure has, however, less impact in US than in many other jurisdictions, as much of the 
enforcement follows an adversarial process following the principles of civil and criminal 
procedure from the start. This will be explained further below. When the European 
Commission enforces the EU competition law, it follows an administrative procedure. The 
superior principles regulating the activities of the European Commission follow from the EU-
treaty61 and the TFEU.62 The details of procedure in the European Commission’s enforcement 
of the EU competition law are mainly regulated by specialized competition regulations. The 
reason is that the EU legal system does not include a general administrative law framework 
comparable to the framework in national jurisdictions. The procedure when the European 
Commission enforces the prohibitions in TFEU, Article 101 and 102, is regulated by Council 
Regulation 1/200363 and supplementing regulations. The procedure in the European merger 
control is regulated by the European merger regulation64 (EMR) and supplementing 
regulations. There are also a few general regulations on the activities on European 
Commission and other European regulatory bodies. There are, for instance, general rules 
concerning access to information in the European regulatory bodies.65  
The rules of civil procedure regulate the handling of civil cases in the courts. Civil 
cases include both disputes between two private parties and disputes between private parties 
and the government in non-criminal matters. In the US, the civil procedure is regulated by 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.66 The rules on evidence in civil cases are regulated by 
                                                 
61 cf. Article 17. 
62 cf. Article 244 f.  
63 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25. 
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22. 
65 Regulation (EC) no 1049/2001 of the European parliament and of the Council of 30 may 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents OJ L 145/43. 
66 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 28 USC. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence67 which also apply in criminal cases. When parties challenge the 
decisions of the European Commission in the European courts, it is considered as a civil 
case.68 The superior principles regulating the activities of European courts follow from the 
EU-treaty69 and TFEU.70 In addition, procedural rules regulate the procedure in the European 
courts.71     
The rules of criminal procedure regulate the procedure in criminal cases. Criminal 
procedure contains many safeguards that are supposed to protect the prosecuted as the 
prosecuted risks severe criminal sanctions. As will be described further below, these 
safeguards may have several impacts on the assessment of evidence. The most serious 
antitrust offences are subject to criminal sanctions in many jurisdictions, including the US. In 
the US, the criminal procedure is regulated by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure72 and 
the rules of evidence in Federal Rules of Evidence. There is no criminal enforcement of the 
EU competition rules at the European level.73 However, many jurisdictions within the EU 
enforce their national competition laws and EU competition law criminally. It is the national 
rules on criminal procedure in the various jurisdictions that apply in these cases.      
Characteristics of the procedure  
The two main principles of organizing legal procedure are the inquisitorial system and the 
adversarial system. The latter is also referred to as a prosecutorial principle in public law 
enforcement. In the inquisitorial system, a judge leads the investigation and makes a decision 
on the basis of this investigation. In the adversarial system, a party brings a dispute to the 
court to be decided by one or more judges or jury persons that are independent of the parties. 
In the latter system, the decision is based on the competing supply of evidence by the parties. 
Each of the parties is supposed to present the evidence they thinks is in favor for their 
position. In the case of public law enforcement, the adversarial system means that the 
prosecution authority or enforcement authority brings the defendant to the courts claiming 
                                                 
67 Federal Rules of Evidence in 28 USC. 
68 However, when the European Commission imposes sanctions, this may be considered criminal in the meaning 
of the European Convention of Human rights. 
69 cf. EU-treaty Article 13. 
70 cf. TFEU Article 251 f. TFEU, Article 263 regulates the powers to overrule the decisions of the European 
Commission. 
71 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19 June 1991 (OJ L 176 of 
4.7.1991, p. 7, an OJ L 383 of 29.12.1992 (corrigenda)) and Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities of 2 May 1991 (OJ L 136 of 30.5.1991, p. 1, and OJ L 317 of 19.11.1991, p. 34 
(corrigenda)). 
72 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 18 USC.  
73 However, when the European Commission imposes sanctions this may be considered criminal in the meaning 
of the European Convention of Human rights. 
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criminal or civil sanctions to be imposed on the defendant. The prosecutor shall, in principle, 
bring forward all the evidence that illuminate the case, though in practice the prosecution 
often becomes a party who argue for conviction. The accused party has a right to defense.       
Whether the process follows an inquisitorial system or adversarial system can have a 
big impact on what evidence is brought forward in the case and the resulting decision. In an 
inquisitorial system, it is the task of the inquisitor to secure that the facts are sufficiently 
illuminated before a decision is made. The inquisitor must collect evidence that both 
strengthens and weakens the hypothesis that the law is violated. The inquisitor should make a 
correct decision based on this evidence. The evidence collected and amount of evidence 
collected is in the hands of the judge.  In an adversarial process, the decider is not responsible 
for the evidence gathering. It is the task of the parties to bring the facts to the table. The judge 
has limited control over the amount of evidence gathered and the types of evidence presented, 
except for safeguarding that the rules of evidence are followed. Either the judges themselves 
or the jury decides on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties.                
More on procedure in US public antitrust enforcement 
The adversarial principle is the basis for the US antitrust law enforcement. The prohibitions in 
the Sherman Act are enforced by the US DOJ Antitrust Division. Both Section 1 and Section 
2 of the Sherman Act are criminal offences, but it is, in practice, only clear intentional 
violations of Sherman Act Section 1 that are criminally prosecuted.74 This includes secret 
agreements (conspiracies) on prices, quantities, market sharing, or bid rigging. Antitrust intent 
requires that the action has resulted in anticompetitive effects and that the defendant knew of 
these probable effects or that the conduct was intended to produce anticompetitive effects, 
whether or not they actually occurred.75 When the Antitrust Division thinks that it has 
sufficient evidence, it can bring the case to the court claiming criminal sanctions including 
imprisonment. The whole process, from investigation to final judgment, is regulated by the 
rules on criminal procedure.  
The Antitrust Division can also pursue violations of the Sherman Act civilly. This is 
usual for violations not considered serious enough to be pursued criminally. In civil 
                                                 
74 This can be partly explained by political priorities. In a press release of May 11, 2009, Assistant Attorney 
General Christine A. Varney expressed a more hostile practice toward monopolization practices, see 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm.  It remains to be seen whether some 
violations of Sherman Act Section 2 will be criminally prosecuted.  
75 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 593. 
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investigations, a so-called Civil Investigative Demand (CID)76 is issued. Civil fines are not 
available, but other remedies may be claimed. This will often be a cease and desist order. 
Similarly to the criminal cases, the claims must be brought to the courts as a complaint.77 The 
civil enforcement is regulated by civil procedure (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Federal rules of Evidence).78  
Many cases settle with consent decrees that must be approved by the court. The 
consent decrees can be enforced in the court as other court orders. Consent decrees are 
beneficial for the defendant in that they cannot be used as prima facie evidence in civil 
cases.79 Furthermore, the Antirust Procedures and Penalties Act require that the settlement is 
announced 60 days before it is consummated. The Antitrust Division must also issue a 
“competitive impact statement” that makes it possible for the court to check that the 
settlement is in accordance with “public interest”.80 The Antitrust Division can also claim 
damages on behalf of the US government.  
The FTC does not have the jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act; however, it 
enforces the FTC Act. According to the FTC Act, Section 5,81 the FTC can intervene against 
“unfair methods of competition”. This provision has been interpreted to cover all conduct that 
is illegal according to the Sherman Act.82 The administrative procedure in the FTC is 
regulated by the FTC Act, Section 5, and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. The 
process is a quasi-judicial process based on an adversarial system.83 This process is managed 
by an administrative law judge, independent of the investigators and “prosecutors” in the 
FTC. The FTC claims remedies that have effects after they enter into force. The process is 
similar to a judicial process with presentation of evidence, interrogation of witnesses, and so 
on. The administrative law judge makes a decision based on this procedure that can be either 
approved or rejected by the Commission. The decision of the Commission can be challenged 
in the ordinary appeal courts.  
The Clayton Act is enforced by both the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC. In 
practice, the two authorities will inform each other before they handle a case, and a division 
of labor prevents that same case being handled at both places. The Clayton Act includes 
                                                 
76 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 594. 
77 See Gellhorn et al. (2004) p. 527. 
78 See OECD (2010). 
79 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 595. 
80 15 USC 16. See Gellhorn et al., p. 527-528.  
81 15 USC 45. 
82 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 596.  
83 See OECD (2010). See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 597 for a description of the process. 
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merger control. The parties of merger may have a duty to notice the merger dependent on, 
inter alia, the size of the merging parties and the size of the transaction as such.84 As a starting 
point, the parties have to wait 30 days after the notification for the consummation of the 
merger. If the DOJ wants to challenge the merger, it must be brought to the court with a claim 
of outright prohibition or with an approval subject to remedial commitments. This procedure 
can also be solved with consent decrees. If the FTC wants to challenge a merger, it follows 
the same procedure as in the enforcement by the Antitrust Division, except that the claim will 
be presented to an administrative law judge subject to approval by the Commission and 
judicial review by the courts.   
More on procedure in EU public enforcement 
The enforcement of competition law in the EU and many of the national jurisdictions in the 
EU is still best characterized as an inquisitorial system or, more precisely, a mixed system.85 
The EU competition laws are enforced centrally by the European Commission and locally by 
the competition authorities of the member states. The enforcement of the prohibitions in 
TFEU Articles 101 and 102 is regulated by Council Regulation 1/200386 and supplementing 
regulations, such as Commission Regulation 773/2004.87 Regulation 1/2003, Articles 4 and 5, 
gives the European Commission and the competition authorities of the member states the 
powers to enforce Articles 101 and 102. Article 6 gives national courts the powers to make 
decisions concerning Articles 101 and 102.  
The European Commission consists of commissioners from the various member states. 
The election of commissioners and the powers of the European Commission are regulated by 
the EU-treaty, Article 17, and TFEU Part 6, Articles 244 et seq. The main rule is that the 
European Commission decides according to majority voting, cf. TFEU, Article 250. The 
European Commission’s enforcement of the competitions rules is organized within DG 
COMP, headed politically by a commissioner and administratively by a Director General. The 
commissioners act independently of the member states they are from, and their loyalty should 
be to the EU as such.         
                                                 
84 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 598. 
85 Posner (2011), p. 852 uses the term “mixed system” for a system of inquisitorial public enforcement subject to 
judicial review. See also Parisi (2002). 
86 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25. 
87 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty Official Journal L 123, 27.04.2004, p. 18-24. 
Commission Regulation 773/2004 is the implementing regulation to Regulation 1/2003. 
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Chapter V in Council Regulation 1/2003 regulates the Commission’s investigative 
powers in the enforcement of TFEU Articles 101 and 102. Regulation 1/2003, Article 18, 
gives the Commission the powers to gather information from undertakings and associations of 
undertakings. Article 19 gives the commission powers to interrogate and interview physical 
and legal persons by their representatives. Article 20 gives the Commission the powers to do 
inspections (dawn raids) at the premises of undertakings and associations of undertakings. 
Under more strict conditions, Article 21 gives the Commission powers to perform inspections 
on other premises, where private homes are the most practical. During the investigation the 
undertakings investigated have access to documents and a right to contradiction. This is 
regulated by Chapter VIII of Regulation 1/2003 and by the implementation regulation. The 
interested parties have a right to be warned before the Commission makes its decision. This is 
implemented as a duty for the Commission to issue a statement of objection (SO), cf. Article 
27 of Regulation 1/2003. The case handling in EU must also satisfy the requirements set out 
in the European Convention of Human Rights.  
There has been some dissatisfaction expressed by legal scholars and the legal society 
that the Commission, as one body, acts as investigator, prosecutor and decision maker.88 The 
Commission has made some reforms to address this issue and separate the roles. A separate 
hearing officer ensures that the hearings in the case are performed satisfactory, and a chief 
economist outside the administrative hierarchy of the case gives advice to the decision 
makers. Since it is the European Commission as a collegial body that makes the decision, and 
the commissioners are not involved in the investigation of the case, there will be some degree 
of separation between the investigation on the one side and the decision making on the other 
side. Furthermore, the case will always be reviewed by the Legal Service of the Commission 
before a decision is made. According to Regulation 1/2003, Article 14, the Commission has to 
consult the Advisory Committee, consisting of member state representatives, before a 
decision is made. The decisions of the Commission can be challenged in the courts. This will 
be described further below.    
The enforcement of the merger regulation is regulated by the European Merger 
Regulation (EMR) and supplementing rules. The enforcement rules in the EMR have many 
commonalities with the enforcement of TFEU Articles 101 and 102 given in Regulation 
1/2003. The framework is different though, as the regulation of merger is mainly about the 
regulation of planned mergers and not violation of a prohibition. The merger decisions of the 
                                                 
88 See OECD (2010) and Geradin and Petit (2010).  
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Commission can be challenged in the courts. This will be described further below. The EMR 
contains rules of procedure including rights for the parties during the procedure. EMR, Article 
11, gives the Commission powers to request information from persons that might possess 
relevant information, including the parties, of course. According to EMR Article 13, the 
Commission can perform inspections. The Commission might also impose a duty for the 
national competition authorities to perform inspections. EMR Article 18 regulates the 
interested parties’ access to hearings and rights to contradiction. The parties have the right to 
be heard and to exercise their right to contradiction on the different stages in the case 
handling. The Commission has issued guidelines on best practice in the handling of 
mergers.89    
The legality of the decisions of the European Commission, both according to 
Regulation 1/2003 and EMR, can be brought to the union courts, cf. TFEU, Article 263.90 
When the affected parties want to challenge a decision by the European Commission, the 
General Court91 handles the case in the first instance. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is 
the appeal body and final court, cf. TFEU, Article 256. The right to have the fines issued by 
the European Commission challenged by court is stated in Regulation 1/2003, Article 31 and 
EMR, Article 16, which both state that the Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to 
review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It 
may cancel, reduce, or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed. This possibility 
to give the courts unlimited jurisdiction on such penalty review follows from TFEU Article 
261.  
A quick comparison of the US and EU public enforcement systems shows that the EU 
enforcement system is best characterized an inquisitorial system92, where the European 
Commission investigates, “prosecutes” and decides the case. If the decision is challenged in 
the courts, it then follows an adversarial system. It is then the parties who have the initial 
burden to establish that there was an error in the Commission’s decision. Furthermore, limits 
in the courts’ standard of review93 make the system quite different compared to following an 
adversarial system from day one. In the US, on the contrary, the adversarial system, as a main 
                                                 
89 DG Competition Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger proceedings 20/01/2004. 
90 If the Commission fails to act when it should have acted, this failure to act can also be brought to the European 
courts, cf. TFEU, Article 265. 
91 Formerly called the Court of First Instance (CFI).  
92 More precisely a mixed system. 
93 The standard of review will be discussed in more detail below. 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
31 
rule, governs the case from day one. The US authorities must bring the case to the court (or a 
court substitute in FTC cases) that makes the decision after an adversarial process.     
Private enforcement 
Private enforcement of the antitrust laws supplements the public enforcement. Private parties 
may challenge a violation of antitrust law for several reasons. Firstly, a person that has 
suffered economic loss because of a violation has an interest in seeking damages. 
Furthermore, a harmed private party might have an interest in an injunction to be imposed at 
the alleged violator, bringing the violation to an end. In addition, it might be in the interest of 
a private party that a contract in violation of antitrust law is declared void without legal effect.   
About 90 percent of the enforcement of antitrust law in the US is private.94 This can 
partly be explained by cultural and historical circumstances, but also by a legal framework 
that encourages private enforcement, especially in antitrust law. The legal framework for 
damages in the US allows for punitive damages, which gives damages an increased deterrent 
role. The main rule in US tort law is that the penal element of damages is a matter of court 
discretion based on the appropriateness of punitive damages in the specific case. In antitrust, 
however, punitive damages are regulated by Clayton Act, Section 4.95 Clayton Act, Section 4, 
states a right for treble damages, which is a right to threefold the damages suffered. This 
provision has probably boosted the incentives for damages litigation.  
Some measures have been taken to prevent perverse incentives, though. One example 
is Brunswick,96 where a local bowling hall sued a bowling chain, after the chain had acquired 
a competing local bowling hall on the edge of ruin. Consequently the bowling hall remained 
in the market and became a more efficient competitor to the plaintiff bowling hall. As 
anticompetitive mergers are prohibited in the US, it is possible for private parties to challenge 
mergers. The Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff had no standing as the alleged damages 
were not a result of antitrust injury, which is an injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent and that flows from what makes the defendant’s conduct unlawful. This is 
logical, as the injury the plaintiff suffered was a result of increased competition and not 
anticompetitive conduct. The concept of antitrust injury is now established in US antitrust 
case law, and has probably played an important role in discouraging the extent of non-
meritorious and non-desirable private litigation.  
                                                 
94 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 602. 
95 15 USC 15. 
96 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
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In the US, the main rule is that each party bears its own costs. This is on the contrary 
to many European jurisdictions, where the losing party must cover the winning party’s 
litigation costs. In the antitrust damages litigation, however, an exemption of this main rule is 
given in Clayton Act, Section 4.97 Here, the main rule is that the defendant must cover the 
plaintiff’s cost in case of unfavorable judgment for the defendant. This also encourages 
private enforcement. The private enforcement in the US follows an adversarial procedure 
according to the rules of civil procedure.                
In EU competition law, there are, at the time of writing, no harmonized legal 
framework of private enforcement. Thus, the right to damages to persons who suffer injury 
after a violation of competition law is regulated by the national laws of the various member 
states and follows the rules of civil procedure therein. However, the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence impose some requirements on the national laws. From 
Courage,98 it follows that the member states are obliged to secure the rights to damages after 
violations of EU competition law. To strengthen the private enforcement in the EU, the 
European Commission published a Green Paper in 2005 addressing measures to increase the 
almost non-existent private enforcement of competition law in the EU.99 This was followed 
by a White Paper in 2008 suggesting measures to secure damages for those who suffer injury 
after violations of EU competition law.100 One measure was a suggestion to provide non-
binding guidance for national courts on the quantification of damages. A group of experts 
assigned by the European Commission performed a study on principles to quantify antitrust 
damages in 2009.101           
Despite attempts to encourage private enforcement of the competition laws in the EU, 
there might be principles in the tort law in the EU member states that prevent the same extent 
of private enforcement in the EU as in the US. For instance, European jurisdictions normally 
limit damages to economic losses, interest on the losses, and nothing more.102 This principle 
is an obstacle to specialized rules that encourage private enforcement, such as punitive 
damages or rules that in other ways give some groups rights to damages exceeding their 
economic loss.    
                                                 
97 15 USC 15. 
98 Courage Ltd. v. Bernhard Crehan, ECJ Case C-453/99, [2001]. 
99 Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005. 
100 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008. 
101 Oxera (2009), External study on the quantification of harm suffered by victims of competition law 
infringements, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf. 
102 Dependent on the jurisdiction the losing party may have to reimburse the litigation costs of the winning party.  
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2.3.3 Rules on admissible evidence    
The rules on admissible evidence have a direct impact on the assessment of antitrust evidence. 
Rules on how much evidence is allowed may indirectly affect what evidence enters into court. 
Rules that directly regulate the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence might be crucial 
to the evidence assessment. The decision might change if some important evidence is not 
allowed to be disclosed to, or used by, the one who assesses the evidence. This section will 
offer a brief presentation of the regulations that affect the amount of evidence in litigation and 
the rules governing the admissibility of evidence.       
Amount of evidence  
The amount of evidence presented in a case is partly a question of economics. To gather, 
assess, and present evidence involves costs. Incurring these costs may increase the likelihood 
of a correct decision, or at least a more informed decision. Thus, there is a tradeoff between 
costs and benefits. This tradeoff is central to the decision theoretic analysis that will follow in 
the subsequent chapters of this study. In an adversarial process the amount of evidence is 
mainly determined by the parties involved. A party will weigh the cost of gathering evidence 
against the benefits. One party’s presentation of evidence may trigger a need for the opposite 
party to gather and present evidence. In principle, the amount of evidence is determined by 
the cost of gathering evidence and the parties’ stakes in the outcome of the case. The 
competitive process is supposed to secure a sufficient amount of evidence. This competitive 
process in presenting evidence is analyzed in Chapter Five and Six. The court may impose 
some restrictions on the amount of evidence. Firstly, the court has discretion in deciding the 
time frame of the process. Furthermore, the courts may refuse the parties to present relevant 
evidence if, for instance, the factual issue is already resolved. Relevance of evidence will be 
discussed further below. Since the adversarial system is the main principle in US antitrust 
enforcement, the competitive dynamics will mainly regulate the supply of evidence.  
Some specific regulations to secure a sufficient amount of evidence are more 
important in an inquisitorial system. These rules are supposed to encourage the inquisitor to 
illuminate the facts of the case to a sufficient degree. Rules to illuminate the case include both 
rules that directly regulate the amount of evidence and rules that safeguard the illumination of 
the facts, for instance, rights to contradiction in the process. When the European Commission 
enforces the prohibitions in the TFEU or performs merger control, the Council Regulation 
1/2003 and the EMR, respectively, state the rights to contradictions and duties for the 
Commission to hold hearings. TFEU Article 263 (2) states that the courts in the review of the 
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legality of the acts of the European Commission have the jurisdiction in challenging, inter 
alia, whether there was an “infringement of an essential procedural requirement”. This 
includes challenging whether the European Commission has provided sufficient reasons for 
its decisions. This will be discussed further in the section on standard of review below.                  
Relevant evidence and admissibility  
The US statutory rules on admissible evidence are more extensive than those in EU procedure 
and many of the European jurisdictions. However, the right to a fair trial following from the 
European Convention on Human Rights provides some basic restrictions on admissible 
evidence since the European Convention on Human Rights applies in EU procedure. The 
process around evidence in the EU is, overall, less regulated, and it is up to the court to assess 
the relevance and weight of the evidence presented. In the US, the extensive use of juries in 
the assessment of the facts makes it more practical for judges to be gatekeepers for the 
evidence presented in court. By declaring evidence as inadmissible in a separate procedure, 
the jury is refused access to the evidence. This separation of the role of the judge as an 
evidence administrator and the role of the jury to assess the evidence makes it possible to 
prevent inadmissible evidence coming to the knowledge of the fact-deciding jury.  
The statutory provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are a good starting 
point for describing what relevant evidence is and what evidence should be admissible. As a 
starting point, all evidence that contributes to resolving the factual uncertainty should be 
admissible. FRE Rule 401 states that  
 
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.  
 
Thus, relevant evidence is all evidence that has a tendency to make a hypothesis regarding the 
facts more or less probable. FRE Rule 402 states that  
 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible.  
 
Thus, admissibility is dependent on relevance in the US. In the EU there will probably not be 
such a strict ex ante test on relevance to determine admissibility based on relevance; but 
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however, as a matter of logic, the courts or European Commission should not give any weight 
to evidence that does not satisfy the relevance test. EU courts will normally ask critical 
questions if they are presented evidence where the courts do not see the relevance. If 
relevance in such a situation cannot be explained, the party may be refused the further 
presentation of the evidence.      
As stated in FRE Rule 402, even relevant evidence might be inadmissible if statutory 
rules say so, or it is prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. In the 
EU, there are also some restrictions on the admissibility of relevant evidence. This will be 
discussed further in the following subsection.          
Restrictions on admissibility of relevant evidence 
Some evidence that satisfies the relevance test may still be inadmissible. Inadmissibility of 
relevant evidence may serve various purposes. Firstly, if some factual issue is already 
resolved, more evidence supporting already established facts might be a waste of time. 
Another reason is that some evidence may appeal to people’s prejudices and be given wrong 
weight as a result of these prejudices. Some evidence may confuse more than they resolve the 
facts. All these reasons are valid reasons for the US courts to declare evidence inadmissible 
according to FRE Rule 403.  
Most jurisdictions have some rules implementing a preference of evidence in more 
direct form to evidence in a more indirect form. For instance, it is considered better to have 
the witness in court than some records of the witness’ statement. Furthermore, it is better to 
have statements from a witness who was a direct observer than some witness providing 
statement about the observations of a direct observer. The reason is that it is easier to cross-
examine a direct witness. In the US, the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence is extensively 
regulated in FRE Rule 801 and the subsequent rules. 
 A special type of witnesses is an expert. In antitrust cases, experts will typically be 
economists or industry experts. Most jurisdictions have special rules regulating the use of 
experts in court. In the US, only experts are allowed to make factual inferences (opinions), cf. 
FRE Rule 701. Some experts might be appointed by parties and some might be court 
appointed. In Daubert103 and many subsequent rulings, the US Supreme Court stated 
principles for the use of expert witnesses. The principles on the use of expert witnesses are 
now at least partially implemented in FRE 702, which states that   
                                                 
103 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
 
Federal Judicial Center (2000) provides guidelines on the use of scientific evidence. The 
European Commission has issued best practices for the submission of economic evidence.104  
The use of experts in antitrust analysis, and, in particular, the use of economic experts 
presenting evidence based on economic models will be studied in detail in Chapter Six.             
The admissibility of some types of relevant evidence might result in some undesirable 
incentives ex ante. For instance, if helping someone after an accident is accepted as evidence 
in support of admission of guilt, this might provide poor incentives to providing such help.105 
There are many rules that, at least partially, have the purpose of avoiding undesirable 
incentives ex ante. In most civilized jurisdictions, no person is obliged to incriminate himself. 
In the US, this follows from the Fifth Amendment to the constitution. In EU the privilege 
against self-incrimination follows from the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6. 
Allowing self-incriminating evidence might give incentives to put undesirable pressures on 
defendants to confess, which again might increase the likelihood of false confessions. This 
may reduce the accuracy of the decisions, which ultimately could reduce the deterrent effect 
of rules. Imposing certain witnesses a duty to witness may also provide undesirable incentives 
ex ante. A duty for medical doctors to witness in court might prevent people seeking medical 
treatment. A duty for family members to witness against each other might be destructive to 
family life. In antitrust law, the privilege for attorney-client correspondence is of particular 
relevance. If this kind of evidence was not privileged, persons might avoid seeking legal 
advice ex ante. This might both reduce compliance with the law and reduce legal certainty. In 
the US, the privilege against attorney-client correspondence is regulated in FRE Rule 502. In 
the EU this privilege follows from case law.106     
This was relatively brief review of the rules on admissible evidence. The topic is broad 
and can fill volumes. The rules of admissible evidence are highly practical and have 
                                                 
104 DG Competition, Best practices for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in cases 
concerning the application of TFEU, Articles 101 and 102 and in merger cases, Staff working paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/best_practices_submission_en.pdf. 
105 See FRE Rule 409. 
106 AM&S Europe Ltd. v Commission Case 155/79. See Graver and Hjelmeng (2006) p. 140. 
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substantial impact on assessment of evidence in practice. These rules will be further discussed 
in Chapter Five and Six.      
2.3.4 Standard of proof 
The standard of proof is the degree of confidence in the correctness of facts that must be 
established to apply the law to those facts. The starting point is that the standard of proof in 
civil cases is balance of probabilities, which means that the most probable fact is used for the 
application of the law. This is also referred to as preponderance of evidence. In criminal 
cases, the starting point is that there can be no reasonable doubt in the correctness of the facts 
for basing criminal liability on these facts. Between the two starting points there are 
intermediate solutions. A higher standard of proof than balance of probabilities might apply in 
civil cases involving administrative sanctions imposed by a public enforcement authority. In 
some situations, a lower standard of proof than balance of probabilities might apply. 
Sometimes, authorities will, for instance, be granted a court order to perform investigative 
measures against persons based on mere suspicion. The decision theoretic explanation for 
some standard of proof other than balance of probabilities is that the risk involved in erring in 
one direction is worse than the risk of erring in the other direction. This consideration will be 
central in the discussion in Chapter Five.  
Proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established for criminal liability for violating 
the Sherman Act. The standard of proof in civil antitrust cases in the US is, as a starting point, 
balance of probabilities. However, the US Supreme Court has decided that the standard of 
proof will depend on the circumstances and experiences.107 Thus, the standard of proof partly 
depends on the type of the case and the specific circumstances of the case. In the US, there are 
no administrative fines in antitrust cases. However, in cases where the court finds that a 
decision imposes heavy burdens on the parties, it might require clear and convincing 
evidence.   
Regulation 1/2003 does not regulate the standard of proof in the European 
Commissions’ enforcement of TFEU, Articles 101 and 102. In the EU, the normal standard of 
proof in civil cases is, as a starting point, balance of probabilities. However, it has been 
argued by scholars that when fines are issued there is a higher standard of proof. 108 In 
Microsoft,109 Paragraph 89, the court stated that  
 
                                                 
107 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See also Pardo (2010).  
108 See Graver and Hjelmeng (2006) p. 149f.  See also Wils (2006) p. 69. 
109 Microsoft Corp v. Commission, Case T-201/04, CFI, 2007.   
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The Community Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is 
factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that 
evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into consideration in 
appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, concerning merger control, Case 
C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, paragraph 39). 
 
Instead of speaking of probabilities directly, the court stated that evidence must be factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent. The same standard applies in merger control. Thus, this 
might seem to be the general standard of proof applied by the European Commission.  
When EU competition law is enforced by the member states, the standard of proof in 
the various national jurisdictions applies. If the EU competition laws are criminally enforced 
by the member states, proof must be established beyond reasonable doubt.       
2.3.5 Burden of proof 
The burden of proof is about which party has to establish the facts according to the standard 
of proof. Normally, it is the one alleging that some factual situation is present who has the 
burden of proof in establishing that fact. If, for instance, the antitrust authorities or some 
private party claims that some person has violated the antitrust laws, it is the claimant who 
must prove this violation according to the standard of proof. If the claimant establishes this 
fact by presenting evidence, it is up to the defendant to “neutralize” this by his own 
presentation of evidence. This is a starting point. Factual presumptions will switch the burden 
of proof to the one having the presumption against him.  
A presumption means that some facts, Y, are presumed to establish facts X. In antitrust, 
some established facts on the structure of the market (Y) may be used to presume some 
anticompetitive effects (X), even where X is not proven as such. Presumptions might be used 
to switch the burden of proof to the party who can prove something at lowest cost, by letting 
the presumption be in disfavor to the one who has the incentives to refute the presumption. 
Presumptions can thus be used to reduce the cost of the process and to facilitate better 
illuminated facts. In practice, the burden of proof will shift back and forth as the case 
proceeds. It is a dialectical process.  
In the US, most cases follow the adversarial system. It will be the court who decides if 
there is enough evidence for finding a violation based on the evidence put forward. The 
opposite party must decide to either take the risk that the opposing party has not presented 
sufficient evidence or to present his own neutralizing counter-evidence. The court will use 
presumptions in the assessment. As described above, the courts have developed many 
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presumptions in the application of the provisions in the Sherman Act. The separation between 
per se violations and rule of reason have blurred developed into a system of presumption 
rules.110 Presumptions also apply in merger control. If, for instance, parties in a horizontal 
merger have high enough market shares, anti-competitive effect might be presumed without 
proof that the merger will actually result in a substantial lessening of competition. It will then 
be up to the merging parties to refute this presumption, for instance, by presenting evidence of 
low entry barriers. Such evidence might trigger a need for the plaintiff to establish that the 
entry barriers are not as low as claimed by the parties, and so on.  
According to Regulation 1/2003, Article 2, it is the European Commission or the 
national competition authority that has the burden to prove a violation of TFEU, Article 101, 
Paragraph 1, and Article 102. An undertaking claiming the benefit of Article 101, Paragraph 
3, has the burden to prove that the conditions are satisfied. However, as described above, by 
the distinction between conduct that restricts competition by object and that restricts 
competition by its effects, the courts have established more precise presumption rules. This 
also applies to TFEU Article 102. When it comes to merger control, it is, as a starting point, 
the European Commission that has to prove that the conditions for prohibiting the merger are 
present. However, from established practice and the merger guidelines, it follows that it is the 
parties that must put forward evidence for efficiency gains.  
A difference between the EU and the US is that the first part of the process is 
inquisitorial. Thus, it will be up to the European Commission as both fact-finder and decision 
body to decide if they think some presumption is refuted by the party that is investigated.   
This evolution of presumption rules and the rational use of presumptions in evidence 
assessment are central issues in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.          
2.3.6 Standard of review 
Standard of review is the body of principles used by an appellate decision body in reviewing 
the decision of a lower-level decision body. The most common example is the body of 
principles the appeal courts use to review the decisions of the lower courts. Typically, there 
might be limits on the appellate body’s powers to review the assessment of evidence in lower 
courts. One reason for restrictions in the standard of review is efficiency considerations. Jury 
trials are expensive, and a full review of facts with a new jury might not improve the 
assessment but simply replace one assessment with another. Thus, a better standard of review 
might be to review if there have been procedural errors that have been likely to affect the 
                                                 
110 Gavil (2008) studies the burden of proof in US antitrust law.  
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assessment of evidence, or if there are reasons to believe that there have been manifest errors 
in the assessment of the evidence. The finding of such errors might justify an annulment, and 
the appeal court may order a new jury trial in the lower court.  
The standard of review in the US is dependent on the type of procedure and the issue 
in question. The content of the standard of review is subject to substantial case law practice. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to survey this practice. As a main rule, the finding of facts in 
US jury trials is subject to a clearly erroneous review in both civil111 and criminal112 
proceedings. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a) 6 states that “Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous” 
when the appellate court reviews the case.  
Another reason for a limited review is the expert character of lower decision bodies. 
Furthermore, the decision of a lower level expert decision body may involve policy questions 
that are not suitable for appeal courts to assess. In the US the decisions of administrative 
bodies, such as the decisions from the FTC, are subject to limited review of the facts. The 
FTC’s finding of fact is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.113 Under this 
standard, the FTC’s finding of facts will be upheld if they are supported by “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”114 
An issue that becomes relevant in inquisitorial systems like in the EU, where the 
inquisitorial body makes a decision subject to adversarial judicial review, is the standard of 
review to be applied to the decision of the inquisitorial body such as the European 
Commission. This is a different kind of review than the appellate review in the US. In the US, 
the first decision has been subject to an adversarial procedure. A limited judicial standard of 
review of a decision by the European Commission means that the access to a full scrutiny of 
the case in an adversarial procedure is limited. As mentioned above, the expert and policy 
natures of such decision bodies might justify a limited review. This is the case in EU 
competition cases, as the courts have established a limited review when it comes to 
challenging the legality of the European Commission’s decisions according to TFEU Article 
263. As a starting point the courts exercises a full review of both law and facts. The full 
review of law is stated explicitly in TFEU, Article 263. When it comes to the facts, the court 
stated in Italian Flat Glass that  
                                                 
111 See, for instance, Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), affirmed in 540 U.S. 644 (2004). 
112 See for instance United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2008). 
113 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997). Vacated on other grounds in 526 U.S. 756 
(1999). 
114 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) at 725.  
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it is incumbent on it […] to check meticulously the nature and import of the evidence 
taken into consideration by the Commission in the decision.115  
 
When it comes to challenging complex economic evidence assessments, however, the ECJ 
has stated that the standard of review is restricted. In Consten and Grundig, the ECJ stated 
that  
 
the exercise of the commission's powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on 
economic matters. A judicial review of these evaluations must take account of their 
nature by confining itself to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal 
consequences which the commission deduces therefrom. This review must in the first 
place be carried out in respect of the reasons given for the decisions which must set out 
the facts and considerations on which the said evaluations are based.116  
 
This limited standard of review has been repeated in many cases. In Thyssen-Stahl, the ECJ 
stated that  
 
it should be borne in mind that, although as a general rule the Community judicature 
undertakes a comprehensive review of the question whether or not the conditions for 
applying the competition provisions of the EC and ECSC Treaties are met, its review of 
complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to 
verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have 
been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there 
has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers.117  
 
Thus, the EU commission benefits from a wide discretion in assessing complex economic 
matters being subject to a review of manifest errors. This was further substantiated in Alrosa, 
where the ECJ stated that  
 
In paragraphs 129 to 136 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court expressed 
its own differing assessment of the capability of the joint commitments to eliminate the 
competition problems identified by the Commission, before concluding in paragraph 
154 that alternative solutions that were less onerous for the undertakings than a 
complete ban on dealings existed in the present case.  By so doing, the General Court 
put forward its own assessment of complex economic circumstances and thus 
substituted its own assessment for that of the Commission, thereby encroaching on the 
discretion enjoyed by the Commission instead of reviewing the lawfulness of its 
                                                 
115 SIV v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/82 and T-78/89, [1992] para. 95. 
116 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Economic 
Community Joined cases 56/64 and 58/64 [1966] p. 347 
117 Thyssen Stahl AG v Commission of the European Communities Case C-194/99 [2003] p. 78. 
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assessment. That error of the General Court in itself justifies setting aside the judgment 
under appeal.118  
 
Thus, the courts cannot replace the Commission’s assessments of complex economic matter 
with their own.  
That said, the ECJ stated in Tetra Laval that the limited standard of review of complex 
economic matters  
 
does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the 
Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must the 
Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the 
information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation 
and whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into 
account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.119  
 
Thus, although the courts recognize a limited standard of review, they are quite intense in 
exercising their powers within that limited standard of review.120 
 TFEU, Article 261, states that  
 
Regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and by the 
Council, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaties, may give the Court of Justice of the 
European Union unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties provided for in such 
regulations.  
 
As described above, Regulation 1/2003 and the EMR give the courts such powers. Thus, 
when it comes to fines issued by the European Commission, the ECJ has unlimited 
jurisdiction.121    
                                                 
118 European Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd Case C-441/07 [2010] para. 66-68. 
119 Commission v. Tetra Laval C-12/03 [2005] para. 328. 
120 See Gavil and Petit (2010) for a further analysis of the judicial standard of review in EU competition law. 
121 There is, however, a debate whether the courts practice such unlimited jurisdiction. See Gerard (2010). A 
topic associated with this issue is whether a limited review of fines complies with the European Convention on 
human Rights, Article 6 regarding fair trial. This was discussed by Advocate General (AG) Sharpston in her 
Opinion in the KME-case (C-272/09 P). A further discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this study.     
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3 An analytical framework for rational antitrust analysis 
3.1 Introduction and motivation  
This chapter offers a more precise description of the various components of antitrust analysis 
and a basic framework for assessing the rationality of antitrust analysis. A theoretical 
framework for rational decisions will be presented and it will be described how this is to be 
applied to the various components of antitrust analysis. Furthermore, the principles of rational 
analysis will be briefly related to how antitrust analysis is actually performed. The latter topic 
will only be discussed at a superficial level, which will serve as a basis for the detailed studies 
in the subsequent chapters of this study.    
 This framework is intended to connect the research that will follow in the subsequent 
chapters of this study. In addition, this chapter also raises some independent research 
questions. The chief research questions of this chapter are: What is a rational antitrust 
analysis? Can and should the principles of rationality guide antitrust analysis? The last 
question is essential in determining the value of proceeding with the study of rationality in 
antitrust analysis.       
3.2 What is antitrust analysis? 
Antitrust analysis is the analysis used when some event is scrutinized under the antitrust laws.   
If persons involved in the antitrust enterprise are asked what antitrust analysis is, some would 
probably say it is determining the content of the correct antitrust legal rule to be applied for 
the facts in question. Some would reply that it is the assessment of the relevant facts in an 
antitrust case given the legal rule. Most would probably agree both of these answers, as does 
the approach in this study. Analysis means to divide a complex issue into smaller parts to 
study it better. The main components of every antitrust case are the assessment of law and the 
assessment of facts. Both of these assessments might themselves be complex issues to be 
analytically divided into smaller parts for further assessment.    
Thus, the components of antitrust analysis consist both of the application of legal 
method to determine what the appropriate legal rule is and to assess whether the facts to apply 
the legal rule are in place. The first component is a question of interpretation of law and is 
solved by the appropriate legal method of the jurisdiction in question. This involves 
interpreting legal sources and applying valid methods of legal reasoning to determine the law.  
The second component of antitrust analysis normally involves more or less assessment 
of evidence. In complex cases, the application of science might be necessary to assess the 
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evidence. Forensic science is about the application of science in the assessment of legal 
evidence. Most people are familiar with forensic medicine through popular fiction, but other 
sciences also have an important role in the assessment of evidence in legal cases.122 In 
antitrust cases economics is the most relevant science to aid the assessment of evidence.123 
Economic models of competition are used to assess whether it is likely that that some 
particular behavior restrict competition or whether it is likely that the market outcome is the 
result of some illegal anticompetitive behavior.           
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the determination of the legal rule and 
the assessment of evidence. Assume that there is an exclusivity agreement that is under 
antitrust scrutiny. Let us, for simplicity, say that the statutory law states that agreements that 
restrict competition to the detriment of consumers are prohibited. In principle, the legality of 
the agreement could be assessed fully by legal method. The relevant sources of law and the 
principles of legal reasoning would then be used to construct a rule regulating the particular 
exclusivity agreement in question. Former legal decisions are used as precedence, and 
principles of reasoning, like the use of analogy, can be used to either argue for a rule that 
prohibits the exclusivity agreement in question or that the agreement falls outside the 
prohibition. On the other side, one could approach the legality of the exclusivity agreement by 
assessing evidence. Economic analysis would then be used to assess whether the agreement is 
likely to restrict competition to the detriment of consumers.  
Which method should be used is a question of whether one should consider the law as 
a standard or whether there is a specific rule that regulates the agreement in question. After 
reading a court decision or opening a textbook on antitrust law of the US or EU jurisdictions, 
it is soon apparent that it is not clear whether the legal status of various activities has been 
assessed according to the method of law, as an assessment of facts against a standard, or a 
combination of both. This is not unique to antitrust. In almost all areas of law, and most 
jurisdictions, former legal decisions and other authoritative statements, Supreme Court 
decisions in particular, are relevant sources for assessing the law. A former decision, 
however, is just the application of law on the facts in an earlier case. The question is, then, to 
what extent the factual circumstances of this former case should be turned into case law. 
The choice between rules and standards and the choice of the level of precision of 
rules are topics that are suitable to be studied by decision theory according to the rationality 
                                                 
122 A broad and interdisciplinary survey of the use of forensic evidence can be found in Reference Manual on 
Scientific Evidence published by Federal Judicial Center (2000).    
123 See Schinkel (2008) for a survey of the use of forensic economics in competition law analysis.   
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criteria. These are topics that will be discussed in Chapter Four. When the rule is decided, the 
assessment of facts can be studied by evidence-based decision theory according to the 
rationality criteria. This will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
Since model based-inference, and, in particular, the use of economic models is so 
important in antitrust analysis, Chapter Six is devoted to rationality in the assessment of 
economic models in antitrust analysis.     
The remainder of this chapter compromises a description of the theory of rational 
decisions and how this theory is to be applied to yield a rational antitrust analysis. The 
relation between rational antitrust analysis and actual antitrust analysis is briefly discussed. 
This will serve as an introduction to the theory that will guide the assessment of rationality of 
antitrust analysis in the remainder of this study. It will also offer grounds for a conclusion as 
to whether rationality can and should guide antitrust analysis.   
3.3 What is a rational antitrust analysis?  
3.3.1 Antitrust analysis and the assumptions of rationality 
The framework for rational decision making 
Antitrust analysis can be considered rational if it is performed as it would have been 
performed by a rational decision maker. A rational decision means that the decision maker 
follows some basic principles that are considered rational. In a world of risk and 
uncertainty,124 this includes adapting to uncertainty in a rational way. For the purposes of this 
study, it is not necessary to dig deep into the details of the mathematical axioms of rational 
behavior. Nevertheless, some description is necessary. For a decision to be rational, it must be 
in accordance with some axioms. Axioms are premises that cannot be deductively proved and 
can be considered as basic assumptions that must be assessed on their reasonableness and 
empirical support alone. Today’s axiomatic approach to decision theory is based on, inter alia, 
Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Savage 
(1954).125 Before discussing the axioms, the framework the axioms of rationality are assumed 
to operate within is briefly described. 
                                                 
124 Some decision theory texts distinguish between risk and uncertainty originating from Knight (1921). Decision 
under risk is reserved to those situations where probabilities are available and the term uncertainty is reserved for 
the situations when probabilities are not available. The latter is also referred to as decisions under ignorance. 
Uncertainty is, by others, applied as a term covering both risk and ignorance. In this study, uncertainty and risk 
will be used interchangeable. See Binmore (2009) p 35 f. and Peterson (2009) p. 4 f.   
125 Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p. 11 f. describes the axioms of rationality systematically and in more detail and 
has served as inspiration for the description in this text. See also Gilboa (2009) p. 49 f., Hargreaves-Heap and 
Varoufakis (2004) p. 8 and Varian (1992) p. 95 f and 173 f. 
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For simplicity, discrete variables will be used to illustrate the framework for rational 
decisions. The framework for real world decisions, like the decision on how much to eat or 
what price to charge, is often continuous. This study mostly operates with discrete decisions, 
such as deciding violation or non-violation of the antitrust laws. The framework described can 
easily be adapted to a continuous framework, and the same principles will apply.  
The framework for discrete rational decisions assumes that there are m possible 
actions a1,a2,…,am. The decision is about choosing between those possible actions. The 
outcome of an action depends on the state of the world. The realization of the different states 
of the world can be assigned a probability. Thus, there is a risk involved. The possible states 
of the world are assumed to be R1,R2,…,Rn, and they occur with respective probabilities 
p1,p2,…,pn, where p1=p(R1), p2=p(R2),…, pn=p(Rn). The different actions might have different 
outcomes under different states of the world. A typical example to illustrate decision under 
risk is that carrying an umbrella has different consequences under different weather 
conditions. It is a hassle to carry in nice weather, but a blessing in bad weather. In this simple 
example, a1 can be interpreted as leaving the umbrella home, while a2 is bringing it. R1 is the 
state of nice weather, while R2 is the state of bad weather.     
The probabilities of the different states of the world must satisfy the axioms of 
probability derived by Kolmogorov (1950)126. The axioms of probability can briefly be 
described as follows.127 Assume that R1,R2,R3,…,Rn are mutually exclusive states and include 
all possible states. Then 
 
p(Ri)≥0 the probability of a state must be equal or larger than zero   
p(Ri෽Rj)=p(Ri)+p(Rj) the probability of at least one of two mutually exclusive states is the 
sum of their probabilities (i≠j) 
∑i p(Ri)=1 the probability that at least one of all possible states occurs is one 
 
                                                 
126 Published in German in 1933. There are other axiomatic systems that represent uncertainty, see for instance 
Halpern (2003) p. 11 f. For example is it possible to build an axiomatic system not based on exact probability 
measures but on relative terms such as “A is more probable than B” without specifying the exact probabilities for 
A and B. However, the mainstream decision theory is based on the Kolmogorov axiomatic system. Decision 
theories based of other representations of uncertainty has not been developed to a stage that makes it practically 
suitable to be used as a basis for this study. The issue of rational decision rules when exact probabilities are not 
available will be returned to below.      
127 See for instance Wasserman (2003) p. 3 f. for a more detailed description of the axioms of probabilities. 
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Let us now say that two events, A and B, are not mutually exclusive. For instance, let 
A={R1,…,Rk} and B={Rk,…,Rn}. A and B have Rk in common. If the state Rk is realized, 




p(A෼B) is the probability that both A and B are realized simultaneously. This rule is intuitive.  
If p(A෼B) is not deducted from the sum of the probabilities of A and B, it would be counted 
twice. Thus, one of them must be deducted. In our example, p(A෼B)=Rk and is included two 
times in p(A)+P(B). Thus, in the probability of either A or B, which is P(A෽B), p(A෼B)=Rk,  
must be deducted from p(A)+P(B).     




This is intuitive since the probability that A happens given that B happens is the share of 
possible states in which both A and B happen as a share of all the possible states in which B 
happens.      
Furthermore, two events are independent if p(A|B)=p(A). This is also intuitive. If A 
and B are independent, then the knowledge of B does not give information on the probability 
of A. Independence implies that p(A෼B)=p(A)p(B) given the definition of conditional 
probabilities above.  
The framework for rational decisions also assumes that a person’s assessment of the 
outcome of an action must be state-independent. This means that the preference of the 
alternative actions in different states can be assessed before taking the decision and is 
independent of which action was actually taken. If the preference of an action is not known 
before making it, it is difficult to make a rational decision. This assumption means that the 
decision itself cannot affect the desirability of that decision. It would be meaningless to assess 
rational decisions if a decision is preferred because it is taken. If you prefer an apple in the 
choice between an apple and orange because the apple was what you chose, it is impossible to 
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meaningfully assess what the rational choice should be before the choice is made. It might be 
that this assumption conflicts with reality. Cognitive biases may, in practice, work in such a 
way that people, after a choice is made, become more convinced that the choice actually taken 
was the right one. Cognitive biases will be discussed below. However, for a normative ex ante 
assessment of what decision is rational, it would be difficult to take into account that an action 
is preferred because it was chosen. In the extreme, that would make any choice rational.       
The basic axioms for rational decisions under risk and uncertainty  
Now the framework for rational decision making is established, and the axioms of rational 
behavior can be returned to.  
The completeness axiom of rationality requires that all possible actions can be ranked 
against each other, and that the decision maker takes all alternatives into account when 
deciding. The reasonableness of this assumption can be questioned. How often are all possible 
alternatives known when making a decision? However, at least for small delineated decisions 
problems, this axiom seems reasonable. In an antitrust analysis context, the completeness 
axiom of rationality means that the decision maker must be able to rank all possible antitrust 
decisions in a given case. 
Transitivity is another basic axiom. Transitivity means that the decision maker is 
consistent in the ranking of alternatives. In other words, if a1 is preferred to a2, and a2 is 
preferred to a3, then a1 is preferred to a3.128 Transitivity is important. We could earn infinite 
money exploiting a person that violates this principle in his preferences. Assume that Peter 
prefers apples to bananas and bananas to oranges. Transitivity means that Peter prefers apples 
to oranges. Assume, otherwise, that oranges are preferred to apples. Assume that Peter holds a 
banana. Then, we could sell him an apple for the banana and some additional money. Peter 
then possesses an apple. We would possess the banana and the additional money. We could 
then sell him an orange for the apple and some additional money. Now, Peter possesses the 
orange, which he would exchange for the banana we hold and some additional money. We are 
back to the start, only we are richer and Peter is poorer. We could repeat these transactions 
and get infinite rich (assuming an infinitely rich Peter). In an antitrust analysis context, the 
transitivity axiom means that if a1 to a3 are possible antitrust decisions and a1 is preferred to a2 
and a2 is preferred to a3, then a1 is preferred to a3. 
                                                 
128 In mathematical terms this means that if a1๎a2 and a2๎a3, then a1๎a3. 
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Another axiom is the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. This axiom 
assumes that if a1 is preferred to a2, then choosing a1 with probability α and a third action, a3, 
with probability 1-α, is preferred to choosing a2 with probability α, and the third action a3 with 
probability 1-α. Briefly: if a1 is preferred to a2, then αa1+(1-α)a3 is preferred to αa2+(1-α)a3 for 
0<α≤1.129 This axiom of independence ensures that two decisions can be compared only on 
those components that make them different.  
Below possible reasons why the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives is 
violated in practice are discussed. However, it seems reasonable to assume that if a third 
alternative is truly irrelevant in the choice between two decisions alternatives it would be 
rational to not take this irrelevant alternative into account in a lottery involving the possibility 
of this third alternative. If, for instance, the action of choosing an apple is preferred to the 
action of choosing an orange and there is a possible third action involving not getting 
anything at all, then introducing the possibility of a positive probability of getting nothing at 
all does not change the ranking between the apple and the orange. In antitrust, this means that 
if two decisions are ranked in a particular order then introducing the possibility of a third 
decision does not change the ranking of the two. If, for instance, ordering “cease and desist” 
is preferred to an approval decision, then introducing the possibility of a third decision, let us 
say some kind of approval with commitments decision, does not change the ranking between 
the “cease and desist” order and the approval. However, this relies on the assumption that a 
commitment decision is an irrelevant alternative, which it might not be from a legal 
perspective. Introducing a possibility of commitment might be argued to change the ranking 
between “cease and desist” and approval because imposing commitments is a possible 
alternative. The legal argument would be that the possibility of commitments is more likely to 
make a “cease and desist” order less proportional. This might be true, but if this is the case 
then the actions available are not really “cease and desist” and approval, but “cease and 
desist” and approval, given that a commitment decision is possible. The possibility of 
commitments is then no longer an irrelevant alternative. Thus, this would not be a criticism of 
the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, but a criticism against considering 
commitment as an independent alternative.          
The Archimedean axiom assumes that if a1 is preferred to a3, and a3 is preferred to a2, 
which means that a3 is ranked between a1 and a2, then there exist lotteries that mix a1 and a2, 
that are both worse and better than a3. That means that there exist an 0<α<1 and a 0<β<1 such 
                                                 
129 Or, in shorter terms: if a1๎a2, then αa1+(1-α)a3๎αa2+(1-α)a3 for 0<α≤1. 
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that αa1+(1-α)a2 is preferred to a3, and a3 is preferred to βa1+(1-β)a2.130 This means, simplified, 
that no action is so bad or good that, no matter how small its probability, it will “dominate” 
the preference order. The Archimedean axiom is also referred to as the axiom of continuity. It 
is easy to see that this axiom could likely be violated in some circumstances. Let say that 
choosing an apple is preferred to choosing an orange, and they are both better than an action 
involving a certain death. The Archimedean axiom implies that there exists some lottery 
involving a positive probability of an apple and a positive probability (although small) of the 
action involving a certain death that is still better than the orange. Some would probably 
violate this axiom by choosing the orange action no matter how small the possibility of death 
is, as long as it is positive. The minimal extra benefit of getting the more preferred apple is 
not worth the risk of death, no matter how small this risk is. The Archimedean axiom is more 
of a technical nature needed for the some of the implications of the theory of rational 
decisions (discussed further below). However, as long as we operate in delineated decision 
situations not involving possible actions with extreme “downturns”, the satisfaction of the 
axiom is probably a harmless assumption. In the delineated framework of antitrust analysis, 
there are normally no available actions involving extreme “downturns” that will dominate any 
decisions involving the possibility of this “downturn”. Thus, the satisfaction of the 
Archimedean axiom seems to be a harmless assumption for rationality in the context of 
antitrust analysis.                 
Axioms of rational decisions when probabilities are subjective  
So far, the probabilities for the different states of the world have been assumed to be 
objective. This means that the probabilities of the different states of the world have been 
considered to be objective and equal for all decision makers. What if there are no objective 
probabilities for the different states, but only a person’s own more or less qualified subjective 
probability assessments? Subjective assessments might differ from person to person. You will 
probably not have the exact same assessment of the probability of nice weather tomorrow as 
the person in your neighboring office. Similarly, in an antitrust analysis context, one person’s 
assessment of the probability of harmfulness of some conduct might differ substantially from 
another person’s assessment. Is it possible to construct some plausible axioms of rationality 
taking into account that different decision makers only have subjective assessments of the 
                                                 
130 In mathematical terms: if a1๎a3 and a1๎a3๎a2, then there exist an 0<α<1 and a 0<β<1 such that αa1+(1-α)a2๎a3  
and a3๎βa1+(1-β)a2. 
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probabilities of the different states? Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), and Savage (1954) 
explored and developed such axioms.  
Savage’s approach is the usual foundation for today’s analysis of rational decisions 
under uncertainty. Savage constructed some axioms for rational behavior under such 
subjective probability beliefs. It is rather complicated to go through Savage’s axioms, and this 
is beyond the scope of this study. They are partly modifications and further developments of 
the above stated axioms based on Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The mathematics 
involved will not be presented here.131 Nevertheless, some can be said about the requirement 
for rationality under subjective probability assessments.  
For decisions to be considered rational under subjective probability assessment, it is 
assumed that a rational decision maker is coherent concerning his subjective beliefs of the 
probabilities. The requirement of coherence was pointed out by de Finetti (1937). Coherence 
means that the subjective beliefs satisfy the basic laws of probability stated above. Coherence 
of subjective probabilistic assessment seems to be a reasonable assumption on rational 
decision making under uncertainty. A consequence of lack of coherence can be illustrated by 
so-called Dutch Books. A bookmaker must avoid Dutch Books to prevent a player to exploit 
incoherence to earn an infinite amount of money. To simplify, let us say that the betting is on 
a horse race game involving only two horses. The player can play on which horse will win. 
Let say that the bookmaker offers the following odds 1:4 and 7:3 on horse 1 and horse 2, 
respectively.132  This means that he takes the price 0.2 to pay out 1 if horse one wins 
according to the first bet. In the second bet, he takes the price 0.7 to pay out 1 if horse 2 wins. 
The player could bet on horse 1 in the first bet and horse 2 in the second bet. This would cost 
0.9 and give a sure payment of 1. The bets that guarantee a sure payoff can be illustrated by a 
matrix: 
 
Figure 3.1: betting on a horse raise game 
 
 Payoff if horse 1 wins Payoff if horse 2 wins 
Bet 1 0.8 -0.2 
Bet 2 -0.7 0.3 
Sum (gain) 0.1 0.1 
 
Thus, the player can construct a sure win by betting on horse 1 in the first bet and betting on 
horse 2 in the second bet. The reason for this is incoherence. In the first bet, the bookmaker 
                                                 
131 See for instance Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p. 81 f. 
132 The numerical example is based on Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p. 17 
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indirectly assigns a probability of 0.2 to that horse 1 wins, while in the second bet the 
bookmaker assigns a probability of 0.3 that horse 1 wins. The player can exploit this to a sure 
win. In antitrust analysis, coherence means the antitrust decision maker must be coherent in 
his assessment of probabilities. If the decision maker, for instance, believes that the 
probability that some conduct has anticompetitive effects is 60 percent, then the probability 
that the same conduct does not has anticompetitive effects must be 40 percent.     
Another crucial aspect of rationality in the presence of subjective probability 
assessments is that the decision maker updates his belief according to the correct rules of 
probability. In fact, this follows from the assumption of coherence since if the decision maker 
does not update his beliefs according to the rules of probability the resulting probabilities will 
not be coherent. This means that the decision maker must update according to Bayes’ rule 
when the decision maker receives information relevant for assessing the probability. Assume 
e is a piece of evidence received before making a decision. From the definitions of probability 
above, remember that p(A|e)=P(A෼e)/P(e). Using this rule one more time, which means using 
p(e|A)=p(A෼e)/p(A), gives us p(A|e)=p(e|A)p(A)/P(e). The last equation is Bayes’ rule and 
shows how evidence should update the probability assessment of A according to the rules of 
probability. In antitrust analysis, this means that evidence must be assessed according to the 
rules of probability to reach rational antitrust decisions.          
Axioms of rationality and rational antitrust decisions  
Rational antitrust analysis is the analysis made by a rational decision maker to obtain a 
rational antitrust decision. This means that the antitrust decision must satisfy the basic axioms 
of rationality described above. However, instead of trying to apply the axioms directly on 
antitrust decisions, it is better to apply the principle of maximization of expected utility which 
is equivalent to adhering to the axioms stated above. This will be the topic in the following 
subchapter.                
3.3.2 Expected utility maximization and rational antitrust analysis  
Rationality and expected utility maximization  
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) showed that if preferences satisfy the rationality 
axioms outlined above, this is the same as if preferences can be represented by a utility 
function and the rational choice is the choice that maximizes expected utility. This means that 
if a1 is preferred to a2, then there is a utility function U(.) such that U(a1)≥U(a2) with strict 
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inequality if  a1 is strictly preferred to a2.133 Furthermore, the correct utility measure of some 
action where the outcome is uncertain is the expected utility. This means, for instance, that if 
action a1 either generates utility U1(a1) with probability p1 or utility U2(a1) with probability 
p2=1-p1, then the correct utility measure of action a1 is the expected utility given by 
p1U1(a1)+p2U2(a1). 
 Thus, a rational decision under uncertainty can be modeled as the decision that 
maximizes expected utility. An intuitive explanation for this is that a decision that maximizes 
expected utility gives the highest utility in the long run.134 The proof in von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) was based on objective probabilities. Savage (1954) showed that the 
same applies under subjective probabilities satisfying the assumptions discussed above.  
If Ui(ak) is the utility of action k, given that the state of the world is i and the 
probability that the world will be in state i is pi, the expected utility of deciding action k can 




The rational decision is the one that makes EU(ak) highest. This can be written as  
 
d*=arg maxk EU(ak).  
 
The next question that arises is how to derive and measure the probabilities and the 
utility measures necessary to make a rational decision. For now, we can think of the 
probabilities as given and the utility as some measure that makes it possible to cardinally rank 
decision alternatives quantitatively. Before elaborating on the problem of deriving and 
measuring probabilities and utilities, the principle of maximization of utility applied to 
antitrust analysis is described.    
Expected utility maximization in antitrust analysis  
In the legal context of antitrust analysis, one can think of two major mutually exclusive 
decisions resulting from the antitrust analysis. These two decisions are either that the law is 
violated or not violated. In reality, there is a variety of possible antitrust decisions, and even a 
continuum of possible decisions. If a decision involves an establishment of violation and the 
                                                 
133 In other words: if a1๐a2 then U(a1)≥U(a2) and if a1๎a2 then U(a1)>U(a2). 
134 This intuition, however, will be of little help in unique decision problems that are not repeated. 
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setting of a fine, the continuum of possible sizes of the fine creates a continuum of possible 
decisions. Furthermore, a settlement, possibly including commitments, is a possible 
alternative to deciding violation. A decision of not violation may also be imprecise and 
involve many decisions. This involves explicit statements that there was not a violation, as 
well as statements that a violation is not proven according to the standard of proof. However, 
for simplicity, this study will illustrate the rational antitrust decision by assuming two 
mutually exclusive decisions: violation and not violation. The principles are the same with a 
wider range of possible decisions. Thus, the decision framework can be written as   
 
aV: deciding violation of law 
 
aNV: deciding that the law is not violated 
 
 
The corresponding utilities are 
 
UV(aV): utility of deciding violation of law given that the law was violated 
 
UNV(aV): utility of deciding violation given that the law was not violated  
 
UV(aNV): utility of deciding not violation of law given that he law was violated 
 





pV: probability that the law was violated  
 
pNV: probability that the law was not violated 
 
 
The uncertainty for the decision maker is that he does not know for sure if the law was 
violated or not. However, pV is the probability that the law was violated and pNV=1-pV is the 
probability that the law was not violated. For now, those probabilities are given. Later, 
however, the analysis will take into account evidence gathering and that the probability of 
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violation will be affected by the assessment of evidence. Deciding violation is rational if 
EU(aV)>EU(aNV).135 
3.3.3 From expected utility maximization to expected loss minimization 
Expected utility maximization is the normal way to represent rational decisions. However, in 
many contexts, and in particular legal contexts expected loss minimization, also figures as a 
decision rule. Maximizing expected utility and minimizing expected loss is the same 
principle, although minimization of the expected loss of wrongful decisions sometimes has a 
more intuitive appeal, especially in the legal context. Since this study will mostly operate with 
the minimization of expected loss as the rational decision rule, it will be described how the 
maximization of expected utility decision rule can easily be transformed into a minimizing 














LV=UNV(aNV)-UNV(aV) is the loss of wrongfully making the decision that the law was 
violated, aV. This is the forgone utility of making the right 
decision of non-violation minus the utility of making the wrong 
decision as such. If it is decided that the law was violated, the 
probability of this error is (1-pV). This error is called a type-1 
                                                 
135 Strictly speaking deciding violation will be rational if and only if  EU(aV)≥EU(NV). However we will operate 
with the assumption that if the expected utility of deciding violation and not violation is equal, then deciding not 
violation is decided.   
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error, which, in legal terms, means wrongful conviction.136   
 
LNV=UV(aV)-UV(aNV) is the loss of wrongfully deciding that the law was not violated, 
dNV. This is the forgone utility of making the right decision of 
violation minus the utility of making the wrong decision as such. 
If it is decided that the law was not violated, the probability of 
this error is pV. This error is called type-2 error, which, in legal 
terms, means a wrongful acquittal.137   
 
 Thus, the rational decision problem boils down to minimizing the expected loss of a 
wrongful decision. Violation of law should be decided if ELV<ELNV, which is when (1-
pV)LV<pVLNV. The expected loss, given that the decision that minimizes expected loss is 




This result is quite amazing. All we need to do to make a rational decision is to choose the 
action that minimizes expected loss. It is then of course assumed that the assessments of 
probabilities are coherent. It might be rational to make a decision based on less probable facts 
if the loss of a wrongful decision is less than the loss of a wrongful decision based the more 
probable facts. Another way to say this is that the higher the loss associated with a wrongful 
decision in one direction the more certain we must be that the facts favor this decision.138 This 
is the scientific basis for the well-known rule of “erring on the right side”. The expected loss 
from type-1 error must be compared to the expected loss of type-2 error, and the alternative 
with the lowest expected loss should be chosen.  
                                                 
136 In statistics a type 1-error is to wrongfully reject a hypothesis. Transferred to the legal environment this 
means wrongfully reject a hypothesis of innocence.   
137 In statistics a type 2-error is to wrongfully accept a hypothesis. Transferred to the legal environment this 
means wrongfully accept a hypothesis of innocence. 
138 (1-pV)LV<pVLNV is the same as (1-pV)/pV<LNV/LV, which becomes pV/(1-pV)>LV/LNV. Thus, if, for instance, 
the loss of wrongfully deciding violations is 10 times higher than wrongfully deciding not violation, then the 
probability of deciding violation must be more than 10 times higher than the probability for not violation for it to 
be rational to decide violation.  
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3.4 Expected loss minimization in antitrust analysis  
3.4.1 Rational determination of antitrust rules 
Now we can start to approach decision problems relevant for the various components of 
antitrust analysis. Before it is possible to decide violation or not violation, the rule that is 
either violated and not violated must be determined. Assume we are deciding between what 
kind of rule is best for making rational antitrust decisions: rule 1 or rule 2. The costs 
associated with the formulation and the application of the alternative two rules are C1 and C2, 
respectively. Let ELR1 and ELR2 be the expected loss of the two rules respectively. This is 
the accumulated type-1 and type-2 errors that is associated with the application of the 




Thus, two factors are relevant for deciding between rules: the expected loss and the 
formulation and application cost. The expected loss of a rule is dependent on both the type-1 
errors and type-2 errors associated with the rule. Both losses must be taken into account. A 
rule associated with higher expected losses can be tolerated if formulation and application 
costs are sufficiently lower.140 The application of this principle in the determination of 
rational antitrust rules will be the main topic in Chapter Four.   
3.4.2 Expected loss minimization and evidence assessment  
The rule is now taken as given. The question then becomes how to minimize expected losses 
of an antitrust decision taking into account the possibility of gathering evidence that can be 
used to update the probability assessments as to whether there was a violation or not.  
Assume that Ē is the evidence that is gathered. Ē is a subset of the potential amount of 
evidence, Ētot. The outcome of gathering Ē is unknown before it is observed. If we, for 
instance, search for some communication in an antitrust conspiracy case, we might not find 
such evidence. Both finding and not finding such evidence are outcomes of Ē. Assume that e 
is the outcome of gathering evidence Ē. If e is the outcome of Ē, then the probability of 
                                                 
139 This could have been modeled mathematically by using a model of how often the errors are likely to occur. A 
proper model would involve more advanced calculus. This will not be necessary for the general level of analysis 
performed here.  
140 Kaplow (1992) and Kaplow (2000) study the optimal design of rules in general. Posner (2011), Chapter 20, 
covers, inter alia, rules versus standards. Easterbrook (1984), Beckner and Salop (1999) and Christansen et al. 
(2006) study the optimal design of antitrust rules. This literature will be scrutinized in detail in Chapter Four 
below.  
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violation updates to become pV(e). pV(Ē) is the ex-ante probability of violation if Ē is 
gathered, which is stochastic before we know what e actually materializes. 
The value of gathering evidence is how much it reduces the expected loss of the 
decision. Assume that EL is the expected loss of an optimal decision when not gathering 




The value of gathering evidence, Ē, can then be measured as EL-EL(Ē), which is the 
decision value of  gathering evidence.141 It can be shown that a priori, taking into account free 
evidence will always reduce the expected loss of a decision.142  
 Evidence is often costly to gather and assess. These costs can be described by a cost 
function, c(Ē). Economic considerations should guide the evidence gathering process. Both 
what evidence should be gathered and the sequence in which the evidence is gathered should 








The idea behind the formula above is simple, though it might appear complicated. There are 
two minimization operations. Given that some evidence, e, is gathered, the rational decision 
maker will minimize expected loss. This means deciding aV if (1-pV(e))LV<pV(e)LNV, and aNV 
otherwise. However, before the evidence is gathered, the rational decision maker has to 
“average” over all possible outcomes of Ē by taking the expectation when deciding to gather 
the evidence or not. This is the EĒ part. The MinĒ refers to the decision maker having to 
optimize the evidence gathering taking the cost of gathering evidence into account. The 
evidence gathering must be optimized with both regard to the amount of evidence and the 
sequence by which evidence is gathered. The question is whether the decision value of 
gathering some evidence exceeds the cost. As said by Beckner and Salop (1999): “the court 
                                                 
141 See Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p. 259 f. for a survey of the literature.   
142 Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961). 
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first should gather information that is least expensive, resolves the most certainty, and is most 
likely to affect its decision”. Dynamic programming can, in principle, be used to solve the 
optimization problem. In practice, we have to rely on heuristic methods and a dialectical 
process of competing agents presenting evidence that benefits their case. This will be 
elaborated further upon in Chapter Five.143,144  
3.4.3 Expected loss minimization and model-based inferences   
Implicitly we always use models when analyzing a decision problem. A model says 
something about the structural links and connection between variables, including causality. In 
models, some explanatory variables are usually used to explain a response variable. In 
antitrust analysis, market structure, for example, is used in some models to explain a firm’s 
pricing. In some economic competition models, it is a sure consequence that an increase in 
market concentration results in increased prices.145 Models can be more or less informative 
based on their power to explain and predict. Decisions can be improved by explicitly taking 
into account the uncertainty associated with the models used in the decision making. Let 
pV(e|M) be the probability of violation given evidence e and that model M is “true”, and p(M) 
the probability that model M is the “true” model.146    
When taking the uncertainty of the models into account, the decision problem can be 
described as   
 
 




EM(1-pV(Ē|M))LV=ƩM(1-pV(Ē|M))p(M)LV and EMpV(Ē|M)LNV=ƩMpV(Ē|M)p(M)LNV. 
                                                 
143 See Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p 221 f. for a general framework on how this maximization problem can be 
solved. Posner (2011), Chapter 22, gives a general law and economics approach. Beckner and Salop (1999), 
Kerber et al. (2008). and Kretschmer (2011b) use this approach in antitrust contexts. The theory will be 
described in more detail in Chapter Five.  
144 With a prefixed standard of proof set to be α, the evidence assessment becomes a restrained maximization 
problem as follows: Minimize  EĒ((1-pV(Ē))LV)I(pV(Ē)>α)+pV(Ē)LNVI(pV(Ē)≤α)+c(Ē)) where I(pV(e)>α)=1 if 
pV(e)>α and 0 else, and I(pV(e)≤α)=1 if pV(e)≤α and 0 else. This is more realistic in the legal context as the 
standard of is given exogenously dependently on the type of the case. This maximization problem will be 
discussed further below in Chapter Five. 
145 This will, for instance, apply under so-called Cournot quantity competition, where an increased concentration 
is not associated with lower marginal costs. Economic models will be described further in Chapter Six.   
146 Note that models might also be involved in the assessment of the losses LV and LNV. Incorporating model 
uncertainty in the assessment of such losses raises issues of state dependence, which substantially complicates 
the analysis. The choice of model will then affect the utility and losses. Thus, it is chosen not to introduce this 
complication in this study. Rather, it is assumed that the consequence of model uncertainty is fully captured in 
the model dependent probabilities.      
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Thus, a rational assessment involves giving weight to the model-based inferences based 
on the model probabilities. EM(x) is the expected value of x, where the x’s “predicted” by the 
various models are “averaged” over all models weighted according to their probability. The 
explicit assessment of model uncertainty is essential for rational model-based inferences in 
decision making. This is particularly relevant when it comes to antitrust analysis because the 
use of economic models has an important role for inferences in antitrust analysis. Rationality 
in the assessment of economic models is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
3.5 How to deal with unavailable and subjective probabilities 
In the decision-theoretic analysis of antitrust analysis presented above, it was assumed that the 
probability of violation was available. This raises two questions regarding the application of 
decision theory to antitrust analysis. Firstly, what shall we do if we don’t have any precise 
probabilities? Can the theory of rational decisions based on the availability of precise 
probabilities still be useful or must the rational decisions be based on other principles? 
Secondly, are there any objective probability measures? Can there be any objective rational 
antitrust decisions if the probabilities are subjective? These questions are dealt with in turn in 
this subchapter.  
3.5.1 The absence of precise probabilities  
Savage (1954) stressed that his analysis only applies to “small worlds” (i.e. delineated 
environments). In “big worlds” the available actions, the possible states of the world or at 
least the probabilities of the different states of the world and the consequences of actions are 
unknown. In the assessment of evidence, the amount of potential evidence and the a priori 
impact of evidence on probabilities violation may be unknown. A decision rule based on 
maximization of expected utility assuming the presence of precise probabilities may simply 
not be an available method of making decisions. A comprehensive and debated question is 
how rational decisions should be made under such circumstances.  
Principles for rational decisions under ignorance, which means decisions when precise 
probabilities are not available, have been proposed.147  Some principles are obvious and some 
are less obvious. One obvious principle is the principle of dominance. If there, for instance, is 
a dominating action, which is an action that is sure to give a better outcome whatever state of 
the world, it is rational to decide upon this action. Conversely, an action that is dominated, 
                                                 
147 See for instance Halpern (2003) p. 166 f., Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p. 112 f. and Bermúdez (2009) p. 25. 
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which is an action associated with a worse outcome than another available action no matter 
the state, should not be decided. If we know, for instance, that the outcome of deciding not 
violation will yield a better outcome even if we could say with certainty that there actually 
was a violation, then deciding not violation is apparently rational. This principle does not 
seem to be sufficient as a general decision rule as the presence of dominating actions is 
probably more the exception than the rule, except for those who are general opponents of 
antitrust law and always would want to decide not violation.      
An optimal decision can usually not be picked from the dominance criterion alone. 
Another candidate for a decision principle under ignorance is the minimax principle. The 
minimax principle is very conservative and means to choose the action that minimize the 
maximal possible loss whatever the state. If, for instance, the loss of wrongfully deciding 
violation is bigger than wrongfully deciding not violation, and there is some chance of 
wrongfully deciding violation, then we should decide not violation. If the minimax principle 
governed the decision, there would be no need to gather evidence. We just have to look for 
the action with the least error in case of wrongful decision and decide upon this decision. As 
with the dominance criterion, this rule doesn’t seem to be very practicable as a general rule  
A third possible candidate decision principle is the minimum regret principle. 
According to this principle, we should choose whatever decision we would regret least if we 
were wrong. If, for instance, we would regret more if we decided violation when there 
actually had not been any violation than deciding not violation and then there actually had 
been a violation, we should decide not violation. In this context, where the loss of making a 
wrong decision is the potential for regret, the minimax and minimum regret principles 
coincide. This means that the minimum regret decision principle would be impracticable for 
the same reasons as stated for the minimax principle above. It can be mentioned that 
experiments148 seem to indicate that the minimum regret principle has some merits in 
descriptive decision theory, and therefore cannot be ignored in the study of actual decision 
making.  
Several models of generalized expected utility decision making have been 
developed.149 These are based on decision theories that relax the reliance of the axioms stated 
above. These modifications have at least two purposes. One purpose is to create decision 
theories more in line with actual decision making. Those modifications might improve the 
                                                 
148 See references and discussion in the in section on descriptive decision theories below.  
149 See Halpern (2003) p. 164 f.  
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decision theories in terms of explaining and predicting actual behavior.150  Descriptive 
decision theories take into account how people actually make decisions subject to, inter alia, 
cognitive biases.151 Such theories include prospect theory,152 Choquet expected utility 
theory,153 and maxmin expected utility theory154. These theories are not necessarily very 
useful as normative theories of rational decision making. A theory that might explain any 
decision as “rational” would not be a very useful guide what rational decisions are. 
Descriptive decision theory will be addressed further below. 
Another task for general expected utility decision models is to base the models on 
axiomatic principles of representing uncertainty other than the availability of precise 
probabilities.155 Our uncertainty representation could, for instance, be limited to a belief that 
violation is more probable than non-violation. The uncertainty representation could 
alternatively, for instance, be some belief that the probability of not violation is less than 30 
percent and that the corresponding probability of violation is larger than 70 percent. This is a 
promising field of research. A good normative theory of rational decision based on more 
imprecise representations of uncertainty would be very welcomed to be further developed into 
a method that is operational for a normative model of legal decision making, as more vague 
representations of uncertainty are more in line with the nature of legal decisions. However, 
such models are, to the author’s knowledge, not explored to a point where they are easy to 
apply in the context of legal decision making. This requires further research. Incorporating 
such theories into this study would mean contributing to this field of research, which is 
beyond both scope and aim of this study. 
Being left with a normative theory based on the presence of precise probabilities, the 
question then becomes whether this is such a strong assumption that it is useless as a 
normative theory for antitrust analysis. This would also mean that a large amount of existing 
research based on those assumptions, such as a substantial part of the law and economics 
research, would be effectively useless. There have been such allegations.156 Such allegation 
will not stop this study to be based on the theory of rationality assuming the presence of 
precise probabilities. Although a theory based on the presence of precise probabilities might 
work poorly as an operational guide to finding the specific rational decision in an actual case, 
                                                 
150 See for instance Gilboa (2009) p. 145 f. for a description of such behaviorally based decision theories.  
151 See Gilboa (2009) p. 145 f.  
152 See Gilboa (2009) p. 154 f. Developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
153 See Gilboa (2009) p. 145 f. Based on Schmeidler (1989). 
154 See Gilboa (2009) p. 160 f. Based on Schmeidler (1989). 
155 See Halpern (2003) p. 11  f. and p. 164 f. 
156 See, for instance, Allen (2003) and  Stein (2011).  
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the theory is still useful as a normative benchmark. A chief question of this study is whether 
the antitrust assessment principles and procedures are likely to facilitate rational decisions. If 
the antitrust assessment principles and procedures work well, they will facilitate decisions that 
converge towards rational decisions even where no one involved in the decision making 
procedure actually knows the precise probabilities.      
3.5.2 Dealing with subjective probabilities  
The problem of absence of precise probabilities was dealt with above. Unfortunately, there is 
another problem associated with applying probability measures in rational antitrust analysis. 
This is the problem of subjective probabilities. Although Savage (1954) elegantly proved that 
the principle of maximizing expected utility (and equivalently, minimizing expected loss) also 
applies for rational decisions based on subjective probabilities as long as those probabilities 
satisfy the rationality criteria, this does not help us if we are in search for objective rational 
decisions. If the probabilities applied in antitrust analysis are intrinsically subjective, without 
corresponding objective values, then the rationality of antitrust decisions would be subjective 
too.  What would appear a rational decision for one person would appear irrational for another 
person. There would not be any objective rational antitrust decisions. 
 The question is, then, whether there are any objective probability measures. Is there, 
given the evidence available, any objective true value for the probability of violation? At least 
in many cases, there will be some objective truth. The parties in a violation will often, but far 
from always, know if they violated the law or not. Parties in a price conspiracy might, for 
example, know very well if they agreed upon prices or not, and thus know if they violated the 
law. Parties in some complex vertical agreements, on the contrary, may not know if they 
violate the law or not. However, we are not interested in determining the objective truth with 
certainty in this context. We are interested in whether there is some objective way to assess 
the probability of violation given the presence of some evidence. The objectivity of 
knowledge is a complex, more general, epistemological question that is studied in the 
philosophy of decision theory and the philosophy of science in general.157  General 
philosophical epistemological issues are outside the scope of this study, though some 
arguments for assuming the existence of objective probabilities for antitrust violations are 
presented.  
                                                 
157 See, for instance, Achinstein (2005) p. 95 f. Gilboa (2009) p. 138 f. See also Posner (2008) for a practical 
discussion on epistemological issues in legal analysis.  
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By using Bayes’ rule described above, the probability of some hypothesis given some 
evidence, e, can be written as 
 
p(H|e)=p(e|H)p(H)/[p(e|H)p(H)+p(e|not H)p(not H)]. 
 
This means that the probability of a hypothesis given some evidence consists of two main 
components: the a priori probability that the hypothesis is true p(H),158 and the probability of 
the evidence given that the hypothesis is true or not true, p(e|H) or p(e|not H). The a priori 
probability is a person’s probability assessment of H before any evidence is collected, for 
instance, that some conduct has anticompetitive effects in violation of the antitrust law. The 
probability of evidence given that the hypothesis is true or not, is the probability that the 
evidence will be present given that the hypothesis is true or not, for instance, the probability 
of certain market characteristics given that some conduct has or has not had anticompetitive 
effects.  
 It might not be unreasonable to assume that the a priori probabilities are of a more 
subjective nature than the probability assessment of the evidence given the truthfulness of a 
hypothesis. Dependent on what school of economics you belong to, the a priori attitude 
towards the anticompetitive effects of certain vertical restraints might, for instance, differ 
substantially.159 It might also be subjective differences when it comes to the probability of 
some evidence given the truthfulness of a hypothesis, however, there appears to be a higher 
level of consensus on this issue. If we assume that two persons disagree on the a priori 
probability that some vertical restraint restricts competition, they might still agree upon 
whether evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that the vertical restraint restricts 
competition than the hypothesis that the vertical restraint does not restrict competition. Maybe 
some evidence is disputable, but, as more and more evidence is gathered, there will be more 
and more consensus. Besides, and maybe more importantly, there are established scientific 
methods to assess evidence’s consistency with a hypotheses. Rational inferences from 
evidence based on probability calculus are elaborated upon further in Chapter Five. Statistical 
models can be used to test hypotheses based on real world data. When this is used in the 
context of economic models this is referred to as econometrics. The use of statistical and 
econometrical methods to improve antitrust analysis will be a topic in Chapter Six.  
                                                 
158 The probability that H is not true, p(not H), also figures in the model, but by the laws of probability p(not H) 
equals 1-p(H). 
159 This will elaborate on in Chapter Six. 
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 Therefore, the main problem related to subjective probabilities is the subjectivity of 
the a priori probabilities. However, it can be argued that the subjectivity of a priori 
assessments is a limited problem for obtaining objective probabilities. Firstly, as more and 
more evidence is gathered, the impact of the a priori assessment of the probabilities will be 
less and less.160 Correspondingly, the impact of evidence becomes larger and larger. 
Secondly, although the a priori probabilities might be subjective, there may be more or less 
objective consensus to fix the a priori probability as a matter of law. The presumption of 
innocence used in criminal law illustrates this. This can be illustrated by an example outside 
antitrust law. Although our a priori assessment of the probability of the guiltiness of some 
serial robber might differ from person to person, we might still agree upon the use of the 
presumption of innocence when his case is tried in the court of law. As described in more 
detail in the subsequent chapters of this study, antitrust is filled with presumptions rules that, 
to some extent, fix the priors in the application of the law.  
 Thus, to conclude this subchapter, subjective probabilities might constitute a barrier in 
the pursuit of an objective rational antitrust analysis. However, this problem is mitigated by 
evidence gathering and by pursuing objective methods for assessing evidence. This means, 
more precisely, to rationally adhering to the rules of probability calculus and, more generally, 
adhering to objective scientific methods in assessing evidence. The question of rational 
evidence assessment in will be returned to in Chapter Five, and the use of objective scientific 
methods in the assessment of economic models will be returned to in Chapter Six.      
3.6 What is the utility and loss from an antitrust decision?  
The rational decision maker maximizes expected utility or, equivalently, minimizes expected 
loss. Thus, the rational decision depends on the decision maker’s measure of utility (which is 
also used to derive the loss of errors). This means that the rational decision depends on the 
decision maker’s preferences. If a rational antitrust decision is dependent on the personal 
preferences of the decision maker, then what is the point of pursuing rational antitrust 
decisions? The same decision might be irrational for someone else. An important question is, 
thus, whether there are some objective measures of the utility of an antitrust decision that can 
be made as an objective standard for assessing the rationality of antitrust analysis and the 
resulting decisions. 
                                                 
160 See Wasserman (2003) p. 181 f. One cannot say in general that the impact of priors will be eliminated as 
more evidence is gathered. The impact of priors becomes less, though.   
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3.6.1 Economic welfare and efficiency as an objective standard 
A natural candidate for guidance on some objective measure for the utility of antitrust 
decisions must be the purpose of the antitrust laws. The purpose of antitrust is a debated topic, 
as discussed in Chapter Two. However, most antitrust scholars would probably agree that 
promoting the competitive process to promote efficiency and economic welfare has some 
merits as the purpose of antitrust. Fortunately, efficiency and welfare are exactly the measures 
that economists use in the rational assessments of policies. Economic theory provides a 
framework to assess the effectiveness of policies and to assess the welfare properties of 
policies. Thus, the welfare measures established in microeconomics comprise a candidate for 
an objective measure of the utility and losses from antitrust decisions.  
Efficiency can, in general terms, be described as to not waste scarce resources. One 
concept of efficiency is Pareto-efficiency161 which means that no Pareto-improvements are 
possible. A Pareto-improvement is some action that makes at least one person better off 
without making anybody else worse off. This means that those that benefit from an action will 
benefit so much that they are able to compensate those who lose, keeping their utility as least 
as high as it was, and that this compensation is actually performed if required. Another 
concept of efficiency is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency means that potential 
Pareto-improvements are realized without necessarily compensating those who lose from the 
action. Economic welfare is normally considered improved if a potential Pareto-improvement 
is realized. This means that it is normally not a requirement for an action to be considered 
welfare improving that those that lose from the action are fully compensated as long as those 
who benefit do so more than those who lose.162 However, for some policy considerations, 
there are elements of compensation requirements. In EU antitrust law it is, for instance, 
normally assumed that consumers must be better off for the ability of some effective anti-
competitive practice to escape illegality.163  
Utility must be translated into monetary terms for welfare to be measured in money. 
People who lose utility from some action are assumed able to be compensated in monetary 
terms to stay at same utility level. The compensation required is a measure of the monetary 
                                                 
161 Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). 
162 When it comes to policy questions, this can be defended by the existence of other policies that distribute the 
surplus. If some policy makes the “cake” bigger despite some being worse off, other policies such as tax policies 
and subsidy policies can be used to redistribute the cake in the politically desirable way.  
163 As was discussed in the Chapter Two, the compensation as such might not be the main purpose of such 
requirements.  
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value of the utility loss. The same applies reverse with actions that increase utility.164 Welfare 
in a market context can be briefly described as the utility of consumption measured in money 
less the real resources spent on production, reflected by costs. Any action that increases this 
difference is welfare improving by realizing a potential Pareto-improvement. Thus, efficiency 
improvements increase welfare. A measure of welfare in the context of a market is the total 
economic surplus. The total economic surplus is the willingness to pay, reflected by demand, 
less total costs. This is an approximation to the exact measure of welfare determined by the 
potential compensation principle above.165  A measure of consumer welfare is the consumer 
surplus, which is the willingness to pay, reflected by the demand-curve, less the price paid by 
the consumer. The economic welfare concepts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
Remember from above that the optimal antitrust decision minimizes the expected loss 
of an erroneous decision. Finding violation of law minimizes expected loss if (1-
pV)LV<pVLNV.  
LV=UNV(aNV)-UNV(aV) is the loss due to wrongfully making the decision that the law 
was violated, aV. This is the forgone utility of making the right decision of not violation less 
the utility of making the wrong decision as such. The forgone utility from not making the 
right decision of not violation is that some lawful presumably welfare-improving conduct is 
discouraged, both in the individual case and in the future through legal precedence. Note that 
some might say that even prohibiting lawful behavior might generate some utility by 
spreading knowledge of the existence of the law, and in this way contribute to deterrence. 
This is not necessarily a valid inference, though. Prevention of lawful behavior might 
contribute to legal arbitrariness and can reduce prevention of unlawful behaviour. If finding 
violation is arbitrary whether an action is rightfully a violation or not, one might as well 
violate the law.166 
  LNV=UV(aV)-UV(aNV) is the loss of wrongfully deciding not violation, aNV. This is the 
forgone utility of making the right decision of violation less the utility of making the wrong 
decision as such. The forgone utility from not making the right decision of violation is that 
some presumptive welfare-reducing practice is not discouraged in either the individual case or 
in the future through legal precedence. It is difficult to assess whether there are any benefit 
                                                 
164 To get a money measure of the gain, one could ask how much money must be taken from them for utility to 
stay at the same level.  
165 Economists operates with equivalent variation (EV) and compensating variation (CV) as exact monetary 
measures of welfare, while the total surplus (TS), consisting of consumers surplus (CS) and producers surplus 
(PS) are approximations. See Varian (1992) p. 160 f.   
166 See Kaplow and Shavell (1994b) and Posner (2011) p. 827. See Also Spier (2007).   
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from the wrongful decision of not violation when the law was actually violated. Some 
enforcement costs are at least saved. 
 Thus, so far, promotion of efficiency and then economic welfare seems so be a good 
candidate for an objective utility measure that can be used to achieve an objective antitrust 
analysis. Some problems will soon follow, though.   
3.6.2 Problems with economic welfare and efficiency as an objective standard 
The economic welfare standard seems to provide a good objective standard for the utility (and 
loss) of antitrust decisions. However, there are some problems hiding in the details. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, there might be additional purposes of antitrust laws. Such a 
purpose might be to promote cross border trade, as was argued in EU competition law. In the 
US, some industrial policy goals might be argued to be additional objectives of antitrust 
policy. If such additional objectives cannot be incorporated into the objective economic 
welfare calculations, this might be an obstacle to the possibility of an objective rational 
antitrust analysis.  
Even if antitrust analysis were not disturbed by such additional purposes, there is some 
confusion as to whether the correct economic welfare standard should be total welfare or 
consumer welfare. If total welfare were pursued, the antitrust analysis would be rational. If 
consumer welfare is pursued, in the sense that consumers must receive a fair share of the 
benefit, there is a risk of irrationality. Assume that there are three possible decisions: one with 
large total surplus and a small consumer surplus, one with medium sized total surplus and 
consumer surplus and one with small total surplus but large consumer surplus. Unless there is 
some objective and rational standard to choose among these criteria, there is a threat both to 
objectivity and rationality. This issue cannot be resolved here; nevertheless, this is an 
additional argument for total welfare to be the ultimate standard of antitrust analysis. 
However, if applying a consumer welfare standard in the single cases improves total welfare, 
then it can be defended on objective rational grounds. 
One additional problem should also be mentioned. The measures of economic welfare 
are based on economic models. Thus, the economic welfare measures should be considered as 
model-based inferences. Inferences from economic models are not necessarily correct. Thus, 
model imperfections and uncertainties should, in principle, be taken into account. The rational 
use of models taking model uncertainty into account will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
The possible shortages of or failures in of obtaining an objective measure of the utility 
(and loss) of an antitrust decision might chill some of the interest in studying rational antitrust 
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decisions. If there is no good way to create an objective measure of the utility of an antitrust 
decision, making the rationality of antitrust decisions a subjective enterprise, then why bother 
to study the rationality of antitrust decisions? By the same argument, one could also address 
the point of having antitrust rules in the first place, or any economic regulation. The economic 
concepts of efficiency and welfare as objective measures of the utility of antitrust decisions 
are in this study considered to be good enough to proceed further with the inquiry of rational 
antitrust analysis with sufficient confidence that such an inquiry can be performed 
objectively. Thus, economic welfare will be used as a yardstick in the further analysis as a 
standard for utility in the assessment of rational antitrust analysis. 
The question becomes, then, whether the assessment principles and procedures 
employed in actual antitrust analysis will facilitate objective rational antitrust analyses based 
on economic welfare as the assessment standard. This is a central question in this study.    
3.6.3 Are there alternatives to economic welfare and efficiency as a standard? 
Although economic welfare is established as at least an important partial standard for antitrust 
analysis as discussed above, and in more detail in Chapter Two, it is, for the sake of the 
argument, interesting to ask whether there could be other standards that would perform better 
in achieving rational antitrust decisions. Another approach, in line with democracy and in line 
with fear for a technocratic tyranny from efficiency-seeking economists, is to consider the 
objective utility of antitrust decisions as some consensus on the utility obtained by the 
individuals in the society. The utility could, for instance, be based on what would be the result 
of majority voting or the utility of some elected official.  
Social choice is the study of collective decision-making. Kenneth Arrow was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in economics based on, inter alia, Arrow (1951), where he derived the 
impossibility theorem of social choice.167 Simplified, Arrow (1951) showed that it is 
impossible to derive a social utility function based on voting, including majority voting, that 
generally satisfies the assumptions of rationality. A utility function based on majority voting 
might, for instance, violate the transitivity axiom. Thus, to base antitrust decisions on, for 
instance, majority voting in the parliament seems to be a poor instrument in obtaining rational 
antitrust decisions. 
Another approach promoted by another winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, John 
C. Harsanyi, is to construct a social utility function as a weighted sum of individuals’ utility. 
                                                 
167 Developed further by another winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, Amartya Sen. See Sen (1970, 1995 
and 1999). 
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This utility function will, itself, satisfy rationality.168 One could imagine that this weighted 
sum of individuals’ utilities is represented by the utility function of an elected official or that 
the elected official is supposed to make decision in accordance with such a weighted sum. 
When it comes to elected officials, however, their personal preferences might be rational, but 
public choice theories tell us that their utility might be a poor approximation to the 
maximization of some fair weight of peoples’ individual preferences. Interest group influence 
and politics might have the result that the utility of the members of some particular interest 
group gets far more weight than a fair weight, and might, in addition, be in conflict with 
efficiency and economic maximization of welfare.169 Thus, letting some elected representative 
make antitrust decisions according to his own preferences might give us rational decisions 
based on his own preferences, but might be a poor instrument to obtain rational decisions if 
some “fair” weighted sum of individual utilities is the standard we want to be applied.    
Thus, basing antitrust decisions on the personal preferences in a system of 
representative voting or of an elected official might be a poor instrument to yield objective 
rational antitrust decisions.  
3.7 Rational antitrust analysis and actual antitrust analysis    
A normative theory for rational antitrust analysis was outlined above. This involved which 
requirements rationality imposes on antitrust analysis and how this applies to the components 
of antitrust analysis. It was also discussed whether there could be such a thing as an objective 
rational antitrust analysis that can be used to achieve objective rational antitrust decisions. It 
was concluded that there are good enough objective measures on both probabilities and 
utilities to proceed with the study of an objective rational antitrust analysis.  
Given the existence of such an objective rational analysis, the next question is to what 
extent antitrust analysis as it is actually performed corresponds to this objective rational 
antitrust analysis. This will be the chief topic in the subsequent chapters of this study, which 
address whether the assessment principles and procedures applied in antitrust are likely to 
yield rational antitrust analyses. This subchapter briefly addresses the question of whether 
rational antitrust analysis and actual antitrust analysis are compatible issues. Is it possible to 
pursue rationality within the framework in which antitrust analysis is actually executed? This 
is necessary to answer the research question on whether rationality can guide antitrust 
analysis, which will be addressed later in this chapter.   
                                                 
168 Harsanyi (1955, 1979). 
169 See Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983). George Stigler and Gary Becker are 
also winners of the Nobel Prize in economics. 
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3.7.1 The substantive antitrust rules  
The antitrust rules constitute the substantive legal framework for antitrust analysis. The 
antitrust rules were described in Chapter Two above. The antitrust statutes themselves, both in 
the US and the EU, are quite wide and general, leaving it to case law to develop the more 
precise content of the antitrust laws. Thus, it is the courts and other authoritative decision 
makers that develop the substantive content of antitrust law. This is done within the frames of 
the legal procedure.  
The court has to demonstrate valid methods of legal reasoning in determining the 
content of the antitrust rules. Thus, the principles of jurisprudence and legal reasoning 
naturally have a strong impact on legal decision making.170 Imperative methods of legal 
reasoning, such as the use of precedence and the use of analogy, can potentially threaten the 
rationality of antitrust analysis. The use of precedence might create a path-dependence 
diverging from rationality. An analogy not taking into account relevant similarities and 
differences might result in a decision that fails to coincide with rationality.  
However, the relatively wide antitrust statutes combined with pragmatic methods of 
legal reasoning, where the purpose of the law and the consequences of alternative decisions 
are guiding the determination of the rules, increases the possibility of achieving rational rules. 
This is, in particular, the situation in antitrust where economic welfare is a major purpose of 
the law.  This makes antitrust an almost ideal substantial legal framework to facilitate rational 
rules.171 The relationship between the methods of legal reasoning and the rationality of 
antitrust rules will be discussed further in Chapter Four.    
3.7.2 Antitrust analysis and the antitrust legal procedure 
Actual antitrust analysis is performed within the frames of a legal procedure. The 
characteristics of the legal procedure have a crucial impact on actual antitrust analysis and the 
resulting decisions. The various properties of the legal procedure are thus essential in 
assessing the rationality of antitrust analyses.  
As described in Chapter Two, the organization of the legal process can broadly be 
divided into two types: the inquisitorial and the adversarial systems.172 In the inquisitorial 
                                                 
170 Posner (2008) normatively and descriptively discuss the established methods and standards for legal 
argumentation in US and how those methods are likely to impact the legal decisions. 
171 See Posner (2008) p. 376 for a similar point of view. 
172 The separation between the inquisitorial system and the adversarial system is not at dichotomy. There are 
hybrids between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. In other words, it is a sliding scale between the 
inquisitorial and adversarial system. See Parisi (2002). This will be discussed further in the subsequent chapters 
of this study, in particular in Chapter Five.  
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system, the fact finder and the decision maker is the same decision body. This characterizes 
the European Commission’s enforcement of the EU competition laws. In the adversarial 
system, two parties compete to convince an independent decision body. This characterizes the 
situation when a case is brought to the court for a decision. In the US, the antitrust 
enforcement is mainly adversarial. Both systems have their pitfalls and benefits. This will be 
explored in detail in the subsequent chapters of this study.  
The impact of the procedural system on the fact-finding process and the outcome of 
the decision is studied in the field of law and economics.173 The inquisitorial system might 
reduce the cost of fact finding, but at the cost of less accurate facts compared to an adversarial 
system. Thus, the procedural system may have a significant impact on antitrust analyses and 
the resulting decisions. The impact of the procedural system on antitrust decisions and the 
rationality of antitrust decisions will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters. 
It is, in theory, possible to pursue rational antitrust analysis both in the adversarial and 
inquisitorial system. Both systems are compatible with rational antitrust analysis in the sense 
that none of the systems excludes the possibility to pursue rationality. However, both systems 
contain some imperfections that constitute obstacles for obtaining rationality. Such 
imperfections are addressed briefly below, and then fully explored in the subsequent chapters 
of this study.     
3.7.3 Some obstacles for rationality in antitrust analysis  
Institutional factors 
The persons that make antitrust decisions have their own preferences that might deviate from 
an objective standard. What recognizes antitrust decision makers, whether they are politicians, 
appointed judges, or bureaucrats, is that they are public officials working in a political 
system.174 The theories of public choice shed light on the incentives of public officials 
whether they are directly elected in a political procedure or derive their authority by being 
appointed by political figures. The desire for reelection, interest group influence, and other 
forms of political capture are likely to influence the decisions of politicians.175 Budgets, 
salary, and career opportunities are factors that are likely to affect the incentives of employed 
public officials. Thus, the theories of public choice become relevant in studying the 
                                                 
173 See Posner (2011) part VI, Sanchirico (2007) and Spier (2007). This issue will be scrutinized in Chapter Five.   
174 If antitrust issues are decided in an arbitration court, the decision makers are not public officials. However, 
antitrust issues decided in arbitration courts are not considered official antitrust decisions in this study.    
175 See Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983). George Stigler and Gary Becker are 
also winners of the Nobel Prize in economics. 
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performance of antitrust analysis and the resulting antitrust decisions. The application of 
theories of public choice to study incentives in antitrust analysis will be a returning issue in 
the further scrutiny of actual antitrust analysis in this study. Although institutional factors do 
not exclude rational antitrust analysis, they constitute a risk of biased decision making.  
Practical methods of reasoning and cognitive biases  
As discussed above, precise probability measures are not available in antitrust analysis. In 
practical reasoning, more practical methods must be utilized in the decision making, such as 
the use of analogies and more intuitive heuristic methods. These methods will be discussed in 
detail in the subsequent chapters of this study.   
Rational decision theory can be seen as normative opposed to descriptive decision 
theory. Descriptive decision theory is about how decisions are actually made.  The branch of 
economics called behavioral economics intersects with psychology, and studies actual 
decision making, especially how cognitive biases might affect decisions to deviate from 
rational decisions. Thus, lessons from behavioral economics might be important to understand 
how antitrust decisions are actually made.  
An early example of deviation between actual and rational decisions was provided by 
the French economist and winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, Maurice Allais176 as a 
critique of Savage. Allais showed that, in the choice between a sure award of one million 
dollars and a lottery with a one percent chance of winning zero, a 10 percent chance of 
winning five million, and an 89 percent chance of winning one million, many would prefer 
the former. On the other hand, the same persons would prefer a lottery winning five million 
with 10 percent probability and zero otherwise over a lottery winning one million with an 11 
percent probability and zero otherwise.177 This behavior is inconsistent with the maximization 
of expected utility. If the first choice maximizes expected utility, the latter cannot and vice 
versa. The underlying axiom violated here is the axiom of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. The two choices are equal, except that in the first lottery there is an 89 percent 
chance of winning 1 million while in the last there is an 89 percent chance of winning zero 
independent of the choice made. Thus, in the first lottery there is more reason to regret if the 
zero award materializes than in the second, where it, after all, is quite a big chance that the 
zero award materializes anyway. According to the axiom of independence, this is not rational 
to take into account.  
                                                 
176 Allais (1953). 
177 Even Savage made these choices when presented by Allais. 
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Ellsberg (1961) presented another “paradox”. Assume that an urn contains 90 balls: 30 
red balls and 60 balls that are mixed between black and yellow balls in unknown proportions. 
Ellsberg showed that many would prefer a lottery giving 100 dollars if a red ball is drawn 
from the urn over a lottery giving 100 dollars if a black ball is drawn from the urn.  On the 
other hand, the same people would prefer a lottery giving 100 dollar if a drawn ball is yellow 
or black over a lottery giving 100 dollars if a red or yellow ball is drawn. This behavior is 
inconsistent with the maximization of expected utility. However, what can be interpreted from 
such behavior is that people prefer to choose under known probabilities than unknown 
probabilities. The first lottery gives a “sure” probability of 1/3 of winning, and the second a 
“sure” probability of 2/3 of winning. This can be interpreted as a preference for known 
probabilities, which is not taken into account in the axioms for rational decisions described 
above.  
These “paradoxes” are interesting, but might not provide so much systematic 
information of cognitive biases. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky178 have provided important 
knowledge of cognitive biases in decision making through extensive seminal research on the 
topic, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Kahneman et al. (1982). Examples of cognitive 
biases are the base rate fallacy on how people fail to take into account prior probabilities in 
their probability assessment, and the loss aversion theory on how people irrationally prefer 
avoiding losses to making gains. Behavioral economics has now become a popular field for 
research in economics and has probably boosted the interest in experimental economics. 
McKenzie (2010) contains an updated and critical survey on some of the research. Some 
irrationality in decision making can be explained by evolution and rationality. Since the brain 
has limited processing resources, it can sometimes be rational to be “bounded” rational and 
make decisions that might appear irrational when weighing saved brain resources against the 
quality of the decision.179 This is not a new idea, being pointed out by the Nobel laureate in 
economics, Herbert Simon in the 1950s.180  One can say actual decision making rationally 
utilizes heuristics as a result of evolutionary efficiency. As mentioned above, there are 
developed generalized expected utility model frameworks that take into account cognitive 
biases, such as prospect theory,181 Choquet expected utility theory,182 and maxmin expected 
utility theory.183 
                                                 
178 D. Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for his works with A. Tversky. Had 
Tversky been alive at the time they would probably have received the price together.   
179 See McKenzie (2010), Chapters 7 and 8. 
180 See Simon (1955) and Simon (1957). Simon was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978.   
181 See Gilboa (2009) p. 154 f. developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
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Cognitive biases have particular relevance for how legal evidence is assessed, 
including antitrust evidence. Experiments have been done on mock juries that revealed large 
deviations from rational decision-making. Farnsworth (2007) provides comments and further 
references to this literature. Decision makers may be subject to confirmation biases which 
bias the decisions towards prior beliefs.184 The impact of cognitive biases on decision making 
will be particularly relevant in the discussion in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
That actual decision making utilizes informal methods deviating from the methods of 
rational decision making and may be subject to cognitive biases is a challenge for obtaining 
rationality in antitrust decision making. This, however, does not make actual decision making 
incompatible with rational decision making. The challenge is to design assessment principles 
and procedures that mitigate the impact of such imperfections. This will be discussed further 
in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.   
The impact of argumentation and rhetoric                     
Legal argumentation and rhetoric has been studied by both philosophers and lawyers since 
ancient Greece.185 Argumentation, argumentation techniques, rhetoric, and even abusive of 
rhetoric by the parties involved in the decision making has a central role in the legal decision 
procedure. A study of actual legal decision making would be incomplete if the role of 
argumentation and rhetoric in the process is not taken into account. A challenge for the 
procedural design is to prevent decision makers from being influenced by non-meritorious 
abuse of rhetoric. The impact of argumentation and rhetoric on the rationality of antitrust 
analysis will be revisited in the subsequent chapters of this study, in particular, in Chapter 
Five and Six.   
Multiple decision makers 
It is often not one single adjudicator that performs the antitrust analysis, but many 
adjudicators who must make the decision in concert. In antitrust cases, the decision makers 
will typically be judges in a collegial body or commissioners in a collegial body. In an 
adversarial system, as in the US, it is, as a main rule, a layman jury who must reach a 
collective decision upon the facts.  
                                                                                                                                                        
182 See Gilboa (2009) p. 145 f. based on Schmeidler (1989). 
183 See Gilboa (2009) p. 160 f. based on Schmeidler (1989). 
184 See for instance Posner (2011) p. 824. 
185 See for instance Walton (2002). 
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Collective decision making is analyzed in the theory of social choice, as was described 
above.186 Arrow (1951) derived the impossibility theorem of social choice, which showed that 
it is impossible to construct a utility function based on, inter alia, majority voting, which 
generally satisfies the assumptions of rationality. This has been applied in a legal contexts by, 
inter alia, Easterbrook (1982, 1984b) Thus, the collective nature of antitrust decision making 
may impose a threat to the possibility of achieving rational antitrust decisions. One way out of 
this situation is if all decision makers share the same preferences. This will be achieved if all 
the decision makers are rational and apply unified methods based on objective principles. The 
complications that follow from the collective nature of many antitrust decisions will be 
returned to in several contexts in this study.  
3.7.4 Are rational antitrust analysis and actual antitrust analysis compatible? 
A central topic in this study is whether the assessment principles and procedures in actual 
antitrust analysis are likely to facilitate a rational analysis. Thus, it would be very premature 
to make such a conclusion here. However, a question that is not premature is whether rational 
antitrust analysis and actual antitrust analysis are compatible at all. Is it possible to pursue 
rationality in actual antitrust analysis? If not, it would be difficult to proceed with a study that 
is about the intersection between rational antitrust analysis and actual antitrust analysis. Based 
on the discussion above, it does not seem to be something intrinsic about actual antitrust 
analysis that categorically excludes the possibility of pursuing rationality.  
The substantive antitrust laws do not seem to constitute a major barrier to rational 
antitrust rules. The general wide nature of the statutes makes it possible to determine the 
precise content of the rules in accordance with rationality. This depends on the possibilities 
and restraints associated with the methods of legal reasoning. If the methods of legal 
reasoning allow for pragmatic reasoning, this makes it possible to let the purpose of the rules 
and the consequences guide the determination of the rules in line with rationality.   
The fact that antitrust analyses are performed within a legal procedure does not prohibit 
the analysis from being rational. The legal framework that the actual antitrust is performed 
within does not have a nature that excludes the possibility of reaching rational decisions. 
There are, however, some obstacles for rational antitrust analyses to be generated by the legal 
procedure. This creates a potential for improvements that facilitate antitrust analyses that are 
more rational. The challenge is to arrange assessment principles and procedures in such a way 
that the resulting decision becomes as rational as possible. The ability of the assessment 
                                                 
186 See Binmore (2008) for a short introduction.  
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
77 
principles and procedures applied in antitrust analyses to facilitate rational analyses and 
possible improvements to facilitating rational analyses are the chief issues of this study that 
are discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters of this study.   
3.8 Can and should rationality guide antitrust analysis? 
Above it was established what a rational antitrust analysis is, and this was related to the way 
antitrust analyses are actually executed. The research question as to whether the principles of 
rationality can and should guide antitrust analysis can now be adressed. 
3.8.1 Can rationality guide antitrust analysis? 
The question on whether rationality can guide antitrust analysis is dependent on several sub 
questions. The first question is whether it is possible to derive what a rational antitrust 
analysis is and apply this in practice. The rationality assessment is based on the presence of 
precise probabilities that are not likely to be available. Alternative theories of rational 
decisions, which are less dependent on such precise measures of probabilities, were briefly 
discussed above, but were not found adequate to be applied in antitrust analysis at the 
moment. However, it was found that the theory based on presence of precise probabilities is 
applicable as a normative theory of rational decisions, even the lack of knowledge of such 
precise probabilities. The challenge is to design assessment principles and procedures that 
facilitate a decision based on the correct probabilities even if no one knows these probabilities 
exactly. 
 Another issue addressed above was that of the subjectivity of probability measures, 
which could be an obstacle to objective rational decisions. However, it was concluded that the 
subjectivity of the probability measures most of all influence the a priori probability 
assessments, while objective methods of assessing evidence are likely to make the subjective 
probability measures converge towards objective measures as more and more evidence is 
gathered.   
 Rational decisions also rely on assessing the utilities associated with various decision 
alternatives. This is the same as assessing the loss of a wrongful decision. The question is 
whether there are any objective utility measures that can be used to derive objective rational 
antitrust decisions. The concept of economic welfare as a utility standard for antitrust 
decisions gives us an objective standard to assess the objectivity of antitrust analysis.187  
                                                 
187 However, as mentioned above, the principles of economic welfare are based on the neoclassical paradigm of 
economic models. Thus, the uncertainty associated with this particular modeling framework should ideally be 
taken into account. Rationally in the assessment of economic models will be returned to in Chapter Six.    
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The wide and general character of the antitrust statutes combined with economic 
welfare as one of the main purposes of the law provides a good substantive legal framework 
for rational antitrust analyses. However, it was found that there might be characteristics 
associated with how antitrust analyses are actually performed that might be obstacles for the 
actual antitrust analyses being rational. The method of legal reasoning might raise some 
barriers to rationality in the determination of antitrust rules. Furthermore, antitrust analyses 
might be influenced by properties of the legal process that the antitrust analysis is performed 
within, which might bias the decisions away from rationality. However, nothing with the legal 
framework excludes antitrust analyses and the resulting decisions from being rational. The 
legal framework can eventually be improved to facilitate rational antitrust analyses.  
Thus, despite challenges, it seems reasonable that rationality can guide antitrust 
analysis. At least, it is worth the efforts to study how assessment principles and procedures 
used in antitrust analyses today coincide with rationality and whether it is possible to make 
the analyses more rational.                
3.8.2 Should rationality guide antitrust analysis? 
If rationality can guide antitrust analysis, the next natural question is whether rationality 
should guide antitrust analysis.  There are several arguments for rationality to guide antitrust 
analysis. Arguably, the chief argument is that a rational antitrust analysis maximizes the 
expected economic welfare of the decisions, which, in the long run, maximizes the economic 
welfare of having antitrust rules. Thus, rational antitrust analysis is what gives us the greatest 
economic welfare in the long run. 
 By returning to the axioms behind rationality, we can see that rational antitrust 
analysis provides us with an additional property that might appeal to some. Rationality in the 
determination of rules will provide coherence and consistency in the choice between rules. 
Assume that we have three ways to interpret a rule: Alternatives A, B, and C. Rationality will 
secure that we can rank all these alternatives against each other and that the choice between 
the rules satisfies transitivity. Assume that we prefer A to B and B to C. Transitivity means 
that we will prefer A to C. This was a simple example, but by applying the principle of 
rationality we will secure such coherence and consistency in a more complex environment of 
many rules. This is not without value. The consistency between many types of abuse 
interpreted to be abuse of dominance can, for instance, be questioned.188 If some conduct that 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
188 See OECD (2009) p. 21 f.  
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escape illegality has worse consequences than some conduct that is prohibited, this should, 
everything else equal, be considered to be wrong. Rationality will prevent such inconsistency. 
  A last argument for rationality is predictability. Normally, rational decisions are easier 
to predict than irrational decisions, at least if the irrationality is not systematic. Thus, 
rationality in antitrust analysis also promotes legal certainty with all associated benefits.   
Therefore, the conclusion must be that rationality should guide antitrust analysis.      
3.9 Conclusions 
In the introduction to this chapter, two research questions were raised: What is a rational 
antitrust analysis? Can and should the principles of rationality guide antitrust analysis? 
These questions will be addressed in turn.  
What is a rational antitrust analysis? 
This chapter began by establishing what antitrust analysis is: it is the determination of rules 
and assessment of evidence in antitrust cases. Then, what a rational antitrust analysis is was 
established. This is the antitrust analysis that satisfies the axioms of rationality established in 
modern decision theory. Such analysis will lead the analyses to rational antitrust decisions. 
Following the axioms is equivalent to maximizing expected utility of antitrust decisions, 
which again is equivalent to minimizing expected loss.  
The axioms of rationality impose quite strong assumptions regarding the presence of 
precise probability measures. It was explored whether alternative theories of rational 
decisions that do not impose such assumptions provide better normative guidance on rational 
decisions, but the conclusion was that they do not do so at the moment. There is potential, 
however, for alternative decision theories to be applied when they become more operational 
for legal analysis. Despite the lack of the precise knowledge of precise probabilities, a 
decision theory based on such knowledge may serve as normative guidance. The assessment 
principles and procedures can ideally be designed such that the resulting decisions are made 
as if precise knowledge of probabilities were available.  
Furthermore, it was addressed whether there is some objective standard of rational 
antitrust analysis as both the probability assessment and the utilities involved may be of a 
subjective character. It was found that, by using objective methods in assessing evidence and 
using economic welfare as a utility measure, we come close an objective standard for rational 
antitrust analysis.  
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Thus, rational antitrust analysis is, more precisely, to maximize the expected economic 
welfare from antitrust decisions, which is equivalent to minimizing the expected loss of 
economic welfare from erroneous decisions. Objective methods should be used in assessing 
evidence.  
Can rationality guide antitrust analysis? 
It was found in this chapter that rationality can guide antitrust analysis. The lack of precise 
knowledge of probabilities does not prohibit antitrust analysis from being rational. 
Assessment principles and procedures can facilitate rational decisions based on such 
knowledge of exact probabilities, even when no one actually knows these probabilities. 
Furthermore, it is possible to use objective measures of probabilities and utilities to approach 
an objective standard for rational antitrust decisions. It was also found that there is nothing 
intrinsic in the legal framework that excludes antitrust analysis from being rational. The 
challenge is to establish assessment principles and procedures that facilitate rational analyses. 
The wide and general antitrust statutes, combined with economic welfare as one of the major 
purposes of antitrust law, provide a good substantive legal framework for rational analyses.  
Should rationality guide antitrust analysis?  
The question whether rationality should guide antitrust analysis, was answered affirmative. 
Rational antitrust analyses will maximize the expected economic welfare from antitrust 
decisions and, in the long run, maximize the economic welfare from having antitrust laws. 
Furthermore, rationality secures a system of coherent and consistent antitrust rules. Finally, it 
can be argued that rational decisions are more predictable, and thus increase legal certainty.           
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4 Rationality in the determination of antitrust rules 
4.1 Introduction and motivation 
Antitrust analysis starts with the determination of the rule to be applied in the case under 
scrutiny. This chapter addresses rationally in the determination of the antitrust rules. In this 
study, the statutory antitrust laws are taken as given. This means that the focus will be on the 
determination of rules by those who make antitrust decisions in resolving antitrust cases. In 
the final stage, it is the courts that determine the antitrust rule to be applied in the case. 
However, in inquisitorial enforcement systems, like the enforcement of the European 
Commission, it is the enforcer who makes the first decision and thus determines what rule to 
apply. As long as this decision is not challenged in the courts, it is the enforcement authority 
that determines the rule to be applied in the case.  
 This chapter will first discuss how to implement rationality in the 
determination of antitrust rules. The study of how to implement rationality in the 
determination of rules will be delineated to two topics. These are rationality in the choice 
between rules and standards and the rational precision level of the rules. These topics are 
particularly relevant in determining rational antitrust rules. This is illustrated by the attention 
these two topics are given in the antitrust law and economics literature. This will be followed 
by a discussion on whether it is likely that the current US and EU antitrust rules are 
characterized by a rational choice between rules and standards and a rational precision level.  
Then, the question of whether the assessment principles and procedures associated 
with antitrust analysis are likely to facilitate the evolution of rational antitrust rules is 
addressed. This discussion will include possible improvements that can be made to facilitate 
more rational rules. The main contribution to research will be to provide insight into whether 
the principles of determining rules in antitrust and the procedural framework surrounding the 
determination of rules are likely to facilitate the production of rational rules and whether there 
is room for improvements. 
  Thus, the chief research questions of this chapter are: Are the current antitrust rules 
likely to be rational? Are we likely to observe an evolution towards rational antitrust rules? 
What can be done to promote more rational antitrust rules? 
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4.2 Standards, rules, and precision level in antitrust law 
4.2.1 Rationality in the choice between rules and standards 
Distinguishing rules and standards 
A legal standard means that the conditions for applying a legal rule are determined by a 
standard. This is opposed to some precise regulation of the situation for when the law applies. 
With standards, the assessment of the facts in a specific case has more impact on the 
application of the law. Perhaps the simplest and most illustrative example is road speed limits. 
A fixed speed limit of, let us say, 60 km/h on a particular road can be characterized as a rule. 
This is opposed to some general standard saying that a driver should carefully adjust his speed 
according to the circumstances of the road. In the latter case, the question of whether the 
driver had driven to fast would be assessed according to the standard on whether he had 
carefully adjusted his speed according to the circumstances on the road. Another example is 
some law saying that a person is liable for negligent conduct. Negligence is a standard, as 
opposed to specific rules on what kind of conduct that triggers liability. One way to abstractly 
explain the separation between rules and standards, is that, with rules the law is given content 
ex ante, while with standards, the content is given ex post.189 
The prohibitions in the US antitrust and EU competition statutes are, prima facie, best 
characterized as standards. The prohibitions against anticompetitive cooperation and abuse of 
dominance/monopolization impose few limits on what kind of conduct that potentially can be 
covered by the prohibitions. The same applies to the merger control. This is just a starting 
point, though. With the evolution of case law and enforcement guidelines, the wide antitrust 
standards have been given content that at least come close to rules. The evolution of conduct 
considered per se illegal in US is an example of how the initial standard has evolved into 
rules. By case law, various types of business conduct have evolved to be per se antitrust 
violations, reducing the need to assess the specific effects of the conduct in question.190 
However, as will be discussed further below, the per se rules are better characterized as 
presumption rules, which do not make the specific effects of the conduct totally irrelevant. 
The use of presumption rules is also the approach used in EU, since conduct considered 
restricting competition by object is just a presumption of illegality.  
The discussion on rules versus standard is not new. Many issues debated today were 
addressed already in Bentham (1776). The analysis of rules versus standards has been given 
                                                 
189 See Kaplow (2000). 
190 Krattenmaker (2008), Easterbrook (1984).  
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substantial attention in legal theory. In recent decades, the analysis of rules versus standards 
has been studied in law and economics. In law and economics, the relative cost and benefits 
of standards and rules are used to study the optimal design of rules. A seminal early 
contribution to the law and economics analysis of rules versus standards is Ehrlich and Posner 
(1974). Richard Posner’s research and reflections on the topic are summarized in Posner 
(2011).191 Another seminal contribution is Kaplow (1992), summarized in Kaplow (2000). A 
seminal contribution in the particular field of antitrust is Easterbrook (1984), which, inter alia, 
studies per se rules versus rules of reason in antitrust from a law and economics perspective. 
Kretschmer (2011) surveys the law and economics literature on rules versus standards in 
general and the literature that addresses rules versus standards in antitrust.  
Below, a decision theoretic analysis on the rational choice between rules and standards 
will be presented. The question becomes which kind of regulation gives the best decisions to 
the least costs. This can again be formulated as a question of economizing expected losses 
from errors, and costs of formulating and applying the rules. Rules and standards have 
different costs and benefits.192 This study draws on both the general law and economics 
literature and the specialized antitrust law and economics literature.  
The decision theoretic model  
The law and economics literature contains various decision theoretic models that, with more 
or less use of formal mathematics, studies rules versus standards based on various 
assumptions. A model based on the decision theoretic framework presented Chapter Three, is 
presented below. This is a general model that captures much of the existing insight from law 
and economics. After the presentation of this model, certain factors that affect the rationality 
in the choice between rules and standards with references to the existing insight from law and 
economics are discussed.  
As follows from Chapter Three, the rational decision can be found by making the 
decision that maximizes expected utility, which is the same as minimizing expected loss.193 
Assume we are deciding between what kind of rule is best for making rational antitrust 
decisions: a rule (r) or a standard (s). The costs associated with the formulation and the 
application of the alternative two legal regulations are Cr and Cs, respectively. Let ELRr and 
ELRs be the expected loss of the rule and the standard, respectively. Thus, this is the 
                                                 
191 Posner (2011) p. 747 f.  
192 See Kaplow (2000) and Posner (2011) p. 747 f.  
193 This can be derived from the axioms of rational behavior. The intuitive explanation is that this is the decision 
rule that minimizes losses in the long run.    
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accumulated type-1 errors (false findings of violations) and type-2 errors (false acquittals) that 
are associated with the application of the alternative regulations. This could have been 
modeled mathematically by using a model of how often the errors are likely to occur. 
However, this will not be necessary for the general level of analysis performed here. Note that 
deterrence and eventual over-deterrence and under-deterrence are implicitly covered by the 
model. A consequence of type-1 errors is that not only the conduct in question being 
discouraged, but also similar conducts in the future due to the eventual precedence and 
effects. This is over-deterrence. Similarly, type-2 errors may lead to under-deterrence.194  The 




Thus, both expected losses from errors and the cost associated with the legal rules must be 
taken into account. A rule that generates more expected losses from errors might still be 
preferred to a standard if the associated costs are sufficiently lower and vice versa. Below, 
various factors that are likely to affect the tradeoff between rules and standards are identified. 
Both the general law and economics literature and the specialized antitrust law and economics 
literature will be relied upon. The error cost approach to antitrust rules has a long tradition in 
the law and economics literature as well as the specialized antitrust law and economics 
literature.195 The factors are discussed using antitrust law issues as examples, but the main 
discussion the choice between rules and standards in antitrust law will be treated in the 
separate subchapter on rules, standards, and precision in the actual determination of antitrust 
rules below.     
The cost of formulating and applying the rule 
The costs associated with the legal rule are the costs of first formulating the rule and then the 
costs associated with applying the rule. The cost of formulating a rule is the cost of figuring 
out the right rule and formulating it. Since the statutes are taken as given and the focus of this 
chapter is on case-based rules created by the antitrust decision makers, promulgation costs 
will not be given particular attention. The costs of applying a legal rule include the costs of 
                                                 
194 See Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) and Sørgard (2008) for the explicit modeling of deterrence effect associated 
with errors in antitrust enforcement.  
195 See, for instance, Erlich and Posner (1974) for a general error cost approach, and Easterbrook (1984) for an 
error cost approach in antitrust.  
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enforcing the rule and the cost borne by private parties to learn the rule for deciding 
compliance.  
The costs described above can be analyzed within a standard model of microeconomic 
analysis where formulating the rule is a fixed cost and applying the rule is a variable cost.196 
A rule might involve higher fixed formulation costs of finding the appropriate rule to regulate 
the issue compared to the formulation of a standard. It might, for instance, be higher costs 
associated with finding appropriate rules to regulate vertical agreements in competition law 
than formulating a standard that, for instance, simply declares anticompetitive agreements 
illegal. When the legal rule is first formulated, however, the cost of applying a clear rule will 
normally be lower than that of applying a standard, since a rule reduces the requirement of 
performing a factual analysis according to the standard. However, this is not always the case. 
As rules evolve to become more complex and extensive, the cost of finding out what specific 
rule that applies to a specific situation might be high. For instance, to assess whether some 
conduct is covered by an antitrust per se prohibition or not, might, in some cases, be more 
costly than to just answer the question of whether the conduct is likely to restrict competition 
or not. Complexity is addressed further in the discussion of precession level below.  
Since the formulation of a legal rule is a fixed cost and application is a variable cost, 
the frequency of use becomes a determining factor in the choice between rules and 
standards.197 If a legal rule is expected to be applied to similar circumstances often, this 
speaks for incurring the fixed cost of making a rule. Infrequent use on the contrary, speaks for 
a standard.  
When it is the court that determines the legal rule, they have resolving the specific 
case in mind. They might not have either the resources or time to make a full assessment of 
the consequences of the rules. General courts that only occasionally apply the legal rule may 
also lack the proper incentives to perform a comprehensive study of whether a rule will be 
more economical than a standard. This might be different when it comes to an inquisitorial 
enforcement body, such as the European Commission. The European Commission will more 
than occasionally face the same situation and may have larger incentives to invest fixed cost 
in determining a rule to reduce costly efforts later.198 This theory is consistent with evidence: 
the production of block exemptions and guidelines seems to be more comprehensive in EU 
than in US. Incentives in the development of legal rules will be discussed further below.            
                                                 
196 See Fon and Parisi (2007) and Schäfer (2006).  
197 See Kaplow (1992) and Fon and Parisi (2007). 
198 See Posner (2011) p. 858 for a similar argument regarding inquisitorial enforcement authorities in general.  
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Losses from errors  
The losses from errors are not likely to be the same for rules and standards. A central question 
is whether a standard or rule approach gives the smallest expected losses due to errors. Both 
type-1 and type-2 errors must be taken into account. If standards are more adaptable to the 
particular circumstances being under scrutiny, it is natural to think that there are lower 
expected error losses associated with a standard than a rule. Rules might be either over-
inclusive by discouraging conduct they should not discourage, or under-inclusive by allowing 
conduct they should not allow. Thus, a standard can more precisely address the conduct to be 
discouraged in the specific circumstances.199 A standard does not necessarily mean that all 
circumstances will be taken into account, but a standard is at least flexible concerning which 
circumstances can and should be taken into account.200 As will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five, the optimal gathering of evidence, including the optimal use of presumptions, 
should regulate the extent of case-specific circumstances that should be taken into account in 
deciding an antitrust case. This has strong parallels to the so-called “quick look” approach and 
the structured rule of reason approach, which will be discussed in more detail below.  
However, it might not be a very robust inference that standards reduce expected error 
costs. Standards might be more prone to rent-seeking activities that might bias the results. 
Rents-seeking will be discussed below. As pointed out by Schäfer (2006), the discretion of the 
decision maker in the presence of a standard might make standards more vulnerable for 
corruption. Thus, standards may not work so well in developing countries with corruption 
problems. Note, also, that there might be substantial biases present when the decision maker 
assesses evidence. This might have more impact under the standard approach than under the 
rule approach. This will be further elaborated upon in Chapter Five. If such biases are likely 
to occur, this would reduce the benefits of less expected errors associated with a standard. 
There is also a close connection between losses from errors and standard of proof, as 
explored in Chapter Two and will be explored further in Chapter Five. The flexibility of the 
standard of proof is a relevant factor to take into account in the choice between rules and 
standards. To the author’s knowledge, this point is not formally explored in the law and 
economics literature, but an informal explanation is offered here. The rational minimization of 
expected loss means that the decision maker can adjust the standard of proof according to the 
relative consequences of errors. If a wrong decision in one direction is worse than a wrong 
                                                 
199 See Hylton (2003) for this approach to analyze per se versus rule of reason in antitrust p. 129 f. 
200 Kaplow (2000). 
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decision in the other direction, then the confidence in the facts right for the first decision must 
be higher for the first decision to be rational. This rational adjustment of the standard of proof 
mitigates the losses when choosing between standard and rule. If a standard is more precise in 
addressing the correct behavior, making the expected loss lower, then it is more likely that the 
optimal standard of proof is closer to a balance of probabilities.201  If there is a risk that a rule 
is over-inclusive, this reduces the relative cost of type-2 errors, as there is a chance that 
deciding not violation is beneficial even where the law was actually violated. This calls for a 
high standard of proof for finding a violation in the presence of over-inclusive rules. This high 
standard of proof mitigates the expected losses from over-inclusive rules. The mitigation of 
losses through the right standard of proof does not apply if the standard of proof that has to be 
applied is not adaptable to the specific circumstances of the case. If a high standard of proof is 
justified by the risk of over-inclusiveness associated with rules is also applied to a standard 
where there is less risk over-inclusiveness, this mitigates the benefits associated with the 
greater flexibility in the standard. Thus, if an exogenously determined standard of proof is 
determined by the risk of errors associated with rules, and this standard of proof is used in the 
application of the standard, the benefits from introducing a standard is reduced. Conversely, if 
the legally determined standard of proof has its background in a flexible standard, and the 
standard of proof is not adjusted with the introduction of rules, this might mitigate the benefit 
of rules. A simpler way to say this is that if the standard of proof is not flexible, this must be 
taken into account in the choice between rules and standards.  
Thus, no robust answer as to whether standards or rules are generally best in reducing 
the expected error of a decision is apparent. This depends on the other factors discussed in 
this section. This includes factors such the need for flexibility, the risk of rent-seeking, at 
what level the decision can best be made, and the benefits from legal certainty. These issues 
are discussed in turn below.     
Flexibility and adaptability 
Standards are more flexible than rules.202 Standards can better address the specific facts in 
question. Standards increase the room for discretion by the enforcement authorities and, 
ultimately, the courts.  This may make it easier to make decisions and promote conduct that 
complies with the purpose of the law, despite changes in circumstances. The conduct can be 
                                                 
201 However, if a standard is used, errors might be more likely in marginal cases where the expected loss of 
making error is smaller. 
202 Parisi (2004). 
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assessed in light of the development of the society, scientific development, and other 
circumstances. Standards are, in other words, adaptable to such developments. In antitrust 
law, the scientific development, in particular in the science of economics, has had a crucial 
impact on what interferences in the market are considered suitable to promote competition 
and economic welfare. If the antitrust law had been rule-based from the start and based on the 
economic theory available more than 100 years ago, those rules might have been a terrible fit 
to the understanding of economics today. The more rapidly the development of circumstances 
is crucial for good regulations, the more advantageous are the standards.203 Another way to 
say this is that the more often a rule becomes obsolete and must be revised to fit with the 
regulatory purpose of the rule, the more advantageous it is to use a standard instead. 
Standards are more adaptable to learning by the decision makers. By using a standard, 
it allows for utilizing the accumulated learning from former cases.204  This is, in particular, 
relevant for specialized enforcement authorities that accumulate experiences from their own 
actions and that may improve their knowledge by performing ex-post assessments thereof. 
Thus, if the learning from case handling is likely to improve the assessments necessary to 
reach the purposes behind a rule, this speaks for using a standard. The learning aspect also 
justifies a case-law created development from standards to rules.205 As the decision makers 
become more confident on the correct regulation on some specific behavior, they may state 
rules to reduce future application costs. In antitrust law, this is illustrated by the early case-
law based establishment of per se violations of the Sherman Act derived from the standard 
based statutes.  
An evolution from standards to rules is natural as more precise knowledge either from 
scientific development or learning is gained. However, there are examples of the opposite. It 
might be realized over time that the effects of some conduct are so complex and context-
specific that a rule is not suitable. Thus, we might also experience an evolution from rules to 
standards. This might characterize the evolution towards an effects-based, or more economic, 
approach in the EU.206 In the US, the Supreme Court abandoned the per se rule approach to 
                                                 
203 Erlich and Posner (1974) and Fon and Parisi (2007). 
204 Schäfer (2006). 
205 Kaplow (2000). 
206 A specific example is the standard of merger control in the EU. In the previous EU merger regulation, the test 
of illegality was whether the merger created or strengthened a dominant position, which is known as the 
dominance test. This was a more rule-oriented test than the significant impediment of effective competition test 
(SIEC-test) in the present merger regulation. Economic theory and enforcement practice showed that the 
dominance-test did not satisfactorily address all potentially harmful mergers. With the SIEC-test the EU got a 
more standard oriented approach more flexible to developments in economic theory and experiences.          .   
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minimum resale price maintenance and established a standard-based rule of reason approach 
for such conduct in Leegin.207   
Legal certainty 
An obvious argument for rules is that they provide more legal certainty in terms of 
predictability.208 Predictable rules reduce the costs of applying the rule, as mentioned above. 
It is normally cheaper to assess the legality of some action regulated by a rule than by a 
standard. However, legal certainty provides more benefits than just the reduced costs of 
learning the rule. Legal certainty makes it easier to comply with the rule in general. Persons 
can assess the legal consequences associated with their actions with more confidence. Less 
predictability of the outcome of an assessment against a standard may cause risk-averse 
agents to over-comply with rules. In antitrust, over-compliance might result in less aggressive 
competitive behavior detrimental to competition. In addition, legal certainty in contrast to 
legal arbitrariness promotes deterrence because the relative gain from complying with the law 
increases.209 Note that Katsoulacos and Ulph (2010a), who study legal certainty in an antitrust 
context, have another opinion. They point out that some legal uncertainty may increase the 
welfare associated with a standard. This will depend on whether the uncertainty performs 
better in deterring more harmful actions that else would not have been deterred than deterring 
beneficial actions that else would not have been deterred.210  
However, it is not necessarily always the case that rules provide more legal certainty 
than standards. As rules evolve to become more complex and extensive, what specific rule 
that applies to a specific situation might be associated with substantial uncertainty. Applying 
some predictable standard might be better and provide more legal certainty.211 For instance, to 
assess whether some conduct is covered by an antitrust per se rule or not might be less 
predictable than to just answer the question if the conduct is likely to restrict competition or 
not. In particular, this may be the case for business decision makers. For instance, if some 
business managers plan to exchange some information, it might be easier for them to relate to 
                                                 
207 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
208 Sullivan (1992), Parisi (2004). 
209 See Posner (2011) p. 827. If the risk of being convicted is not much different whether you follow the law or 
not, one might as well break the law. See Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) for an exploration of this argument in 
antitrust enforcement using a collusion-model.   
210 See also the discussion in Posner (2011) p. 826 f. 
211 Fan and Parisi (2007) 
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the question of whether this exchange is likely to restrict competition than to relate to a large 
complex body of rules that regulates information exchange.212   
Rent-seeking biases 
In the literature, the reduced rent-seeking costs in the application of the rules have been 
indicated as an advantage with rules relative to standards.213 With standards, there is more 
room for discretion, which again gives more room for rent-seeking in the application of the 
standard.  Rent-seeking involves investment in non-meritorious arguments to persuade the 
decision maker to make a wrong decision. Rent-seeking not only involves the real costs 
associated with the rent-seeking activities as such, but also the costs of errors if the rent-
seeker succeeds in persuading the decision maker to make a wrong decision. Rent-seeking 
might, for instance, involve resources in trying to exploit cognitive biases or other 
irrationalities that may influence the decision maker. In the choice between rules and 
standards, we have to face the reality that the decision maker will not always make rational 
decisions. We can, for instance, not base the choice between rules and standards in antitrust 
on the premise that the decision maker will rationally assess the economic evidence according 
to its merits. This will be discussed further both in Chapter Five and Six. The parties involved 
will not necessarily have any interest in the correct assessment of evidence. This lays the 
ground for rent seeking. Thus, properties of actual decision making must be taken into 
account in the choice between rules and standards. If it is a large chance that evidence will be 
assessed incorrectly, the benefits of a standard are reduced.    
However, the rent-seeking argument for rules must be modified. Although a rule might 
reduce the potential for rent seeking in the specific case, a rule approach might shift some of 
the rent-seeking form the application of the rule to the creation of the rule.214 Rent-seeking at 
the creation stage of the rule might give a non-optimal rule and have much greater 
consequences than the case by case rent-seeking associated with a standard. This is particular 
relevant for promulgation, though this is outside the scope for this study. Still, by the principle 
of precedence this is also relevant for court-made rules. The principle of precedence will be 
returned to below.   
                                                 
212 The costs of complexity in the discussion on precision of rules will be returned to below.   
213 See for instance Christiansen and Kerber (2006).  
214 See Christiansen and Kerber (2006), Kaplow (2000) and Posner (2007) p. 583 f. 
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Knowledge and decision level   
The choice between rules and standard is also a choice between decision levels.215  Standards 
leave more discretion at the level at which the decision is taken. Rules retain more control at 
the rule-making level. A standard may utilize decentralized knowledge gained by the decision 
maker. This may apply to situations where decentralized learning is important in 
understanding the consequences of alternative decisions.216 It is not always the case that 
decentralized knowledge is superior to centralized knowledge. When rules are promulgated 
after a careful assessment involving hearings of all parties affected by the rules, the rules can 
reflect more knowledge than the knowledge that can be utilized in standards. The legislator 
can exploit informational advantages in knowing what kinds of behaviors which are 
harmful.217 As mentioned, promulgation is outside the scope of this study; however, this is 
still worth noting because if courts and other antitrust decision makers want to create rules, 
some of the same considerations should be taken into account. Has the decision maker such a 
superior knowledge to trump the benefit of decentralized knowledge?   
4.2.2 Rational precision level of antitrust rules 
Precision level of rules 
Another issue in the formulation and determination of legal rules is the precision level of the 
rules. This is also referred to as the level of differentiation in the law, the level of complexity 
of the law, or the level of detail in the law. The precision level is, in principle, relevant both 
for standards and rules. A standard can be more precise by, for instance, prohibiting 
anticompetitive conduct detrimental to welfare instead of just anticompetitive conduct. Rules 
can be more precise by describing in more detail when a certain conduct is illegal. For 
instance, “agreements on prices between competitors holding more than 10 percent of the 
market each are illegal” is more precise than “agreement on prices is illegal between 
competitors”. Although precision level is relevant for both a standard approach and a rule 
approach, the precision level of rules will be given most attention here. A more precise rule 
can, in some sense, reduce the difference between rules and standards as more detailed rules 
can reflect a more differentiated legal assessment of distinguishable types of factual 
situations. In addition, more precise rules can combine standards and rules. A rule can, for 
                                                 
215 Kaplow (2002). 
216 Schäfer (2006). 
217 See Kaplow (1993). For instance, government agencies might have an advantage in knowing what substances 
which are harmful to environment. The government might also, for instance, have more information on the 
potential harm of driving fast in an area, making them more suitable to regulate the speed limit as a rule.   
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instance, say that “agreements on price between competitors together holding less than 10 
percent of the market are always legal, agreements on a price between competitors together 
holding between 10 and 60 percent of the market are illegal if they restrict competition, and 
agreements on a price between competitors together holding more than 60 percent of the 
market are always illegal”. This legal rule applies a standard to the middle case where the 
competitors together hold between 10 and 60 percent of the market.          
In antitrust, the statutory laws themselves are not very precise. The more precise rules 
must be derived from an interpretation of the law, where court precedence, and especially 
Supreme Court precedence, is an important source. Above, the distinction between standards 
and rules in antitrust law implemented as a distinction between per se rules and rule of reason 
rules in the US was discussed. The parallel in the EU it is the distinction between conduct that 
restricts competition by object and that conduct that restricts competition by effect. In 
practice, the distinction in both systems is blurred into more precise rules. There are 
intermediate forms where more precise presumption rules gradually have evolved from 
precedence. This is often described as structured rule of reason, truncated rule of reason, or a 
“quick look” approach.218 This means that a full-fledged effect analysis of conduct might not 
be necessary, but still some further investigations of the factual circumstances has to be done 
than just establishing the conduct as such, such as investigating some structural characteristics 
of the market in question. Anticompetitive effects are presumed if some facts are present 
without the need of a full rule of reason inquiry. The stronger the presumption that some 
conduct is harmful to competition, the less need there is for an analysis of effects. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the section on standards, rules, and precision level in the actual 
determination of antitrust law.   
The efficient precision level of rules is studied in law and economics. The optimal 
precision of rules is touched upon in Ehrlich and Posner (1974). A seminal contribution is 
Kaplow (1995), summarized in Kaplow (2000). The main idea is that more precise rules are 
more costly to draft and more costly to apply, but provide benefits by precisely addressing the 
intended conduct. The expected loss from errors is thus lower. Christiansen and Kerber 
(2006) studies optimal differentiated rules in an antitrust context. The authors criticize the 
European Commission for not adequately exploring the possibility of optimal differentiated 
rules in the pursuit of a more effect-based approach in antitrust. Beckner and Salop (1999) 
uses decision theory to study optimal rules in antitrust. This is developed further in Kerber et 
                                                 
218 See Cristiansen and Kerber (2006), Hovenkamp (2005) p. 265 f., Gellhorn et al. (2004) p. 200 f. and Hylton 
(2003) p. 113 f. See also Gavil (2008). 
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al. (2008) and Kretschmer (2011b), which study optimal sequential investigation rules in 
antitrust. Kretschmer (2011) surveys both the general law and economics literature and the 
antitrust law and economics literature on the optimal precision of rules. Gavil (2008) studies a 
quick-look approach in a burden of proof context.   
The decision theoretic model 
A rational decision can be made by making the decision that maximizes expected utility, 
which is the same as minimizing expected loss.219 The basic framework is the same as the one 
used to compare rules and standards. Let ELR be the expected loss of a rule. Thus, this is the 
accumulated type-1 errors (wrongfully finding violation) and type-2 errors (wrongfully 
finding not violation) associated with the application of the rule. Note that deterrence and 
eventual over-deterrence and under-deterrence are implicitly covered by the model. A 
consequence of type-1 errors is that not only the conduct in question, but also similar conduct 
due to the precedence effect, is discouraged. This is over-deterrence. Similarly, type-2 errors 
may lead to under-deterrence.220  We can separate the expected loss of the rule, ELR, into 
ELRt1 and ELRt2, as the expected loss of errors due to type-1 errors and type-2 errors, 
respectively. 
Assume that C is the cost of first formulating the rule and then applying the rule 




Now, let d be the precision level of the rule. The precision level affects both the 
expected losses from applying the rule and the costs of drafting and applying the rule. This 





This model is similar to the analytical framework used in Christiansen and Kerber 
(2006). The level of precession has an effect on the expected loss of errors, both type-1 and 
type-2 errors. The costs of formulation and application are also dependent on the precision 
                                                 
219 This can be derived from the axioms of rational behavior. An intuitive explanation is that this is the decision 
rule that minimize losses in the long run.    
220 See Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) and Sørgard (2008) for the modeling of deterrence effects and errors in 
antitrust enforcement.  
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level, d. The optimal level of precision is where the gain from more precise rules equals the 
costs of more precise rules. This is where the marginal gain of precision, which are the 
reduced expected losses from errors, equals the marginal cost of precision.221  
 Various factors that might influence the optimal precision level of rules are discussed 
below. Lessons from the law and economics literature as well as the specialized literature on 
antitrust law and economics are relied upon, using examples from antitrust. However, the 
discussion of the choice of precision level in the actual determination of antitrust rules will be 
discussed in a separate section below.     
Costs of formulation and application 
On the contrary to the choice between rules and standard that was discussed above, it is not 
necessarily a tradeoff between the costs of formulating the rules and the cost of applying the 
rules in the choice of how precise rules should be. Rules that are more differentiated are likely 
to be associated with both higher formulation costs and higher application costs.  
 The cost of formulating precise rules that always correctly address the conduct to be 
prohibited might be prohibitive. Note that by “more precise rules” in this context, also “more 
correct rules” is meant, as very detailed rules drafted at random are likely to be under-
inclusive or over-inclusive, thus not improving the decisions. The lack of precision in the 
Sherman Act can partly be explained by prohibitive costs of formulating more precise rules.  
The drafters in the 1880s did not know the developments in economic theory that have been 
so influential as to what antitrust rules that are considered correct today.  
The other cost element is the cost of applying the rule for enforcement authorities, 
private parties, and the courts. Precision increases the legal complexity. More complex rules 
are generally considered to be more costly to apply both because of learning costs and 
because more facts have to be gathered and analyzed in the application of the rules. Thus, 
information costs associated with more precise rules are higher.222 Note that more precise 
rules in this context mean more selection criteria.223 More detailed rules, in terms of more 
words, do not necessarily involve higher information cost. In general terms, it is not difficult 
find situations where a rule with a lower number of words is associated with higher 
information costs. If the legal rule is a shortly stated standard, the costs of determining 
                                                 
221 See Christiansen and Kerber (2006).   
222 See Kaplow (2000). 
223 See Kaplow (1995).  
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whether this standard is satisfied or not may involve higher costs than assessing the facts 
associated with a rule with a higher number of words.      
Error costs  
If more differentiated rules are associated with higher formulation and application costs, the 
benefits must come in the form of lower expected losses from errors. Increasing the 
differentiation level of rules has an effect on the expected losses from both type-1 errors 
(falsely finding violation) and type-2 errors (falsely finding not violation). A more precise 
rule will reduce the expected losses. This is valid either when the less precise rule is over-
inclusive or under-inclusive from the start. Assume that the original rule is over-inclusive, for 
instance, by stating that all horizontal mergers are prohibited. The loss from a type-2 error 
with such an over-inclusive rule, which is not finding a horizontal merger when there was a 
horizontal merger, is low because it is likely that many horizontal mergers are beneficial to 
welfare anyway. A more precise rule stating which horizontal mergers that are prohibited 
increases the loss from type-2 errors in case of over-inclusive rules. When it comes to losses 
from type-1 errors, the losses from these errors will be reduced because, with a less over-
inclusive rule, those mergers that are wrongfully prohibited are likely to be “border cases” 
closer to those harmful mergers that are prohibited. With more precise rules, the losses from 
type-2 errors will increase, while the losses from type-1 errors will be reduced. This makes it 
optimal to avoid more type-2 errors, which will reduce the expected losses of the rule. The 
reason is that it will be optimal to avoid more type-2 errors at the same time as the losses from 
more type-1 errors are reduced. This will result in a more optimal mix of error avoidance. 
Fewer errors will occur, which will reduce the expected losses of the rule.224 The same 
argument can be used if the original rule is under-inclusive. In other words, more precise rules 
are likely to discourage more harmful behaviors and allow more beneficial behaviors on 
average.225 The rule will more often correctly address the conduct intended. Expected losses 
from errors are reduced.  
Note that the standard of proof should rationally be determined endogenously. With 
very over-inclusive or under-inclusive rules, the decision theoretic correct standard of proof 
might either be very high or very low. If we, for instance, have a very over-inclusive rule 
saying that all horizontal mergers are prohibited, a high standard of proof may mitigate many 
                                                 
224 See Christiansen and Kerber (2006) for a similar argument. See also Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), which also 
models deterrence effects explicitly. 
225 See Kaplow (2000).  
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
96 
of the harmful interventions that such a rule facilitates. This high standard of proof may not 
correspond to the exogenously determined standard of proof that has to be applied according 
to the law. A more precise rule makes it more likely that balance of probabilities will be 
closer to the decision theoretic correct standard of proof. Thus, what the correct legal 
precision level is may also depend also on the standard of proof, or at least the flexibility of 
the standard of proof. 
Rent-seeking 
One important question is how differentiation of rules affects rent-seeking costs. The more 
criteria it is necessary to assess to establish some legal consequences, the more room there is 
for rent-seeking. Isolated, based on this inference, more precise rules are more prone to rent-
seeking. On the other hand, more precise criteria may make it more difficult to disguise the 
facts as a consequence of rent-seeking. From this perspective, more differentiated rules are 
less prone to rent-seeking.  
It is difficult to give some robust statements regarding rent-seeking and precision level 
of rules. However, if decision makers are prone to increasing the differentiation level when 
they actually determine the rules, this opens the gates for rent-seeking behavior from parties 
who will argue that their particular case should be differentiated out of the rule. A defendant 
has, for instance, incentives to argue that his specific case should not be subject to a per se 
rule, arguing for criteria in the per se rule that exclude his case from the per se rule. The per se 
rules in the US have been narrowed after such arguments.226 In this sense, the possibility for 
achieving more differentiated rules by argumentation may facilitate rent-seeking for an 
increased non-meritorious differentiation level.  
Another issue related to rent-seeking and differentiation of rules may emerge if rules 
are not rational. If rules are irrational and incoherent, the parties will argue that their case 
should be assessed according to the most lenient rule. It has, for instance, been argued that 
incoherent rules may have developed under the abuse of dominance-test in the EU. For 
instance, margin squeeze is argued to be treated more harshly than refusal to deal.227 This 
might both give incentives to rent-seeking and ineffective adaption to the rules.  
                                                 
226 See Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 57 f. See also Gavil (2008).  
227 See OECD (2009) p. 21 f. 
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Legal certainty is about being able to predict the legal consequences of conduct. If more 
precise rules mean more transparency surrounding the legal criteria applied, then more precise 
rules should contribute to more legal certainty. However, a higher precision level is about 
using more specific criteria to differentiate the legal assessment of different kinds of behavior 
that are likely to have different consequences. As the body of rules become more complex and 
more costly to learn, this may, in the end, be detrimental to legal certainty.  
Optimal sequential rules 
In the antitrust law and economics literature, the study of optimal sequential rules represents a 
further development of the study of optimal precision of rules. Optimal sequential rules can 
be regarded as the optimal depth of rules. A seminal contribution is Beckner and Salop 
(1999), further developed by Kerber et al. (2008) and Kretschmer (2011b), in the form of 
optimal sequential investigation rules. Optimal sequential rules can be represented by a 
decision tree, where one optimally gathers evidence according to its probative force and costs. 
The presence of specific evidence determines whether the case should be decided on the 
evidence already gathered or if further scrutiny is necessary. It appears that this issue belongs 
closer to the rationality in the assessment of evidence. Thus, the literature on optimal 
sequential decisions the application of antitrust law will be discussed in Chapter Five.         
4.2.3 Rules, standards, and precision in the actual determination of antitrust law  
As follows from the decision theoretic analysis above, there is a substantial amount of law 
and economics literature that enlighten the rational choice between rules and standards and 
the choice of precision level in antitrust. The question will be to what extent the 
recommendations from this literature actually have been implemented by the antitrust 
decision makers. The analysis of the choice between rules and standards and choosing the 
precision level of rules is relevant both in the statutory design of rules and the later 
determination of precedence-based rules. Here, the statutory design is taken as given, so the 
attention will be given to the determination of rules by the antitrust decision makers.  
It would be a far too ambitious a task for this study to try to determine all the antitrust 
rules derived from the statutory antitrust standards and assess whether these rules are rational 
or not. However, some insight is offered into the factors that have actually been applied in the 
choice between rules and standards, and in determining the precision level of antitrust rules, 
and whether these factors are likely to give rational rules. The choice between rules and 
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standards and the choice of precision level is discussed together since the two topics overlap 
and are interrelated. The categorical choice between rules and standards has evolved into 
more precise rules based on presumptions.  
The actual choice between rules and standards in antitrust law will only be discussed 
in the context of the substantive assessments of law associated with the cooperation and abuse 
of dominance/monopolization provisions and merger control. The choice between rules and 
standards and the choice of precision level also applies to other legal issues, such as in the 
determination of what an “undertaking” is in EU competition law and what a “person” is in 
US antitrust law. However, such technical details will not be discussed here.          
4.2.4 Rules, standards, and precision in US antitrust law 
Per se versus rule of reason 
The distinction between rules and standards appeared early in the application of US antitrust 
law, although with some analytical differences from the way of practicing antitrust analysis 
today. The story in the US starts already with Addyston Pype228 in 1898, where the Supreme 
Court distinguished between ancillary restraints and naked restraints. This distinction was 
based on the common law heritage of US antitrust law. If prices where set by means other 
than competition, it was a naked restraint and illegal. An ancillary restraint however, which 
was a restraint on competition ancillary to some agreement with a legitimate objective, was to 
be assessed according to its reasonableness. This way to look at it was challenged in Standard 
Oil229 in 1911, which resulted in the requirement of a full rule of reason analysis in all cases. 
Some years later, in Trenton Potteries,230 the Supreme Court lay the ground for the modern 
way of distinguishing between “per se” and “rule of reason” violations of antitrust. In GTE 
Sylvania231 the court stated that per se rules apply to practices that are “manifestly 
anticompetitive.” In National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE)232 the court stated 
that  
 
[t]here are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first 
category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly 
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their 
illegality—they are “illegal per se.” In the second category are agreements whose 
                                                 
228 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1898).  
229 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
230 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
231 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) at 50. 
232 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
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competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, 
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.233  
 
The Supreme Court has stated in Topco that “[i]t is only after considerable experience with 
certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman 
Act.” 234  
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has in State Oil  
 
[…] expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the 
context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not 
immediately obvious.235  
 
In addition, it can be mentioned that the US guidelines on cooperation between competitors236 
(horizontal cooperation) states in Section 3.2 that  
 
Agreements of a type that always or almost always tends to raise price or to reduce 
output are per se illegal. The Agencies challenge such agreements, once identified, as 
per se illegal.  
 
The courts have shown through practice that the assessment is dynamic. On various occasions 
the, courts have changed rules when the current rules, in light of new knowledge, no longer 
seemed manifestly anticompetitive. In particular, this became evident with the insight 
provided by the Chicago-school in the 1970s. The Chicago-school used developments in 
economic theory to criticize the prevailing skepticism against vertical restraints. The impact 
of the Chicago-school will be discussed further in Chapter Six.  One Chicago-school inspired 
landmark case was the above-mentioned GTE Sylvania, which stated that non-price vertical 
intra-brand restraints should be judged according to the rule of reason. Another landmark 
decision is Leegin,237 which provided the final chapter in a series of decisions phasing out the 
per se prohibition of resale price maintenance established in Dr. Miles.238 In Leegin it was 
established that the last remaining element of the per se rule associated with resale price 
maintenance, the prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance, was also to be assessed 
                                                 
233 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) at 692.  
234 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
235 State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) at 10. 
236Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors issued by the Federal Trade Commission and US 
Department of Justice (04/2000). 
237 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
238 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
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according to rule of reason. Thus, this practice was no longer considered “manifestly 
anticompetitive.”   
Even though the US Supreme Court has expressed experiences as a determining factor 
in establishing per se rules, and eventually abandoning per se rules, theory seems to have had 
a large influence in practice. Some of the most important changes in the US regarding per se 
rules followed the Chicago school critique in the 1970s. As mentioned above, The US 
Supreme Courts abandoned many of the formerly per se treatments of certain vertical 
restraints in GTE Sylvania. On the other hand, some per se violations that one should expect 
to have been abandoned in light of the Chicago-school critique still remained for a long time. 
An example is minimum resale price maintenance, which was abandoned in the end, but not 
before 2007. 
In the statements above, the main question as to whether a restriction should be 
considered a violation per se is whether the restriction is anticompetitive with sufficient 
confidence by being “manifestly anticompetitive.” The anticompetitive effects must be so 
certain that the flexibility to assess the cases individually is not necessary. The statements of 
the US Supreme Court also seem to require actual experiences to establish per se violations. 
Thus, theoretical assessment should not be enough. It can be questioned, however, as to what 
extent this requirement has been implemented in practice. Firstly, there might be 
methodological difficulties in assessing the actual effects of certain practices. These 
difficulties will be elaborated on in Chapter Six. Experiences will, of course, also include the 
courts’ own experiences that certain practices have almost always been considered a violation 
under the rule of reason standard, qualifying them for a per se treatment. The courts have then 
utilized decentralized learning as described in the decision theoretic analysis above. However, 
if some practices are considered harmful just because they have always been considered 
harmful before, this might be a problem of path-dependence. Path-dependence will be further 
discussed in the subchapter on the evolution of legal rules below.  
The confidence in the anticompetitive effects of certain practices is a relevant factor in 
assessing the expected loss of a legal rule. It says something about the probability that some 
type of conduct has anticompetitive effects and thus the probability of falsely condemning 
lawful behavior (type-1 error) or falsely accepting unlawful behavior (type-2 error). With high 
confidence in the anticompetitive effects, the probability of making errors is low, reducing the 
need for individual assessments. The consequences of making a wrongful decision are, 
however, also relevant. Even if there is a high probability that some conduct has 
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anticompetitive effects, choosing a rule will still, on a few occasions, deter beneficial 
behavior. Such a rule might be irrational if the consequences of condemning beneficial 
behavior are high relative to the consequences failing to condemn harmful behavior. Thus, the 
consequences of making errors should be taken into account in the considerations. This is not 
explicitly taken into account in the criteria established by the US courts. It could be argued 
that those kinds of conduct that are assumed to almost always have anticompetitive effects are 
not likely to have large positive effects anyway in those few occasions in which the effects are 
not negative, which would make it unnecessary to take the consequences of errors into 
account. This might not always be the case, especially in abuse of dominance cases. 
Condemning conduct that is likely to be anticompetitive but may facilitate innovation in a few 
occasions may have large consequences in terms of expected errors. Thus, if the courts want 
to make a rational choice between rules and standards, errors should be taken properly into 
account.    
Costs of formulation and application are also relevant in the choice between rules and 
standards. Are the reduced variable costs associated with a rule worth the fixed cost of 
formulating the rule? This factor is not explicitly mentioned by the courts. Furthermore, the 
courts have not explicitly mentioned the costs associated with rent-seeking, which may tip the 
scale in favor of a rule.  
Thus, as a conclusion, it seems like the determining factor for the US courts in the 
choice between rules and standards is a high probability of anticompetitive effects. Both 
actual experiences and theory are relevant for assessing the probability. This probability is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to take into account in determining rational rules. 
From per se versus rule of reason to precision and presumptions 
The distinction between per se rules and rule of reason rules has become blurred in recent 
practice.239 On the one hand, per se rules get more and more precise by incorporating more 
criteria relevant for a per se rule to apply240. On the other hand, a rule of reason assessment 
has to stop at some point. Dependent on the type of case, the rule of reason assessment can be 
better described as a truncated rule of reason, structured rule of reason, or “quick look” 
approach, which is something in between per se and rule of reason.241  
                                                 
239 Hovenkamp (2005) p. 265 f 
240 See Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 57 f., Hovenkamp (2005) p. 255 f. 
241 See Cristiansen and Kerber (2006), Hovenkamp (2005) p. 265 f., Gellhorn et al. (2004) p. 200 f. and Hylton 
(2003) p. 113 f. See also Gavil (2008). 
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One of the first cases that illustrates the blurred distinction between per se rules and 
rule of reason is Broadcast Music. Here, the Supreme Court stated that   
 
in characterizing this conduct under the per se rule,  our inquiry must focus on whether 
the effect and, here because it tends to show effect, […], the purpose of the practice are 
to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy - that is, 
whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or  almost always 
tend to restrict competition and decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or 
instead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather 
than less, competitive".242  
 
This statement can be interpreted as meaning that it is always possible to argue for the 
efficiencies of some conduct subject to per se scrutiny. If it is always possible to argue that 
the conduct in question generates efficiencies, and thus is not subject to a “per se” treatment, 
this is in reality a rule of reason assessment.243 The statement means that efficient practices in 
principle escape the “per se” treatment as long as the efficiencies can be proven. This means 
that it is always a standard “residual” in every per se rule. But then, per se is not a pure rule 
anymore but a presumption principle, like in the EU.  
 In California Dental the Supreme Court more explicit states the blurred distinction 
between per se and rule of reason. Here, the court stated that   
 
[t]he truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than 
terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of reason” tend to make them appear. We 
have recognized, for example, that “there is often no bright line separating per se from 
Rule of Reason analysis,” since “considerable inquiry into market conditions” may be 
required before the application of any so-called “per se” condemnation is justified.244  
 
This statement confirms that an inquiry into market conditions may be required also in per se 
offences. This decision also includes a specific comment regarding preciseness. Referring to 
the antitrust scholar P. Areeda, the Court states that Areeda  
 
cautioned against the risk of misleading even in speaking of a ‘spectrum’ of adequate 
reasonableness analysis for passing upon antitrust claims: “There is always something 
of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding scale formula 
deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for… . Nevertheless, the 
quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances”.245  
                                                 
242 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) at 19-20. 
243 See Elhauge and Geradin (2007) p. 57. 
244 California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) at 779. 
245 California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) at 780. 
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Here the court, with reference to P. Areeda, indicates that the extent of a reasonableness 
inquiry depends on the circumstances. This is elaborated on in the subsequent passage, where 
the court stated that  
 
As the circumstances here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be 
drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of 
anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, 
rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic 
of a restraint. The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so 
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of 
a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more 
sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses 
in case after case reach identical conclusions.246  
 
Thus, the scope of inquiry is dependent on experiences with the effects of the conduct under 
scrutiny, which was also the topic in determining whether some conduct should be subject to 
per se treatment. The more confidence in the effects of some conduct, the less is the need for 
an initial assessment of the evidence of the case. The conduct can be said to be subject to an a 
priori assessment of the anticompetitive effects. The stronger the a priori probability of 
harmful effects, the less is the need for an in initial inquiry of actual evidence of harmful 
effects. This is in line with rational evidence assessment, which will be discussed in Chapter 
Five. A quick look creates a presumption that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.247 If 
the defendant manages to present evidence of efficiencies, a more careful inquiry is necessary. 
From a dynamical perspective, this case contributes to new learning, making it possible to do 
more precise a priori assessments in the future.         
Thus, instead of talking about standards and rules and preciseness of rules, we can talk 
about presumption rules that become more precise as we learn more about different kinds of 
conduct. The probability of anticompetitive effects seems to be the main factor in the actual 
determination of the presumptions. The confidence in anticompetitive effects as a basis for the 
legal rules contributes to less expected error losses in a decision theoretic sense. However, 
there are other determining factors for both the choice between rules and standards and the 
optimal precision of rules.  
The consequences of errors should also be taken into account, as described above.  
Furthermore, by abandoning a categorical distinction between rules and standards by 
                                                 
246 California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) at 780-781. 
247 See Gavil (2008) for the same point of view.  
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abandoning a clear distinction between per se and rule of reason regulations, the benefits of 
rules are lost. If there is always room for an individual assessment, then the application costs 
saved from precluding such individual assessments are lost. Utilizing presumptions instead of 
individual assessment in each case will, however, realize some application cost savings 
associated with standards. Getting more and more precise presumption rules may reduce the 
expected errors in individual cases, but the increased costs of complexity should also be taken 
into account. This complexity might also be detrimental to legal certainty. Furthermore, 
leaving the floor open for arguing for a more precise rule in every case facilitate rent-seeking. 
Thus, even if one of the imperative factors in rational rules is taken into account, namely the 
probability of error, more factors should be considered if one wants to obtain rational rules.   
Briefly about merger control 
Mergers are, in general, assessed according to an effects standard as described in the legal 
framework chapter above. The importance of always having the standard in mind in assessing 
mergers was illustrated by Brunswick,248 which was a private merger suit. In Brunswick, a 
competitor tried to challenge a merger claiming damages for the increased competition 
resulting from the efficiencies created by the merger. The merger created a more efficient 
competitor. The court stated that this was not antitrust injury and refused the plaintiff 
standing.   
Mergers are, in general, likely to create efficiencies. Thus, most mergers should be 
assessed according to a standard. Merger control is, in general, of another nature than 
enforcing violations as mergers are often challenged by public enforcement authorities in ex 
ante control. The result is that merger control is usually not subject to punitive remedies, but 
rather to less judgmental regulatory remedies.  
In merger control, it is often not a question of total prohibition or clearance but more 
about finding acceptable measures that suitably address the anticompetitive concerns. This 
need for flexibility speaks for assessing mergers according to a standard. It might be that more 
or less precise per se violations could have merits in a few areas of merger control such as 
horizontal mergers between the largest firms in a market. However, it is outside the scope of 
this study to determine if that would actually be rational.   
Presumptions are utilized to achieve efficiency in merger control. The determination 
of the presumption rules used in US merger control has not been subject to the same 
                                                 
248 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
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principled debate as the regulation of market conduct, as described above. The most widely 
used presumptions are found in the horizontal merger guidelines,249 where concentration level 
and increase in concentration level is used to screen mergers that are not likely to raise 
anticompetitive concerns.     
Thus, as with the violations, the use of presumptions is the assessment principle used 
in merger control. Still, merger control seems to be more flexible with less prefixed 
presumptions than in the enforcement of the violations.  
4.2.5 Rules, standards, and precision in EU competition law  
Object versus effects 
TFEU Article 101, which prohibits anticompetitive cooperation between undertakings, does 
not distinguish between per se violations and rule of reason violations as in the US. However, 
TFEU Article 101 operates with a separation between cooperation that restrict competition by 
object and cooperation that restrict competition by effect. Object restrictions are presumed to 
be anticompetitive, leaving it to the parties to prove any beneficial effects according to TFEU 
Article 101 (3). Thus, the legality of the conduct having as its object to restrict competition is 
still assessed according to a standard, but the burden of proof is switched to the party. In 
Consten and Grundig, the ECJ stated this as  
 
[F]or the purpose of applying Article [101(1)], there is no need to take account of the 
concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition.250  
 
In the same decision, the ECJ characterized an object restriction by clauses that “reveal the 
effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious.” More recently, in BIDS and Barry 
Brothers, the ECJ distinguished object and effect restrictions by the following statement:  
 
The distinction between „infringements by object‟ and „infringements by effect‟ arises 
from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by 
their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition.251  
 
Thus, those restrictions that are sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive without further 
scrutiny are considered to restrict competition by object. However, it seems that the ECJ will 
                                                 
249 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (August 19, 2010) Section 5.3. 
250 Joined cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966].  
251 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v BIDS and Barry Brothers [2008] Para 17. 
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not accept a pure abstract approach to whether a restraint under scrutiny restricts competition 
by object. The ECJ has stated that the object classification of a specific restraint under 
scrutiny can be rebutted by an assessment of the “the economic context in which the 
agreement is to be applied.”252 In the GlaxoSmithKline saga, the CFI stated that whether the 
deprivation of advantages to consumers could be presumed by the conduct in question should 
be included in the assessment of the context of the agreement. However, this was refuted by 
the ECJ.253 In addition to the statements of the courts, the European Commission’s guidelines 
on the application of TFEU Article 101 (3),254 Section 21 states that  
 
Restrictions of competition by object are those that by their very nature have the 
potential of restricting competition. These are restrictions which in light of the 
objectives pursued by the Community competition rules have such a high potential of 
negative effects on competition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of applying 
Article 81(1) to demonstrate any actual effects on the market. This presumption is based 
on the serious nature of the restriction and on experience showing that restrictions of 
competition by object are likely to produce negative effects on the market and to 
jeopardise the objectives pursued by the Community competition rules. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, it has been argued that the EU may have something 
similar to per se prohibitions in the application of TFEU Article 102.255 Examples are selling 
below cost256 and exclusive supply agreements and pricing practices with similar effects.257 
There is no established criteria determining what would qualify as a per se violation of TFEU 
Article 102 since it is not even settled that there are such per se violations. It is more likely to 
assume that there are factual presumptions that may switch the burden of proof to the 
dominant firm in the same way that a restriction by object switches the burden of proof 
according to TFEU Article 101.258 In Michelin, the General Court stated that:  
 
If it is shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant 
position is to limit competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an effect.259  
 
                                                 
252 Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v. Commission [1984] Para 26. 
253 GlaxoSimithKline Services Unlimited v Commission Case C-501/06 etc. ECJ [2010]. 
254 Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 97-118. 
255 See also Bailey (2010).  
256 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission Case C-62/86 [1991]. 
257 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities Case 85/76 [1979]. 
258 See Bailey (2010) for the same argument. 
259 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission of the European Communities Case T-
203/01 [2003] Para 241.  
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Thus, it seems like the distinction between object an effect also applies to TFEU Article 102. 
The criteria for a restraint to be considered to restrict competition by object according to 
TFEU Article 101 should then be applied to whether a restraint restricts competition by object 
according to TFEU Article 102.   
 As follows from above there is no categorical distinction between standards and rules 
in the application of TFEU Articles 101 and 102. However, TFEU operates with two 
categories, where one category includes those restraints presumed to be anticompetitive by 
object and one includes those restraints where the anticompetitive effects must be established. 
Furthermore, whether a restraint is in the object category must be considered in light of the 
circumstances of the restraint. This is comparable to the recent development in the US 
discussed above, where the specific circumstances of the restraints are relevant for 
determining per se violations and where the distinction between per se rules and rule of 
reason analysis has blurred into a system of presumption rules where the need for assessing 
the specific circumstances of the case is dependent on the confidence in the anticompetitive 
effects a priori.  
However, there is at least a formal difference. While the courts in the US, according to 
recent practice, operate with a sliding scale, the EU operates with a categorical distinction 
between object and effect. However, despite the formal distinction between object an effect 
restrictions, it is likely to be a sliding scale. As described above, the “economic context” 
should be taken into account in the object assessment. This economic context is likely to be 
more crucial for offences on the border of the object category. On the other side, if some 
conduct in the effect category is a priori more likely to restrict competition, then less evidence 
will be necessary to establish that the conduct is anticompetitive. That said, the EU 
competition law enforcement has been criticized for being rigid and form based, which may 
indicate that this sliding scale is not as sliding as it should be, especially in the application of 
TFEU Article 102.260 This critique was met by a discussion on a more economic approach 
illustrated by the European Commission discussion paper on exclusionary practices261 from 
2005.262  
It is difficult to say whether the European Courts actually have pursued such a more 
economic approach. Some recent decisions may indicate that a transition towards a more 
                                                 
260 See Christiansen and Kerber (2006) and Geradin and Petit (2010). 
261261 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, 
Brussels, December 2005.  
262 See Christiansen and Kerber (2006). 
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economic approach may take some time. In Tomra,263 the General Court stated that the 
analysis of actual effects were not necessary where the European commission had performed 
such an effect analysis.  The object category presumptions in the EU seem to be more settled 
than those restraints that are in the per se category in the US. Some per se violations that are 
abandoned in the US, such as the per se treatment of certain vertical restraints, remain in the 
EU as restraints considered to restrict competition by object. 
 By operating with a system of presumptions, it is always possible to refute the 
presumption according to the effects standard. In this way, one forgoes the full benefits 
associated with rules, which excludes the possibility of refuting the presumption, and hence 
saves some application costs.  
The object category in EU competition law covers conducts that “can be regarded by 
their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition”. On its 
wording alone, this seems to require less than being “manifestly anticompetitive”, which is 
the US counterpart. Still, it seems that, like in the US, the probability of anticompetitive 
effects is determining for whether some conduct belongs in the object category. Determining 
presumptions that correctly address anticompetitive conduct with sufficient confidence is the 
main principle in determining whether some conduct should be in the object category. 
Avoiding errors is the main factor. Other factors such as the consequence of errors, the costs 
of formulation and application, including rent-seeking costs are not explicitly stated as factors 
that should be taken into account.  Thus, similar to US, even if one of the necessary factors 
for determining rational rules is taken into account, namely, the probability of loss from 
errors, more factors should be considered if one wants to obtain rational rules.      
Block exemptions 
In the enforcement of TFEU Article 101, so-called block exemptions may be issued by the 
Council or European Commission with delegated powers from the Council. A block 
exemption creates a safe harbor by giving a group of agreements the benefits according to 
Article 101 (3). For instance, it is issued a block exemption for certain vertical agreements 
and concerted practices.264 These block exemptions are relevant for the discussion on rules 
versus standards as safe harbors can be seen as rules that create a per se legality for certain 
                                                 
263 Tomra ASA and others v. European Commission Case T-155/06 [2010]. Upheld by the ECJ in Case 
C-549/10 P [2012].    
264 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, 
Official Journal L 102 , 23/04/2010 P. 0001 – 0007.  
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types of conduct. However, the block exemptions do not fully create a per se legality as the 
European Commission and the national competition authorities may withdraw the benefits 
from a block exemption in a single case.265 Thus, the block exemptions are more like strong 
presumptions for legality. The legal basis for the block exemptions is TFEU Article 103 (2) b, 
which states that they shall be designed  
 
to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 101(3), taking into account the 
need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify administration to 
the greatest possible extent on the other.  
 
Thus, the block exemptions are supposed to take into account effective supervision on the one 
hand and simplify administration on the other hand. This look very much like the decision 
theoretic analysis of the choice between rules and standards discussed above. The term 
“effective supervision” must mean a supervision that does not create too many errors. Safe 
harbors are likely to include at least some harmful actions depending on how extensive the 
safe harbors are. Allowing these actions can be considered as type-2 errors. To “simplify 
administration” is to reduce the application costs. By relying on a safe-harbor, both the 
enforcers and private parties save the costs of an individual assessment. As the block 
exemption can be withdrawn in single cases, the full potential of cost savings is not realized; 
however, on the other hand, the worst type-2 errors can also be avoided. Since the block 
exemptions usually address conduct with very low chances of harmful effect it can probably 
be questioned as to whether the reduced risk of type-2 errors is worth the extra costs of 
operating with a presumption rather than an irrefutable rule. Formulation costs are not 
explicitly mentioned in TFEU Article 103 (2) as a relevant cost in considering block 
exemptions. If such costs are not taken into account, it is likely to be developed too many 
block-exemptions. However, since the European Commission has limited budgets, they are 
likely to, at least indirectly, take formulation costs into account when they consider producing 
block exemptions.            
Briefly about merger control 
In merger control, there is no separation between mergers that have as their object to restrict 
competition and mergers that restrict competition according to their effects. All mergers are 
                                                 
265 See Regulation 1/2003 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25)   
article 29.  
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assessed according to its effects. The merger control in the EU is, however, interesting from a 
rule versus standard perspective. The standard for merger review changed from a “creating or 
strengthening a dominant position” test (dominance-test) in the previous merger regulation266 
to a “significant impediment of effective competition” test (SIEC-test) in the present merger 
regulation267 (EMR). The dominance-test can be said to be more a rule-based test while the 
SIEC-test is a more standard-based test. One of the main reasons for this change was the 
assumed expected errors that were likely to be associated with the dominance test. In 
particular, the risk of under-inclusiveness (failing to condemn harmful mergers) was 
associated with the dominance-test as the test was alleged to not include mergers between 
non-dominant companies that still were likely to be harmful from an oligopoly point of 
view.268 From the debate surrounding the merger review standard,269  it appears that reducing 
expected error from under-inclusiveness was the main force leading to the changes. 
Opponents partly argued that the dominance-test was sufficiently flexible and that it provided 
legal certainty. Thus, many of the decision theoretic relevant factors were involved in the 
debate. 
 As in the US, the presumptions used in merger control are not as settled as for the 
prohibition provisions discussed above. This is natural since the SIEC-test is relatively new in 
the EU. In the horizontal merger guidelines,270 concentration indexes are used to screen off 
mergers that are unlikely to create harmful effects. Usually, it will be the merging parties that 
have the burden of proof in proving efficiencies that offset the anticompetitive effects alleged 
by the European Commission.               
Guidelines 
Enforcement authorities will typically present their interpretation of rules in guidelines. 
However, when inquisitorial bodies like the European Commission produce guidelines, they 
have a particular authoritative role since they are also decision makers. Inquisitorial bodies 
can determine rules in guidelines with the confidence that they have the power to use these 
rules in their own decisions. The European Commission has developed a substantial amount 
                                                 
266 Regulation 1310/97 OJ [1997] L 180/1. 
267 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22. 
268 See Whish (2009) p. 853  
269 See, for instance, Whish (2009) p. 851-856 for a description of the debate. 
270 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03). 
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of guidelines. These include guidelines on the application of TFEU Article 101 (3),271 
guidelines on horizontal agreements,272 guidelines on vertical restraints,273 guidelines on 
horizontal mergers,274 and guidelines on non-horizontal mergers.275  
In the guidelines on horizontal agreements, Section 1.1 (7), the European Commission 
state that  
 
[g]iven the potentially large number of types and combinations of horizontal co-
operation and market circumstances in which they operate, it is difficult to provide 
specific answers for every possible scenario. These guidelines will nevertheless assist 
businesses in assessing the compatibility of an individual co-operation agreement with 
Article 101. Those criteria do not, however, constitute a ‘checklist’ which can be 
applied mechanically. Each case must be assessed on the basis of its own facts, which 
may require a flexible application of these guidelines.  
 
Similarly, in the guidelines on vertical restraints, Section I.1 (3), the Commission states that  
 
[b]y issuing these Guidelines, the Commission aims to help companies conduct their 
own assessment of vertical agreements under EU competition rules. The standards set 
forth in these Guidelines cannot be applied mechanically, but must be applied with due 
consideration for the specific circumstances of each case. Each case must be evaluated 
in the light of its own facts.  
 
Thus, the purpose of the guidelines is allegedly to provide legal certainty to the companies. 
Despite the possible good intentions, these guidelines may not be an improvement 
from a decision theoretic point of view. First, even though the guidelines stress the 
consideration of specific circumstances, the guidelines can be argued to turn the standards 
into rules. It might be that, in many cases, it is easier to relate to the antitrust standard than the 
guidelines. For some companies, it might be easier to assess whether their conduct actually 
restricts competition, than to scrutinize a substantial amount of guidelines. Furthermore, in 
addition to the problem of turning standards into specific rules, these guidelines can reflect a 
non-optimal level of detail in increasing the complexity costs.  
                                                 
271 Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 97-118. 
272 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements  Official Journal C11, 14.1.2011, p. 1. 
273 Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints Official Journal C 130, 19.05.2010, p. 1. 
274 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings Official Journal C 31, 05.02.2004, p. 5-18. 
275 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings Official Journal C 265 of 18/10/2008. 
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Enforcement authorities, especially those under supervision by political authorities, 
might, as described above, be vulnerable to rent seeking activities that can result in non-
optimal guidelines. Furthermore, enforcement authorities are often measured on what they do 
and not on what they do not do. This might mean that the enforcement authorities are more 
concerned about avoiding type-2 errors than avoiding type-1 errors. As a result of this, more 
precise rules presented by enforcement authorities are not necessarily more correct rules from 
a decision theoretic point of view. The impact of the decision makers’ incentives in the 
evolution of rules is addressed further below. 
Thus, from a decision theoretic rational point of view, it can both be questioned 
whether the guidelines really provide legal certainty and whether the European Commission 
has the correct incentives in formulating the guidelines.    
4.2.6 Discussion and critique  
It is all about presumptions  
After the discussion of the actual implementation of rules, standards, and precision level in 
US antitrust law and EU competition law, it appears that the assessment principles applied are 
not as different as might appear at first sight. The distinction between per se and rule of 
reason in the US has developed into an increasingly blurred system of presumption rules. The 
stronger the a priori belief that some conduct has anticompetitive effects, the less evidence of 
actual circumstances is needed to establish a presumption of anticompetitive effects. The EU 
competition rules have always operated by a system of presumptions where conduct 
considered restricting competition by object creates a presumption of harmful anticompetitive 
effects, while other conduct must be assessed according to its effects. However, the scope of 
the inquiry is dependent on the circumstances of the restriction, which, in practice, is blurring 
the distinction between object and effect restrictions. Conduct on the border of the object 
category will normally require more inquiry into the circumstances of the restriction to 
establish a presumption of harmful effects, while some conduct close to the object category 
will require less inquiry of the actual circumstances than some conduct very different from 
those in the object category.  
Both theory and actual learning are important in assessing the confidence of 
anticompetitive effects used in determining the presumption rules. As a matter of observation 
it seems that EU operates with stricter presumptions than in the US.   
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Standards versus rules versus precision level 
By operating with presumptions that always potentially may be refuted, both the US and EU 
apply a legal standard in antitrust analysis. Thus, an assessment according to a standard is 
preferred to a rule-based approach for all sorts of conduct. This excludes the possible benefits 
associated with rules in terms of reduced application costs. This is in line with statements 
from the courts in both the US and the EU, in both of which confidence in anticompetitive 
effects and not application costs seems to be the most important factor in the determination of 
the legal rules. This can be criticized not because it is necessarily wrong to always operate 
with at standard, but because the benefits of pure rules do not seem to have been sufficiently 
considered.  
 However, by creating presumption rules as described above, one can at least realize 
some of the benefits associated with rules within the standard assessment framework. 
Individual assessments are replaced by presumptions that may be refuted. Correct use of 
presumptions will contribute to rationality in evidence assessment. This will be further 
stressed below and discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. The theory of rational precision 
level of rules also applies to presumption rules. With presumption rules, the choice between 
rules and standards is replaced with the choice of optimal precision level of the presumption 
rules. More precise presumption rules are likely to facilitate fewer errors, but more 
preciseness is also associated with higher formulation costs and application costs.      
Are the losses from erroneous decisions properly taken into account?  
The confidence in the anticompetitive effects of certain practices is one relevant factor in 
assessing the expected loss from errors of a legal rule. This says something about the 
probability that some type conduct has anticompetitive effects and then the probability of 
falsely condemn benign behavior or falsely accept harmful behavior. With high confidence in 
the anticompetitive effects, these probabilities are low. However, the consequences of making 
a wrongful decision are also relevant in making a rational decision. Even if there is a high 
probability that some conduct has anticompetitive effects a priori, it might still be rational to 
do an in depth inquiry into the actual effects if the negative consequences of making a wrong 
decision are sufficiently high. Thus, the consequences of making errors should be taken into 
account in the considerations. This is not explicitly taken into account in the criteria 
established by the courts, in either the US or the EU. The courts focus on the confidence in 
harmful effects and not the consequence of making mistakes. It might be that those kinds of 
conduct that are assumed to almost always have anticompetitive effects are not likely to have 
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large positive effects anyway in those few occasions the effects are not negative. This reduces 
the consequences of not taking errors into account. However, this might not always be the 
case, especially in abuse of dominance cases. Condemning conduct that is likely to be 
anticompetitive but may facilitate innovation in a few occasions may have large negative 
consequences. Thus, if the courts want to state rational legal rules the consequences of errors 
should be taken into account in the assessment of how much inquiry into the actual 
circumstances of the case is necessary. 
Are the costs of formulation and application properly taken into account?    
The costs of formulation and application are important factors in determining rules. It costs 
more to formulate more precise rules. The presumption rules have two opposite effects on 
application costs. Since presumption rules partially replace individual assessments, 
application costs are saved. Thus, some of the variable cost savings associated with rules are 
implemented with the presumption rules. On the other hand, as the presumption rules 
becomes more and more precise, complexity costs arise, requiring more and more inquiry into 
the factual circumstances to determine which presumption rule applies.  
The tradeoff between the different costs is not explicitly mentioned by the courts in the 
decisions referred to above. Whether the decision makers have the proper incentives to incur 
all the fixed cost to formulate the correct rule depends on the organization of the process. This 
will depend on how much they will benefit from the reduced costs of application in the future. 
In this context, one should believe that inquisitorial specialized decision makers have stronger 
incentives, maybe too strong, to incur the costs of developing rules to save application costs 
later compared to courts that occasionally have an antitrust case. However, the incentives to 
develop more precise presumption rules stops at some point where the preciseness means that 
too many individual factors must be taken into account. The incentive to reduce application 
costs may be a partial explanation for why the EU seems less keen to abandon rules that are 
abandoned in US. It might also explain the development of the extensive body of guidelines 
in the EU. The issue of incentives in the development of rules is returned to below. For now, 
it is sufficient to conclude that neither the courts in the US or the EU seem to explicitly point 
at all the relevant costs to be taken into account in the determination of the presumptions 
rules.      
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An indirect cost that was explained in the decision theoretic analysis above is that of rent-
seeking. A benefit of rules compared to standards is that they are less prone to rent-seeking 
activities in the application of the rules. This is a benefit that may tip in favor of a rule in the 
choice between rules and standards. The rules, on the other hand, are more prone to rent-
seeking activities when they are determined. If it is public that there is some chance that the 
decision maker will establish some new rule in a case, this might draw a lot of attention to the 
case from parties affected by the rule. Affected parties have the incentives to incur substantial 
costs to influence rules to be determined according to their preferences. With presumption 
rules, rent-seeking is likely to be large at both the formulation stage and the application stage. 
The rent-seeking aspect does not seem to be a factor explicitly taken into account by the US 
or EU decision makers when they determine presumption rules.   
There are limited opportunities to influence the courts outside the formal frames of 
litigation. A specific case is necessary to have a rule determined. An inquisitorial enforcement 
authority decision maker such as the European Commission might be an easier target for rent-
seeking as they also may state rules in guidelines. The issue of rent-seeking will be revisited 
under in the discussion on the institutional factors in the evolution of rules below.  
Legal certainty 
As discussed above, rules have some advantages compared to standards in providing legal 
certainty. This also applies to presumption rules. There are some limits to the legal certainty 
provided by rules, as discussed above. If rules become too complex and costly to learn, this 
may threaten legal certainty. In some cases, it may provide more legal certainty to adhere to a 
standard than to a complex set of legal rules. For instance, if a business manager wonders if 
their exchange of information is legal or not, it may be easier for them to relate to the question 
of whether their exchange is likely to restrict competition rather than relating to a complex 
body of rules.   
Legal certainty is not an explicit factor stated by the courts to be taken into account in 
the determination of presumption rules.276 Still, as providing legal certainty is one of the roles 
of the courts, it is natural that providing predictable rules is one of those things judges take 
into account in determining rules. However, it should be noted that it is not likely that the 
courts will take into account the complexity of the legal system in general by asking 
                                                 
276 As discussed above it is an explicit factor the European Commission take into account when they produce 
guidelines.  
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themselves whether the rules they make tip the body of rules into too much complexity. 
Judges are probably most concerned with finding the correct rule to apply on the facts in 
question. The rationality in the evolution of legal rules will be discussed in more detail below.   
More instruments used in the EU 
In the EU, a wider range of tools are employed in determining rules. First, the EU has a 
formal system of block exemptions that formally create strong presumptions of legality. Even 
if the presumption of legality is the general main rule, as it is the interference with private 
actions that need a justification, the block exemptions are likely to have an impact in practice. 
According to TFEU Article 103 (2), balancing errors and costs is the purpose of block 
exemptions. The block exemptions can be said to be quite complex. For instance, many block 
exemptions operate with exemptions from the block exemptions for so-called hard-core 
restraints. Furthermore, complex calculations are often necessary to identify the market shares 
that determine if a block exemption applies. Therefore, it can be asked whether these block 
exemptions contribute to reduced application costs. As just stated, most practices covered by 
the block-exemptions are quite clearly not anticompetitive anyway, and it may be easier to 
just relate to the likely anticompetitive effects directly. Taking into account the administrative 
and political cost associated with formulating these block exemptions, the net benefits might 
well be negative.   
The European Commission also applies another authoritative instrument in the 
determination of rules: the guidelines. Although guidelines are also produced by the US 
enforcement authorities, they have another authority when they are coming from an 
inquisitorial decision body subject to a limited judicial review, as in the EU.277 The European 
Commission has the power to make its actual decisions in line with the rules stated in the 
guidelines. Furthermore, as private enforcement has a lesser role in the EU than the US, the 
European Commission has a stronger influence on the evolution of rules. The evolution of 
rules will be discussed in more detail below. As discussed above, a purpose of the EU 
guidelines is to provide legal certainty and thereby reduce the assessment costs for the 
businesses affected by the rules. As for the block exemptions, it is legitimate to ask whether 
guidelines serve this purpose. For instance, assessing the likely anticompetitive effects of a 
                                                 
277 The FTC could in principle produce guidelines with the some of the same normative value. Even the FTC 
follows and adversarial procedure in front of an administrative law judge, this decision is subject to review by 
the Commission. The FTC doesn’t seem to have produced guidelines to the same extent as the European 
Commission though. See Posner (2011) p. 858 for a discussion on the production of guidelines by US 
enforcement agencies.     
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horizontal agreement may be easier than assessing the conduct according to the complex rules 
and the many reservations in the guidelines on horizontal agreements. Taking into account the 
enormous amount of resources used to produce these guidelines, it is difficult to be confident 
in the rationality of these guidelines.  
4.3 Jurisprudence and the evolution of rational antitrust rules  
4.3.1 The principle of precedence  
In most legal systems, court decisions evolve into precedence, especially Supreme Court 
decisions.278 In inquisitorial systems such as the enforcement of EU competition law by the 
European Commission, unchallenged enforcement practice is also used as precedence. 
However, enforcement practice lacks the same authoritative precedential value as Supreme 
Court decisions, though.  
Experiences from earlier decision making can be seen as accumulated information 
capital. The principle of precedence involves utilizing the information capital gained by 
previous decisions.279 By applying the same rule on similar factual circumstances as in earlier 
decisions, one saves the cost of performing a similar assessment, which is likely to lead to the 
same decision again. The principle of precedence may also deter judges and enforcers from 
corruption or other non-relevant influences since far more people scrutinize a decision for its 
precedence value than for its value in solving the specific case. 
The principle of precedence is the mechanism that makes the decision makers of 
specific cases able to determine rules to be applied in later cases. If the courts want to replace 
a standard by a rule or want to create a more precise rule as described in the previous 
subchapter above, the courts ability to create precedents is the principal instrument to achieve 
this. Thus, the actual cases to be decided provide the basis for the development of rules. 
Inquisitorial enforcement authorities, such as the European Commission are not bound by the 
constraints of having a suitable case at hand in the determination of rules, as they can state 
their interpretation of the rules in guidelines.280  
 The principle of precedence can be further specified as the doctrine of stare decisis, 
usually associated with common law systems, and as the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, 
                                                 
278 See MacCormick and Summer (1997) 
279 See Posner (2011) p.743 f. and Kaplow (2000).  
280 The US FTC could in principle produce guidelines according with some of the same authoritative value. The 
FTC follows and adversarial procedure in front of an administrative law judge, but the decision is subject to 
review by the Commission. The FTC doesn’t seem to have produced guidelines to the same extent as the 
European Commission. See Posner (2011) p. 858 for a discussion on the production of guidelines by US 
enforcement agencies. 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
118 
usually associated with civil law systems.281 In the doctrine of stare decisis, a legal rule 
established in one case serves as a binding authority for the legal rule to be applied in later 
similar cases.282 Under the doctrine of jurisprudence constante, the courts are only bound to 
follow a rule established by a consolidated trend of decisions. Legal decisions are not 
established as an authoritative source of law before they mature in to a prevailing line of 
precedents.283 For the purpose of this study, a principled discussion on exactly how many 
consistent decisions are necessary to establish a legal rule in the US or the EU is avoided. 
This is dependent on many factors and is beyond the scope of this study. However, in line 
with Posner (2011), it is assumed that a single precedent is a “fragile thing that easily can be 
distinguished away.”284 Thus, a precedence-based rule becomes stronger as more and more 
decisions confirm the rule.  
Below, it is discussed as to how the principle of precedence influences the evolution of 
rational antitrust rules. This will be done by addressing three aspects of precedence-based rule 
making. One aspect is path-dependence. An obvious disadvantage of precedence is that if the 
decisions that form the basis for the precedence-based rule are wrong, this error may ripple 
into future decisions. The second aspect addressed is the role and consequences of analogical 
reasoning. No cases are equal, and it will almost always be necessary to interpret the existing 
legal rule to decide if it applies to the case at question. In this interpretation analogy is 
imperative as a practical method of legal reasoning. Thus, the principle of analogical 
reasoning influences the evolution of rules. The relationship between precedence and standard 
of proof is also addressed below. If facts in earlier cases are used to create a precedence-based 
rule that covers similar fact, this might interfere with the standard of proof.   
 In this subchapter, it is discussed how intrinsic properties of legal reasoning are likely 
to affect the evolution of legal antitrust rules. Thus, the discussion in this subchapter will not 
systematically take into account the incentives of the decision makers in this subchapter. The 
impact of the incentives of those who determine the antitrust rules is discussed in the next 
subchapter. 
                                                 
281 See Fon and Parisi (2006).   
282 See Luppi and Parisi (2010) and Fon and Parisi (2006).   
283 See Fon and Parisi (2006).  
284 Posner (2011) p. 725 
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4.3.2 Precedence and path-dependence 
Path-dependence is well known in evolutionary theory285 and economics.286 By path-
dependence, one can be locked into inferior solutions due to historical circumstances. An 
example is the QWERTY organization of the keyboard that was once developed to prevent 
jam in mechanical typewriters.287 This precaution is unnecessary for electronic keyboards 
today. However, the switching costs associated with changing to an optimized keyboard 
system suitable for today’s needs have created inertia towards an inferior keyboard 
construction that was once superior.288 The principle of precedence may facilitate a path-
dependence which settles inferior legal rules.289 Rules that were once superior but no longer 
are, or that were wrong in the first place may have authority due to precedence. The likely 
effects of path-dependence depend on the impact of the self-reinforcing effects of precedence 
and the availability of correction mechanisms that may correct undesirable path-dependence.   
The self-reinforcing effects of the principle of precedence in establishing rules have 
been studied in the law and economics literature.290 This is partially a question of the 
incentives of the judges and the decision makers to adhere to precedence. Below, it will be 
shown that judges may have strong incentives to adhere to the principle of precedence. Here, 
it will be discussed whether the mechanism of precedence itself is likely to facilitate a case-
selection that reinforces the precedence.  
The incentives to litigate and the case selection under the principle of precedence are 
studied in law and economics.291 The incentives to litigate a liability rule are assumed to 
depend on the stakes in question and the strength of the precedence based rule that regulates 
the issue. The plaintiff decides if he wants to litigate. The incentive to litigate to establish a 
liability is higher the higher the possible gain if liability is established, the higher probability 
that liability is established, and the lower the potential loss if the case is lost. Thus, the 
incentive to litigate is higher the higher the gain to loss ratio and the higher the probability of 
liability.292 The probability of liability is dependent on, inter alia, the consolidation of 
precedence establishing the liability rule. The stronger the consolidation of precedence, the 
                                                 
285 In biology path dependence is also known as inertia, See Sober (2008) p. 243 f. 
286 See Arthur (1988,1989).  
287 See David (1985). 
288 One such switching cost is that everybody must learn the new system which will reduce productivity in the 
learning phase.  
289 Roe (1996), Rubin (2000) and Posner (2007) p. 753. 
290 See inter alia Fan et al. (2005), Fon and Parisi (2006), Luppi and Parisi (2010) and Marciano and Khalil 
(forthcoming).  
291 See, for instance, Priest and Klein (1984) and Fan and Parisi (2005).  
292 See Fan and Parisi (2005).  
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more probable is it that the courts will establish liability in a new case. This will further 
strengthen the precedence-based rule.     
Let us first assume that the consolidation of precedence is so weak that the liability 
rule is not likely to be consolidated further in a new case. This weakness might, for instance, 
follow from academic critic against the rule and dissenting opinions in the precedence-based 
rules. This means that the courts are not likely to make a decision that strengthens the 
precedence-based liability rule. It will only be rational to litigate under such circumstances if 
the gain loss ratio is sufficiently high, since the probability of winning is low. If such a case is 
litigated, this is likely to lead to a further weakening of the precedence-based rule. Thus, in 
the end, the rule will be abolished if it is used as a basis for litigation. Litigation requires a 
high gain to loss ratio for somebody to have the incentive to litigate. If not litigated, the rule 
will just stand there as a weak rule until it becomes so old that it eventually loses its 
precedential power for that reason.  
Next, let us say that the precedence is already consolidated and that the rule is strong. 
Then, it is rational to litigate even when the gain to loss ratio is low. This litigation is likely to 
reinforce the strength of the rule, leading to an even more consolidated precedence. Thus, as a 
conclusion we can say that a strong precedence-based rule is likely to be reinforced. The 
reason is that the incentives to litigate on the basis of a strong rule are high. The incentives to 
litigate a weak rule are weaker since it requires more for such litigation to be profitable. Weak 
precedence-based rules are only likely to be abandoned quickly of someone have sufficient 
incentives to litigate. The weaker the liability-based rule, the weaker the incentives to enforce 
it by litigation.  Thus, almost paradoxically, the weaker the liability rule, the less likely it is it 
that the court will get chances to challenge it. This means that there is an intrinsic self-
reinforcing effect of precedence. Strong precedence is likely to be stronger, but weak 
precedence is not so likely to become weaker.    
There is also a theory of strategic litigation293 in which influential litigators such as 
large companies and governments can choose the cases to litigate and settle in order to 
strategically establish desirable precedence. In that sense there will be a bias in the evolution 
of precedence that will favor big litigators. The interest group influence on the evolution of 
legal rules will be returned to below.  
The theory of path-dependence can probably explain some of the evolution of antitrust 
rules in the US and EU, and, even more importantly, the theory can explain some significant 
                                                 
293 See Spier (2007) and Sanchirico (2007) for a survey.  
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differences between the evolution of rules in the US and EU. In the US, private litigation is 
important for the development of rules. Private enforcers are driven by private gain, not the 
social benefits of the rule as such. Thus, private parties may have incentives to sue for the 
benefit from practices such as minimum resale price maintenance, even if such practice is no 
longer are considered suitable for antitrust liability. The skepticism towards antitrust liability 
for such practices has resulted in a gradual abolition of antitrust liability for resale price 
maintenance, ending with the Leegin294 decision, where the per se prohibition of minimum 
resale price maintenance was abandoned. Thus, the precedence prohibiting minimum resale 
price maintenance could be considered as having gradually weakened until its fall in Leegin. 
This weakening was only possible because somebody had the incentives to litigate the rule. 
This is different in the inquisitorial system in the EU, where the main development of law 
follows from public enforcement. If the European Commission does not see the merits of 
enforcing a rule, the incentives to enforce such rules are limited.295 The result is that the rule 
is not challenged and the courts have no opportunity to abandon it.      
4.3.3 Precedence and analogical reasoning  
Precedents are based on facts from former cases. In theory, we can think of the creation and 
use of precedence in terms of induction and deduction. A general rule established by 
precedence is created by induction of similar cases, and the principle of deduction is used to 
decide if that rule applies to the facts of a new case.296 As deduction and induction are the 
established methods of scientific reasoning, legal scholars have advocated that these methods 
apply in legal reasoning.297 However, even if deduction and induction may be scientific 
ideals, they may not be very descriptive for practical legal reasoning. The facts of a new case 
are not likely to be so similar to the facts of the former cases that form the basis for the 
precedence-based rule that the principle of deduction can be used directly in the application of 
the rule in the new case. Some interpretation of the rule is necessary for the rule to be applied 
in the new case. In practical legal reasoning, the principle of analogy is an imperative method 
                                                 
294 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
295 There have indeed been a few cases regarding Resale Price Maintenance enforced by the European 
Commission. A Survey is given in OECD (2008). However, in the cases regarding Resale Price Maintenance 
this price policy have been practiced in combination with other restraints such as restrictions on parallel trade, 
territorial restrictions, exclusivity and in conjunction with horizontal agreements. Thus, courts have had few 
chances to challenge Resale Price Maintenance as a pure offence.          
296 The principles of deduction and deduction will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
297 See Weinreb (2005) Chapter 1  
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
122 
in the interpretation of rules.298  Despite the use of analogy being alleged to lack scientific 
basis, it continues to be a major instrument for lawyers in interpreting the law. In the 
following it will briefly be discussed how analogical reasoning is likely to affect rationality in 
the determination of rules.299 It will be assumed that there is an underlying standard as in 
antitrust. From this standard, the courts have established a rule. This rule may be a 
presumption rule, as is usual in antitrust.   
The facts from the cases that form the basis for the precedence-based rule must contain 
some similarities with the case in question so the principle of analogy can be used to derive 
the legal rule to be applied to the case in question. There are likely to be some factual 
differences though, since no cases are likely to be completely identical. These differences in 
facts might be crucial to the compliance with the underlying antitrust standard. This is 
illustrated in figure 4.1:  
 
















In Figure 4.1, area B illustrates the facts in the present case similar to those in former cases 
that provide the basis for the precedence-based rule. The areas A and C are factual differences 
that distinguish the present case from the facts in the cases that provide the basis the 
precedence-based rule. If area A is determining for whether the conditions in the standard are 
                                                 
298 See Weinreb (2005) Chapter 1. See also Posner (2008) p.180 f. for a discussion. The use of analogical 
reasoning can be considered as an abductive method, which is stressed by legal philosophers as the main method 
of reasoning in law. See Walton (2002). Abductive reasoning will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.   
299 The use and performance of analogies to make inferences and make decision is has been subject to a 
substantial scrutiny. Analogies are important in contrastive inference and case based inference. Lipton (2004) 
argues that contrastive inference is central for the inference to the best explanation in the presence of complex 
evidence. Walton (2002) stresses the importance of analogies in the dialectical method used in legal 
argumentation. Gilboa (2009) studies the performance of case based decision making as an analogy-based 
practical method. The principle of analogical reasoning and the performance of analogical reasoning will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter on rationality in evidence assessment.      
Facts of precedence 
Facts of present 
case 
A B C 
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met, then this should be caught by the principle of “distinguishing the facts” in the 
interpretation of the law. However, there might be a risk that the difference is not given 
weight if the differences are not discovered. The facts in area A might also not be given 
weight due to respect for the precedence as such. The decision makers’ incentive to adhere to 
the principle of precedence will be discussed below. If the factual differences, C, were not 
determining for the original decisions, we might not even know of them. C might still be 
relevant for the compliance with the standard if A is present. Thus, rules based on analogy 
should be avoided if they are based on cases where other facts, potentially, can change the 
compliance with the standard. This will typically be in areas with less experience concerning 
what circumstances are relevant for the compliance with the standard.  
Furthermore, if the determination of the analogy-based rule ends up in an assessment 
of all the similarities and differences of the present case and the body of cases that constitute 
the precedence to determine the rule, then this is, in reality, an indirect way to check if the 
conditions in the standard are met. Furthermore, this may be as expensive as doing a fresh 
assessment against the standard. Thus, this might be a very imprecise and expensive way of 
assessing facts against the underlying standard.  
Thus, analogies should be used critically. In antitrust law, analogical reasoning should 
always be performed in the context of the underlying standard. If an agreement between 
competitors to set up a joint selling unit is found illegal, it does not mean that an agreement to 
set up a joint purchasing unit for some input should be illegal, even if there are some 
similarities between the two situations. A quick look at the economics behind these two 
agreements reveals that their anticompetitive effects are likely to be quite different. Thus, the 
underlying antitrust standard and purpose quickly tells us that this is a bad analogy. The 
analogy becomes a method for finding candidate rules. We find some rule that seems to 
regulate a similar situation at a first glance, and then we can find out if this analogy-based rule 
really has merits by looking at the underlying standard and purpose of the rule.300 Thus, the 
underlying standard and purpose serve as a corrigendum for analogical reasoning. This works 
well if the underlying standard and purpose of the rule are clear. Using this principle will be 
more difficult in assessing an analogy based on a rule that is not rational in the first place, or 
where the purpose is ambiguous. How shall we, for instance, assess an analogy based on the 
prohibition301 of minimum resale maintenance in the EU? If we don’t know what we want 
                                                 
300 See Weinreb (2005) chapter 1 and Posner (2008) p. 180 f. for a similar discussion on the role of analogies in 
the interpretation of rules.   
301 In terms of strong a strong presumption since resale price maintenance is in the object category.  
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with this rule, how shall we assess the merits of an analogy? Since the amount of such rules 
where the purpose is unclear seems to be larger in the EU than the US, as discussed above, 
this may indicate that potential failures associated with the use of analogy are more 
widespread in the EU than in the US. An illustrative example is as just mentioned prohibition 
of resale price maintenance. According to the EU guidelines of vertical restraints,302 
Paragraph 223:  
 
agreements or concerted practices having as their direct or indirect object the 
establishment of a fixed or minimum resale price or a fixed or minimum price level to 
be observed by the buyer, are treated as a hardcore restriction.  
 
Whether some practice has an indirect object of fixing a minimum resale price must be based 
on an analogy from fixing resale prices. The risk of irrationality of a rule resulting from such 
an analogy is high as long as we do not know the purpose of prohibiting resale price 
maintenance as such.     
4.3.4 Precedence-based rules and the standard of proof 
If precedence is used to create a rule from a standard, this might result in a circumvention of 
the standard of proof. Precedence-based rules are made from facts from previous cases. By 
using precedence, similar facts in new cases can be assessed against the rule instead of a fresh 
analysis of the facts against the underlying standard. Applying this rule instead of a fresh 
assessment might be used to circumvent the standard of proof by making it easier to establish 
a violation. This can best be illustrated by an example. Let us say that some agreement 
between firms is considered to restrict competition according to balance of probabilities in a 
case. This case creates precedence for a rule in the sense that similar agreements to the 
agreement in question are considered illegal. Let us now say that some firms have entered into 
a similar agreement according to balance of probabilities. This means that, most probably, the 
firms have entered into a similar agreement. In reality, this means that, most probably, there 
exists an agreement that most probably restricts competition. This might well still mean that it 
is most probable that the conduct in question does not restrict competition.303 If the conduct 
had been evaluated against the standard in the first place according to a standard of proof 
requiring balance of probabilities, the standard of proof might not be satisfied in the 
                                                 
302 Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints Official Journal C 130, 19.05.2010, p. 1. 
303 Assume for instance that there is 60 percent chance that the conduct is present and that there is 60 percent 
chance that this conduct, if present, restricts competition. It is then 36 percent chance that competition is 
restricted.   
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assessment of the conduct in question. The result is that the chance of condemning behavior 
that is not anticompetitive increases. Thus, rationally the correct standard of proof should be 
adjusted to the rule in question.  
A specific antitrust example is information exchange: for example, the exchange of 
capacity information. Assume that the exchange of capacity information is found to be an 
anticompetitive agreement. There is no dispute over the parties having agreed upon 
exchanging capacities. Let us say this case is used to create a rule that the exchange of 
capacity information is illegal. Now, let us assume that there is a new case where there is 
uncertainty whether there even was an exchange of capacities but it is considered to be more 
probable than not. In applying the new rule, this probable information exchange may be 
considered illegal. However, if the original rule was applied taking into account the 
uncertainty associated with both the existence of any information exchange and whether this 
exchange is anticompetitive, we are more likely to find that anticompetitive effects are not 
probable. By this mechanism, the principle of precedence may cause the antitrust rules to 
expand into areas where they have no merits.  
  In both US antitrust law and EU competition law, the rules established by precedence 
are presumption rules. It is always possible to refute the presumptions. Such presumptions 
partially replace the standard of proof. The initial burden of proof becomes to establish the 
presumption with sufficient confidence. Presumptions should ideally be used as an instrument 
for achieving rational evidence assessment. Both the presumption itself and the uncertainty 
associated with whether the presumption is established by the evidence in the case should be 
taken into account in the assessment of whether the standard of proof is satisfied. This is a 
question of whether the assessment of evidence is rational. These issues are discussed further 
in Chapter Five.  
For now, it is sufficient to conclude that the principle of precedence creates a risk that 
the standard of proof is circumvented, with a resulting undesirable expansion of antitrust 
rules. This is, in particular, a risk in antitrust, where an enormous body of rules has evolved 
from relative simple standards. The substantial amount of guidelines developed in EU, such 
as the guidelines on horizontal agreements304 and the guidelines on vertical restraints305 make 
this risk particularly present in EU.   
                                                 
304 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements  Official Journal C11, 14.1.2011, p. 1. 
305 Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints Official Journal C 130, 19.05.2010, p. 1. 
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4.4 Institutional factors, incentives, and the evolution of rational antitrust 
rules 
4.4.1 Decision makers as utility maximizers  
Judges and other antitrust decision makers that determine the antitrust rules as a by-product of 
deciding cases are subject to personal preferences as every other person. Since the legal 
method cannot be used to objectively deduct the legal rule to be applied in a case, this leaves 
room for the influence of personal preferences of the decision makers on the decisions. A 
decision maker may intentionally make his decisions as much in line with his personal 
preferences as possible, or the decisions might unintentionally be biased by the these personal 
preferences. A decision maker’s preferences for alternative actions are dependent on the 
decision maker’s net utility. With net utility in this context, is meant the utility of an action 
minus the personal costs and efforts of taking that action.  An antitrust decision maker’s net 
utility of taking alternative actions is affected by, inter alia, career opportunities, salary, 
recognition, political biases and not necessarily by an intrinsic preference to determine 
rational rules.306 
 Posner uses utility maximization to explain the incentives for judges to adhere to the 
principle of precedence.307 Using precedence saves the costs and efforts of fresh assessments, 
which provides an incentive to adhere to precedence. Furthermore, Posner argues for some 
kind of equilibrium, where every judge has some incentive to follow precedence since they 
create precedents themselves that they want other judges to adhere to. Thus, the judges have 
some interest in the preservation of the principle of precedence, and to maintain this, they 
must adhere to the principle themselves. Furthermore, judges are afraid either to have their 
decisions reversed by appeal or that legislators will intervene against the rule they determine, 
which would make it obsolete. This creates incentives to reduce risk by adhering to the 
principle of precedence. The decision makers’ incentives to adhere to precedence contribute 
to the path-dependence associated with precedence. Posner also points out that decision 
makers in administrative enforcement authorities do not have equally strong incentives to 
follow the principle of precedence.308 They are not subject to the same equilibrium as judges.  
A judge’s or another antitrust decision maker’s actions to maximize his net utility are 
likely to depend on whether the system is inquisitorial or adversarial. Furthermore, a decision 
maker’s utility-maximizing actions are likely to depend on whether the decision maker is 
                                                 
306 See Posner (2008) p. 57 f. and Posner (2011) p. 725 f. for a discussion on what judges maximize 
307 Posner (2008) and Posner (2011) p. 725 f.  
308 Posner (2011) p. 852 and p. 858. 
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directly political appointed or whether the decision maker is appointed by political principals. 
Furthermore, the actions are likely to depend on whether the decision maker is an independent 
adjudicator or a bureaucrat in a hierarchic system.309 In addition, the utility-maximizing 
actions may be dependent on whether a decision maker is appointed for life or for a limited 
period, subject to, or not subject to, renewal.  
  The organization of the antitrust decision making is different in the US and EU 
as was described in Chapter Two. The first part of the EU decision procedure is inquisitorial, 
where bureaucrats prepare the decision to be decided by a commission of political appointed 
commissioners. This decision is subject to judicial review by independent judges subject to a 
limited standard of review. In the US, the antitrust decision making, as a main rule, follows 
and adversarial procedure, where the decision is decided by an independent judge appointed 
by politicians.310 Thus, one should expect that the utility maximizing actions of the decision 
makers are likely to differ in the two systems.         
Below, economic analysis is used to study the incentives of decision makers in the 
determination of antitrust rules and how those incentives are likely to affect how the rules are 
determined.  
Often, it is not only one decision maker but several assembled in a court or 
commission who, together, determine the rule to apply in the case. The strategic interaction of 
the decision makers may also potentially affect the rationality of the resulting decision on 
what rule to apply. Thus, how the joint decisions of several decision makers are likely to 
affect the rationality of the resulting rules will also be briefly discussed.   
4.4.2 Efficiency versus interest group influence  
In the theory of public choice, there are two main theories on how rules become how they are: 
the efficiency hypothesis and the interest group theory. Note that it is assumed that the 
antitrust statutes are given, so the analysis here is restricted to the development of rules by 
decision makers in the actual application of antitrust law. This means that the rules are either 
determined by the courts when they decide cases at hand or in the context of the decision-
making of an inquisitorial enforcement agency. Enforcement agencies have the additional 
                                                 
309 The analysis of what judges maximize in Posner (2008) p. 57 f. and Posner (2011) p. 725 f. is based on 
adversarial judges. Inquisitorial judges might also be compared to bureaucrats. There is extensive literature in the 
field of public choice on what bureaucrats maximize. Seminal contributions are Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), 
and Niskanen (1971). See also Mueller (2003) p. 359 f.     
310 Recall that we are concerned with the federal antitrust laws. Federal judges are appointed. On the state level 
judges are normally directly elected. For the FTC enforcement of the FTC-act, the case is presented to an 
administrative law judge and the case is finally administratively decided by the Commission, which is subject to 
judicial review.    
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
128 
instrument of being able to state their determination of rules in guidelines and similar 
documents without necessarily having a case at hand.    
The efficiency hypothesis 
The efficiency hypothesis of regulation stresses the long-run evolution of regulations towards 
efficiency.311 According to this theory, only regulations promoting efficiency will survive in 
the long run. If a rule initially came into place for a reason other than efficiency, it will later 
be applied in a way that promotes efficiency by the courts. The efficiency hypothesis is not 
clear on why there is an evolution towards efficient rules. However, the best argument is that 
efficiency increases the social surplus. Somebody will always earn from more efficient use of 
resources. By the definition of efficiency, they will gain more than those who lose. Thus, 
there will be surplus demand for more efficient rules. Another explanation is that legal rules 
evolve in jurisdictions in competition with each other. Those systems with the most efficient 
rules will prosper, while those systems with inefficient rules will lose in the competition with 
other systems.  
There are several studies in law and economics that argue that precedence-based rules 
developed by courts are likely to be efficient.312 Rubin (1977) uses asymmetric stakes to 
argue for the efficiency of precedence-based rules. Litigation is usually a null-sum game 
where one party wins what the other party loses. However, when rules are inefficient, there 
might be dead-weight losses due to inefficiencies that would likely be eliminated with more 
efficient rules. This creates asymmetries in the stakes that encourage litigation. Thus, parties 
are more likely to litigate than to settle when the underlying rules are not efficient. This 
means that inefficient rules are more likely to be challenged and changed. Priest (1977) 
extends the analysis of Rubin (1977) by assuming that the stakes are higher for the party that 
has most to gain by efficient rules. Thus, the one who benefit from efficient rules is likely to 
spend more on litigation and, consequently, win the case. Thus, even if the judges have no 
preference for efficient rules, or even are biased against efficient rules, there will be an 
evolution towards efficient rules. There have been other studies with other assumptions 
providing additional theoretical support for the efficiency hypothesis given the 
                                                 
311 See Viscusi et al. (2000) p. 313 f.  
312 See Posner (1974). Posner is a major contributor to the development of the efficiency hypothesis in 
explaining the evolution of precedence based rules either in common law or in the application of a statutory 
standard such as in antitrust. See Rubin (2000) for a survey of the theories. 
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assumptions.313 However, as for many models, the sensitivity of the assumptions provides a 
problem for the real world informative value of the models. The efficiency hypothesis of 
precedence-based rules can be criticized on several grounds. The principle of precedence may 
be subject to path-dependence and other deficiencies, as discussed above. Furthermore, other 
theories predict that rules, including precedence based rules might be biased due to interest 
group influence. This will be discussed next. 
Interest group influence            
The interest group theory use interest group influence to explain why regulation and rules are 
how they are.314 This theory is based on the general public choice theories on how political 
authorities decide, normally under the condition that they are agents for voters in a democratic 
system. Political elected decision makers act in self-interest and maximize their utility, which 
is dependent on political support measured in votes. To maximize the number of votes, a 
policy must be chosen to maximize support. Money is important for outreach and election 
campaigns. In this context, monetary support from interest groups is important.315 This means 
that politicians must weigh the profit interests of industries supporting their campaigns against 
the effects on votes from consumers that want low prices. This tradeoff in protecting special 
interest groups and consumers is analyzed formally by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). 
Cooperation with interest groups can also be important for politicians for other reasons. A 
firm can, for instance, influence the votes of its employees, and a labor union can influence 
the votes of its members.  
Becker (1983) modeled interest group influence as competition between many interest 
groups with conflicting interests. The interests of the group spending most on influencing will 
be most successful in having its interests implemented in the legislation. It is the relative 
levels of support that are important. If two opposing interest groups spend equally on support, 
they will cancel each other out. Thus, we have a game where the level of support from one 
interest group is dependent on the support of the other interest group. The result is dependent 
on which group that is best to organize and represent their interest to the legislator. Interest 
groups with a few wealthy members, but where each member is heavily impacted by some 
regulation, will presumably be better promoting their interests collectively than a large group 
                                                 
313 See, inter alia, Luppi and Parisi (2010) and Marciano and Khalil (forthcoming) for recent references to the 
theory.  
314 The theory can at least be traced back to Olson (1965). 
315 With interest groups it is meant all organized units with common interest in the outcome. This can be affected 
firms and their related unions, user and consumer organizations, labor unions and voluntary organizations.  
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with many members where each member only suffers a minor impact. This might be the case 
even when the total impact on the bigger group is larger. The reason is that, in a group, each 
member will have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts on the others. If little is at stake for 
each individual separately, this “problem” might have substantial effects. How many 
consumers are, for instance, willing to incur much effort to promote some regulation that 
reduces a price by five percent, although the economic impact might be large for the group of 
consumers as a whole? This means that, according to the interest group theory, concentrated 
interests have more impact on regulations and legislation than dispersed interests do.   
It is reasonable to believe, as a starting point, that interest-group influence by rent-
seeking activities is more likely to affect political decision makers subject to re-election than 
independent judges not subject to re-election.316 Influencing judges outside the procedural 
framework of the case easily becomes illegal, while much influence on politicians can be 
done legally by lobbying. However, some research suggests that adversarial courts are at least 
as likely to be influenced by interest-group influence as politicians.317 The inquisitorial 
system is argued to be better than the adversarial system in terms of avoiding rent-seeking by 
special interests. It is argued that, in the inquisitorial system, the decision makers pursue some 
goal of finding the truth, and have incentives to do so in a cost-efficient way. In the 
adversarial system, no party has any interest in arguing for the truth as such, but rather for the 
facts that benefit them. The amount of resources to spend is delegated to the parties. This 
creates a playing field for the parties and interest groups that support the parties to spend a 
substantial amount of resources on rent-seeking activities, such as providing testimonies from 
high profile experts, and so on.318 An analogy could be two companies that compete in terms 
of deceptive advertising.319 It is the best organized interests groups that are likely to spend 
most money on rent-seeking and to obtain biased decisions to their benefit. Thus, this theory 
is directly contrary to the efficiency hypothesis, which argues that the adversarial process is 
likely to facilitate efficient rules.  
Some comments on bureaucracy influences  
Often, legal decisions are not done by the political elected persons directly, but by public 
officials appointed by the politically elected persons. These public officials may be 
                                                 
316 If a judge is elected, he might need campaign money, like politicians. This applies to state-level judges in the 
US, but not federal judges, which are the focus of this study.  
317 This includes several contributions by the economist and lawyer Gordon Tullock, inter alia, Tullock (1980).  
318 This will be discussed and analyzed in more detail in Chapter Five.  
319 See Parisi (2002) for the same analogy. 
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independent judges who cannot be instructed by the politicians after they are appointed. 
However, if these independent judges are dependent on the politicians for a career in the 
judiciary, this may give the politicians some control. US Supreme Court judges are appointed 
for life inter alia to avoid such influence. Bureaucrats on the other hand are employees and 
agents for their political superiors usually subject to the instructive powers of the 
politicians.320 Politicians must then use incentives schemes to encourage the bureaucrats to 
implement their interest group politics.  
The employed public officials maximize their own utility subject to those incentive 
mechanisms provided by the politicians. After the appointment of independent judges, the 
possibility of using incentive mechanisms is limited ex post. Politicians can, to some extent, 
increase and reduce budgets. If the politicians do not like the decision of one particular judge, 
they may increase the number of judges to reduce the average number of cases that will be 
handled by this judge. One of the most important instruments for the politicians in controlling 
independent decision makers is the power to appoint decision makers with the desirable 
preferences.321 Bureaucrats subject to the instruction powers of the political principals can, in 
principle, be instructed to do exactly as they are told as a condition for their salary. It is not so 
easy, though. Bureaucrats possess private information both when it comes to the 
consequences and costs of decisions. This is likely to leave some room for determining rules 
according to their own preferences, which may deviate from the preferences of their 
principals.322 The larger the possibilities for the decision makers to make decisions 
independently from their superiors, the more rent-seeking activities are likely to be targeted 
directly towards these decision makers. 
Efficiency and interest group influence in the US versus the EU   
The organization of the competition law decision-making in the US and EU is characterized 
by some fundamental differences, as stated above. The decision-making in the public 
enforcement in the EU follows an inquisitorial procedure subject to a limited judicial review. 
The public enforcement is the main way that the EU competition law is enforced, although 
private enforcement is possible. In the US, on the contrary, the antitrust decision-making 
follows, as a main rule, an adversarial procedure. Besides, most of the enforcement is private. 
                                                 
320 Some bureaucrats may be subject to limited instructive powers. This usually applies to heads of competition 
authorities and other regulatory bodies to secure the professional legitimacy of these bodies.  
321 Posner (2011) p. 726 f.  
322 There is much literature in the field of public choice on what bureaucrats maximize. Seminal contributions are 
Tullock (1965), Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971). See also Mueller (2003) p. 359 f.     
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  According to the efficiency hypothesis, the US system should facilitate rational rules, 
while this would not be obvious in the EU inquisitorial system, at least in the short run. The 
reason is that the rules in the US are determined by the courts in an adversarial procedure with 
a basis in the general antitrust standards. By the evolutionary mechanisms advocated by the 
followers of the efficiency hypothesis, the antitrust rules should become more and more 
efficient, and thus rational.  
According to the interest group theory, the implications are more ambiguous. Since the 
European Commission is headed by commissioners that can be best described as 
politicians323, one should believe that the European competition law decision-making is more 
influenced by interest groups than the courts in the US. Furthermore, since the enforcement is 
executed with the aid of bureaucrats, some of the bureaucrats’ pursuit of their own utility 
maximizing behavior is likely to be reflected in the enforcement and the determination of 
rules. It is likely that enforcement officials are rewarded more for what they do than what they 
do not do. Thus, enforcement officials may have an over-optimal preference for avoiding 
type-2 errors.324 Furthermore, government officials who want to reduce their amount of effort 
in finding violations may decide upon rules that have over-optimal harsh presumptions 
switching the burden of proof to the defendants. The result is over-inclusive rules and 
inefficiencies in evidence assessment.  
The superiority of the adversarial process to the inquisitorial process is disputed by 
other contributors in law economics as described above. According to this theory, the 
enforcement of the European Commission is superior as they are likely to pursue the goal of 
finding the truth in a cost efficient way, while parties and interest groups that support the 
parties are more likely to dig in their deep pockets to obtain a desirable result in the 
adversarial procedure.   
It would be difficult to conclude which theory of rent-seeking fits best to antitrust 
decision making. However, the risk of rent-seeking and some biases from rent-seeking are 
likely in both the EU inquisitorial system and in the US adversarial system. It will be shed 
more light on this topic in Chapter Five.       
                                                 
323 They have not been directly elected by the voters of the European Union, but are appointed by the political 
leadership in their home countries. Their loyalty should be with the EU as such. Thus, they are not under directly 
instruction by the politicians in their home country. However, since the commissioners are often career 
politicians, they are considered as politicians.  
324 Posner (2011) p. 858.  
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4.4.3 Determination of rules and social choice 
Often, antitrust decisions are not made by one decision maker, but by multiple decision 
makers that have to agree somehow. In the EU, the full commission of all the commissioners 
is the formal decision body who decide by majority voting. The judicial review is done in a 
forum by multiple judges. In the US, the appeal courts have multiple judges.  
Collective decision making is analyzed in the theory of social choice.325 Kenneth 
Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1971 for, inter alia, Arrow (1951) which 
derived the impossibility theorem of social choice.326 Simplified, Arrow (1951) showed that it 
is impossible to construct a utility function based on, inter alia, majority voting, which 
generally satisfies the assumptions of rationality. This theorem has been applied in the law 
and economics theory to study collective decision making by judges.327 
As a result of the impossibility theorem, the collective nature of antitrust decision 
making may impose a threat to the possibility of achieving rational antitrust rules. One way 
out of this problem is if all decision makers share the same preferences. This may be true if all 
judges use an objective rationality standard in their determination of the rules. Such a 
standard was presented in Chapter Three. In practice, however, the various decision makers 
are likely to have different preferences that influence their decisions. Thus, the collective 
decision making nature of antitrust decision making is likely to impose a further challenge to 
achieve rationality in the determination of rules.  
A difference between the US and EU decision making systems is the possibility of 
dissenting opinions. In the EU, neither the European Commission nor the courts provide 
dissenting opinions. This stands on the contrary to the US, where the judges may dissent. The 
possibility of dissention may increase the possibility of rationality in the determination of 
rules as one is not so dependent on finding some solution that survives majority voting or 
other methods to reach consent.328 The impact of multi-party decision making on antitrust 
decisions will be scrutinized further in Chapter Five.    
4.5 Conclusions  
The chief research questions addressed in the beginning of this chapter were: Are the current 
antitrust rules likely to be rational? Are we likely to observe an evolution towards rational 
                                                 
325 See Binmore (2008) for a short introduction.  
326 Further developed by another winner of the Nobel memorial prize in economics Amartya Sen, see Sen (1970, 
1995, and 1999). 
327 See for instance Easterbrook (1982, 1984b) and Kornhauser (1992a, 1992b). See Rubin (2000) for a review of 
the literature. 
328 For a law and economics based analysis of dissents, see Epstein et al. (2011).     
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rules? What can be done to promote more rational rules? The two first questions are 
discussed in turn below. Recommendations for promoting more rational rules are integrated 
into this discussion. The recommendations are summarized in the end.   
Are the current antitrust rules likely to be rational? 
In the discussion of rationality in the determination of antitrust rules it was analyzed how to 
choose rationally between rules and standards how to choose rationally the precision level of 
rules. It was found that the assessment principle in both the US and EU seems to have 
converged on presumption rules, which in practice mean that all conduct is assessed 
according to a standard. Presumption rules generate some of the benefits of rules, though, by 
mitigating the need to perform a full analysis in each case. A question then becomes how 
precise these presumption rules should be.  
The confidence in the anticompetitive effects is used to determine the presumption 
rules in both the US and EU. The more confidence in the anticompetitive effects in question, 
the less is the need for inquiry into the actual circumstances of the case. In other words, the 
higher the a priori probability of anticompetitive effects, the less is the need for case specific 
evidence to confirm this a priori assessment. At a superior level, expected error costs, costs of 
formulation, and costs of application should all be taken into account in determining the rules. 
This requires a broader assessment than just assessing the likely anticompetitive effects of the 
conduct in question. Thus, on the question as to what can be done to promote more rational 
rules, it is desirable that the antitrust decision makers take more criteria into account when 
they determine the rules. In particular, if more factors relevant for choosing between rules and 
standards, such as the consequences of errors and the formulation and application costs were 
taken into account, this might have shown that clear rules not subject to rebuttal might be 
rational in some circumstances. Furthermore, the theory on optimal precision level of rules 
suggest that there is some rational precision level of rules where the gain of more precise 
decisions is outweighed by costs of complexity. This tradeoff seems not to be stated as a 
criterion in the determination of the precision level of the presumption rules neither in the US 
nor the EU.                          
Thus, it cannot be concluded that the presumption rules used in the EU and US are 
likely to be rational. The criteria used to determine these rules seem to be too narrow. A 
potential evidence of such irrationality might be the divergence of certain presumption rules 
used in the US and EU. The argument would be that, if the US and EU use different rules, 
they cannot all be rational at the same time. This would be a too hasty a conclusion, though. 
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The procedural frameworks in the US and EU are different, and the different benefits and 
costs of various rules may not be equal in the two systems. Still, since the confidence of the 
anticompetitive effects is the most influential criterion in the determination of the 
presumption rules in both systems, it is peculiar that the presumption rules are as different as 
they are. The differences are likely to be explained by other circumstances such as the 
organization of the decision process and the incentives, which will be commented upon 
below.  
Are we likely to observe an evolution towards rational rules? 
On the question as to whether we are likely to observe an evolution towards rational antitrust 
rules, two aspects relevant for such evolution were discussed.  
The first aspect was whether the principle of precedence is an obstacle to the evolution 
of rational antitrust rules. One potential obstacle associated with the principle of precedence is 
path-dependence. The principle of precedence seems to facilitate a selection of cases that 
reinforce strong precedence-based rules while failing to phase out weak precedents. To avoid 
this, there should be mechanisms providing litigators with incentives to challenge weak 
precedence-based rules. It was shown above that, in the US, the private stakes resulting from 
the benefits of some irrational precedence-based rule may almost paradoxically contribute to 
the abandoning of such a rule. If, for instance, a precedence-based rule is likely to be weak 
due to new understanding and knowledge, the private interest associated with such a rule may 
provide the courts with cases that give the courts a chance to abandon that rule. If, for 
instance, some private party has an interest in litigating for the private benefits associated 
with a per se prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance, this gives the court the chance 
to abandon such a rule if it is not justified anymore due to new economic understanding. This 
is one of the benefits following from the important role of private enforcement in the US. If 
there was no such private enforcement, the courts in the US may not have got the chance to 
abandon the per se prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance as they did in Leegin.329  
In EU competition law, which relies more heavily on public enforcement, the 
correction of undesirable precedence-based rules is less likely. If the European Commission 
does not see the merits of enforcing a rule, the precedence will be there until it becomes so 
old that this, as such, is enough for the rule to be considered abandoned. To avoid undesirable 
path-dependence, there should be some correction mechanisms. Private enforcement is one 
                                                 
329 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
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such mechanism. The enforcement authorities may also, on principled grounds, challenge 
rules likely to be abandoned in courts, to check if courts actually are ready to abandon the 
rules. Thus, a recommendation that applies to the European Commission in particular is to 
challenge precedence-based rules likely to be abandoned by the courts, so they actually can be 
abandoned. Another recommendation is to continue the work on facilitating private 
enforcement in EU. Then private interests can be exploited to have all the rules challenged in 
the courts, not only those the European Commission choose to enforce.   
Analogical reasoning is used to complement the principle of precedence as no cases 
are identical. Analogical reasoning constitutes a possible obstacle to the evolution of rational 
antitrust rules. Using analogical reasoning and not properly take into account the relevant 
circumstances may yield rules that are not rational. An antitrust rule derived by analogy from 
another antitrust rule should always be checked against the underlying antitrust standard and 
purpose to check if the analogy-based rule actually has merits in that respect. Thus, analogies 
can serve as a start in deriving a rule, but not as an end. It was shown above that a problem of 
using analogies might arise particularly if the analogy is based on a rule where the purpose is 
unclear. If the purpose of some antitrust rule is ambiguous, then how can we know if an 
analogy derived from the same rule is rational? By analogical reasoning a non-merit rule can 
expand to cover more and more practices and hereby creating more and more harm. The risk 
associated with such expansion is likely to be higher in the EU than in US as the amount of 
rules not serving any clear purpose can be argued to be higher in the EU. This does not mean 
that the risk is not present in the US too, though. Thus, the recommendation would be for 
antitrust decision makers to be careful in the application of analogical reasoning and in 
accepting analogy-based arguments presented by the parties. As just stated, analogy should be 
the start and not the end in determining an antitrust rule. This means that antitrust decision 
makers should always complement analogical reasoning with the underlying antitrust 
standard. Furthermore, analogies should not be derived from rules that themselves have no 
merits according to the antitrust standard.   
A final point that was addressed related to the principle of precedence was the point 
that precedence-based rules can more or less intentionally contribute to the circumvention of 
the standard of proof. As more and more practices are considered or presumed 
anticompetitive as a matter of rule, it is a risk that the uncertainty associated with the 
anticompetitive effects is not properly addressed when the rule is applied. By this argument, 
the antitrust rules can expand into condemning practices not very likely to be anticompetitive. 
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Antitrust decision makers should be careful in deciding a case on the basis of presumption 
rules without properly taking the uncertainty associated with the presumptions into account. 
The rational use of presumptions in will be returned to in Chapter Five. 
The second aspect analyzed was the impact of institutional factors and the incentives 
of the decision makers on the evolution of rules. It was found that interest group influence and 
utility maximizing behavior of the decision makers are likely to bias the evolution of rules 
away from rationality. The decision-makers will maximize their own net utility subject to the 
incentives provided them by their principals and the system. According to the efficiency 
hypothesis, the adversarial system with independent courts facilitates efficient rules. Some 
theories even predict that this evolution of efficient rules in the adversarial system is robust to 
biased preferences of the judges. The interest group theory predicts that political supervised 
inquisitorial enforcement authorities are likely to be influenced and biased by interest group 
influence in their determination of rules. In addition to this the decisions are likely to be 
biased by the preferences of the utility-maximizing bureaucrats. Thus, according to these 
theories, we should expect more rational rules in the US, which operates with an adversarial 
system, while the rules in EU should be biased both due to interest group influence and 
bureaucratic behavior. However, other theories predict a superiority of the inquisitorial 
system relative to the adversarial system in facilitating efficient rules. The argument is that 
the inquisitorial decision makers are likely to pursue the truth in a cost efficient way in the 
decision making, while rent-seekers have the opportunity to spend almost unlimited resources 
on deceptive argumentation in an adversarial court. 
It was not concluded as to which of these theories that are most likely to be most 
informative. Rent-seeking and decision maker incentives are likely to disturb the evolution of 
rational rules in both the inquisitorial and adversarial system.  
What can be done to promote more rational rules? 
The antitrust decision makers should take more criteria into account when they determine the 
rules. The presumption rules in both the US and EU are determined by the confidence in the 
anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question. At a superior level, expected error costs, 
costs of formulation and costs of application should all be taken into account. This requires a 
broader assessment than just assessing the likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct in 
question. 
To cope with the problems associated with the principle of precedence, a system should 
contain incentives for parties and enforcement authorities to try out precedence rules that are 
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likely to be overturned by the courts, so that they actually can be overturned. A system of 
private enforcement facilitates this. Thus, the work to promote private enforcement of EU 
competition law should continue. Enforcement authorities such as the European Commission 
may also enforce these rules to give the rules a chance to be challenged in the courts.  
The principle of precedence is supported by analogical reasoning. Decision makers should 
be careful in applying analogies as an end in legal interpretation. Analogies can be used as a 
source of inspiration for what a rule should be, but this suggested rule should be checked 
against the underlying antitrust standard and purpose. Thus, analogies should be used very 
carefully when they are based on rules with an ambiguous purpose.  
A risk of circumvention of the standard of proof is associated with the principle of 
precedence. To avoid the principle of precedence being used to circumvent the standard of 
proof, a responsibility rest on antitrust decision makers to not turn facts from previous cases 
into precedence-based rules without due critical considerations. The probative force of the 
presumption rule as such should be taken properly into account in the question of whether the 
presumption rule is rebutted.   
It is more difficult to provide good suggestions to avoid biases as a result from interest 
group influence and personal preferences of the antitrust decision makers. However, a crucial 
element of avoiding such biases is to promote rationality in evidence assessment, which will 
prevent the evolution of precedence based on epistemologically wrong decisions. This topic 
will be returned to in Chapter Five.    
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5 Rationality in the assessment of antitrust evidence 
5.1 Introduction and motivation  
In this chapter more precise directions for rationality in the assessment of antitrust evidence, 
including rational gathering of evidence, are provided. The rational assessment of antitrust 
evidence will be compared to the assessment principles and procedures used in the actual 
assessment of antitrust evidence.  
  The chapter begins by presenting a decision theoretic framework for rational evidence 
assessment. This framework will be an extension of the framework presented in Chapter 
Three. The framework for rational evidence assessment will be followed by a study of how 
antitrust evidence is actually assessed and how this actual evidence assessment coincides with 
rational evidence assessment. To inform the performance of actual evidence assessment 
further an economic model of actual evidence assessment is presented. Suggestions to 
improve the rationality in antitrust evidence assessment will be presented throughout the 
discussion. The results will be summarized in a concluding section.         
The chief research questions addressed in this chapter are: How should antitrust 
evidence rationally be assessed? Do the assessment principles and procedures in antitrust 
analysis promote rational evidence assessments? How can the assessment principles and 
procedures used in antitrust analysis be improved to promote rational evidence assessments? 
5.2 Rational evidence assessment  
5.2.1 The superior principle 
Beckner and Salop (1999) stated that “The court first should gather information that is least 
expensive, resolves the most uncertainty, and is most likely to affect its decision.” This is a 
good overall description of what rational assessment of legal evidence is. In this subchapter, 
the decision theoretic framework established in Chapter Three is used to derive more precise 
and operational implications as to what rational evidence assessment is. The analysis will be 
related to antitrust, but the discussion of actual antitrust evidence assessment will be returned 
to in a separate subchapter.  
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5.2.2 A decision theoretic framework for rational evidence assessment   
Evidence and expected loss minimization  
A rational decision is the decision that maximizes expected utility, which is the same as 
minimizing expected loss.330 It is rational to decide violation if the expected loss of 
wrongfully deciding violation is less than the expected loss of wrongfully deciding not 
violation.331 Let LV be the loss of wrongfully deciding violation (type-1 error). LNV is the loss 
of wrongfully deciding not violation (type-2 error). pV is the probability that the law was 
actually violated, and pNV=1-pV is the probability that the law was not violated. The expected 
loss of finding violation is then ELV=(1-pV)LV. This is the expected loss from type-1 error.  
The expected loss of not finding violation is ELNV=pVLNV. This is the expected loss from 
type-2 error.  The rational decision is to decide violation if ELV<ELNV and not violation 
otherwise.332 This means that it is rational to decide violation if (1-pV)LV<pVLNV The 
expected loss is then EL=min[ELV,ELNV]=min[(1-pV)LV,pVLNV]. The precise content of these 
losses was discussed in Chapter Three.   
Now evidence can be introduced into this picture. We can think of assessing evidence 
as hypothesis testing. Let HV be the hypothesis that the law is violated. This means that the 
probability of violation can be written as pV=p(HV is true)=p(HV). The probability that the law 
is not violated can be written as pNV=p(HV is false)=p(HNV). Since pNV=1-pV, we have pNV=1-
p(HV).  
Let ĒTot be the total amount of potential evidence that can be gathered. Let Ē be the 
evidence that is gathered, and let e be the evidence actually observed. This means that e is the 
outcome of Ē. When we gather evidence, we can choose both what evidence to gather and in 
what sequence to gather the evidence. If e is relevant evidence, it affects the probability 
assessment of HV. p(HV|e) is the probability we assign to HV given evidence e. In an antitrust 
context, e might, for instance, be some e-mail from company A to company B on planned 
price changes, and HV the hypothesis that it has been an illegal agreement on price. 
                                                 
330 This can be derived from the axioms of rational behavior. An intuitive explanation is that this is the decision 
rule that minimizes losses in the long run.    
331 As explained in Chapter Three, two extreme decisions are assumed: violation and not violation. This is a 
simplification. Both violation and not violation might consist of many decisions. Violation can constitute a 
continuous space of decisions. If deciding violation involves fines or other sanctions, every possible size of the 
fine of or sanction is a separate decision. When it comes to deciding not violation, this might also involve many 
decisions. This can involve an acquittal, which just means that a violation is not found according to the standard 
of proof. However, the decision maker can also, in some circumstances, state explicitly that the conduct in 
question is not a violation. The binary decision framework is chosen for simplicity. This will, most of the time, 
be illustrative for the study of rationality If this framework is deviated, this will follow clearly from the text.    
332 More precisely, it is rational to decide violation if and only if ELV≤ELNV. However, we assume that if the 
expected loss of deciding violation and not violation is equal, then not violation will be decided.   
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 We do not know the outcome of the evidence-gathering before it is gathered. If, for 
instance, e is written communication of prices, we can search for this evidence. If we find this 
evidence, it might boost our probability assessment of HV. Not finding the evidence might 
also have some impact on our probability assessment of HV, but not so much as if we found 
the evidence of written communication. In line with rational decision theory, we assume that 
we know the a priori probability of finding such evidence if we search for it. This means that 
we know the probability distribution for p(Ē) for all possible subsets of ĒTot.  For instance, 
even if we do not know if we will find communication if we search for it, we at least know 
the probability of finding such evidence.333 We also know how this evidence potentially 
affects our probability assessment of HV. This means that, for a given outcome of evidence e, 
we can calculate p(HV|e). 
For some given evidence e, it will be rational to find violation if ELV(e)<ELNV(e).  
Given evidence e, we have that ELV(e)=(1-p(HV|e))LV and ELNV(e)=p(HV|e)LNV, which 
makes it rational to find violation if (1-p(HV|e))LV<p(HV|e)LNV. The expected loss of a 
rational decision given evidence, e, is then  
 
EL(e)=min[ELV(e),ELNV(e)]=min[(1-p(HV|e))LV,p(HV|e)LNV]. 
Evidence, expected loss minimization, and costs of gathering evidence 
Gathering evidence, Ē, is also associated with costs. It is assumed here that the cost of 
gathering evidence is c(Ē), and that this cost is known a priori.334 This cost function will be 
elaborated upon below.  
A rational decision that includes evidence gathering minimizes the sum of all costs. 
This is the sum of the expected losses from errors and the costs of gathering evidence. The 
minimization of the sum of the expected loss from error and costs of gathering evidence can 




Since EL(Ē) is equal to min[1-p(HV|Ē)LV,p(HV|Ē)LNV], this becomes 
 
 
                                                 
333 This assumption and ways around this assumption will be discussed in the subchapter of probative force 
below. 
334 In theory, we could assume that there was some uncertainty associated with the costs, and then operate with 
expected values. This is a complication is not pursued in this study.  
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The idea behind this formula is simple although it might appear complicated. There are two 
minimization operations. Given that some evidence, e, is gathered, the rational decision maker 
will minimize expected loss. But before the evidence is gathered, he has to “average” over all 
possible outcome of Ē by taking the expectation when he is deciding to gather the evidence or 
not. This is the EĒ part. The MinĒ refers to that the decision maker must optimize the evidence 
gathering taking the cost of evidence-gathering into account. The evidence gathering must be 
optimized both with regard to the amount of evidence and the sequence in which the evidence 
is gathered.  This will be illustrated by an example later in this subchapter.   
A rational decision maker will gather evidence based on how it will reduce the 
expected loss of the decision by resolving uncertainty and on the cost of gathering the 
evidence as such. As pointed out in the law and economics literature, the reduced expected 
loss from error from gathering evidence must be weighed against the cost of gathering 
evidence.335 A question is if it always reduces the expected loss of error to gather more 
evidence. Let us say that we possess some compelling evidence for a violation. Wouldn’t then 
gathering some possible contradictory evidence reduce the probability of HV and then 
increase the expected loss of the decision? The answer to this is, no. The existence of such 
evidence must, never-the-less, be taken into account a priori. Let us say that there is a 90 
percent chance that such contradictory evidence exists. Then this uncertainty must be taken 
into account a priori. It can be shown that, a priori, gathering free evidence will always reduce 
the expected loss of a decision.336 Recall that there is also a chance that the probability of HV 
will increase if the 10 percent chance that the evidence gathering reveals that such evidence 
does not exists kicks in. Then the expected losses will be correspondingly lower. Since the 
uncertainty must be taken into account a priori, the expected loss of errors will always 
decrease if we get more evidence. Thus, it will always reduce expected loss of errors to 
include free evidence in the decision.  
However, evidence is not free. It will then be a tradeoff whether gathering the 
evidence pays off. If EL is the expected loss without gathering evidence, Ē, and EL(Ē) is the 
expected loss when Ē is gathered, the decision value of the evidence, Ē, can then be measured 
                                                 
335 See Posner (1999), Posner (2011) p. 819 f. and Spier (2007). A very simple model would be to just assume 
that E(e) is the reduced expected error losses from gathering evidence and that C(e) is the cost of gathering 
evidence. E is decreasing in e and C is increasing in e. The optimal amount of evidence is when E’(e)=C’(e). See 
Posner (2011) p. 819.   
336 See Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961). This will be illustrated by an example below. 
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as EL-EL(Ē).337 The question is if this decision value exceeds the cost of gathering evidence.  
Dynamic programming can, in principle, be used to solve the optimization problem in 
gathering evidence338, but in practice we have to rely on heuristics. This optimization problem 
is returned to below in the discussion of optimal evidence gathering. 
Everything else equal, the evidence that resolves most uncertainty should be gathered 
first. This is the evidence with the highest decision value. The decision value of evidence will 
be discussed in detail below. The evidence’s decision value is, inter alia, dependent on its 
probative force. Rationally assessing probative force will be discussed in more detail below.  
The maximal probative force of evidence is evidence that resolves the factual issue with 
certainty. This is evidence that is only compatible with either the law having been violated or 
not. This is sometimes described as direct evidence.339  
Furthermore, everything else equal, the evidence associated with the lowest cost of 
gathering should be gathered first. This also includes that the one who can gather a piece of 
evidence to the lowest cost should have the burden to do so. This can be solved with optimal 
presumptions and evidence competition between two conflicting parties.  
It is a tradeoff between decision value and costs. The cheapest evidence with the 
highest decision value should normally be gathered first. The tradeoff between decision value 
and costs is the overarching topic in the rest of this subchapter.  
Evidence, expected loss minimization, and standard of proof 
In the decision theoretic framework above, the standard of proof was assumed endogenous. 




This means that the higher the relative loss of wrongfully deciding violation is compared to 
wrongfully deciding not violation, the higher a probability for violation is necessary for 
violation to be the rational decision. This means the higher the relative loss from type-1 error 
to type-2 error, the more confident we must be that there was a violation for it to be a rational 
decision to decide violation.  
                                                 
337 See Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p. 259 f.   
338 See Berger (1985) p. 432 f. Parmigani and Inoue (2009) p 221 f. for a general framework on how this 
maximization problem can be solved. Beckner and Salop (1999, Kerber et al. (2008), and Kretschmer (2011b) 
use this approach in the antitrust context. This literature will be returned to below.  
339 Walton (2002) p. 74 refers to this as the McCormick-criterion after Charles T. McCormick (1889-1963). This 
is roughly the definition of direct evidence used by Anderson et al. (2005) p. 76. 
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In the legal context, the decision maker is often not allowed to adjust the standard of 
proof to the specific relative losses of type-1 and type-2 errors in the case. In pure civil cases, 
balance of probabilities is the main rule. In a decision theoretic framework, this means that 
type-1 errors and type-2 are considered equally bad. In criminal procedure, however, the main 
rule is that criminal liability must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Decision theoretically 
this means that type-1 errors are considered far worse than type-2 errors. Thus, the loss of 
finding an innocent wrongfully to be guilty is considered much larger than the loss of finding 
a guilty wrongfully to be innocent. This can partly be explained by the high sanctions 
including imprisonment, which are available in criminal cases. In civil cases where the 
government imposes some administrative sanctions of punitive character, the standard of 
proof is not as settled as in criminal procedure, and there might be room for more flexibility to 
weigh loss of type-1 errors against losses of type-2 errors. In antitrust, it might, for instance, 
in some cases be a substantial risk that some substantial innovation is not realized as a result 
of a type-1 error, while in other cases this risk might be associated with type-2 errors. A more 
detailed description of the actual standard of proof in antitrust was given in Chapter Two.  
The question of whether a fixed standard of proof is rational or if it should be flexible 
to the circumstances of the specific case, is partially a question of costs. It will impose costs 
on judges and courts to assess the consequences of errors in specific cases. A fixed standard 
of proof saves this cost. A fixed standard of proof also promote legal certainty, as it is easier 
to assess the legal consequences of actions. Still, judges and other antitrust decision makers 
may consciously or unconsciously take into account the loss of errors.340 If a decision maker 
de facto uses another standard of proof than formally stated, it might appear confusing. If, for 
instance, a decision maker applies a higher standard of proof than balance of probabilities in a 
pure civil case from an error loss perspective, but still argues that balance of probabilities was 
applied, this would be confusing for anyone who wants to learn how decision makers assess 
evidence.   
The conditions for a rational decision can be derived under the constraint that the 
standard of proof is fixed. Assume that the standard of proof for finding violation is α (for 
instance, 0.99). This means that violation is found if p(HV|e)>α and not else. The expected a 
priori loss of a rational decision, including gathering evidence, can then be written as: 
 
MinĒ EĒ((1-p(HV|Ē))LVI(p(HV|Ē)>α)+p(HV|Ē)LNVI(p(HV|Ē)≤α)+c(Ē)),  
                                                 
340 The incentives of judges and other antitrust decision makers will be discussed in more detail below. 
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I(p(HV|Ē)≤α)=1 if p(HV|Ē)≤α and 0 else. 
 
With a fixed standard of proof, the decision maker may sometimes be forced to make a 
suboptimal decision. This can be partially mitigated by collecting more evidence, but might 
also not make it worthwhile to gather as much evidence as is optimal. This will be illustrated 
in the example below.  
The framework exemplified  
An example of evidence assessment in the rational decision framework presented above might 
clarify its nature. Assume that in an antitrust case two companies are under scrutiny for price 
fixing. Let us say that the current evidence is extensive data on parallel pricing behavior. 
However, ex ante, parallel pricing is both consistent with tough competition and a price 
conspiracy. Assume that in most situations parallel pricing is a result of tough competition. 
Thus, based on this knowledge, we assume that p(HV)=0.09 while p(HNV)=0.91. Assume that 
the cost of wrongfully finding a price conspiracy is $20M, and the cost of wrongfully 
acquitting a price conspiracy is $10M.  
Assume the only other evidence that can be found is if there was communication 
between the firms before every price change. Thus, we can gather Ē, which can have the 
outcomes e or not e, where e is that such communication is found while not e is that such 
communication is not found. If such communication exists, then p(HV|e)=0.8, while 
p(HNV|e)=0.2. The probability that such evidence, e, can be found is 10 percent. This means 
that p(e)=0.1. If Ē is gathered but communication cannot be found, then p(HV|not e)=0.01 
while p(HNV|not e)=0.99.341  
                                                 
341 The consistency of these numbers can be justified by the theory presented in the section on probative force 
below. Numbers in the example have been rounded to two decimals as information to those who want to check 
the consistency of the numbers.    
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Before gathering evidence, the rational decision would be to decide not violation. This 
would give an expected loss of $0.9M (0.09*$10M). If we gather evidence and e is present, it 
would be rational to decide violation. It would give us an expected loss $4M (0.2*$20M). If e 
cannot be found, then it would be rational to decide not violation with expected loss of $0.1M 
(0.01*$10M). The expected loss if we decide to gather the evidence, but before we know the 
outcome of the gathering, will be 0.1*$4M+0.9*$0.1M=$0.49M. Thus, gathering evidence 
will expectedly reduce our expected loss by $0.41M ($0.9M-$0.49M). Thus, as long as it cost 
less than $ 0.41M to gather and assess the evidence, we should do it.   
With a fixed standard of proof, the situation will change. Let us say that the standard 
of proof in proving violation is 0.99. As p(HV|e)=0.8 is the maximal confidence we can obtain 
that there has been a violation, the only available decision is to decide not violation. If we still 
choose to gather the evidence the expected loss of the decision after gathering evidence will 
be 0.1*0,8*$10M+0.9*0.01*$10M=$0.9M. Thus, there is nothing to gain by gathering 
evidence.  
Now, for the sake of analysis, let us assume that parallel behavior gives a strong 
presumption of violation. Let us say that violation will be found unless it will be proved that 
the probability of violation is equal to or less than 0.1 percent. The expected loss if evidence 
is not gathered in this situation is $18.2M as there is a 0.91 chance of an error loss of $20M. If 
evidence is gathered for and e is found, the expected loss will be $4M (0.2*$20M). If 
evidence gathered for and not found, this will suffice to decide not violation. The expected 
loss will then be $0.1M (0.01*$10M). The a priori expected loss when gathering evidence 
will then be 0.1*$4M+0.9*$0.1M=$0.49M. Thus, gathering evidence will reduce our 
expected loss by $17.71M ($18.2M-$0.49M). As long as it costs less than $17.71M to gather 
evidence, it should be gathered. Thus, when the standard of proof is flexible, it is only rational 
to gather evidence as long as it costs less than $0.41M. If the cost is between $0.41M and 
$17.71M, it will be rational to gather evidence with a fixed standard of proof and a strong 
presumption for violation, but not with a flexible standard of proof. This is an example of how 
a fixed standard of proof may make it rational to gather more evidence than with a flexible 
standard of proof.  
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5.2.3 Rationally assessing the probative force of evidence 
Evidence, uncertainty, and probative force 
It appears from the decision framework for rational evidence assessment described above that 
it is imperative to find the probability of violation given evidence. More precisely we need to 
know p(HV|e) for any possible e. Thus, we need to know to what extent evidence impact the 
probability of a hypothesis. Probative force of evidence is about how much some evidence 
affects the probability of a hypothesis we want to test. Evidence reduces uncertainty. In legal 
terms, one can say that the rational weight of evidence is determined by its probative force. 
Evidence with strong probative force should be given high weight.342  
In the extreme case, some evidence can resolve all uncertainty. If one can deduce from 
evidence that one specific hypothesis is true, the hypothesis is true as long as the premises for 
the deduction are true. If a piece of evidence is only consistent with one hypothesis, the 
hypothesis can be accepted with certainty, and if evidence is deductively inconsistent with 
one hypothesis, this hypothesis can be rejected with certainty.343 Evidence that is only 
consistent with either that a law is violated or that a law is not violated is sometimes referred 
to as direct evidence.344 Direct evidence resolves the issue; there is no more information in 
knowing the truth than knowing the evidence. The role of deduction in evidence assessment 
has a central role in detective novels like Sherlock Holmes, where the detective, by deduction, 
eliminates hypothesis after hypothesis and in the end is left with the one true hypothesis.  
Normally, deduction from evidence to the truth of a legal hypothesis on the violation 
of law is not possible. In real life, we usually do not have the evidence to resolve the issue 
with certainty. Even if some evidence, at its face, resolves the uncertainty, for instance, some 
participating witness testifying that a price conspiracy was concluded in a business meeting, 
credibility issues reduce the “concluding” force of this evidence to a question of probative 
force. The witness may lie for some reason. Non-deductive inference means that it is not 
possible to infer the truth of one hypothesis from the evidence with certainty. Evidence makes 
hypotheses more or less probable. A piece of evidence is relevant and has probative force if it 
makes a hypothesis more or less probable. Empirical experiences and structural knowledge on 
probable connections are used to evaluate how probable a hypothesis is given evidence. This 
                                                 
342 See Schum (2009). 
343 The premise for valid deduction is formal logic and the validity of the premises. Formal logic means, for 
instance, to use logical laws like if A implies B, then not B implies not A (modus tollens), or if A implies B and 
B implies C, then A implies C (using modus ponens in two steps). 
344 Walton (2002) p. 74 refers to this as the McCormick-criterion after Charles T. McCormick (1889-1963). This 
is roughly the definition of direct evidence used by Anderson et al. (2005) p. 76. 
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involves inductive reasoning, which means to generalize from observations and examples 
back to some specific situation. Assume that we know that almost always when competing 
firms with more than 70 percent market share together merge, competition will be reduced 
and prices will increase. This can be used to say that is probable that a proposed merger 
between two companies holding more than 70 percent will reduce competition and increase 
prices. Inductive reasoning is subject to some logical problems addressed already by Hume 
(1748).345 Why does the fact that the sun has been rising every day so far make it probable 
that the sun will raise tomorrow? This is not the right place to elaborate on such philosophical 
issues. However, the problem of induction will be returned to, as it is central in the critique of 
the mainstream decision theory by the proponents of causal decision theory. Inductive 
interference can be considered as model-based inference. The question then is whether 
assuming that the sun will rise every morning is a good model to utilize in decision making.346 
Model-based inference will be returned to in detail in Chapter Six.  
Given the possibility to express the connection between evidence and hypotheses in 
probabilistic terms, probability calculus provides guidance on how to handle these 
probabilities. In fact, adherence to the rules of probability is one of the crucial assumptions 
for rationality, as explained in Chapter Three. If these rules are not followed, decisions will be 
incoherent. Rational decisions require beliefs to be updated according to the laws of 
probability if new information becomes available.347 
Some legal scholars have has expressed obstacles when it comes to applying 
probability calculus to legal evidence, and these obstacles will be addressed properly later.348 
However, for now we are concerned with rational decisions under uncertainty. Thus, 
probability calculus is used to assess the probative force of evidence. It should also be noted 
that exact numbers are not necessary for probability calculus to inform legal assessment of 
evidence. It is the principles and logic of probability calculus that is important to inform the 
rational assessment of probative force of evidence.  
                                                 
345 See for instance Gilboa (2009) p. 21.   
346 I decide to not bring a flashlight when I go out in the morning because I rely on the sunrise.  
347 As explained in Chapter Three, there have been developed theories for rational decisions with more lenient 
representations of uncertainty. These are promising theories for modeling rational legal decisions. However in 
this study, the mainstream theory of rational decisions, which is based on exact probability measures, is relied 
upon.    
348 See, for instance, Stein (2011). 
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It will be described below how probability theory is used to determine the probative 
force of evidence.349 Examples from antitrust will be drawn upon. However, the actual 
assessment of antitrust evidence will be studied in a separate subchapter below. Thus, the 
principles presented here will serve as a benchmark for the study of the rationality of actual 
evidence assessment below. Note that the basic rules of probability calculus are based on the 
axioms in Kolmogorov (1950), which were described in Chapter Three. These rules of 
probability are applied without further justification here. 
Numerical and relative probative force of evidence 
Let HV be the hypothesis of violation and let e be the evidence gathered. The probability of 
the hypothesis given the evidence is p(HV|e). By knowing e, the probability of HV changes 
from p(HV) to p(HV|e). A measure on the probative force of evidence is p(HV|e)-p(HV). This 
measures in numerical terms how much the probability of the hypothesis change by knowing 
the evidence e. If this measure is positive, the evidence supports HV by increasing its 
probability and if it is negative the evidence contradicts HV by reducing its probability.  
Another way to measure probative force of e is to look at how much it relatively 
changes the probability of HV. This means that we look at the ratio p(HV|e)/p(HV). If this 
measure is larger than one, the evidence supports HV, and if it is less than one, the evidence 
contradicts HV.  
For both the numerical measure and the ratio measure on probative force the question 
is if p(HV|e) is larger, equal to, or less than p(HV). Some evidence, e, can be said to have 
positive relevance if p(HV|e)>p(HV) and negative relevance if  p(HV|e)<p(HV).350 Recall that 
this definition coincides with how the term relevance used in Federal Rules of Evidence 
(FRE), Rule 401, where relevance is a term used for evidence that makes a hypothesis more 
probable or less probable. Another way to say this is that e confirms H if (and only if) 
p(HV|e)>p(HV), and disconfirms HV if (and only if) p(HV|e)<p(HV).351 Note that, by definition, 
                                                 
349 Only the highlights of probability calculus will be presented here. For those who want to explore the 
foundations of probability calculus in more depth there is a large body of literature. Books on statistics such as 
Wasserman (2003) give an introduction to probability and the variety of statistical methods. Books on 
probability theory, decision theory, and more generally, the philosophy of science provide fundamental 
understanding on the philosophy of probability concepts. Achinstein (2001), Hacking (2001) and Sober (2008) 
Chapter 1, provide a philosophy of science perspective. Parmigiani and Inoue (2009), Gilboa (2009), and 
Binmore (2009) provide a decision theoretic perspective on probability. Farnsworth (2007) Chapter 29 and 30, 
and Dawid (2005) introduce probability in the context of legal assessment of evidence. Taroni et al. (2010) use is 
a comprehensive study of the use of probability theory and decision theory in forensic science. Sanchirico (2012) 
discuss probabilities in an evidence law and economics perspective.       
350 Achinstein (2001) p. 45 uses this definition and traces this back to Carnap (1962).   
351 Sober (2008) p. 15. 
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HV and e are independent if p(HV|e)=p(HV). If e is independent of HV, it is not relevant and 
has no probative force. The weather in Chicago is probably independent of the existence of a 
price conspiracy in New York, and is thus no evidence for such a conspiracy (although you 
never know).          
A question is whether the numerical measure or the ratio measure is best to measure 
the probative force of evidence. Technically, this is irrelevant for the loss minimization 
framework presented above, but the two measures provide some different intuitive insight. 
Assume that p(HV)=0.001 and p(HV|e)=0.002. This means that the evidence, e, increases the 
probability of HV with only 0.001, which is quite little in numerical terms. However, with the 
same numbers, the ratio p(HV|e)/p(HV) is 2, which means that the evidence makes the 
hypothesis of violation twice as probable. This may be considered to be quite much.    
Exploiting Bayes’ rule  
Sometimes, we have empirical data, experiences, and structural knowledge to assess p(HV|e) 
and p(HV) directly by induction. If we, for instance, scrutinize a company for abuse of 
dominance, and receive evidence that the company has less than 10 percent market share, we 
know that p(HV|e) is very small by direct induction from those experiences. So, if p(HV) was 
not very small from the beginning, this evidence has strong probative force.  
When such direct induction is not possible, we can use probability calculus to say 
more about p(HV|e). The conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence is 
p(HV|e)=p(HV෼e)/p(e). By the definition of conditional probabilities, we know that 
p(e|HV)=p(HV෼e)/p(HV), which means that p(HV෼e)=p(e|HV)p(HV). Thus, by using the 




This is the so-called Bayes’ rule. The rule on conditional probability is used the other way, 
and p(HV෼e) is replaced with p(e|HV)p(HV). This transformation is very important in the 
application of probability calculus to evidence. We may have much better empirical data or 
structural knowledge to say something about the likelihood of some evidence given the truth 
of a hypothesis than the opposite. The formula says that the probability of a hypothesis given 
evidence is equal to the probability of the evidence given that the hypothesis is true, 
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multiplied with the a priori probability with the hypothesis and divided by the probability of 
the evidence in general. This means that the probability of an hypothesis given evidence is 
larger, the more often the evidence occur given the truth of the hypothesis, the more likely the 
hypothesis is a priori (before evidence is known), and the less probable the general occurrence 
of the evidence is.  
Recall from above that p(HV|e)/p(HV) is the ratio measure of probative force. Another 
way to see the formula derived just above is that p(HV|e)=[p(e|HV)/p(e)]*p(HV), which is the 
same as p(HV|e)/p(HV)=p(e|HV)/p(e). This means that the probative force for e in support of 
HV in relative terms is stronger the more likely the evidence is given that the hypothesis is 
true relative to the probability of evidence in general. In intuitive terms this means the 
probative force is stronger the more likely it is that we find e if it we know that HV is true than 
if we don’t know whether HV is true or not. However, how much p(HV|e) becomes in 
numerical terms is dependent on the a priori probability of the hypothesis p(HV). Even if 
p(e|H)/p(e) is large, the resulting p(HV|e) will not be large in numerical terms if p(HV) was 
low in the first place. Thus, to know the probative force in numerical terms, which is p(HV|e)-
p(HV), we need to take the a priori probability into account. To not take this a priori 
probability into account is referred to as the base rate fallacy.352 This will be returned to in the 
discussion of cognitive biases below.             




Thus, the probability of e in general is nothing more than a weighted average of the 
occurrence of e, whether HV is true or not, where the weights are the probability the 
hypothesis being true or not, respectively. By performing some simple algebra, we find that 
p(e|HV)>p(e) if and only if p(e|HV)>p(e|HNV).353 Thus, the evidence is more likely given the 
truth of the hypothesis than in general if and only if the evidence, e, is more likely to occur if 
we know that the hypothesis is true than if we know that the hypothesis is false. Thus, what is 
important for the relative probative force of evidence is the likelihood of evidence given that 
the hypothesis is true relative to the likelihood of the evidence given that the hypothesis is 
false. If parallel pricing is equally likely, price conspiracy or not, parallel pricing does not 
                                                 
352 Also known as the prosecutor fallacy. 
353 p(e|HV)>p(e) is the same as p(e|HV)>p(e|HV)p(HV)+p(e|HNV)p(HNV), which is the same as p(e|HV)(1-
p(HV))>p(e|HNV)p(HNV). Since 1-p(HV)=p(HNV), then this is the same as p(e|HV)>p(e|HNV). 
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have probative force in favor of a price conspiracy. A fallacy is to deduce probative force 
from consistency with a hypothesis alone, for instance to deduce probative force from the fact 
that parallel pricing is consistent with a price conspiracy. This is not enough. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the discussion of actual evidence assessment below.354  
The problem of priors  
Recall from above that p(HV|e)=p(HV෼e)/p(e)=p(e|HV)p(HV)/p(e). Thus, to determine p(HV|e), 
the one who assess evidence must have some positive a priori belief on the probability of the 
hypothesis, p(HV), for instance, the general probability that some restraint is anticompetitive. 
The problem of the subjectivity of priors was described Chapter Three. Even if there are 
objective ways in assessing the consistency of evidence, which is to assess p(e|HV), the 
subjectivity of priors will constitute an obstacle to an objective assessment of probative force. 
Luckily, there are ways around this.  
One solution is that the impact of priors will be less and less as more evidence is 
gathered.355 Thus, by gathering more and more evidence, the influence of the prior on the 
final probability assessment will be less and less.   
Another solution to the problem of priors is to legally fix the priors to get some 
objective common priors. Both the EU and US operates with presumption rules that can be 
seen as a way to fix priors. These presumption rules were described in Chapter Four and will 
be returned to in the discussion of actual evidence assessment below. The presumption rules 
for antitrust violations are based on the general confidence in the anticompetitive effects of 
the type of the restraint in question. The less general confidence in the anticompetitive effect, 
the more evidence based on the actual circumstances must be assessed to establish a 
presumption of anticompetitive effects. This is in line with Bayes’ rule. The general 
confidence in the anticompetitive effects can be seen as the a priori probability of 
anticompetitive effects p(HV). The lower this is, the more evidence of anticompetitive effects 
in terms of p(e|HV)/p(e) is necessary to establish a presumption rule determined by a high 
p(HV|e).  
Another legally fixed prior relevant for antitrust analysis is the presumption of 
innocence. The presumption of innocence is an important legal safeguard in criminal 
                                                 
354 This can be an element of confirmation bias, where evidence with no probative force is interpreted to support 
a hypothesis in line with a person’s prior beliefs.  
355 See Wasserman (2003) p. 181 f. One cannot say in general that the impact of priors will be eliminated as 
more evidence is gathered; the impact of priors becomes less, though.   
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enforcement. A presumption of innocence may intuitively seem to require that the probability 
of a hypothesis of violation, p(HV), should be assumed to be zero before one starts to assess 
evidence. However, the equation for p(HV|e) given above has no meaning when assuming that 
p(HV)=0 because we multiply by p(HV). With the theory of Bayesian updating, no evidence 
will ever make the probability of violation larger than zero if the a priori probability of 
violation is zero in the first place. Does that mean that a presumption of innocence precludes 
probability calculus as a tool to inform legal evidence assessment? Not necessarily! A 
presumption of innocence could be instrumentally fitted to the Bayesian framework by 
assuming that a person scrutinized for some violation, is, a priori, considered no more 
probable to have committed the violation than any other randomly chosen person in the 
population.356 Another way to safeguard the presumption of innocence is to only relate to the 
ratio measure of probative force and avoid the problem of a priori probabilities. Then, 
p(e|HV)/p(e) is a factor that the a priori probability of violation can be multiplied with to find 
the probability of violation given the evidence. This means that whatever belief we have in 
the probability of the hypothesis before the evidence is available, the probability of the 
hypothesis becomes p(e|HV)/p(e) larger by having the evidence.  
A question that is interesting both from a legal perspective and a rationality 
perspective is the compatibility of the strong presumptions of anticompetitive effects 
established by the antitrust presumption rules and the presumption of innocence. Often, these 
presumptions are logically compatible. If, for instance, agreements on prices is subject to a 
strong presumption of anticompetitive effects and, thus, illegality, the question of whether 
there was an agreement on prices or not is subject to the presumption of innocence. However 
it is not difficult to imagine conflicts between presumptions of anticompetitive effects 
established by the antitrust presumption rules and the presumption of innocence. Would it, for 
instance, be sufficient to establish reasonable doubt on the existence of offsetting consumer 
gains to escape illegality? Probably not! Still, in this case, the underlying antitrust standard is 
not satisfied according to a reasonable doubt requirement. A solution to this legal issue will 
not be discussed here. From a rational decision perspective, the question is whether 
establishing reasonable doubt should be enough to switch the burden back to the plaintiff to 
eliminate that reasonable doubt by further evidence.  Rational use of presumptions will be 
returned to in the section on minimizing costs of evidence gathering below.            
                                                 
356 It would be beyond the scope of this study to enter into a discussion on the precise legal content of the 
presumption of innocence. As a starting point, this presumption means that a charged person benefits from any 
reasonable doubt.  
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Probability ratios, likelihood ratios, and probative force 
So far, we have only analyzed the probative force of some evidence associated with a single 
hypothesis of violation, HV. Often, the assessment of evidence is performed in the context of 
many competing hypotheses. In this subsection it will be shown that the analysis of probative 
force of evidence might be simplified by explicitly taking into account the competing 
hypotheses. The probative force of evidence for a hypothesis relative to a competing 
hypothesis can be measured by how the evidence changes the probability ratio between the 
hypotheses. The probability ratio is also called the odds ratio.357  
The obvious competing hypothesis to HV is its mutually exclusive negation, HNV. This 
particular competing hypothesis was already addressed above. The probability ratio between 
H and HNV is given by 
   
p(HV|e)/p(HNV|e)=[p(e|HV)p(HV)/p(e)]/[p(e|HNV)p(HNV)p(e)]. 
 
As we can see, p(e) can now be eliminated as it appears both in the numerator and 








Thus, the extent to which the evidence increases or decreases the original probability ratio is 
dependent on how probable the evidence is given the two hypotheses. The change in the 
probability ratio is dependent on which hypothesis the evidence is most consistent with. If 
p(e|HV)/p(e|HNV)>1, e supports HV relative to HNV. If p(e|HV)/p(e|HNV)<1, e contradicts HV 
relative to HNV. If p(e|HV)/p(e|HNV)=1, the evidence is neutral and provides no information. 
Another way to say this is that if p(e|HV)>p(e|HNV), e supports HV relative to HNV, and if 
                                                 
357 The odds ratio between two probabilistic events such as which of the teams A or B wins the soccer match is 
r=p(A)/p(B). The interpretation of this ratio is that team A is r times as much likely to win the match as team B. 
In odds terms this is often written 1:r. In a fair bet, someone who bets on A receive one if A wins, but must pay r 
to the opponent if B wins. The ratio is always positive, but can be less than or equal to one, depending on which 
event is most probable.    
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p(e|HV)<p(e|HNV), e contradicts HV relative to HNV. Consistency of evidence with a 
hypothesis is the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis. Assume, for instance, that in a 
price conspiracy case we observe that all suspected companies changed their prices with the 
exact same amount at the exact same time over a two year period. Is this evidence more likely 
given that there was a price conspiracy going on, or is it more likely without a price 
conspiracy? If it is more likely with a conspiracy than without a conspiracy the evidence 
supports price conspiracy, relative to not price conspiracy. 
p(e|HV)/p(e|HNV) is called the likelihood ratio between HV and HNV. The likelihood 
ratio is an important concept in scientific evidential inference. The “likelihoodists” of 
philosophy of science stress the use of likelihood ratios as the scientifically correct method of 
assessing evidence.358 The likelihood ratio is a measure of the extent to which evidence 
supports a hypothesis relatively to a competing hypothesis.   
If we look back, we see that testing if p(e|HV) is greater or less p(e|HNV) is also a 
logical equivalent to testing probative force of e on HV directly without going via HNV. This is 
not surprising. As p(HV)=1-p(HNV), analyzing the impact of evidence on p(HV) directly and 
relative to p(HNV) is basically the same. This changes when we use the probability ratio 
between non-exhaustive hypotheses.  
Let us now generalize and assume that the two competing hypotheses are H1 and H2. 
H1 and H2 are not necessarily exhaustive. In antitrust analysis, H1 could, for instance, be a 
hypothesis of violation according to one specific theory of harm, while H2 is a hypothesis of 
not violation based on one specific theory of efficiencies. By the same calculations used just 




The question of whether the evidence relatively supports H1 or H2 is dependent on which 
hypothesis is most consistent with evidence. If p(e|H1)/p(e|H2)>1, the evidence supports H1 
relative to H2. If p(e|H1)/p(e|H2)<1, the evidence supports H2 relative to H1. If 
p(e|H1)/p(e|H2)=1, the evidence is neutral. p(e|H1)/p(e|H2) is the likelihood ratio that measures 
how much more or less evidence supports H1 relative to H2. Let us, for example, say that we 
scrutinize an agreement on exclusive purchasing between a wholesaler and a retailer. The two 
competing hypotheses are, on the one hand, that the agreement restricts competition on the 
                                                 
358 See Achinstein (2001) p. 125 for the argumentation. See also Sober (2008) p. 32 f. 
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wholesale level and, on the other hand, that the purchaser wants to realize efficiencies from 
economies of scale in procurement, and by this obtain lower input prices. Let us say that 
evidence present shows a large upfront payment from the wholesaler to the retailer before the 
agreement was entered into. Is the evidence more likely given the anticompetitive explanation 
or given the specific efficiency explanation? This will be determining for the likelihood ratio. 
With two non-exhaustive competing hypotheses, the likelihood ratio only says which 
of the hypotheses evidence relatively supports. It might be a third unknown hypothesis that 
the evidence supports even more. For instance, even though the evidence might support the 
anticompetitive hypothesis more than the efficiency hypothesis, there might be a third 
competing efficiency hypothesis based on another efficiency theory that is even better 
supported by the evidence. Some might try to exploit this point to manipulate an irrational 
decision maker’s assessment of evidence. An irrational decision maker might be manipulated 
to believe that a hypothesis is most probable since it is more probable than a competing 
hypothesis. This would be an abuse of rhetoric. The abuse of rhetoric will be discussed in the 
discussion of actual evidence assessment below.    
          What the likelihood ratio between H1 and H2, p(e|H1)/p(e|H2), does is to update the a 
priori probability ratio p(H1)/p(H2) to the a posteriori probability ratio p(H1|e)/p(H2|e). The 
likelihood ratio p(e|H1)/p(e|H2) is the update factor. This means that if we, for instance, a 
priori considered H1 to be half as probable as H2, and we then find the likelihood ratio to be 
two (the evidence is twice as likely given H1 than given H2), then H1 and H2 are equally 
probable a posteriori. If, however, we, for instance, a priori considered H1 to be one hundredth 
as probable as H2, and we then find the likelihood ratio to be two, then H1 is one fiftieth as 
probable as H2 a posteriori. Thus, even though likelihood ratios can tell us how much an a 
priori probability ratio must be adjusted in light of the evidence, it say nothing, as such, about 
which hypothesis is most probable. The same likelihood ratio equal to two can both update a 
hypothesis from being half as probable to be equally probable and a hypothesis from being 
one hundredth as possible to being one fiftieth as probable. At the end of the day, we are 
interested in knowing how probable a hypothesis is, or at least which hypothesis is most 
probable. For this, we need to have some ideas on the a priori probabilities. As mentioned 
above, the failure to take into account the a priori probability in assessing evidence is referred 
to as the base rate fallacy, which will be explored further in the discussion of cognitive biases 
below.  
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Some critics on probabilistic inference in legal assessment of evidence 
The use of probability calculus as a method of assessing legal evidence has not been without 
critics.359 It is easy to agree with the critics related to the use of probability calculus as a 
descriptive theory of how people actually assess evidence.360 This topic will be addressed 
properly in the section on actual evidence assessment in antitrust below. The study of 
behavioral economics has, for instance, revealed that persons are prone to significant 
cognitive biases in the assessment of evidence.361 However, that probability calculus is not a 
good description of how evidence in a legal context is actually assessed does not make it less 
valuable to analyze how a rational decision maker should assess evidence. This can give 
normative guidance to how evidence should be assessed, which can guide judges and others 
when they assess evidence. Furthermore, it can guide the design of procedural principles and 
rules. Rational assessment of evidence is also an important benchmark to assess the 
performance of actual decision making.   
Another objection to the use of probability calculus in evidence assessment could be 
that when witnesses express themselves in probability terms, they might have no idea what 
they are talking about. As a consequence, probability calculus using probability statements 
expressed by witnesses are wrong. However, there are counterarguments to this objection. 
The possibility of irrationality in witness statements can be handled in a rational way. Assume 
that a witness is not coherent in his statements. Coherence is simply that people are consistent 
in the handling of probabilities, as described in Chapter Three. Assume that a witness of a 
robbery is asked with what probability he thinks that the robber is a man. To this, he replies 
that he is 40 percent sure that it was a man. On the question on the probability that the robber 
is a woman, he replies that he is 30 percent sure that the robber is a woman. This is incoherent 
as the sum is less than 100 percent. Probably, he replies this because of a general feeling of 
uncertainty. A way to handle this lack of coherence in the witness statement is to look at the 
probability ratio. According to the witness, p(robber is man)=0.4 and p(robber is 
woman)=0.3. This gives p(robber is man)/p(robber is woman)=1.33. Thus, according to the 
witness, the ratio of man to woman is 1.33:1. Transformed to probabilities, this gives p(robber 
is man)=0.57 (1.33/2.33) and p(robber is a woman)=0.43. 
                                                 
359 See, for instance, Allen (2003), Stein (2011), Graver (2009), and Anderson et al. (2005) p. 246 f.  
360 However, by this it is not meant that probability models can be used as an instrumental model of actual 
evidence assessment. This will be done in the economic modeling of evidence assessment below.  
361 The behavioral economics literature was described in the analytical framework chapter and will be returned to 
below. 
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The probabilistic approach to decision making discussed above has also been 
criticized on normative grounds. Mainstream decision theory has been criticized for its 
handling of causality by proponents of causal decision theory.362 Simplified, one can say that 
proponents of causal decision theory only acknowledge beliefs based on causal connections. 
General empirical evidence is not relevant as long as it is not casually connected to the 
probability we want to assess. Stein (2011) uses causal decision theory to argue for a flawed 
probabilistic foundation of law and economics based on the mainstream decision theory used 
in this study. Stein (2011) seems to interpret mainstream decision theory wrongly. In 
mainstream decision theory, it is rational to take into account all relevant information. 
General empirical evidence provides information that might be refuted by some more context-
specific causally related evidence. The further philosophical details on the distinction between 
mainstream decision theory and causal decision theory will not be discussed here. All 
evidence whether it is based on pure empirical induction or case specific causal inference are 
considered relevant in accordance with mainstream decision theory. The question is to what 
extent evidence is informative in making better decisions. Methods of assessing the 
informative value of empirical evidence will be returned to in the discussion on the use of 
statistics and econometrics in Chapter Six. 
5.2.4 Some additional insight on probability and probative force 
The use of conditional probabilities, Bayes’ theorem, probability ratios, and likelihood ratios 
to derive numerical and relative measures of probative force of evidence are chief instruments 
in the rational assessment of probabilities to achieve rational decisions. Some additional 
insight from probability theory in calculating the probative force of evidence is presented in 
this subchapter. The purpose is to give some additional insight on the rational assessment of 
probative force in some situations where there is a risk of fallacies in actual evidence 
assessment. This will provide valuable insight for the discussion on actual evidence 
assessment in antitrust below.  
Multiple evidence and probative force   
So far, we have been concerned with some evidence, e, which might include many pieces of 
evidence. The evidence can be separated into a set of evidence elements e1,..,en,363 which are 
                                                 
362 See Martin (2009) p. 187 f. for an introduction to causal decision theory. Causal decision theory is strongly 
related to the problem of induction discussed above.  
363 For convenience e1,..,en is written instead of e1෼..෼en, but the meaning is the same.  
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also elements that could possibly be separated further into sub-elements. The evidence in 
most legal cases consists of a combination of elements, some that might support each other 
and some that might contradict each other. In the assessment of a combination of evidence, 
each element of evidence may have stand-alone probative force, but the combination of 
evidence will often have probative force exceeding the sum of the probative force of each 
element assessed independently. Evidence of some oddly correlated behavior in a market and 
information exchange might each independently have positive probative force for the 
hypothesis of price conspiracy. The combination of the two elements of evidence might, 
however, have higher probative force than the sum of their individual contributions.  
An illuminating example outside antitrust is to assume that there has been an old-
fashioned bank robbery. The robber was observed by a witness to have red hair, a big tattoo 
on his left arm and a mole at the right cheek. All this observed characteristics might be 
considered as evidence against a suspect that satisfies these characteristics. However, each 
element, individually, will have weak probative force. Many have read hair, many have a big 
tattoo on the left arm, and many have a mole on the right cheek. The evidence of a suspect 
satisfying all these characteristics in combination has much stronger probative force against 
the suspect than each characteristic separately. It is far less likely to find all these 
characteristics in some random person than each of the individual characteristic considered 
separately.   















where p(e1,..,en|H1)/p(e1,..,en|H2) is the likelihood ratio. 
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So far, we have just replaced e with e1,..,en. What is interesting is to know how to 
rationally assess the information in the combination of evidence. How is the probability of a 
combination of evidence related to the separate probabilities of the single pieces of evidence? 
For simplicity, it is assumed that there are two pieces of evidence: e1 and e2. By the laws of 
probability, we have that p(e1,e2)=p(e1ǀe2)p(e2).364 Equivalently, since order does not matter, 
we have p(e1,e2)=p(e2ǀe1)p(e1). Conditional on HV, the same probabilities become 
p(e1,e2ǀHV)=p(e1ǀe2,HV)p(e2ǀHV) and p(e1,e2ǀHV)=p(e2ǀe1,HV)p(e1ǀHV). Needless to say, given 
HNV, the same probabilities become p(e1,e2ǀHNV)=p(e1ǀe2,HNV)p(e2ǀHNV) and 
p(e1,e2ǀHNV)=p(e2ǀe1,HNV)p(e1ǀHNV), respectively. 
In legal evidence, it is usual to talk about evidence that support or contradict each 
other. It is usual to talk about “corroborative” evidence as pieces of evidence that support 
each other and of “contradictory evidence” or “conflicting evidence” where the pieces of 
evidence are contradictory with each other.365 Intuitively, evidence that supports HV can be 
said to be supportive to other evidence that supports HV. Evidence that contradicts HV can be 
said to be contradictory to evidence that supports HV. The formulas outlined above can be 
used to elaborate on what this means. Recall that evidence has probative force in support of, 
or contradictory to, HV dependent on whether the likelihood ratio p(e1,e2|HV)/p(e1,e2|HNV) is 
larger or less than 1.   





We can see that the presence of e2 in addition to e1 increases the probative force in support of 
of HV and only if p(e2ǀe1,HV)/p(e2ǀe1,HNV)>1. This means that, if the probability of e2 given e1 
is higher if HV is true than not true, then e2 will support e1, which means that the probative 
force of the total evidence becomes stronger. In other words, if it is more likely that we 
observe e2 given that we have observed e1 when HV is true than not, and we actually observe 
e2, then the probative force of evidence in support of HV increases by observing e2. On the 
contrary, if it is less likely that we observe e2 given that we have observed e1 given that HV is 
true than not, and we actually observe e2, then the probative force of evidence in support of 
HV decreases by observing e2.  
                                                 
364 We know from the laws of probability that p(A෼B)=p(AǀB)P(B). This can be used on p(e1,e2). 
365 See Anderson et al. (2005) p. 69-70.  
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If e2 is independent of e1 both if HV is true and not true, the formula above can be 
reduced to p(e1,e2ǀHV)/p(e1,e2ǀHNV)=p(e1ǀHV)p(e2ǀHV)/p(e1ǀHNV)p(e2ǀHNV).366 This means that a 
combination of two independent elements of evidence that both have standalone probative 
force in support of HV will have higher probative force than knowing only one of the evidence 
elements. In other words, 
 
 p(e1,e2ǀHV)/p(e1,e2ǀHNV)>max{p(e1ǀHV)/p(e1ǀHNV),p(e2ǀHV)/p(e2ǀHNV)}.  
 
This means that having two supportive independent elements of evidence is better than having 
only the better of the two. Opposite, if two independent elements of evidence that both have 
standalone probative force in contradiction of HV, their combination contradict HV even more. 
Assume we have two elements of independent evidence where one has stand-alone probative 
force in support of HV and one has probative force contradicting HV. This means 
p(e1ǀHV)/p(e1ǀHNV)>1 and p(e2ǀHV)/p(e2ǀHNV)<1. Then, the probative force of the combination 
of the evidence is somewhere between the two, where the direction of the probative force is 
dependent on which of the two pieces of evidence has the strongest probative force.  
On the other extreme side, assume that evidence e2 deductively follows from e1 either 
if HV is true or not. This means that p(e2ǀe1,HV)=1 and p(e2ǀe1,HNV)=1. The second evidence is 
only a logical consequence of the other. For instance, e1 might be evidence that two 
companies have had identical prices for the last three months, while e2 is the evidence that 




The probative force is not changed by the new element of evidence. In this example the 
deductively dependence was quite obvious. In other situations, it might not be so obvious that 
one element of evidence is just some logical consequence of the other.  
 The lesson from this exercise is that the dependence of evidence must be taken 
properly into account in the rational assessment of the probative force of a combination of 
evidence. To avoid being confused by the quantity of evidence, one must critically ask the 
probability of observing the additional evidence given the existing evidence. For instance, two 
econometrical analyses based on the same data will be highly dependent. If two econometric 
                                                 
366 If A and  B are independent, then p(A෼B)=p(AǀB)P(B)=p(A)p(B). 
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experts present coinciding econometric conclusions based on the exact same data and method, 
the probative force of the analysis from the second expert is limited, especially if the experts 
are “instructed” on the data and method to apply.            
A subtle issue associated with dependence and combination of evidence that might run 
counter to intuition is the “Simpson’s paradox.”367 An example is best to illustrate this. 
Assume that observation shows that there is a tendency of antitrust convicts to have higher 
education than the population in general. Let HV be the hypothesis that the suspect is guilty of 
antitrust violation and e be the evidence that the suspect has higher education. Thus, 
p(HVǀe)>p(HV). Now, assume m is the evidence that the suspect is in top level management. 
We might well have that p(HVǀe,m)<p(HVǀm) and p(HVǀe,not m)<p(HVǀnot m). This might 
seem like a paradox. A higher education increases the probability of being guilty of an 
antitrust violation, but reduces the probability of guiltiness regardless of whether the suspect 
is in top level management or not. The explanation is simple. Observing higher education 
increases the probability that a person is in top level management, and being in top level 
management increase the probability of antitrust violation as a matter of opportunity. 
However, top level managers with higher education might be more law abiding than top level 
management without higher education.368 Thus, if we have the two elements of evidence: 
higher education and top level management, both might unconditionally seem to support the 
hypothesis that a person is guilty of an antitrust violation. In this example, however, higher 
education is contradictory evidence to violation given that the evidence that the suspect is top 
level management is taken into account. This is a causality issue that will be returned to 
below. The lesson from this is to always have the picture of total evidence in mind when 
assessing evidence. Using non-conditional probabilities of evidence where the presence of 
evidence are dependent not only gives a wrong measure of probative force, it might also even 
give a wrong direction of the probative force.  
Probative force and multiple criteria to be proved 
A legal hypothesis concerning a violation of law will usually consist of several cumulative or 
alternative conditions that must be proved.  For each of these conditions, evidence must be 
assessed. For instance, in the assessment of abuse of dominant position in EU competition 
law, both dominance and abuse must be proved. These are cumulative criteria. When, for 
instance, the anticompetitive effects of a merger are scrutinized, increased unilateral market 
                                                 
367 See Pearl (2009) p.174 f. and Simpson (1951). 
368 Or opposite. This is just an example for illustration. 
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power and the possibility of coordinated behavior are alternative facts that might lead to a 
prohibition.        
  When it comes to cumulative conditions that must be satisfied, the question is what the 
probability that all the cumulative terms are satisfied is. How is this related to the probability 
of the satisfaction of each condition individually? Let HV be the hypothesis that all the 
cumulative criteria, Z1,…,Zn, are satisfied, which means that HV=Z1෼….෼Zn. For simplicity, it 
is assumed that n=2. This means that HV=Z1෼Z2. By using the formula on conditional 




and since order doesn’t matter,  
         
p(Z1෼Z2)=p(Z2ǀZ1)p(Z1). 
 




The cumulative conditions are seldom independent in legal hypotheses. In, for instance, a case 
on abuse of dominance, the probability of abuse is not independent of the probability of 
dominance.369 In the assessment of a merger, the probability of anticompetitive effects is not 
independent of the probability of harm to consumers. We must then apply the more advanced 
formula above. When there is a positive dependency between the criteria, which means that 
the probability of one criterion increases in the presence of the other, the use of independent 
probabilities will give a too low an assessment of the cumulative probabilities.370 Conversely, 
if we assume there is a negative dependency between the criteria, which means that the 
probability of one criterion reduces in the presence of the other, the use of independent 
                                                 
369 Some of the same evidence applies to the two criteria. The abusive act might even be evidence in the test for 
dominance.  
370 If p(Z1ǀZ2)>p(Z1) then p(Z1ǀZ2)p(Z2)>p(Z1)p(Z2). 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
164 
probabilities will give too high an assessment of the cumulative probability.371 Failing to take 
this into account will give a too high estimate when “doubt is accumulated” in a legal context.  
To illustrate the importance of dependencies, assume that a merger is scrutinized. The 
probability that the merger restricts competition is 0.8. This means that p(Z1)=0.8. 
Furthermore, assume the probability that the merger harms consumer welfare, given that it 
restrict competition, is also 0.8, which means that p(Z2ǀZ1)=0.8. However, assume that the 
probability that the merger harms consumer welfare is 0.2 when not conditioned on the 
restriction of competition. This means that p(Z2)=0.2 Without taking into account the 
dependence, one might easily conclude that the merger does not restrict competition as 
p(Z1)p(Z2)=0.16. This would be a fallacy. The probability that the merger is harmful to 
consumer welfare, assuming that restriction of competition is the only cause for such harm, is 
p(Z1)p(Z2ǀZ1)=0.64.  
The impact of the dependence between the cumulative criteria is important in the 
rational assessment of the probative force of evidence. If the same evidence has probative 
force for both of the two cumulative criteria, then the probabilities of the two criteria are 
positive dependent on each other. This is particularly relevant in competition law as the same 
evidence is often relevant for many of the cumulative criteria necessary to establish violation. 
The same evidence can be relevant in determining the relevant market, the assessment of 
market power, and the effects of some conduct. All doubt associated with these criteria cannot 
be accumulated as if the criteria were independent.        
Above it was assumed that the conditions were cumulative. Now, assume that the 
conditions are alternative. At least one criterion must be satisfied for the law to apply. For 
simplicity, assume that one of two alternative criteria, A1 and A2, must be established. This 
means that the hypothesis, HV, is that at least one of the criteria are satisfied. This can be 
written as HV=A1෽A2. Probability calculus gives us that p(A1෽A2)=p(A1)+p(A2)-p(A1෼A2). As 
explained in Chapter Three, the probability that both criteria are satisfied, p(A1෼A2), must be 
deducted to not be counted twice.  
Assume that A1 and A2 are the alternative factual criteria for a merger to restrict 
competition, which are unilateral effects or coordinated effects. If the probabilities of each of 
these conditions are 40 percent, the probability that at least one of the conditions is fulfilled is 
80 percent, minus the probability that both conditions are satisfied at the same time. If these 
                                                 
371 If p(Z1ǀZ2)<p(Z1) then p(Z1ǀZ2)p(Z2)<p(Z1)p(Z2). 
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conditions are mutually exclusive, as it is usual to assume in antitrust, there will be an 80 
percent chance that the competition is restricted. Thus, without any further investigation we 
can say that it is 80 percent chance that the merger restricts competition. Assuming no 
offsetting benefits, the merger should be prohibited according to balance of probabilities 
standard, even where no theory of harm has been established according to the balance of 
probabilities. 
 It is not difficult to predict a lawyer’s objection to this logic. This would be that it is 
the facts that are used as basis for the decision that must be proved according to balance of 
probabilities. The lawyer would argue that you cannot sum the probability of alternative facts 
that that would satisfy the legal criterion for prohibition. This argument could represent a 
logical fallacy, though, and could lead to a wrongful assessment of the probative force of the 
evidence of alternative facts. The validity of the argument depends on the condition 
established by the law. If the legal criterion is that competition is restricted, this criterion is 
satisfied according to the standard of proof. Analytical exercises on the way to prove that the 
legal criterion is satisfied, such as dividing the analysis into unilateral effects or coordinated 
effects, should not affect the outcome. It can be a coincidence how the legal criterion is 
divided into various sub-criteria. It has, for instance, no impact on the legal criterion if the 
merger agreement is signed by the right or left hand. In principle, one can say that in the same 
way it has no impact on the fulfillment of the legal condition whether the restriction of 
competition follows from unilateral or coordinated effects.372 When facts are assessed, there 
are always factual circumstances that are not scrutinized since they have no influence on the 
result. Normally, and as will be shown below, it is a waste of resources to scrutinize factual 
circumstances that have no impact on the decision.  
Probability and causal inferences  
The counterfactual analysis is the basis for the assessment of causality in legal contexts. Most 
developed jurisdictions use a “but for” assessment as the starting point for assessing causality 
in the determination of legal liability.373 This includes antitrust liability.374 Thus, the relevant 
criterion for finding causality is whether an event is a necessary cause for the effect. Tort law 
is illustrative for this concept. In tort law, the causality between the harmful act and the harm 
                                                 
372 In practice, it might have impact on what kind of commitments might remedy the anticompetitive effects. For 
this reason, it might be necessary to analyze carefully how the anticompetitive effects materialize. 
373 See Fumerton and Kress (2001). 
374 See Abele et al. (2011). See Carrier (2011) for an in-depth analysis of the causation standards in US antitrust 
law. 
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is determined by the assessment of whether the harm would be present if the harmful act were 
assumed away. If it would not, causality is inferred. The question is whether the harmful act 
was necessary for the harm.  
Thus, the necessary cause requirement is the starting point for assessing 
anticompetitive effects of some conduct in antitrust law. In determining whether, for instance, 
some agreement has anticompetitive effects, it must be assessed whether the agreement is 
necessary for a restriction of competition.375 The counterfactual approach also applies to 
merger control, as the counterfactual in determining whether a merger result in a significant 
impediment of competition (SIEC) in the EU or a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) 
in the US. For this assessment of anticompetitive effects in antitrust, the use of presumptions 
rules are crucial in both US and EU as explained in Chapter Four.          
  The necessary cause principle used in the counterfactual “but for” assessment is, 
however, just a starting point for assessing liability. The test might be both over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive in determining legal liability depending on the specific circumstances. In 
some circumstances, an act is considered as a liable cause even it was not likely to be 
necessary for the effects. This can be illustrated by an example from antitrust law. Assume 
that a market consist of three suppliers: A, B, and C. The suppliers A and B enter into an 
agreement which restricts competition. Assume that A is able to prove that if A and B had not 
entered into an agreement, then B and C would have entered into an agreement with the same 
anticompetitive effects on the market. A would probably not get far with the defense that the 
agreement between A and B is not necessary for the anticompetitive effects as B and C in the 
absence of the agreement between A and B would have entered into an agreement with the 
same effects in the market.  
An example showing that some act that is necessary for some anticompetitive effect 
may not be considered as a liable cause can also be picked from antitrust law. Assume, like 
above, that competitors A and B have entered into an anticompetitive agreement. The last 
competitor in the market, C, observes that A and B suddenly start to behave less aggressively, 
and decides to adapt to the less aggressive behavior by competing less aggressively. Though 
C might have his suspicions as to some coordination between A and B, he is not in any 
communication with A or B. The behavior of C is necessary for the anticompetitive effects of 
the agreement between A and B. C will, however, hardly be liable for those effects. That an 
act is a necessary cause seems to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
                                                 
375 For the application of TFEU Article 101, see, for instance, Whish (2009) p. 124. See Carrier (2011) and 
Gellhorn et al. (2004) p. 191 f. for the analysis of effects of horizontal agreements in US.   
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establishing liability.376 Thus, some additional criteria to just establishing necessary cause are 
necessary for establishing liability. Requirements of intent or negligence and requirements of 
proximity narrow the amount of liable actions. Rules on attempt and contribution expand the 
amount of liable actions. From a law and economics perspective, a risk should be placed on 
the one who can deal with it most efficiently. By placing the liability for acts that might cause 
harm with the one who can prevent the harm at the lowest cost, the harm will be avoided to 
the lowest cost given that it is efficient to avoid the harm.377  
Still, the requirement of necessary cause is the starting point of establishing liability. 
The question that will be discussed here is how the concept of necessary cause should be 
addressed in a rational probabilistic sense. In this section the principles will be discussed. 
Inferring causality from empirical analyses will be returned to in Chapter Six. Some rather 
complex calculations will be needed to achieve the results of this section. However, the 
results in the end will be intuitively appealing.        
The probability that X is a necessary cause of Y is the probability that X is necessary 
for Y to incur. This is the same as the probability that if X does not occur then Y will not 
occur. To address the causality question it is conditioned on that X=true and Y=true.378 The 
probability that X is a necessary cause of Y can be written as:  
 
PN(X,Y)=p(Y=false when X=falseǀX=true,Y=true)379  
 
To develop this formula further it is necessary to go via the sufficient cause concept.  
The probability that X is a sufficient cause of Y is the probability that the effect Y occurs 
when X has occurred independent on other circumstances that might affect Y. We condition 
                                                 
376 There have been attempts to create objective requirements on causality that can be used to assess liability. 
The legal philosopher J.L. Mackie developed the co-called INUS-criterion (Insufficient but Necessary part of an 
Unnecessary but Sufficient set of Conditions). See Mackie (1965), Pearl (2009) p. 313 f., and Sloman (2005) p. 
29 f. This was developed further by the legal philosopher R. Wright who suggested the simpler definition of the 
INUS-condition called the NESS-condition (Necessary Element of Sufficient Set and NESS-criterion). See 
Wright (1988) and Pearl (2009) p. 314. NESS defines the actual cause as a necessary element of a sufficient set 
of conditions for the effect. From the first example above, we see that the agreement between A and B is a 
necessary element of the sufficient of conditions for the anticompetitive effect to materialize, but the potential 
agreement between B and C is not such a necessary condition. The anticompetitive effects were realized without 
any such agreement. Thus, the agreement between A and B satisfy the NESS-condition, but the NESS-condition 
screens off the potential agreement between B and C as an actual cause. However, the NESS-condition fails to 
screen off the behavior of C as an actual cause in the second example, as the conduct of C is a necessary element 
of the sufficient conditions for the anticompetitive effects. Thus, the NESS-criterion has been criticized in the 
literature to fit as a uniform objective definition of causality suitable for establishing liability. See Fumerton and 
Kress (2001). 
377 See Posner (2011) p. 213 f.   
378 If we not make this assumption we cannot know if the lack of Y is the result of lack of X.   
379 See Pearl (2009) p. 286. 
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on X=false and Y=false to address the causality question as above. The probability that X is a 
sufficient cause of Y can then be written as: 
 
PS(X,Y)=p(Y=true when X=trueǀX=false,Y=false).380   
 
The probability that X is both a necessary and sufficient cause of Y can be written as 
 
PNS(X,Y)=p(Y=true when X=true,Y=false when X=false).381 
 




If X is exogenous relative to Y, the calculations can be simplified. Exogeneity means 
that if X is fixed directly by direct manipulation, it has the same effect on Y as if the same 
value of X had occurred without manipulation. With some risk of vagueness, one can say that 
there are no confounding variables that both affect Y via X and by other means.383 In an 
antitrust context, exogeneity can be exemplified with a merger. A structural change in the 
market such a change in the technology might change the optimal size of the firms in the 
market. Thus, “forcing” the merger might not have the same effects as if the merger was 
performed without force, but instead because of technological changes. The merger can be 
made exogenous by narrowing the analysis to the new technological circumstances. If X is 
exogenous relatively to Y, we have:  
 
p(Y=true when X=true)=p(Y=trueǀX=true).384 
 
With some calculations, and assuming exogeneity, we can derive the following:385  
     
PN(X,Y)=PNS(X,Y)/P(Y=trueǀX=true)  and  PS(X,Y)=PNS(X,Y)/P(Y=falseǀX=false). 
 
                                                 
380 See Pearl (2009) p. 286.  
381 See Pearl (2009) p. 286. 
382 See Pearl (2009) p. 287. 
383 See Pearl (2009) p. 246 f. for various descriptions of exogeneity. The discussion of exogeneity will be 
returned to in Chapter Six.  
384 When the condition of exogeneity is satisfied, it is possible to condition on X without affecting the 
probability. This means: p(Y=true when X=true)=p(Y=true when X=trueǀX=true)=p(Y=trueǀX=true). See Pearl 
(2009) p. 289. 
385 See Pearl (2009) p. 291. 
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To simplify the calculations further, the assumption of monotonicity is introduced.386 
That Y is monotonic relative to X means that if X is changed from false to true, then Y cannot 
change from true to false. This means that X=true cannot be a cause of Y=false. An antitrust 
example of monotonicity would be that some agreement is only able to restrict competition 
and never promote it. Most antitrust practitioners know that very few practices are only able 
to restrict competition. Almost all agreements can promote competition in some 
circumstances. Thus, as for exogeneity, the analysis must be narrowed to the right 
circumstances to achieve monotonicity.  




The probability that X is a necessary and sufficient cause of Y is the probability that Y=true 
given that X=true minus the probability that Y=true given that X=false. By combining the 






From this formula, it follows that in the presence of exogeneity and monotonicity between X 
and Y, the probability that X is a necessary cause of Y is the difference between the 
probability that Y is true given that X is true and the probability that Y is true given that X is 
false relative to the probability that Y is true given that X is true. Briefly, this can be 
described as the relative extra risk of Y following from X. This result is of crucial importance 
for rational analysis of legal evidence in general, and antitrust evidence analysis in particular. 





To figure out the probability that C is a necessary cause for the anticompetitive effects, A, we 
need both the probability of anticompetitive effects given the presence of the conduct and the 
                                                 
386 See Pearl (2009) p. 291 f.  
387 See Pearl (2009) p. 291. 
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probability of anticompetitive effects in the absence of the conduct. The assumption of 
exogeneity and monotonicity must be valid for this equation to be valid. This means that we 
must narrow our analysis to ensure that the conduct can be considered as exogenous and 
monotone relative to the anticompetitive effects to utilize the simple formula above. More 
complicated formulas can be derived if these assumptions are violated. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this study.388  
The formula above presents some intuitive valuable insight that can best be described 
with an example outside antitrust. Assume first that exogeneity and monotonicity are 
satisfied. Assume that given that the use of some specific substance is used in the production 
of food the probability of injury in a person is 0.003 (0.3 percent). Without the substance, the 
probability of injury is 0.001. Then, the probability that the substance is a necessary cause for 
the injury is (0.003-0.001)/0.003=0.002/0.003=2/3=0.67. Thus, the probability that the 
substance is the necessary cause is 67 percent. By the abuse of rhetoric, one can make it 
sound intuitively unappealing that the substance can be the necessary cause of the injury when 
the probability of the injury is only 0.3 percent. However, rational calculations reveal that it is 
actually a 67 percent chance that the substance was a necessary cause of the injury.389 The 
discussion of abuse of rhetoric will be returned to below.  
Crucial for the calculation example above is exogeneity and monotinicity. The simple 
formula will not work if there is some common factor both affecting the consumption of the 
substance and the injury. If, for instance, the substance is known to reduce the risk of peptic 
ulcer it is not unlikely that some person in the risk zone of peptic ulcer eat food with this 
substance with the purpose of reducing the risk of peptic ulcer. In this case, both the 
assumption of exogeneity and the assumption of monotonicity of are violated. The 
assumption of exogeneity is violated because there is a common factor, the person’s particular 
exposure to peptic ulcer, which both affect the consumption of the substance and the 
probability of peptic ulcer. Furthermore, if there is a chance that the substance reduces the 
probability of peptic ulcer, the condition of monotonicity is not satisfied. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the substance is a necessary cause of peptic ulcer. It is not likely that the problem due to 
the absence of exeogeneity and monotonicity could be helped by narrowing the circumstances 
for the analysis, as narrowing the analysis might show that the substance reduces the risk of 
                                                 
388 See Pearl (2009) p. 293 f.  
389 The intuition is quite clear when comparing it to a lottery or other small probability events. Although there is 
a very low chance to win the lottery, there is a high probability that playing the lottery was a necessary cause for 
winning. The probability that playing the lottery was a necessary cause is not 100 percent, though, because you 
might win because someone intentionally or unintentionally played in your name, or win because of some error.   
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peptic ulcer for all groups. This would be an example of the “Simpson’s paradox” explained 
above. Because of the correlation between the consummation of the substance and the 
occurrence of peptic ulcer, the substance may appear to cause peptic ulcer, but the truth is that 
it reduces the risk of peptic ulcer.    
If we change the example a little, we can illustrate how to mitigate the problem of lack 
of exogeneity. Assume that the substance is known to increase the risk of peptic ulcer. In this 
case, it is likely also to be a violation of the assumption of exeogeneity because people with a 
particular risk of getting peptic ulcer are likely to avoid the substance. Thus, the formula 
above may underestimate the true effect of substance as a necessary cause. The lack of 
exogeneity can now at least partly be helped by narrowing the analysis to persons outside the 
risk group, which means to control for this group or to base the probability on experimental 
studies that eliminate the problem with the lack of exogeneity.390 This brings us to the field of 
statistical analysis, which will be addressed in Chapter Six. The lesson for now is that, to 
rationally assess the probability of necessary cause, the issues of exogeneity and monotonicity 
must be dealt with rationally.            
5.2.5 Decision value of evidence 
Probative force and decision value 
The probability part of rational evidence assessment was addressed above. Probability 
calculus was used to show the capability of evidence with probative force to resolve 
uncertainty about the truthfulness of a hypothesis. However, in the decision theoretic loss 
minimization framework presented above, reducing uncertainty is not a goal but a means for 
the minimization of expected losses from errors. Evidence is information that improves the 
accuracy of our decisions and reduces the expected loss of errors from a decision. The 
decision value of some evidence can be seen as its ability to reduce expected loss of errors of 
the decision.391 The probative force of evidence is an input in determining the decision value 
of evidence.  
Finding the decision value of evidence 
Recall from above that, given some evidence, e, it will be rational to find violation if the 
expected loss of deciding violation is less than the expected loss of deciding not violation, 
which is ELV(e)<ELNV(e). Given evidence, e, we have that ELV(e)=(1-p(HV|e))LV and 
                                                 
390 Test persons should then be drawn randomly from the population.  
391 See Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) and DeGroot (1984). See also Parmigiani and Inoue (2009) p. 255 f.  
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
172 
ELNV(e)=p(HV|e)LVN, which makes it rational to find violation if (1-p(HV|e))LV<p(HV|e)LVN. 




Gathering evidence is also associated with costs, c(Ē). A rational decision, including the 
decision on what evidence to gather, must minimize the sum of the expected losses from 









For now we will ignore the costs. The costs will be returned to below.  
To illustrate the decision value of evidence, a simplified situation will be analyzed. 
Assume that there is only one possible evidence, Ē, to gather, and this can have either the 
outcome eV or eNV. eV has probabilistic probative force in support of HV, and eNV has 
probabilistic probative force in contradiction of HV, which means that 
p(HV|eV)>p(HV)>p(HV|eNV). We know from probability calculus that 
p(HV)=p(HV|eV)p(eV)+p(HV|eNV)p(eNV). 
 






Let us then see what we can expect to gain by gathering Ē. Ē might turn out to be eV, which 
has probability p(eV) or eNV with probability p(eNV). If eV appears, the expected loss of our 
decision is min[(1-(p(HV|eV))LV,p(HV|eV))LNV]. If eNV appears, then our expected loss will be 
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min[(1-(p(HV|eNV))LV,p(HV|eNV))LNV]. Thus, when we have decided to gather Ē, but before 









The subscript d indicates the decision value of evidence.392 Assume that deciding not 
violation is the loss minimizing decision when evidence is not gathered. This means that 
EL=p(HV)LNV=(p(HV|eV)p(eV)+p(HV|eNV)p(eNV))LNV. Logically, this means that deciding not 








Now we can start calculating EGd(Ē). Assume that, even if eV shows up, it is still optimal to 
decide not violation. This means that min[(1-(p(HV|eV))LV,p(HV|eV))LNV)]=p(HV|eV))LNV. In 
this case, EGd(Ē)=0. There is no gain obtained by gathering the evidence. The reason is that 
gathering evidence does not affect the decision. Even if eV shows up, it still minimizes 
expected loss to decide not violation. The expected loss of our decision ex post will be less if 
eNV shows up, and greater ex post if eV shows up. Before we know the outcome of the 
evidence, we face the same expected loss as the expected loss of not gathering Ē. Simply put, 
we cannot expect to reduce expected losses of errors by gathering the evidence.  
                                                 
392 Readers familiar with information theory should note similarity between measuring the decision value of 
evidence and the information theoretic value of information, which is the expected reduction in entropy. 
Expected reduction in entropy can be seen as a special case of the decision value of evidence.  
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Now, assume that if eV shows up, it is optimal to decide violation. This means that 
min[(1-(p(HV|eV))LV,p(HV|eV)LNV]=(1-(p(HV|eV))LV since (1-(p(HV|eV))LV<p(HV|eV))LNV.  






The value of EGd(Ē) will be positive since (1-(p(HV|eV))LV<p(HV|eV))LNV. Thus, if gathering 
evidence makes it optimal to change decision for some outcomes of evidence, it has positive 
decision value. This decision value will increase with the higher p(eV), the higher p(HV|eV), 
the higher LNV, and the lower LV. Thus, the decision value of evidence is higher, the higher 
the chance we will gather some evidence that will change the decision, the higher probative 
force we are right in changing our decision, the higher the error loss associated with the 
decision we are changing away from, and the less the error loss is associated with the new 
decision. Another way to say this is that the higher the chance some new evidence will make 
it rational to change the decision and the lower the expected loss of this new decision 
compared to the old decision, the higher is the decision value of evidence. Thus, the last part 
of the statement in Beckner and Salop (1999): “The court first should gather information that 
is least expensive, resolves the most uncertainty, and is most likely to affect its decision” 
should now be clear.  
  If the evidence has no impact on the decision, then it has zero decision value. 
However, if some outcome of gathering evidence makes it rational to change the a priori 
decision, the decision value is positive. Thus, the decision value of gathering evidence is 
always positive.393 What prevent us from gathering all potential evidence is obviously the 
costs associated with such efforts. The costs associated with gathering evidence are returned 
to just below. 
5.2.6 Minimizing costs 
Probative force, decision value, and costs  
Above, the probative force of evidence, the decision value of evidence, and how the probative 
force is related to decision value were addressed. Now it is time to address the cost side of 
                                                 
393 Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) show that this is a general result.  
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evidence. Evidence gathered might have probative force and have a decision value by 
reducing the expected error loss of the decision, but there is also a cost associated with 
gathering evidence. Thus, there is a tradeoff between decision value of evidence and the cost 
associated with gathering the evidence. Minimizing the sum of the expected losses from 
errors of a wrongful decision and the costs associated with gathering evidence is the ultimate 
goal of evidence gathering in a decision theoretic context. In this subchapter the cost side of 
gathering evidence is discussed, while the tradeoff between decision value and cost will be 
returned to in the next subchapter.   
The costs of gathering evidence 
The general economic concept of costs applies to the costs of gathering of evidence. This 
means that the cost of gathering Ē is the alternative value of the resources used to gather Ē. 
The cost of gathering evidence involves labor that could be used elsewhere and the use of 
other inputs that could have been used elsewhere. Gathering the evidence includes the time to 
search for and collect “raw” evidence, for instance, market data, and to process and assess 
these data, for instance, by performing an econometric analysis. The costs are incurred by the 
parties in the case, which include enforcement authorities in case of public enforcement, and 
the courts. Costs may also be incurred by others, for instance, the third parties asked to give 
information and to provide witness testimony.394 If costs are incurred by enforcement 
authorities with resource constraints, the alternative value of gathering evidence is using the 
resources on other cases. All costs should be taken into account by a rational decision maker. 
In practice, a decision maker is likely to minimize his own costs and not the overall social 
costs. This topic is returned to in the study of actual assessment of evidence in antitrust below.    
Cost minimization and presumptions 
The person with the lowest cost in gathering some specific evidence should be the person that 
gathers it. Analytically, we can split the cost function and evidence collected into separate 
cost functions associated with the parties involved. For instance, we can let Ē={ĒP,ĒD}. ĒP is 
the evidence gathered by the plaintiff and ĒD is the evidence gathered by the defendant. We 
can then write c(Ē)=cP(ĒP)+cD(ĒD). This means that the total gathering costs are the cost 
associated with the evidence gathered by the plaintiff plus the cost associated with the 
                                                 
394 The parties may pay expert witnesses, but fact witnesses are usually not fully compensated for their time. See 
Friedman and Kontorvich (2011) for an economic analysis of fact witness payment.   
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
176 
evidence gathered by the defendant. Minimizing cost requires that if evidence Ē is gathered it 
should be divided in to ĒP and ĒD such that cost is minimized.  
Presumptions that switch the burden of proof only make sense where there is a 
competition between parties with conflicting interests in the outcome of the evidence 
assessment. The correct use of presumptions will generally motivate the one who has the 
lowest cost in gathering evidence to actually do so. This means that the facts would be 
presumed “against” the person who can refute the presumption at the lowest cost. In antitrust 
the public enforcers will typically be better informed on the general tendency of certain 
conduct to have anti-competitive effects and the methods suitable to calculate the economic 
welfare. These enforcers can typically also more cheaply gather necessary information from 
third parties, both because of enforcement powers and because those third parties might be 
less hesitant to provide public authorities with information than to provide it to trade partners 
who might commercially exploit the information.395 Typically, persons will be able to provide 
their private information at lower cost. It is, for instance, easier for parties to provide evidence 
concerning their own production costs and profit margins.  
The incentives must be properly taken into account when assessing the cost 
performance of presumptions. A general principle in the game theoretical analysis of evidence 
assessment is that a presumption to the disadvantage of one person will give the person the 
incentive to provide the information.396 If we assume that it is sufficient more costly to 
provide fabricated evidence than to provide real evidence, this means that the person will 
provide the real evidence if it exists, and else not.397 Then, it is possible to make inferences 
from the failure to present evidence. This is central in game theoretical models of evidence 
assessment. We will get back to game theoretical models of evidence assessment below. 
The frequency of certain defenses should also be taken into account in the 
determination of presumptions.398 This can be illustrated by the failing firm defense used in 
merger control. This defense is briefly described as the defense that a merger will not have 
anticompetitive effect because the firm acquired is on the edge of failing. Assume that this 
situation has relevance in only one percent of merger cases. If the plaintiff had the burden to 
proof in every case that the acquired firm was not a failing firm, this would likely represent a 
                                                 
395 It is assumed that the enforcement authorities can use the information without revealing commercially 
valuable information. 
396 See Milgrom and Roberts (1986) for an early game theoretical model. Game theoretical models of evidence 
assessment will be discussed in the subchapter on economic models of actual evidence assessment below.  
397 See Sanchirico (2012). See also Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 823.   
398 See Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 826.  
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waste of resources compared to the situation where the acquiring firm has to prove that the 
conditions for the failing firm defense are present in the actual situation.          
As noted above, the initial presumptions for anticompetitive effects in the presumption 
rules established in the US and EU are based on the confidence in anticompetitive effects and 
not explicitly on cost considerations. However, cost consideration should also rationally play 
a role in the determination of the presumption rules. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four. However, it is clear that many of the presumptions established in the application of 
antitrust rules such as the failing firm defense in merger control at least have cost 
justifications. The same applies to the efficiency defense in general, where those who allege 
efficiencies to justify their conduct generally have the burden of proof regarding these 
efficiencies. The actual allocation of costs in antitrust evidence assessment will be discussed 
in more detail in the discussion of actual evidence assessment in antitrust below.   
Procedural rules and cost of evidence gathering 
The procedural rules in general have a strong impact on the cost of gathering evidence. Rules 
on disclosure and out of court settlements can impact the cost of producing evidence.399 
Voluntarily disclosure of evidence is normally less costly than some forced disclosure of 
evidence, or by gathering the evidence by force using investigative powers. Procedural rules 
can create proper incentives for cheap disclosure of evidence. The study of the impact on 
procedural rules on litigation costs is a central branch of law and economics.400 It should be 
mentioned that leniency programs in antitrust enforcement have received much attention by 
economists. A leniency program means that a co-conspirator who provides new evidence 
necessary to convict the other conspirators can receive full amnesty or have their sanctions 
reduced. Leniency is, inter alia, an instrument for enforcement authorities to gather evidence 
at low costs.401 The impact of procedural rules on evidence assessment will be returned to in 
the modeling of actual evidence assessment below.  
5.2.7 Decision value, evidence costs, and rational evidence gathering 
Combining decision value and evidence costs to minimize total costs 
Above the concept of probative force was discussed. This is a central input in finding the 
decision value of evidence, which was discussed next. Then, the costs associated with 
                                                 
399 See Posner (2011) p. 826.  
400 See for instance Spier (2007) for a survey of this literature.  
401 See for instance Harrington (2008a, 2008b) and Spagnolo (2008). 
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gathering evidence, including the use of presumptions and other instruments to minimize the 
costs were discussed. Now, it is time to combine these measures and analyze the tradeoff 
between the decision value of gathering evidence and the costs associated with gathering 
evidence. By doing so, the total costs consisting of the expected losses from errors and the 
cost of gathering evidence can be minimized.    
Decision trees 
A decision tree is a useful analytical tool to analyze the optimal gathering of evidence. 
Decision trees are a central tool in statistical decision theory, which studies the optimal 
sequential gathering of data and optimal stopping rules.402 Kerber et al. (2008) and 
Kretschmer (2011b) use decision trees to study optimal sequential investigation rules in an 
antitrust context. Kerber et al. (2008) and Kretschmer (2011c) study the abandonment of the 
per se violation in the US following Leegin403 in a decision theoretic context of sequential 
evidence gathering. These studies share some similarities with the analysis presented here.  
To keep the analysis simple, it is assumed that the total potential amount of evidence 
consists of two elements of evidence that can be gathered. This means that ĒTot={Ē1,Ē2}. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that gathering Ēi has two potential outcomes (ei1,ei2) with 
probabilities p(ei1) and p(ei2). We can, for instance, assume that there are two potential 
elements of evidence to prove a price conspiracy, which is whether there has been parallel 
conduct (Ē1 has outcome e11) or not (Ē1 has outcome e12) and whether there has been 
exchange of information between the alleged parties to the conspiracy (Ē2 has outcome e21) or 
not (Ē2 has outcome e22). This is, of course, a drastic simplification; nevertheless, it illustrates 
the point.  
The costs are assumed to be zero if no evidence is gathered, c(Ē1) if only Ē1 is 
gathered, c(Ē2) if only Ē2 is gathered, and c(Ē1,Ē2) if both Ē1 and Ē2 are gathered.404  
The decision maker can choose to gather either Ē1 or Ē2 first or to not gather any 
evidence. If Ē1 or Ē2 is gathered first, the decision maker can choose to gather the one of Ē1 or 
Ē2 that was not gathered first or to not gather more evidence. In the decision tree, gathering Ē2 
first is modeled as deciding to not gather Ē1 first, then deciding to gather Ē2, and then 
eventually gathering Ē1 after that. This is better understood by inspecting the decision tree 
                                                 
402 See for instance Parmigiani and Inoue (2009) p. 221 f. 
403 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
404 A careful reader will reveal that quite strong assumptions are imposed regarding the costs. It is assumed that 
there might be some economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the gathering of evidence as we might have 
c(Ē1,Ē2)>c(Ē1)+c(Ē2) or  c(Ē1,Ē2)<c(Ē1)+c(Ē2). However, it is assumed that the cost of gathering both Ē1 and Ē2 
is not dependent on the sequence they are collected (or if they are collected both at once). 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
179 
presented in Figure 5.1 below. In the decision tree, squares represent decision nodes, circles 
chance nodes and triangles are end nodes in correspondence with the normal convention.  
The expected loss from error plus the cost of gathering evidence is listed at each end 
node. The optimal gathering of evidence is solved by backward induction. This means that we 
start at the end nodes and derive the expected loss and cost of a decision at the decision node 
before that level and move “backwards” in the tree. In the decision node before the top end 
nodes in the decision tree Ē1 is gathered with outcome e11. If we choose to gather Ē2, our 




If we choose to not gather Ē2, our expected loss and cost will be EL(e11)+c(Ē1). In this 
situation, it will be rational to gather Ē2 if EL(e11,Ē2)+c(Ē1,Ē2)<EL(e11)+c(Ē1). If this is the 
case, we draw a thick line, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The expected loss and costs under these 
conditions is then EL(e11,Ē2)+c(Ē1,Ē2). The same can be done if Ē1 is gathered with outcome 
e12. In Figure 5.1, it is assumed if e12 is observed it is not rational to gather Ē2. This is because 
it is assumed that EL(e12)+c(Ē1)<EL(e12,Ē2)+c(Ē1,Ē2). The expected cost and loss will be less 
by not gathering Ē2. The expected loss if e12 is observed is then EL(e12)+c(Ē1).  
We can now move one step backward in the decision three. If we gather Ē1, e11 is 
observed with probability p(e11) and e12 is observed with probability p(e12). The expected loss 




The same analysis can be performed for the other end nodes in the decision tree. If Ē2 
is gathered first and if the outcome is e21, then it is assumed that it will be rational to gather Ē1 
with expected loss and cost EL(Ē1,e21)+c(Ē1,Ē2). However, if the outcome is e22, then it is 
assumed that expected loss and cost will be less by not gathering Ē1, so it is rational to not 
gather Ē1. The expected loss will then be EL(e22)+c(Ē2). If we gather Ē2, e21 is observed with 
probability p(e21), and e22 is observed with probability p(e22). The expected loss of gathering 
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If we not start gathering Ē2 after deciding to not gather Ē1 first, the expected loss and 
cost (there will be no cost as no evidence is gathered) is EL. In Figure 5.1 it is assumed that 
gathering Ē2 after deciding to not gather Ē1 has less expected loss and cost than not gathering 




Now we are back at the start node. The thick line at Ē1 means that it is assumed that 
deciding to gather Ē1 first has lower expected loss and cost than deciding to not gather Ē1 first 





Thus, by backward induction we have figured out that the optimal sequential decision is to 
start by gathering Ē1. If e11 is the outcome, we should gather Ē2. However, if e12 is the 
outcome from gathering Ē1, we should decide on the basis of e12, and not incur the cost of 
gathering Ē2. 
We can see that at each decision node it is rational to gather more evidence if the 
decision value of evidence exceeds the extra costs. Assume, for instance, that we are in the 
top of the tree. Given that we have gathered Ē1 and the outcome turn out to be e11, it was 
shown above that it was optimal to gather Ē2 if EL(e11,Ē2)+c(Ē1,Ē2)<EL(e11)+c(Ē1). This 
means that it is rational to gather evidence if EL(e11)-EL(e11,Ē2)>c(Ē1,Ē2)-c(Ē1). This can be 
written as EGd(Ē2|e11)>c(Ē1,Ē2)-c(Ē1). Thus, it is optimal to gather more evidence if the 
decision value exceeds the additional cost.  
Backward induction is the use of dynamic programming to solve sequential decisions. 
It is easy to see that this task soon becomes extremely complex. Let us say that we extend the 
potential evidence to 10 elements, which means ĒT={Ē1,…,Ē10}. Furthermore, assume that 
each element can have three or more outcomes. The amount of computations might be 
prohibitive for deriving the optimal sequential decision tree in those situations. It might even 
be irrational if the cost of such computations is weighed against the performance of cheaper 
methods. The question is how good alternative methods are. Various methods developed for, 
inter alia, artificial intelligence, can provide guidance. Methods of path-finding provide 
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heuristics for forward induction methods that require fewer computations than backward 
induction.405 An easy heuristic method that might perform well is to first look for the 
evidence, Ēi, with the highest difference between the decision value and cost. Then, 
depending on the Ēi, do the same operation conditionally on this outcome and repeat this 
process until there is no more evidence where the decision value exceeds additional costs.    
Heuristic methods provide some guidance. However, as will be explored further 
below, legal evidence assessment is much about the use of human intuition and experience 
assessing evidence holistically based on informal methods of practical reasoning. The 
evidence gathering process can be supported by a competition between parties with opposing 
interests in the decision in providing the evidence. The challenge is then to create practical 
assessment principles and procedures that facilitate as rational an evidence assessment as 
possible.           
  
                                                 
405 See Millington (2006) p. 203 f. See Kretchmer (2011b) for an antitrust related discussion.   
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Optimal evidence gathering in antitrust 
When assessing evidence in antitrust analysis the question is whether the antitrust assessment 
principles and procedures facilitate the optimal gathering of evidence. The presumption rules 
represent the initial stage of antitrust analysis. The presumption rules are based on the 
confidence in the anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question in general. The need to 
scrutinize the actual circumstances of the case is dependent on the strength of this confidence. 
From a decision theoretic point of view, more considerations should be taken into account in 
the determination of the presumption rules. The losses from a wrongful decision should also 
be taken into account to assess the decision value of gathering more evidence. Furthermore, 
the costs of gathering evidence should be taken into account, as mentioned above. This 
corresponds to the conclusions drawn in Chapter Four. 
The presumption rules apply to the initial assessment of the case. The antitrust 
assessment principles and procedure should facilitate a rational evidence assessment 
throughout the whole case. If the initial presumption is refuted, this might establish a new 
rational presumption that might be refuted, and so on. In this way the burden of proof should 
shift optimally back and forth between the parties. Throughout the process, the inferences 
based on the evidence should be rational.  
An obvious observation that can be made is the different possibility to implement 
rational evidence gathering in inquisitorial systems, like the enforcement of the EU 
Commission, and in adversarial systems like that of the US. In an inquisitorial system, the 
inquisitor could, in theory, implement rational evidence assessment by moving along the 
decision three throughout the decision making process. In an adversarial process, the decision 
makers have less control over the cost-efficiency of evidence gathering. The courts can, 
through precedence, establish presumption principles that facilitate rationality in the 
production of evidence. The courts also have some opportunities for sequential decisions, 
such as handling motions to dismiss a case, deciding the applicability of summary judgments 
and in making judgments as a matter of law. Furthermore, the decision maker can exercise 
some control throughout the process by enforcing the rules of admissible evidence. According 
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 403,  
 
[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by […] undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.  
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Thus, the courts can declare some evidence inadmissible as needless, and by this, either end 
the process or shift the burden to the other party to refute the inferences from the evidence 
already gathered.   
The question of whether the decision makers actually will implement a rational 
evidence assessment depends on various factors, including the incentives of the decision 
makers, the assessment abilities of the decision makers, and the incentives of the parties 
involved to provide evidence. The ability for the actual assessment principles and procedures 
used in antitrust to facilitate rational evidence assessment will be discussed further below.                  
5.2.8 Rational versus actual evidence assessment in antitrust     
After having described the framework of rational evidence assessment, the next question 
becomes how to assess the performance of actual evidence assessment against the rational 
evidence assessment standard. This is a more difficult task than assessing the rationality of 
legal rules. While there at least might be some degree of clarity on what rule an antitrust 
decision maker has applied in a specific case, the evidence assessment is less transparent. In 
jury trials, the evidence assessment is only in the mind of the jurors. We can only infer the 
evidence assessment from the conclusions made by the jury. In decisions where the grounds 
include evidence assessment, we can see what evidence has been relevance for the decision, 
and some of the inferences drawn from the specific pieces of evidence. We will however 
seldom see explicit probability assessments in terms of updating according Bayes’ rule, 
probability ratios, decision values, and so on, in an antitrust decision, except possibly in the 
use of statistical and econometrical analyses. We will, however, observe vaguer statements 
such as that it is established that the evidence is consistent and reliable in favor of violation, 
that there are no other plausible explanations for the conduct in question other than to restrict 
competition and so on. The actual formulation of such statements by the decision makers 
below will be returned to below. Thus, much of the information on how the evidence is 
actually assessed is in the mind of the decision makers. The decision maker themselves may 
rely on non-quantifiable measures such as intuition, experience, and practical principles that 
will be described further below.  
In the remainder of this chapter, actual evidence assessment in antitrust is studied. 
Several theories are relied on in the study of how antitrust decision makers actually assess 
evidence. There is an extensive interdisciplinary body of literature addressing the actual 
assessment of legal evidence and its performance. This includes contributions from 
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philosophy and psychology, as well as economics, which enlighten various aspects of 
evidence assessment. Some of this literature addresses antitrust evidence assessment 
specifically. This literature also provides important insights as to why actual evidence 
assessment may deviate from rational evidence assessment.  
 In the tradition of law and economics, economic models are used to study actual legal 
evidence assessment. Game theory is used to study the strategic interaction between 
optimizing players involved in the evidence assessment, including the parties and the decision 
makers. By making suitable assumptions, holistic models of evidence assessment can provide 
additional insight to the interdisciplinary studies mentioned above. The benefit of models is 
that they can be used to analyze dynamical elements of antitrust assessment and to derive 
equilibrium outcomes that can be compared to the rational outcome. By basing a model on the 
same framework as the framework used to guide rational evidence assessment above, the 
model will be particularly informative in comparing how actual evidence assessment is likely 
to correspond with rational evidence assessment. Thus, this chapter will also include 
economic modeling of evidence assessment to study the performance of evidence assessment 
in antitrust.   
5.3 Actual evidence assessment in antitrust 
5.3.1 The framework for actual antitrust evidence assessment 
At a superior level, some fundamental principles must be in place for the procedure 
surrounding legal evidence assessment to work as a truth seeking process and not some 
instrument for abusing power. A trial that accurately and efficiently resolves civil disputes 
and that safeguards the rights of the defendant in the pursuit of a correct judgment in criminal 
cases, are often stated as main goals of legal procedure in civilized legal systems.406 The trial 
must be fair to promote these goals.407 A fair trial must facilitate an assessment of evidence in 
line with these ideals. This includes important rights such as contradictory rights, presumption 
of innocence in criminal cases, and a right to appeal. Competence requirements promote the 
                                                 
406 See inter alia Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 757 f.  
407 In criminal cases the term “fair trial” is often used as a term for a trial that safeguards the rights of defendants 
in criminal procedure. The term “fair trial” is used in the European Convention of Human Rights article 6 and is 
give content by the European Court of Human Rights. Many of the rights necessary for a fair trial are included in 
the constitutions of EU member states and in US. Note that whether a trial is criminal or not according the 
European Convention on Human Rights is functional and not determined by the formal national classification. 
This means that the enforcement of European Commission involving fines is criminal according to the 
convention.    
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independence of judges and jurors by disqualifying judges or jurors who have direct personal 
interests in the outcome of the case.  
A procedure that is not fair is often referred to as a witch-hunt. A witch-hunt is 
characterized by pre-judgments and presumptions (for instance, presumption of guilt) that are 
difficult to refute if even possible.408 Furthermore, a witch-hunt might be characterized by 
methods of evidence assessment not based on logic, knowledge, and science. An example of 
this would be to make inferences of guilt from irrelevant evidence such as the weather of the 
day the case is decided or who paid the judge most in bribes.409  
In most developed countries, the legal procedure can, overall, be characterized as a 
“fair trial”, even supreme courts and supranational courts such as the European Court of 
Human Rights occasionally find violations even in the most developed countries. There have 
been some critics against fairness of the inquisitorial antitrust enforcement in EU.410 When the 
authorities act as investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker, it might be subject to biased 
preferences towards finding a violation. There has even been a discussion as to whether the 
current system complies with the European Convention of Human rights.411 As described in 
Chapter Two there have been some reforms in the EU addressing some of the critique against 
the EU decision procedures. Substantive antitrust law can also be criticized to operate with 
strong presumptions of anticompetitive effects that are almost impossible to refute.  
For the present purposes, it is assumed that the trial is fair at a general level. Thus it 
will not be explicitly discussed how antitrust evidence assessment might be affected by 
bribes, that the decision maker has direct personal economic interest in the outcome of the 
case for one of the parties, or other major irregularities. Note, however, that this is not to say 
that bribes and similar irregularities are non-existing in antitrust cases.            
As described in Chapter Two, the superior principles of legal procedure can be divided 
into two main principles: the inquisitorial system and the adversarial system. It is also 
possible to speak of degree of inquisition, assuming a sliding scale between the adversarial 
and inquisitorial procedure.412 The organization of procedure is an important premise for the 
evidence assessment. 
                                                 
408 Walton (2001) p. 185-186 states some characteristics of a witch-hunt. 
409 Or in literal witch hunts; whether the body floats in water or not.  
410 See for instance Wils (2004), Geradin (2010) and OECD (2010).  
411 See Wils (2004) and Geradin (2010). It will be beyond the scope of this study to go further into the issue on 
whether the enforcement system in EU complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.  
412 See Parisi (2002). See also Damien (2006). 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
187 
 In the inquisitorial system, the inquisitor has control over what evidence is gathered 
and the assessment of this evidence. As discussed above and in Chapter Two, the enforcement 
of the EU competition law by the European Commission can be best be characterized as an 
inquisitorial system.413 Thus, the Commission has, as a starting point, control over what 
evidence is gathered and the assessment of this gathered evidence. However, contradiction 
rights and rights to formal hearings secure some adversarial elements in the framework within 
the inquisitorial system. The party under scrutiny by the inquisitor might try to convince the 
inquisitor by presenting his own evidence and argue for his own assessment of the evidence 
gathered. Compared to an adversarial system, the power balance is asymmetric in the 
inquisitorial system. It is the inquisitor that makes the decision. The decision of the European 
Commission can be brought to the European courts, following an adversarial system. Thus, 
the system is not purely inquisitorial. The system including judicial review can be described 
as a mixed system.414 However, the system in the EU will not be the same as one following an 
adversarial system from start. As described in Chapter Two, there are limits on the courts’ 
competence to challenge the evidence assessment in the judicial review. The court can only 
challenge manifest errors in the assessment of complex economic evidence and cannot replace 
an economic analysis with its own. Furthermore, there is a substantial difference between 
being the defendant in an adversarial procedure and being a plaintiff challenging the decision 
of an inquisitor in the courts. The plaintiff who challenges the inquisitor in courts has the 
burden to initiate litigation and the initial burden to establish the presence of errors in the 
decision of the inquisitor.  
In contrast to the EU, US antitrust cases mainly follow the adversarial system, as 
described in Chapter Two. Even if the enforcement by the FTC is administrative, the 
procedure is adversarial. An additional main difference between the US and EU is the use of 
juries to assess evidence in US as a main rule.415 In jury trials, the judge determines the law 
and serves as a gatekeeper of the jury’s access of evidence by enforcing the rules of evidence.  
In the adversarial process it is the opposing parties that have the responsibility to gather 
evidence to support their case, and the judge has limited control on what evidence will be 
                                                 
413 The member states may have implemented a more or less adversarial system in their enforcement of EU 
competition rules. Many countries do, however, operate with an enforcement system similar to the enforcement 
of the European Commission. However, when the EU member states prosecute antitrust offences criminally 
according to their national jurisdictions, the procedure is adversarial. A comparative study of the process in the 
different European jurisdictions is beyond the scope for this study. 
414 A term used by Posner (2011) p. 852 
415 As it will be described below, there are exceptions to jury trials. Laymen juries are not used in the FTC 
administrative procedure.  
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presented in court. The judge can reject some evidence as inadmissible and hereby exercise 
some negative control on the evidence. Furthermore, the judge also indirectly exercises some 
control on the amount of evidence by deciding on the time frame of the case. By asking 
clarifying questions, the judge might also indirectly influence the evidence presented. The 
judge or jury are normally free to assess the evidence presented, but might be bound by facts 
on which both parties agree upon.  
        The procedural issues described above are the paramount principles of procedure. 
Other procedural rules might also have a big impact on the evidence assessment. Rules on 
disclosure of evidence, rules on settlements, rules on appeal, and even rules on voting 
between judges and jurors can have big impacts on the outcome of the evidence assessment. 
The impacts of various procedural rules are returned to below. 
5.3.2 Abductive reasoning and actual evidence assessment   
Abductive reasoning 
Abductive reasoning416 has been pointed at by legal philosophers as the method decision 
makers apply in the actual assessment of legal evidence.417 Abduction is about finding 
plausible explanations of evidence in deriving the best explanation. Abductive reasoning is 
sometimes described as an heuristic and intuitive holistic assessment of evidence.418, 419  
Heuristic methods of inference to the best explanation are the best we have in the presence of 
complex evidence and no reliable estimates on probabilities, especially on the compounded 
probability associated with all evidence. The question is what inference to the best 
explanation is more precisely is. How do we find the best explanation for some evidence? It 
has been suggested that the best explanation is the one that provide most understanding of the 
                                                 
416 The concept of abductive reasoning was first introduced by the philosopher C. S. Pierce. See for instance 
Pierce (1965).   
417 See Walton (2002) and Walton (2005b). See also Pardo (2010).  
418 See Kolflaath (2007) and Graver (2009). 
419 Note that even if the inference to the best explanation is heuristic and intuitive, this does not mean that more 
precise principles used in the search for the best explanation is impossible to describe further. In artificial 
intelligence, the use of heuristic principles to solve decision problems is well established. The mutual exchange 
of insight between philosophy and artificial intelligence research has provided us with an increased insight on 
heuristic methods. Methods used in artificial intelligence such as artificial neural networks that mimic the 
function of the brain, fuzzy logic that is used to make decisions based on fuzzy terms, and cluster methods used 
to categorize observations based on certain characteristics inform heuristic reasoning. See, for instance, Witten 
and Frank (2005) or Milligton (2006) for technical descriptions of such methods of artificial intelligence. In 
addition to being informative as to how actual heuristic reasoning work, artificial intelligence provides us with 
some additional insight. Artificial methods reveal that the methods actually work. Even the best chess players 
have been beaten by machines. Artificial methods also provide insight as to why heuristic methods sometimes 
fail, and how they can be improved. Walton (2005b) studies the relationship between methods artificial 
intelligence and legal reasoning.    
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
189 
evidence.420 This is the explanation we get after rounds of critically asking why do we have 
this evidence. What is the explanation of this evidence? What are the alternative 
explanations? Contrastive inference and the use of analogies are important in this context. 
What is the difference between the evidence we possess and some evidence assessed earlier? 
Does this evidence calls for another explanation? The use of expert opinion and, in general, to 
listen to persons in a better position to know, is also an important element in the search for the 
best explanation. Abductive reasoning is also about utilizing presumptions to find the best 
default explanation. The best default means that one who asserts that there is some other 
explanation of the evidence than the default, must present arguments that this other 
explanation is better. This means that abduction, in principle, is a method of creating 
presumptions and switching the burden of proof.421 
Lipton (2004) argues that inference to the best explanation, as a main rule, gives us a 
correct assessment of evidence corresponding to the assessment obtained by a rational 
probabilistic approach. Thus, the inference to the best explanation is also the inference to the 
most likely explanation.422 Lipton (2004) is aware of biases and imperfections that might 
cause the best explanation to deviate from the most likely explanation of evidence. The 
impact of these biases on the inference is, however, not the main rule. According to Lipton 
(2004), we do not perform so poorly in the inference to the best explanation, even though this 
is done without the explicit use of probability calculus. This is in line with research showing 
that an intuitive holistic assessment of complex evidence often performs even better than 
attempts to decompose evidence and to algorithmically address uncertainty, by for instance, 
Bayesian updating.423 The argumentation by Lipton (2004) is reasonable. It basically means 
that evidence assessment is likely to be correct if there are no reasons to believe that the 
assessment is wrong. 
Finding the best explanation of evidence might seem too vague to be a precise 
description of legal evidence assessment. In legal evidence assessment different standards of 
proof apply depending on the nature of the case. This was described in Chapter Two. Finding 
the best explanation of evidence is maybe descriptive for cases where balance of probabilities 
is the standard of proof. However, when a higher standard of proof is required, finding the 
best explanation of evidence is not enough. The standard of proof adds some additional 
                                                 
420 See Lipton (2004) p. 59.  
421 See Walton (2002). 
422 See Lipton (2004) p. 107 f. 
423 See Posner (2008) p. 108 f. for a discussion and references to the research on the topic.  
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requirements to the best explanation. Luckily, the abductive method of finding the best 
explanation involves assessments that make it possible to assess the goodness of the best 
explanation. The search for the best explanation involves the search for other plausible 
explanations in the process. The plausibility of alternative explanations is determining for 
how good the best explanation is. By assessing the plausibility of alternative explanations, we 
get an idea on how good the best explanation is. Thus, in assessing evidence according to a 
qualified standard of proof, the best explanation together with the alternative explanations are 
determining for whether the standard of proof is satisfied. Thus, inference to the best 
explanation is suitable in the assessment of evidence according to alternative standards of 
proof. If, for instance, the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, the question is if 
there are alternative explanations plausible enough to create reasonable doubt.                         
Abductive reasoning and antitrust evidence 
As abductive reasoning is considered descriptive as the method for the actual assessment of 
legal evidence, the question becomes whether this is also descriptive of the assessment of 
antitrust evidence. There are good arguments that it is. 
 It appears that the chief elements of abductive reasoning, such as the use of 
presumptions, analogies, and expert knowledge, are all crucial elements of antitrust evidence 
assessment. As described above, the use of presumption rules that switch the burden of proof 
is a central element of antitrust decision making. The presumption rules in the US an EU can 
be interpreted as default inferences in assessing the conduct in question. The anticompetitive 
explanation is the best default inference we can do. This is established as facts as long as the 
defendant does not come up with sufficient plausible explanations as to why the conduct in 
question is pro-competitive or improves welfare in other ways. The question is if these 
explanations are sufficiently plausible to refute the presumption.  
Furthermore, the use of analogies, in terms of how evidence has been assessed in 
former cases, regularly serves as a benchmark for assessing the evidence in a new case. 
Expert knowledge, especially economic expert knowledge, is used to aid the decision making.   
 Thus, at a superior level, abductive reasoning seems to be describable for the 
assessment of evidence in antitrust both in the EU and US. The actual evidence assessment in 
each of these systems will be discussed in more detail just below. 
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More on actual evidence assessment methods in US 
In the US, the use of juries complicates the issue of evidence assessment. How juries assess 
evidence is usually not transparent. Jury instructions reveal that the evidence assessment is 
based on an overall intuitive assessment of the evidence presented.  A typical jury instruction 
in the US on the assessment of evidence is as follows:  
 
[y]ou should use your common sense in weighing the evidence. Consider it in light of 
your everyday experience with people and events, and give it whatever weight you 
believe it deserves. If your experience tells you that certain evidence reasonably leads 
to a conclusion, you are free to reach that conclusion.424  
 
The competition between the parties in providing evidence and the rules on admissible 
evidence is supposed to make the jury to assess the evidence as accurate and objective as 
possible. The transparency surrounding the evidence assessment will be relatively weak as the 
jury’s inferences from the various pieces of evidence will not be a part of the judge’s written 
opinion. We can compare the evidence presented with the decision made and make inferences 
about the inferences. There is, however, some situations where the judges assess evidence, 
and this evidence assessment become a part of the written decision. This is, inter alia, in 
motions to dismiss antitrust claims, in summary judgment decisions, and in decisions 
concerning judgments as a matter of law in jury trials.  
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, the plaintiff must present 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, 
the courts may dismiss a claim that has no evidential merits. This makes it possible for the 
court to dismiss a case already before the discovery phase. These decisions give us a chance 
to see how courts assess evidence in motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court has, in the two 
cases Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly425 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,426 established the controversial 
Twomply/Iqbal “plausibility” standard.427 The Bell Atlantic case was an antitrust case 
regarding a conspiracy to fix prices, while Iqbal was a discrimination case. For the pleader to 
be entitled to a relief, the Supreme Court stated in Bell Atlantic that  
 
                                                 
424 ZF Meritor LLC and Meritor Transmission Corporation v. Eaton Corporation, no. 06-023-SLR (October 7, 
2009), United States District Court for the District of Delaware. 
425 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
426 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
427 Pardo (2010).  
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we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged 
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be 
dismissed.428 
 
The plaintiffs had not managed to establish an antitrust conspiracy as a plausible explanation 
of the evidence. We can see the statement in connection with the court’s statement that the 
parallel behavior  
 
was not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history teaches anything. In a traditionally 
unregulated industry with low barriers to entry, sparse competition among large firms 
dominating separate geographical segments of the market could very well signify illegal 
agreement, but here we have an obvious alternative explanation.429 
 
This tells us that the courts are looking for the plausible explanations, and here the best 
explanation of the evidence was so good in favor of an alternative competitive explanation 
that the claim was dismissed. Bell Atlantic is also illustrative of how the courts make 
inferences from single pieces of evidence. The probative force of parallel conduct for the 
existence of an agreement was addressed by the court stating that  
 
[t]he inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, 
mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in 
line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally 
prompted by common perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact 
from Fantasy, Related Publication 06–08, pp. 3–4 (2006) (discussing problem of “false 
positives” in §1 suits).430 
 
The court here stated the minimal probative force of parallel conduct in inferring an antitrust 
conspiracy. This statement also relies on the appeal to expert knowledge, which will be 
returned to below.  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, states that  
 
[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the 
motion.  
                                                 
428 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007) at 571 
429 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007) at 567.  
430 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007) at 254. 
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A summary judgment makes it possible for the court to avoid a jury trial if it considers that 
the facts are sufficiently established to decide as a matter of law without a jury trial. Summary 
judgments431 are interesting from an evidence assessment perspective. They give an indication 
of what evidence judges consider sufficient facts to make a decision without a jury trial. The 
Supreme Court has developed a “reasonable jury” standard.432 The court has established that a 
moving for summary judgment will be dismissed if a reasonable jury could find in favor for 
the other party.433 Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp434 was an 
antitrust case where Zenith alleged Japanese television manufactures for a conspiracy to fix 
prices at low level to exclude US producers. The question was whether any reasonable jury 
could find in favor for Zenith. The Supreme Court stated that  
 
[i]t follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders respondents' 
claim implausible -- if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense -- 
respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim 
than would otherwise be necessary.435  
 
Thus, similar to motions to dismiss, plausibility of the claim is necessary to avoid summary 
judgment. The claim must make sense. Thus, the one who wants to avoid summary judgment 
must come up with a plausible explanation of the evidence that supports his claim. In the 
context of avoiding summary judgment for the absence of an antitrust conspiracy, the court 
stated that  
 
[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking 
damages for a violation of [Sherman Act] § 1 must present evidence "that tends to 
exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 465 U.S., at 
764. Respondents in this case, in other words, must show that the inference of 
conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or 
collusive action that could not have harmed respondents.436  
 
Thus, inferring an antitrust conspiracy must be a reasonable explanation of the evidence 
relative to independent action as an explanation for the evidence.  
                                                 
431 Summary judgments are, as a general rule, not available in criminal trials as a jury trial is a fundamental right 
for criminal defendants.    
432 Pardo (2010).  
433 Pardo (2010). 
434 Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
435 Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986) at 587. 
436 Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986) at 587. 
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As for motions for dismiss, summary judgments are also informative on the probative force 
of single pieces of evidence. An example in this case is the court’s statement that  
 
[e]vidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices in Japan provides little, if any, 
support for respondents' claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market does not 
tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another.437  
 
Thus, a conspiracy to raise prices in one market had no probative force in inferring a 
conspiracy to charge predatorily low prices in another market.  
Even if the jury trial has started, a party might move for a judgment as a matter of law. 
If the party succeeds in this, the facts are established and the court can decide the case as a 
matter of law. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50, states that the court may rule as a 
matter of law  
 
[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a 
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the 
party on that issue.  
 
Thus, the reasonable jury standard applies in judgment as a matter of law in jury trials. The 
reasonable jury standard in summary judgments and in judgments as a matter of law is 
interpreted similarly.438  
Motions to dismiss antitrust claims, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of 
law are similar instruments in different stages of litigation. A motion to dismiss a claim can 
be applied before the discovery starts, summary judgments can be applied before the jury trial 
starts, and judgment as a matter of law can be applied during jury trial. All instruments 
foreclose further gathering of evidence, and the case can be decided forthwith. Thus, the 
ability of courts to dismiss claims, to make summary judgments, and judgments as a matter of 
law are instruments that can be used to implement rational sequential decisions in the 
assessment of evidence. The purpose of these instruments is, inter alia, to achieve procedural 
efficiency.439 It is debated whether the current standards applied in the use of these 
instruments succeeds in facilitating an efficient procedure.440 It is difficult to answer the 
question of whether judges will assess evidence correctly by inspecting the formulation of the 
                                                 
437 Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986) at 597. 
438 Pardo (2010).  
439 Pardo (2010).  
440 See Pardo (2010) for the debate.  
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standards alone. What matters is the actual evidence assessment performed by the judges in 
the application of the standards and whether it is likely that judges are subject to 
imperfections and biases in their assessment. This is returned to below.  
One obvious criticism against the rationality of the current standards is the lack of 
explicit loss of errors and costs considerations. Whether further evidence should be gathered 
is dependent on reduced expected losses from making a wrong decision and the costs of 
becoming better informed. The standards seem to be too narrowly focusing on the possibility 
of wrong decisions and focusing too little on the costs and consequences of wrong decisions. 
However, loss of errors considerations are partially taken into account by the standard of 
proof as both the plausibility standard and the reasonable jury standard account for the 
standard of proof.441  
The discussion of motions to dismiss antitrust claims, summary judgment, and 
judgment as a matter of law was related to civil procedure. The possibilities to foreclose a 
jury trial are limited under criminal procedure as the right to a jury trial in the determination 
of criminal liability is a fundamental right. However, there are some instruments. The court 
may use the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12, to decide on issues pretrial, such 
as motions to suppress evidence. Furthermore, the courts may use the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 48, to dismiss a complaint.  
In both civil and criminal litigation, the court may use Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 
403, to declare evidence inadmissible according to efficiency considerations. Thus, the courts 
have an opportunity to pursue rationality not only in the procedural stages presented above, 
but also when it comes to the presentation of single elements of evidence.     
It should also be noted that the prioritization process internally in the enforcement 
authorities in the case of public enforcement also involves a screening of cases. The 
authorities have limited resources that must be prioritized among cases. This means that, if the 
authorities only pursue the most merit cases, there is less chance that cases associated with 
weak evidence to arrive trial. However, it may not always be so. The question for 
enforcement authorities is not necessarily the weakness of evidence in supporting a violation, 
but whether it will be able to convince juries exploiting cognitive biases and other 
imperfections in evidence assessment. This topic is returned to below.  
In the administrative enforcement of the FTC, it is the administrative law judge that 
assesses the evidence after an adversarial procedure, and the assessment is finally 
                                                 
441 Pardo (2010).  
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administratively decided by the Commission. Thus, on the contrary to jury trials, a FTC 
decision will contain evidence assessment. Note that the decision of the FTC may be 
challenged by the courts subject to a limited standard of review. This was described in 
Chapter Two as the substantial evidence standard. Under this standard, the FTC’s finding of 
facts will be upheld if it is supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”442 Thus, a holistic overall assessment also 
applies when the FTC evidence assessment is challenged.  
More on actual evidence assessment methods in EU 
In the EU competition law, the assessment of evidence is more transparent as it is performed 
by the Commission as a decision maker and by the judges in the courts in case of judicial 
review. Note, however, that the courts have some limits in challenging complex economic 
evidence and replacing economic analyses with their own, as described in Chapter Two.  
The decision makers can describe how they assess evidence in their decisions. Both 
the Commission and the courts state the inferences made from the various elements of 
evidence in the decision. The decision makers may, for instance, state whether an e-mail 
correspondence have probative force in inferring and agreement or which economic theory is 
used to infer that some exchange of information has anticompetitive effects.443   
When it comes to the methods of accessing the total body of evidence by a statement 
by Alexander Italianer, Director General of the Directorate for Competition in the European 
Commission, is illustrative. Italianer stated that “[w]e take into account quantitative and 
qualitative information to put together a coherent story.”444 Thus, evidence assessment is 
about creating a holistic coherent story. This is in line with inference to the best explanation. 
Furthermore, some statements from the courts are clarifying on the assessment of evidence. In 
Aalborg Portland, the ECJ stated that  
 
In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be 
inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the 
absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the 
competition rules.445   
                                                 
442 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) at 725.  
443 See, for instance, Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 
P, Aalborg Portland and Others v. European Commission [2004] para. 135 f. for a lengthy assessment of the 
probative force of documents in inferring an agreement.   
444 Alexander Italianer, "Quantity" and "quality" in economic assessments, Charles River Associates Annual 
Conference 7 December 2011, Brussels. 
445 Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalborg 
Portland and Others v. European Commission [2004] para. 57.  
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If there are no other plausible explanations for some evidence, we are left with a strong best 
explanation. Recall that the standard of proof used in the EU is also quite illustrative as to 
how evidence should actually be assessed. In Microsoft the court stated that  
 
The Community Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is 
factually accurate, reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that 
evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into consideration in 
appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, concerning merger control, Case 
C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, paragraph 39).446  
 
The inquisitional nature of the enforcement by the European Competition makes it 
possible to implement sequential decision making. Both Regulation 1/2003,447 which 
regulates the procedure in the enforcement of TFEU Articles 101 and 102, and the Merger 
Regulation,448 involve formal stages and phases of the procedure that gives the Commission 
opportunities to either proceed with the case or abandon the case on the basis of the present 
evidence. The Commission has also developed best practices that facilitate the enlightenment 
of the case as it proceeds. This includes best practices in the application of TFEU Articles 101 
and 102,449Best practices on merger control proceedings,450 and best practices on the 
submission of economic evidence.451 Thus, the framework for a rational evidence assessment 
is in place, which, at least in theory, makes the inquisitorial enforcement in the EU a possible 
instrument for rational decision making. By implementing the principles in the regulation and 
best practices, the European Commission should, in principle, be informed to take qualified 
decisions at the various stages of the process, either on what evidence to gather next or to 
abandon the case. Furthermore, the Commission can also take the costs into account in 
weighing the decision value of gathering additional evidence against the costs. The question 
then becomes whether the Commission is subject to imperfections and biases that make it 
likely that it will not rationally assess evidence. Such imperfections are returned to below.    
                                                 
446 Microsoft Corp v. Commission, Case T-201/04, CFI, 2007 para. 89.  
447 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003, p.1-25. 
448Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22. 
449 Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
2011/C 308/06. 
450 DG Competition Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings 20. January 2004.  
451 DG Competition, Best Practices For The Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases 
Concerning the Application of Articles 101 And 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases, Staff Working Paper. 
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The way to proceed  
The discussion above has established that abductive reasoning, which is the search for 
plausible explanations of evidence to reach a best explanation, is descriptive for the antitrust 
decision makers’ actual assessment of evidence. The assumption of Lipton (2004), as 
described above, is that inference to the best explanation as a starting point yields a correct 
assessment of evidence unless the decision makers are subject to imperfections and biases. 
This seems to be a reasonable starting point. Furthermore, both the US and EU procedural 
frameworks contain elements that, in theory, can facilitate rational sequential decision 
making. 
With this starting point, the next step becomes to identify the sources of imperfections 
and biases in actual antitrust evidence assessment and assess how they are likely to affect the 
outcome. In the remainder of this subchapter, various sources of imperfections and biases in 
antitrust evidence assessment are identified. These include institutional biases, cognitive 
biases, imperfections in the use of analogies, imperfections associated with the appeal to 
expert knowledge, and how the abuse of rhetoric may distort the evidence assessment. The 
impact of these imperfections and biases will provide information as to whether actual 
evidence assessment is likely to deviate from rational evidence assessment. After this 
discussion, this insight is used in the next subchapter as input in an economic model of actual 
evidence assessment to see if such a model can inform actual antitrust evidence assessment 
even further.    
5.3.3 The impact of institutional biases 
Decision makers are utility maximizers 
A decision maker’s preferences for alternative actions are dependent on the decision maker’s 
net utility. By net utility, in this context, is meant the utility of an action minus the personal 
costs and efforts of taking that action. An antitrust decision maker’s net utility of taking 
alternative actions is affected by, inter alia, career opportunities, salary, recognition, political 
preferences, and not necessarily, an intrinsic preference to make objective rational 
decisions.452 As long as the decision maker has some discretion in assessing evidence, the 
decision maker has an incentive to establish facts that are in line with his own preferences.  
                                                 
452 See Posner (2008) p. 57 f. and Posner (2011) p. 725 f. The analysis of what judges maximize in Posner (2008) 
p. 57 f. and Posner (2011) p. 725 f. is based on adversarial judges. Inquisitorial decision makers might also be 
compared to bureaucrats. There is much literature in the field of public choice on what bureaucrats maximize. 
Seminal contributions are Tullock (1965), Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971). See also Mueller (2003) p. 359 f.     
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An antitrust decision maker’s actions to maximize his net utility are likely to depend 
on whether the system is inquisitorial or adversarial. Furthermore, a decision maker’s utility-
maximizing actions are likely to depend on whether the decision maker is directly politically 
appointed or whether the decision maker is appointed by political principals. Furthermore, the 
actions are likely to depend on whether the decision maker is an independent adjudicator or a 
bureaucrat in a hierarchic system. In addition, the utility maximizing actions may be 
dependent on whether a decision maker is appointed for lifetime or for a limited period 
subject to or not subject to renewal.  
Below, some incentive factors likely to affect an antitrust decision maker’s assessment 
of evidence are presented.  
Interest group influence and rent-seeking 
The interest group theory is based on the general public choice theories on how public 
officials decide, normally under the condition that they are agents for voters in a democratic 
system. Political elected decision makers act in self-interest and maximize their utility, which 
is dependent on political support measured in votes. To maximize the number of votes a 
policy must be chosen to maximize support. Money is important for outreach and election 
campaigns. In this context monetary support from interest groups is important.453 This means 
that politicians must weigh the profit interests of industries supporting their campaigns against 
the effects on votes from consumers that want low prices. This tradeoff in protecting special 
interest groups and consumers is analyzed formally by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). 
Cooperation with interest groups can also be important for political decision makers for other 
reasons. A firm can, for instance, influence the votes of its employees, and a labor union can 
influence the votes of its members.  
As a starting point, it might seem that political inquisitorial enforcement bodies, such 
as the European Commission, are more prone rent seeking from interests groups than 
adversarial courts with independent judges. The possibilities to influence political bodies by 
legal means are easier than influencing independent judges in a trial. The distance between the 
appointments of commissioners in the European Commission and the democratic institutions 
of the member states is, however, quite long, as described in Chapter Two. This is likely to 
                                                 
453 By interest groups, what is meant is all organized units with common interest in the outcome. This can be 
affected firms and their related unions, user and consumer organizations, labor unions, and voluntary 
organizations.  
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mitigate the Commissioners incentives to systematically protect special interests compared 
the decisions of political decision makers that are elected directly.   
Rent-seeking from special interests is also about who are most effective at 
representing their interests and who spends most in presenting evidence and arguments that 
support their case. Becker (1983) modeled interest group influence as competition between 
many interest groups with conflicting interests. The group spending most on influencing will 
be most successful in having its interests implemented in the decision. It is the relative 
spending that is important. If two opposing interest groups spend equally on support, their 
support levels will cancel each other out. Thus, there is a game where the support from one 
interest group is dependent on the support of the other interest group. The result is dependent 
on which group is best organizing and representing their interest to the decision maker. 
Interest groups with a few wealthy members, but where each member is heavily impacted by 
some regulation, will presumably be better promoting their interest collectively than a large 
group with many members where each member only suffer a minor impact of the regulation. 
This might be the case even when the total impact on the bigger group is larger. The reason is 
that, in a group, each member will have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts on the others. 
If little is at stake for each individual separately, this “problem” might have substantial 
effects. This means that, as a main rule, concentrated interests will have more impact on 
public decisions than dispersed interests, according to the interest group theory. From the 
relative spending point of view, it has been argued that an adversarial court system is likely to 
be more prone to rent-seeking than an inquisitorial system.454 The argument is that an 
inquisitorial enforcement authority, as a starting point, can be considered as a body that seeks 
the objective truth in an efficient way, while an adversarial court is more of a playing field 
where parties can spend enormous resources on rent-seeking without being stopped. Thus, 
adversarial courts may be a better playing field for rent-seeking.  
It is not possible here to draw robust conclusions as to whether politically supervised 
inquisitorial enforcement authorities or an adversarial system are most subject to rent-seeking 
biases overall. That being said, interest group influence will work differently in systems 
where the decision maker has an incentive to protect certain interests as described above, and 
in systems where rent-seeking influences the decision just because one group spends more 
money. In the first case, a decision might be epistemologically wrong because the decision 
maker has an incentive to make a wrong decision, possibly against better knowledge. In the 
                                                 
454 Tollock (1980, 1988).  
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
201 
second situation, the rent seeker must try to exploit other imperfections and biases associated 
with the decision making to prevent the decision maker from making a rational decision. 
Thus, rent-seeking is an intrinsic source of bias in the first situation, while the biases from 
rent seeking must be derived from other sources of biases in the second situation. This is an 
argument that rent-seeking influence is a worse problem in the first situation.  
When it comes to the influence of rent-seeking through spending efforts the theory is 
not clear on whether the inquisitorial system or adversarial system performs worse, as just 
described. There are risks of rent-seeking biases in both the inquisitorial system in the EU and 
the adversarial system in the US. The persons subject to antitrust scrutiny often represent 
concentrated monopoly rents with a strong interest in protecting their monopoly profits. Thus, 
the possibility of rent-seeking is likely to be biased towards monopoly interests. This may 
systematically bias decisions and the corresponding evidence assessments towards non 
violation findings. The incentives to spend resources on rent-seeking will be studied in more 
detail within economic models of evidence assessment below.    
Imperfections in evidence assessment associated with principal agent issues 
Often, legal decisions are not done by the political elected persons directly, but by public 
officials appointed by the politically elected persons. The employed public officials maximize 
their own utility subject to those incentive mechanisms provided by the politicians hiring 
them. The public officials may be independent judges who cannot be instructed by the 
politicians after they are appointed. If these independent judges are dependent on the 
politicians for a career in the judiciary, this may, however, give the politicians some control.  
US Supreme Court judges are appointed for life, inter alia, to avoid such influence.  
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, are employees and agents for their political superiors, usually 
subject to the instructive powers of the political superiors.455 The administrative personnel of 
the European Commission are bureaucrats in this sense. The politicians must then use 
incentives schemes to encourage the bureaucrats to implement their desired politics.  
After the appointment of independent judges, the possibility of using incentive 
mechanisms is limited ex post. Politicians can, to some extent, increase and reduce budgets. If 
the politicians don’t like the decision of one particular judge, they may increase the number of 
judges to reduce the average number of cases that will be handled by this judge. One of the 
most important instruments for the politicians in controlling independent decision makers is to 
                                                 
455 Some bureaucrats may be subject to limited instructive powers. This usually applies to heads of competition 
authorities and other regulatory bodies to secure the professional legitimacy of these bodies.  
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appoint decision makers with the desirable preferences.456 This is quite apparent when it 
comes to the appointment of Supreme Court justices in the US.457 Thus, the preferences of the 
judges are likely to at least be correlated with the preferences of the politicians that appointed 
them. Consequently, they may have some biases towards certain interest groups due to a 
selection effect.  
The possible imperfections and biases on evidence assessment that might result from 
self-interested independent judges are quite diverse.458 It will be beyond the scope of this 
study to discuss this fully. However, some comments are due. We can assume that whatever a 
judge pursues, he will try to achieve this with as little effort as possible. This might have 
certain implications for evidence assessment. If a judge wants to minimize the efforts in 
assessing evidence, he might choose to rely on past experiences as a substitute to a careful 
scrutiny of the facts of the case.459 This might bias the decisions towards prior decisions, 
causing a problem of path-dependence. Important differences in facts that call for another 
evidence assessment might not be discovered. This is returned to in the discussion of 
analogical reasoning below. This problem can be used as an argument for jury trials as jury 
members are less experienced with similar cases, and are then less prone to substitute a 
careful assessment of evidence with past experiences.460        
Bureaucrats subject to the instruction powers of the political principals can, in 
principle, be instructed to do exactly as they are told as a condition for their salary. It is not so 
easy, though. Bureaucrats possess private information regarding the probative force of 
evidence, decision value of evidence, and the costs of gathering evidence. This gives the 
bureaucrats some discretion in assessing evidence in the pursuit of personal preferences.461 
An imperfection associated with evidence assessment is the so-called prosecutorial bias.462 
The prosecutorial bias explains why inquisitorial enforcement authorities, such as the 
European Commission, may be subject to a bias in favor of finding violations. Prosecutorial 
bias is a bundle of biases that covers both incentive biases and cognitive biases, such as the 
                                                 
456 Posner (2011) p. 726 f.  
457 See Posner (2008).  
458 See Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 725 f.  
459 See Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 824.  
460 See Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 824. As also pointed out by Posner, past experience is also an 
advantage that might make the evidence assessment more accurate if taken into account together with a careful 
assessment of the evidence in the case in question. Thus, lesser risk of substitution of a careful assessment of 
evidence with past experiences associated with juries is just one argument for juries, but not necessarily an 
argument that juries overall assess evidence better than judges.  
461 There is much literature in the field of public choice on what bureaucrats maximize. Seminal contributions are 
Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), and Niskanen (1971). See also Mueller (2003) p. 359 f.     
462 See Wils (2004).  
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confirmation bias and the hindsight bias.463 Cognitive biases will be returned to below, while 
the incentive part of the prosecutorial bias is discussed here. The incentive bias arises because 
those who assess evidence are awarded differently depending whether they find violation or 
not. Typically, enforcement authorities are more recognized for doing something than not 
doing something. Naturally, what is done is more measurable and visible then what is not 
done. Thus, finding violations are more likely to be beneficial for the funding of the authority 
and career of the employed officials.464 It has been argued that the European Commission is 
subject to incentive biases in favor finding violation.465 Some of the reforms imposing checks 
and balances in the enforcement of the European Commission described in Chapter Two aim 
to limit the impact of such biases. These reforms will be returned to in the discussion of 
cognitive biases below. 
An additional point is that, with enforcement officials as with judges, it is reasonable 
to assume that enforcement officials would prefer to pursue their goals with as little effort as 
possible. This might have an additional consequence for evidence assessment in inquisitorial 
law enforcement systems. Since the inquisitor has control over the evidence gathering, he 
would prefer to shift as much as possible of the cost of evidence production to other parties. 
This can be achieved by presumptions against the investigated parties. A consequence of this 
is a bias towards too strong presumptions favoring violation in inquisitorial systems. The 
stricter presumptions being used in the EU than in US, in particular when it comes to the 
enforcement of abuse of dominance,466 is at least consistent with such a theory. This point is 
revisited in the modeling of actual evidence assessment below. 
5.3.4 The impact of cognitive biases 
Behavioral economics and cognitive biases 
The branch of economics called behavioral economics intersects with psychology and studies 
actual evidence assessment and decision making. Studies in behavioral economics have 
revealed that cognitive biases might lead to evidence assessments and decisions that 
systematically deviate from what objectively seem rational. Behavioral economics was briefly 
described in Chapter Three.  
                                                 
463 Wils (2004).  
464 See Posner (2011) p. 847 for a discussion of incentives in public enforcement agencies. See Wils (2004) for a 
discussion of incentives in the European Commission.     
465 See Wills (2004) and Geradin and Petit (2010).   
466 See Geradin and Petit (2010). 
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D. Kahneman and A. Tversky467 have provided important knowledge of cognitive 
biases in decision making through extensive seminal research on the topic, e.g., Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973) and Kahneman et al. (1982). Examples of cognitive biases are the base 
rate fallacy on how people fail to take into account prior probabilities in their probability 
assessment and the loss aversion theory on how people irrationally prefer avoiding losses to 
making gains.468 Some irrationality in decision making associated with cognitive biases can 
be explained by evolution and rationality. Since the brain has limited resources, it can 
sometimes be rational to be “bounded” rational and make decisions that might appear 
irrational when weighing the saved brain resources against the quality of the decision.469 This 
is not a new idea, but was pointed out by the Nobel laureate in economics, Herbert Simon, 
already in the 1950s.470 One can say actual decision making rationally utilizes heuristics as a 
result of evolutionary efficiency.  
There is extensive literature on behavioral economics in legal settings,471 which also 
includes literature covering antitrust law in particular.472 Experiments have, for instance, been 
done on mock juries, and large deviations from rational evidence assessment are revealed. 
Below it will be discussed how some cognitive biases can distort the actual evidence 
assessment in antitrust to deviate from a rational assessment of evidence. This will not be an 
exhaustive list of cognitive biases, but rather a selection of those biases most relevant for 
actual antitrust evidence assessment.  
The base rate fallacy 
A cognitive bias with the upmost importance for studying actual assessment of legal evidence 
is the base rate fallacy.473 This is also known as the prosecutor fallacy. The base rate fallacy 
has empirical support.474 The base rate fallacy is a systematic failure to take into account a 
priori probabilities in evidence assessment. This can easily be illustrated by an example.  
Let us say that we know that the chance that a random firm is involved in a price 
conspiracy is 0.001, which is 0.1 percent. Let us say that we found that, in the presence of 
                                                 
467 D. Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for his works with A. Tversky. Had 
Tversky been alive at the time they would probably have received the prize together.   
468 McKenzie (2010) contains an updated and critical survey of some of the research. 
469 See McKenzie (2010) chapter 7 and 8. 
470 See Simon (1955) and Simon (1957). Simon was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1978.   
471 See Sunstein (2000) and Farnsworth (2007) for surveys.   
472 See for instance Wils (2004), Tor (2004) and Stucke (2007).  
473 Kahneman and Tversky (1973). See also Lipton (2004) p. 109 f.  
474 Kahneman and Tversky (1973). The base rate fallacy has been subject to numerous experiments; see 
Farsworth (2007) p. 281 f. Informal base rate fallacy experiments are usually performed on students in 
introductory economics and law and economics courses. Usually, the base rate fallacy is confirmed.     
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illegal price conspiracy, the probability of non-changing prices over more than a one month is 
70 percent. Assume further that finding non-changing prices over more than a one month 
period, if there was no price conspiracy, is just 0.7 percent. This means that finding the 
evidence of non-changing prices over a one month period is 100 times more likely when there 
has been a price conspiracy than if there was no price conspiracy.  
Assume that a random firm is picked out for scrutiny and evidence, e, is found that the 
company’s price has been non-changing for more than one month. Is it probable that this firm 
was involved in a price conspiracy? Let e be the evidence of non-changing prices over one 
month. From the theoretical framework derived above, we know that 
 
p(conspiracy|e)/p(not conspiracy|e)= 
[p(e|conspiracy)/p(e|not conspiracy)]*[p(conspiracy)/p(not conspiracy)]. 
 
The likelihood ratio p(e|conspiracy)/p(e|not conspiracy) is 0.7/0.007, which is 100, as just 
stated. Furthermore, we know that, a priori, if we pick a random firm, the probability ratio 
that this firm is involved in a price conspiracy relative to that it was not involved in a price 
conspiracy is  p(conspiracy)/p(not conspiracy) which 0.001/0.999. This means that if we pick 
a random firm it is about one thousand times less likely that the firm is involved in a price 
conspiracy than not. This gives us that  
 
p(conspiracy|e)/p(not conspiracy|e)=100*[0.001/0.999]=0.1001.  
 
Thus, even where we have evidence which is 100 times more likely given that there was a 
price conspiracy than not, the probability that the firm was involved in a price conspiracy is 
still ten times less than the probability that the firm was not involved in a price conspiracy. 





[p(e|conspiracy)p(conspiracy)+p(e|no conspiracy)p(not conspiracy] 
0.7*0.001/[0.7*0.001+0.007*0.999]= 
0.0007/0.0077=0.09, 
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Thus, given the evidence e, the probability that the random firm is involved in a price 
conspiracy is only 9 percent. This is because of the base rate of only 0.001 of being in a price 
conspiracy in the first place. There will still be many more firms not involved in a price 
conspiracy that have unchanged prices for more than a month. According to the base rate 
fallacy, many people would perceive the probability of a price conspiracy given e as higher 
than 9 percent, maybe as high as 70 percent because this is the probability of the evidence 
given the price conspiracy.475   
 The base-rate fallacy is probably now so familiar among legal decision makers that it 
is not likely to be such a big fallacy as experiments may suggest. Even if judges should not be 
aware of this fallacy, the lawyers of parties who are disadvantaged by the base rate fallacy 
will make the decision makers aware of it. However, juries may be less familiar with the base 
rate fallacy, and may not fully understand the concept, even if the lawyers address it. Thus, 
the base-rate fallacy is likely to be a bigger obstacle to rational evidence assessment in US 
jury trials, than in the EU enforcement, which does not operate with juries.    
Conjunction fallacy  
Another cognitive bias with a particular relevance for evidence assessment is the conjunction 
fallacy. Empirical research has shown that people in some cases find a less probable 
hypothesis more probable because it provides a better explanation due to assumptions that 
have explanatory power.476 More precisely, this means that a hypothesis might be perceived 
as more probable even when the hypothesis has more assumptions that make the hypothesis 
less probable. The reason for this is that the assumptions provide more explanation and 
understanding. A hypothesis that includes an assumption is entailed by the same hypothesis 
not including the assumption. Thus, the hypothesis not including the assumption is more 
general and more probable by deductive logic.  
                                                 
475 Proponents of causal decision theory might disagree on the rationality of taking into account base rates, as 
base rates are often not causally relevant for the decisions, see, for instance, Stein (2011). That only 0.1 percent 
of firms empirically are involved in price conspiracies is casually irrelevant for the question of whether a 
particular firm is involved in a price conspiracy. The logical issues of causal decision theory were addressed 
above. It would be irrational to not take into account base rates. More context-specific information will, 
however, refute the presumptions of base rates when it is due. When more and more context specific evidence is 
gathered, the impact of the base rates will be less and less.    
476 See Lipton (2004) p. 110 f., Kahneman et al. (1982), and Tversky and Kahneman (1984).   
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An example of the conjunction fallacy inspired by literature cited above is the 
hypothesis that Anna works in a bank, is politically active, and went to a political protest. 
This hypothesis sounds more probable than the hypothesis that Anna works in a bank and 
went to a political protest. The first hypothesis offers more explanation, but the latter is 
objectively more probable as it has fewer assumptions. The last hypothesis does not preclude 
Anna being political active and entails the first hypothesis.  
We can construct another example based on competition law. Assume we have two 
hypotheses. The first one is that the competitors, A and B, for a long time had small margins 
and entered into a price conspiracy. The second is that competitors A and B entered into a 
price conspiracy. The first hypothesis says something about the purpose or intention about the 
conspiracy, which make a better explanation than the second. It might, therefore, be perceived 
as more probable than the second one; even the second one is objectively more probable. The 
first hypothesis is included in the second.  
The conjunction fallacy can also be applied by defendants in presenting an alternative 
explanation for some alleged competitive conduct. Suppose some company alleged to have 
restricted competition by refusing to give some interoperability information to competitors, 
argue that this is necessary to protect intellectual property to promote innovation in a market 
that is highly innovative.477  Although the hypothesis that refusing to give interoperability 
information is necessary to protect intellectual property to promote innovation is more 
probable than the hypothesis that refusing to give refusing to give interoperability information 
is necessary to protect intellectual property to promote innovation in a market that is highly 
innovative, the last hypothesis might seem more probable as it offers more explanation for the 
need to protect intellectual property rights.     
Another reason for the conjunction fallacy, in addition to the better explanation 
provided by more assumptions, might be that the one assessing the probability confuses 
assumptions with evidence. In general, we have that p(H|e) might be bigger than p(H), while 
p(H෼e) is always less than (or equal to) p(H). It might, for instance, be that the probability 
that a firm enters into a price conspiracy given that it had low margins for a long time is 
greater than the probability that the firm enters into a price conspiracy in general. Still, the 
probability that a firm enters into a price conspiracy must be larger than the probability that a 
firm both enters into a price conspiracy and has had low margins for a long time. In other 
                                                 
477 Loosely based in the Microsoft-cases in EU; see, for instance, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission Case T-
201/04, CFI [2007] 
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words, the hypothesis that the competitors A and B entered into a conspiracy might be more 
probable given the evidence that they had low margin for a long time. The long time with low 
margins is, however, not evidence here, but an assumption as a part of a hypothesis.    
The conjunction fallacy is probably well known among professional antitrust decision 
makers trained in assessing complex evidence. It is doubtful that there is a very large risk that 
professional decision makers will confuse assumptions that provide a better explanation of 
evidence with evidence. If some assumption is made to make a better explanation, some 
evidence for this assumption will normally be required. If, for instance, low margins are used 
as an argument for the presence of a price conspiracy, both evidence of such low margins and 
a theory as to why those low margins provided incentives to enter into price conspiracy will 
normally be required. Thus, both the evidence and some explanation of the probative force of 
the evidence will normally be required. However, sometimes it is not easy to keep track of 
assumptions, and even professionals are likely to be confused. If economic models are used to 
support inferences it might be difficult for a decision maker to assess all the explicit and 
implicit assumptions that make one model appear more explanatory than another economic 
model. One model might easily seem to give more explanation of the evidence because of 
more assumptions. The rationality in model-based inferences is returned to in Chapter Six.   
The conjunction fallacy is more likely to occur in the use of jury trials with jurors not 
experienced or trained by regularly assessing legal evidence. The conjunction fallacy involves 
subtle issues that may not be understood even if pointed at by the lawyers. In particular, there 
is a risk of conjunction fallacy when narratives are used as a rhetorical instrument. Narratives 
may be filled with unproven conjunctions to make one story appear more convincing than 
another story. The use of narratives is returned to below.   
Confirmation bias 
Confirmation bias means that people tend to interpret evidence in a way most consistent with 
their priors.478 Another way to say this is that people tend to assess evidence in a way that 
confirm their established beliefs or hypotheses.  
 The confirmation bias has, in particular, been addressed as a problem in the 
inquisitorial procedure. Confirmation bias is an element of the so-called prosecutorial bias, 
which refers to the situation when prosecutors are biased in the decision making in favor of 
finding violation. Several studies have addressed the presence of prosecutorial biases in 
                                                 
478 See Posner (2011) p. 824.  
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antitrust decision making. Even if the process in the FTC follows an adversarial procedure, 
the commissioners in the FTC make the final administrative decisions.479 This was described 
in Chapter Two. A commissioner may have been involved in the earlier stages of the decision 
making. Coate and Klein (1998) revealed that commissioners that had been involved in the 
decisions making at an earlier stage were more prone to vote for violation than those who had 
not been involved. Wils (2004) uses statistics on court reversal rates, theory, and case studies 
to enlighten the presence of prosecutorial bias in the enforcement of the European 
Commission. Venit (2011) uses case studies as evidence for prosecutorial bias in the 
enforcement of the European Commission. Although the last two studies have anecdotal 
elements,480 they are quite informative and convincing. One case that is alleged to reveal the 
prosecutorial bias of the European Commission is the Airtours481 case. In this case, the court 
found that the Commission had committed several errors in the evidence assessment, and 
some of these were related to not carefully assessing the evidence and arguments provided by 
the parties.  The Commission has made some reforms to address inter alia the risk of 
prosecutorial biases.482  A separate hearing officer ensures that the hearings in the case are 
performed satisfactory, and a chief economist outside the administrative hierarchy of the 
specific case gives advice to the decision makers. Furthermore, the Commission has 
developed best practices to secure the involvement of the parties in the process. It has also 
established systems of peer review to secure that all cases are scrutinized with the fresh eyes 
of new case handlers in the procedure. These reforms are likely to have mitigated the impact 
of prosecutorial biases in the EU competition enforcement.   
As a counter-effect to the confirmation bias towards violations, an experimental study 
performed by Lyons et al. (forthcoming), is informing. In this study Lyons et al. tested the 
actual assessment of evidence in merger control on experimental groups, including one group 
consisting of antitrust officials. The authors found a null-hypothesis bias in the terms that the 
test-subject seemed to show a tendency to be reluctant to deviate from the null-hypothesis of 
no harmful effects. This study is not very informative when it comes to confirmation bias in 
favor of violation. It addresses an initial assessment of evidence, and not how the test subjects 
                                                 
479 The decision of the Commission is subject to judicial review.  
480 As also pointed out by Wils (2004), single cases cannot be used to infer systemic effects.  
481 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities Case T-342/99 [2002]. Venit (2011) also points out 
Italian Flat Glass (SIV v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/82 and T-78/89, [1992]) and Tetra Laval 
(Tetra Laval BV v Commission of the European Communities T-5/02 (CFI) [2002], C-12/03 (ECJ) [2005]) as 
decisions revealing that the European Commission was subject to a prosecutorial bias.   
482 See Wils (2004), OECD (2010), Geradin and Petit (2010), and Venit (2011).  
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would assess new evidence after a first assessment in favor of violation.483 Still, if it is so that 
antitrust decision makers are biased towards non-intervention in the first place, this could 
mitigate some of the problem with the confirmation bias in favor of violation. The reason is 
that it is a barrier for decision makers to come to such a confirmation bias situation in the first 
place.     
Another dimension of confirmation biases that also applies to adversarial judges is the 
impact of priors due to the decision makers’ experiences with similar cases.484 This is an 
isolated argument for jury trials since jurors are less subject to such priors. 
It follows that the confirmation bias is likely to affect antitrust decisions. Empirical 
evidence and theoretical research seems to indicate that the confirmation bias constitutes a 
systematic bias towards finding violations in inquisitorial systems.   
Hindsight bias 
The hindsight bias is to ex post exaggerate the ex ante probability of some event.485 Simply 
said, hindsight bias is to overestimate the probability of the event that actually occurred. The 
hindsight bias is also relevant for legal assessment of evidence. It might especially affect the 
ex-post assessment of the appropriate ex-ante assessment of the probabilities of the alternative 
outcomes of some conduct. Given the knowledge of the actual outcome resulting from some 
conduct, the probability of this outcome is assigned a higher probability than if the person 
didn’t know the outcome, even if he is told to ignore the knowledge of the actual outcome. 
This is particular relevant in the assessment of negligence when negligence is a requirement 
for liability.  
In empirical studies,486 test groups have been asked to assess what outcome is most 
likely given some evidence. In one group, the members have not been told the actual 
outcome, in the other group the members are told the outcome, but asked to only assess the 
probabilities in light of the evidence, disregarding the knowledge of the actual outcome. 
Members of the last group will systematically be biased towards assessing the actual outcome 
as more probable than the first group. It is rational to use knowledge of the actual outcome as 
evidence for the probability of the actual outcome, but the test group was supposed to ignore 
that information.  
                                                 
483 This could however be a very interesting extension of the study by Lyons et al. (forthcoming).  
484 Posner (2011) p. 824.  
485 See for instance Posner (2011) p. 23. 
486 See Farnsworth (2007), Chapter 23, for examples and references to various studies.  
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When the alleged negligence of some person is assessed, the question is whether the 
person could, to a reasonable degree, have foreseen the outcome of the alleged negligent 
conduct before the outcome materialized. The decision makers, however, know the actual 
outcome. The decision maker will then, according to the hindsight bias, systematically 
overestimate the person’s ability to foresee the outcome, and might then too easily find 
negligence. When antitrust fines are imposed, intent or negligence is a condition for the 
liability for fines. The negligence standard is related to the ability to foresee the potential 
anticompetitive effects of some conduct. If the one who assess the evidence have observed 
actual anticompetitive effects, this might make him overestimate the possibility of the person 
charged to foresee those anticompetitive effects.  
     Wils (2004) points at a rather subtle effect of the hindsight bias in antitrust evidence 
assessment, which makes the hindsight bias to be an element of the prosecutorial bias. Since 
the hindsight bias makes a person overestimate the ability to predict an outcome, it will cause 
discomfort to observe an outcome that one didn’t predict. Thus, one will avoid this discomfort 
by avoiding observing evidence for such an outcome. Wils (2004) applies this to merger 
control as an example. If a person who decides that a merger should be subject to further 
scrutiny, in a so-called phase II investigation, discovers evidence that the merger is not 
harmful to competition, this will cause discomfort because the decision maker will 
overestimate his ability to be able to have seen that the merger was not harmful in the first 
place. Thus, the decision maker will get insecure in his own judgment abilities and tend to 
avoid such evidence, which then will lead to a biased evidence assessment towards violation. 
It might be questioned whether this subtle effect is best categorized as hindsight bias or just a 
part of the confirmation bias. It is, however, an element that explains and strengthens the 
prosecutorial bias. Thus, this is an additional factor that contributes to a systematic effect of 
finding violation in inquisitorial systems.      
On the question on how to avoid the hindsight bias, Farnsworth (2007)487 suggests that 
the one who assesses the evidence should be requested to estimate the probabilities of the 
other possible outcomes of the conduct in question. If person are asked to give an ex post 
assessment of the probability of all possible outcomes and not just the actual outcome, this 
will reduce the impact of the hindsight bias.  
                                                 
487 See Farnsworth (2007), Chapter 23. 
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The impact of anchoring is probably known to all tort law lawyers. Anchoring can bias the 
assessment of evidence towards some reference point, even when the reference point is 
without merits.488 If a person is asked to assess some evidence given some reference without 
any probative force as such, the reference might still affect the assessment. This is best 
illustrated with tort litigation. In experiments, mock jurors have been given some evidence to 
assess damages based on this evidence. In addition, they have been told the claimed damages 
from the plaintiff. The jurors systematically awarded higher damages the higher the claim 
from the plaintiff, even the evidence was equal.489  
Anchoring might also be of relevance in the assessment of evidence in antitrust cases. 
In antitrust damages, anchoring is relevant as just described. Anchoring may, however, be of 
relevance in other aspects of antitrust cases. The parties in the case will benefit from boosting 
economic calculations that support their claims. The plaintiff may have an interest in boosting 
the overcharge resulting from the violation. The defendants may have an interest in boosting 
the size of the efficiencies resulting from an alleged violation to establish an anchor.  
It is difficult to avoid claims serving as anchors in legal cases. Presenting claims is an 
inevitable part of the nature of legal disputes. It is, however, possible to design mechanism to 
limit the benefit of attempting to exploit anchoring. In civil procedure, the incentives to 
exploit anchoring might be chilled by a liability to cover the opposite parties legal expenses if 
one is awarded lower damages than claimed initially. This means a liability to compensate the 
opposite party’s litigation cost even if one, isolated, wins the case, but on less favorable terms 
than claimed. This will reduce the incentives to boost the claim to exploit the anchoring bias. 
This is partially implemented in the procedural rules both in the US490 and EU491.  
  The bias from anchoring is likely to be well known by professional legal decision 
makers. Thus, the risk of bias from anchoring is likely to be higher in jury trials.                  
Self-serving bias  
Another bias that might affect the evidence assessment is the so-called self-serving bias.492 If 
the result of an assessment of evidence for some reason feels better for the one who assess 
evidence than alternative more likely assessment, from an objective point of view, the one 
                                                 
488 See, for instance, Farnsworth (2007) p. 230 f. 
489 Farnsworth (2007) p. 230 f. 
490 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. 
491 A looser may be imposed to pay the legal cost of the winner. The winner has not fully won if he receives less 
than he claims. The legal costs reimbursed may be reduced accordingly.        
492 See Farnsworth (2007) Chapter 26. 
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who assess evidence might still find the first one more likely. Some direct interest in the 
outcome of the evidence assessment might, of course, affect the evidence assessment argued 
for, independently on what the one who argue really believes is the correct assessment. This is 
an incentive bias and not a cognitive bias, and is not what is meant by a self-serving bias. A 
real self-serving bias affects the actual assessment as such. In tort cases, the injured is likely 
to consider the economic harm suffered as higher than injurer’s assessment of the same harm. 
An antitrust competitor plaintiff in a monopolization case may consider his actual harm to 
business as higher than the plaintiff does.     
Some interest in the outcome of the assessment is not necessary for the presence of a 
self-serving bias. It might just be that one likes an assessment of evidence better than another 
one. One would simply feel more comfortable if one assessment of evidence was truth rather 
than an alternative. In the philosophy literature, the loveliest explanations, which are the 
explanations one like most, of some evidence are distinguished from the most likely 
explanations of some evidence.493 The loveliest explanation does not need to be the most 
likely. Still, the loveliest is the one that is believed. This can, for instance, explain why many 
believe in conspiracy theories even though they fail Occam’s razor494 by not being the 
explanation with fewest assumptions consistent with the evidence. Complicated conspiracy 
theories involving a conspiracy of some powerful evil minds might give a “lovely” 
justification for the perceived problems in the world. This might seem lovelier as a scapegoat 
is identified.                   
Distinguishing the loveliest and the most likely explanation might also have relevance 
in antitrust evidence assessment. However, it is not obvious that this has some systematic 
effect in either finding violation or not violation. This can be illustrated with some 
hypothetical examples. Many people will probably find an explanation from a company 
alleged for violating antitrust law that their conduct was necessary to meet competition from 
ruthless foreign competitors in securing national employment more lovely than the 
explanation that the company ruthlessly wanted to eliminate competition detrimental to the 
consumers. The threat from unemployment and ruthless foreign companies is something that 
creates fear in many people who would like to think that something is done against it. 
Furthermore, it is lovelier to think that respectable companies, where many of us have friends 
and family working, are not engaged in some illegal harmful conduct. In this situation, the 
self-serving bias favors not violation. A bias towards the loveliest explanation might also 
                                                 
493 See Lipton (2004) p. 142 f. 
494 Occam’s razor and the principle of parsimony will be returned to in Chapter Six.  
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favor violation. Many might feel some loveliness and comfort in thinking that successful 
businessmen have achieved their fortune as a result of unlawful, anticompetitive behavior. 
This provides some justification for not being as successful in business oneself. Thus, it is 
difficult to make some conclusions on the systematic impact of the self-serving bias on 
antitrust evidence assessment.  
Summary of the impact of cognitive biases   
In this subchapter some of the cognitive biases most relevant for antitrust evidence 
assessment and how these biases are relevant and likely to affect antitrust decisions were 
discussed. For some biases, there is general empirical support, while for some it is empirical 
support for their presence in a legal setting. Some biases are even studied in the specific 
antitrust context.  
It was found that there is a risk that biases from the base rate fallacy, the conjunction 
fallacy, anchoring, and the self-serving bias may influence antitrust decisions. However, it 
cannot be concluded that these biases are likely to systematically bias antitrust decision in the 
direction of finding either violation or not violation. It is likely that the risk of influence of 
these biases is higher in jury trials that when professional decision makers assess evidence. 
Thus, they are likely to be more relevant in the US where jury trials are more common in the 
decision procedure, compared to EU competition procedure that does not use jurors.  
 However, the confirmation bias and to some, but lesser, extent, the hindsight bias, 
seem to impose a systematically bias towards violation in inquisitorial systems, like in the EU 
competition procedure. The confirmation bias may also affect adversarial judges, as they tend 
to confirm their priors due to experiences with similar cases. The confirmation bias is not 
likely to systematically bias adversarial judges towards either violation or not violation, 
though. This is probably a bias that has less impact in jury trials than in adversarial processes 
with professional decision makers, as jurors lack the experiences necessary to establish 
confirmation biases.   
5.3.5 Analogical reasoning  
Analogical reasoning is an imperative instrument of practical abductive reasoning, both in 
everyday life and in the assessment of legal evidence. The idea is that similar cases should be 
assessed and decided similarly. The use of analogies in evidence assessment and decision 
making can be a meritorious method of inference when there are sufficiently comparable 
cases to base the analogies on. Previous assessments can be considered as accumulated capital 
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that can save the duplication of assessment costs. Lipton (2004)495 stresses the importance of 
contrastive inference in the inference to the best explanation in the presence of complex 
evidence. For contrastive inferences, analogies serve as bases for the contrasts. Gilboa (2009) 
discusses the performance of case-based reasoning as a tool for practical decision making, 
where analogies have an important role.496 Methods in artificial intelligence used to aid 
decision making, such as neural networks497 and “nearest-neighbor” classification,498 are 
based on analogies from other cases. Even statistical inference can be seen as using the 
principle of analogy since the situations that are used as a basis for statistical induction are 
often not identical to the situation we want to predict. Here we will, however, think about 
analogical reasoning as a more intuitive heuristic instrument where some similar case is used 
as a benchmark for how evidence should be assessed. 
Appeal to analogies is one of the most common methods of legal argumentation.499 
Analogical reasoning is imperative in the interpretation and determination of rules. Analogies 
based on legal precedents, especially Supreme Court decisions, and to a lesser extent other 
court decisions, are important sources for interpreting the law. This was described in Chapter 
Four. Lawyers are central players in the legal assessment of evidence, both as representatives 
for the parties and as decision makers. Thus, it is natural that lawyers bring with them their 
particular tradition of analogical reasoning into the assessment of legal evidence. Precedents 
are the law applied to the facts in a former case. In the same way that precedents are used to 
argue for a particular interpretation of law, the precedents also include information concerning 
how evidence was assessed in previous cases. Analogy is the main principle to link the facts 
of a precedent to the present case, and this can be used both to argue for what the law is and 
how evidence should be assessed.  
One does not need to read many antitrust decisions to see that the principle of analogy 
is used regularly as a source in the assessment of antitrust evidence. If one, for instance, read 
the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic,500 one will find references to how the 
evidence was assessed in Matsusihita,501 in particular, when it comes to the inferences made 
                                                 
495 See Lipton (2004) p. 71 f. 
496 See Gilboa (2009) p. 171 f.    
497 Witten and Frank (2005) p. 214 f.  
498 Witten and Frank (2005) p. 235 f..  
499 Walton (2002), Chapter 2.  
500 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
501 Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
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from parallel behavior.  A European example is Wood Pulp,502 where the court similarly 
referred to the former decision, Suiker Unie,503 in drawing inferences from parallel conduct.       
Although the use of analogy is usually a useful instrument for practical reasoning, 
there are some extra “dangers” to take into account when analogy is used to argue for a 
particular assessment of evidence. Thus, the focus here will be on some imperfections 
associated with the use of analogical reasoning that can bias antitrust evidence assessment.  
As a main rule, the facts of the present case are not identical with the facts in the 
precedents. Similarities lay the grounds for the use of analogy. The analogy argument is that 
approximately equal evidence should be assessed similarly. A “brother” of the analogical 
reasoning is antithetical reasoning. The antithesis argument would be that if there are some 
differences in evidence, the evidence should be assessed differently. This will also be 
considered as a part of analogical reasoning.  
The analogy or antithesis approach to the assessment of evidence may, if wrongly 
used, result in substantial deviations from a rational assessment of evidence.504 This can be 
illustrated by an example. Assume that in one former case where an illegal price conspiracy 
was found, there was evidence of identical pricing, substantial cost differences, and secret 
communication of prices. In the present case, there is evidence of identical prices, substantial 
cost differences, and prices are published on a public website. Based on analogy, the evidence 
here might be considered similar to the first case. In both cases, there are identical prices and 
substantial differences in cost. What distinguishes the cases is the third evidence. In the first 
case, this is secret communication of prices, but in the present case the prices are 
communicated on a public website. Argumentation based on analogy would be that the 
evidence in the present case is so similar that illegal price conspiracy must be concluded. 
Argumentation based on antithesis would be that secret communication of prices and public 
communication on a web site are so different that there is no price conspiracy in this case. The 
                                                 
502 A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission of the European Communities Joined cases C-89/85, C-
104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 [1993]. 
503 Sucres and denrées v Commission Joined Cases C-40/73, C-41/73, C-42/73, C-43/73, C-44/73, C-45/73, C-
46/73, C-47/73, C-48/73, C-50/73, C-54/73, C-55/73, C-56/73, C-111/73, C-113/73, C-114/73 [1975].  
504 There is a big difference in using an analogy in the determination of law and an analogy in the assessment of 
evidence. When analogy and antithesis are used in the interpretation of law, the purpose of the law will support 
the goodness of either the analogy or the antithesis argument. This was described in Chapter Four, where an 
analogy may serve as an idea of how to determine the law, but subject to a check against the purpose of the law. 
If, for instance, the law says that it is illegal for competitors to agree upon price, an analogy argument would be 
that it would be illegal for anyone to agree upon price. The antithesis argument would be that it is legal for non-
competitors to agree upon price. The antithesis seems more valid in this case since the purpose of the rule is to 
prevent the restriction on competition, not any agreement on price. When analogical reasoning is used in 
evidence assessment, we do not have any such purpose to assess the validity of the analogy. 
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question will then be if the evidence is so similar or so dissimilar that either a price 
conspiracy can be concluded or not concluded. To answer this question correctly, we must 
turn to the question of what we are really going to prove: a price conspiracy. Is a price 
conspiracy more consistent with the evidence in the former case than in the latter? However, 
if we are going to do this direct assessment, then what is the point of using the analogy in the 
first place? Why not assess directly whether the total evidence supports a hypothesis of price 
conspiracy?  
To just compare “similar evidence” or “dissimilar evidence” independently of what is 
actually going to be proven and separately from the total evidence is not likely to yield a 
rational evidence assessment. The evidence assessments in former cases were based on what 
evidence that was present in these cases. There will be no counterfactual assessment of what 
the result of the evidence assessment would have been in that case, had the evidence been 
different. However, when argumentation from analogy or antithesis is based on a former case 
where the fact is different, this is a de facto a counterfactual assessment of the previous case. 
In the case of analogy, the assessment of evidence in the former case is assumed to have been 
the same if the present evidence was the evidence in the previous case. In case of antithesis, 
the assessment of evidence is assumed to have been different if the present evidence was the 
evidence in the previous case. The use of analogy and antithesis is illustrated in Figure 5.2.                              
 

















In Figure 5.2, the left circle is the facts in the case that is under scrutiny. The right circle is the 
facts in the previous cases. A is the evidence that are unique in the present case compared to 
the precedence cases. C is the evidence that was present in previous cases that are not present 
Evidence in cases from 
precedence cases 
Evidence in 
present case  
A B C 
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in the present case. B is the evidence that is common in the present case and the previous 
cases. Thus, B is the evidence that forms the basis for an analogy assessment of evidence. The 
danger with this analogy assessment is that the difference given by A and C might make a 
different assessment of evidence rational. The differences given by A and C form the basis for 
an antithesis argument. Since A and C are different in the two cases, the cases should be 
assessed differently, according to the antithesis argument. This antithesis would, however, be 
wrong if it is the similarities given by B that are determining for the assessment of evidence. 
The grounds in the previous cases would normally not say anything as to what the assessment 
of evidence would have been if A had been present. The only way to find out is to assess what 
impact A has on the evidence assessment. However, if a correct assessment of evidence is the 
standard for determining whether an analogy or antithesis is correct, then what is the point of 
using the analogy or antithesis?   
As said above, analogy and antithesis can be informative for contrastive reasoning in 
saving the cost of a new full-fledged assessment. This will work best the more the cases have 
in common and the more certain we are as to what facts are determining for the assessment. 
This means that analogies and antitheses are most successfully applied where it is an 
established practice that has been subject to scrutiny many times. Thus, with the danger of 
stating the obvious, analogies and antithesis are informative where there are substantial 
similarities. A risk is, however, path-dependence if the established practice in reality 
originates from one decision. Thus, the established practice should be based on independent 
assessments that have yielded the same result.    
The parties and their lawyers are likely to search for argument by using creative 
analogies if there are no better analogies to base the argument on.505 The decision maker’s job 
should then be to not accept this argument and to stop a costly assessment of similarities and 
differences when a direct assessment of the evidence in question will result in a cheaper, 
better, assessment than one based on such use of analogy. An example that may be illustrative 
is Coca Cola v. Commission,506 where one question was whether the European Commission 
should apply a market definition, and finding of dominant position from a previous case. Coca 
Cola was arguing that the Commission should do so. The court stated that  
 
                                                 
505 Searching for a similar case, whether it is for determining the law or for assessing the evidence, is normally 
the first lawyers do when faced with a case. Where similar cases are not found, more creative analogies must be 
applied to have a case as a benchmark.  
506 The Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. v Commission of the European Communities 
Joined cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 [2000]. 
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[m]oreover, in the course of any decision applying Article [102] of the Treaty, the 
Commission must define the relevant market again and make a fresh analysis of the 
conditions of competition which will not necessarily be based on the same 
considerations as those underlying the previous finding of a dominant position.507  
 
Thus, the court stated that market definition and assessment of dominance are questions of 
facts to be assessed afresh in each case. The Commission does not have to assess these facts 
with a previous assessment of facts as a benchmark. 
The use of analogy to assess the facts is likely to work better to illuminate the facts in 
an adversarial process rather than an inquisitorial process. The reason is that in an adversarial 
process it is more likely that a meritless analogy presented by one of the parties will be 
refuted by the other party. In an inquisitorial process, the confirmation bias is likely to prevent 
the inquisitor from seeing the weak sides of an analogy. Thus, as far as analogy is an 
important practical method of evidence assessment, the adversarial process is likely superior 
in extracting a rational evidence assessment through the use of analogies. However, in jury 
trials where complex economic matters are to be assessed, such as in antitrust, it might be 
very difficult to see which analogies perform poorly and which perform better, especially 
when there are subtle differences that are likely to affect the outcome. This will mitigate some 
of the superiority of the adversarial process in the assessment of analogies.   
5.3.6 Appeal to expert knowledge      
The use of expert knowledge in antitrust 
The use of expert knowledge is imperative in practical abductive reasoning.508 This is simply 
a special case of utilizing the knowledge of one who is in a better position to know than the 
decision maker.509 The appeal to use the knowledge of someone who is in a better position to 
know is one of the most usual methods of legal argumentation.510 The starting point is that 
utilizing expert knowledge is an instrument to make decisions that are more accurate. 
However, in this subchapter it will be presented some arguments for how the use of experts 
also may bias antitrust decisions. 
                                                 
507 The Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. v Commission of the European Communities 
Joined cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 [2000] paras. 81 and 82. 
508 See Walton (2002) p. 239.   
509 There is an epistemological asymmetry, see Lianos (2010).   
510 See Walton (2002) chapter 2.  
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In antitrust analysis, the relevant expert knowledge is, in particular, industry expert 
knowledge and economic expert knowledge.511 Economic expert knowledge has always been 
important in US antitrust and has become increasingly important in EU competition law.512  
Economic expert knowledge can enter its way to antitrust decisions in various ways.513 
First, the decision makers may refer to expert knowledge to support their differences. This 
might include reference to economic theories with or without reference to relevant journal 
articles. A US example is Bell Atlantic,514 where the Supreme Court stated that  
 
[t]he inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, 
mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in 
line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally 
prompted by common perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact 
from Fantasy, Related Publication 06–08, pp. 3–4 (2006) (discussing problem of “false 
positives” in §1 suits).515  
 
Here the court refers to economic research to support their argument. Moving to the EU an 
illustrative decision is the decision of the European Commission in Microsoft,516 where the 
Commission, inter alia, makes references to contemporary research on network effects. This 
theory is discussed in the court decision.517  
 However, the decision makers not only refer to the theory. Antitrust cases also 
regularly involve economic experts in the decision-making process. In the adversarial 
procedure in the US, each party usually provides economists as expert witnesses.518 Court 
appointed experts are also possible.519 The use of court appointed experts in US has 
traditionally rarely been used in practice in antitrust cases, but its use has increased over the 
last decades.520 In the enforcement by the European Commission, both internal economic 
experts employed by the Commission and external economists assisting the Commission or 
the parties are involved in the decision making process. The Commission’s chief economist 
                                                 
511 Schinkel (2008).  
512 Neven (2006).  
513 See Lianos (2010).  
514 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
515 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007) at 254. 
516 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft [2004]. 
517 Microsoft Corp v. Commission, Case T-201/04, CFI, 2007. However, the court did not cite academic 
authorities explicitly. This is not usual for the EU courts. See Lianos (2010). 
518 Economists have naturally been involved earlier in the case. Both US DOJ and FTC employ economists, 
many at PhD level. In addition to this, they may have hired external experts.  
519 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 706.  
520 See Lipsky (2003). 
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team employs PhD-economists, making the internal expertise in the European Commission 
strong. If the decision of the European Commission reaches the courts, the parties are assisted 
by economists at each side as advisors to the parties. The court may also appoint experts to 
aid them in the decision-making.521   
 The focus of this subchapter will be to discuss the experts’ power in determining the 
facts in antitrust cases and whether this eventual power of determining the fact is likely to bias 
the evidence assessment. Rationality in the assessment of economic models in antitrust 
analysis is discussed separately in Chapter Six. Thus, the topics of this subchapter will be 
explored further in Chapter Six.        
The experts’ power of the facts  
The experts’ power of the facts in antitrust evidence assessment has a formal side and a 
practical side. The formal side is whether the decision makers formally have to consider 
expert statements as established facts.  The practical question is whether the experts de facto, 
have some power in determining the facts.  
 The experts’ formal power to determine the fact in the US is limited. It is no general 
rule that says that the decision makers have to consider some expert statements as the 
established fact. It is the decision makers in the adversarial process that perform the 
assessment of evidence after hearing the experts. There are, however, a few limits. If a case is 
decided by the FTC and appealed to the courts, the FTC’s finding of fact is reviewed under 
the substantial evidence standard.522 Under this standard, the FTC’s finding of facts will be 
upheld if it is supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”523 Thus, the courts will review if the FTC has made 
reasonable inferences based on the evidence. This leaves some discretion for the assessments 
of the FTC as an expert organ outside judicial review. In the EU, the formal powers of the 
experts are more extensive. The European Commission is an expert organ subject to limited 
review when it comes to complex economic evidence. This was described in more detail in 
Chapter Two. This means that the decision makers in the European Commission have some 
monopoly power as an expert organ in determining the facts.   
                                                 
521 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19 June 1991 (OJ L 176 of 
4.7.1991, p. 7, and OJ L 383 of 29.12.1992 (corrigenda)), Article 47, and Rules of Procedure of the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities of 2 May 1991 (OJ L 136 of 30.5.1991, p. 1, and OJ L 317 of 
19.11.1991, p. 34 (corrigenda)), Article 70. See Lianos (2010) for a discussion.  
522 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997). Vacated on other grounds in 526 U.S. 756 
(1999). 
523 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) at 725.  
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 The de facto power of experts has probably more impact than the formal power. In the 
US, the experts may, on the contrary to lay witnesses, present inferences from evidence 
(opinions).524 Thus, experts have a “monopoly” privilege in drawing inferences from 
evidence. However, this power to state inferences based on expert knowledge is under strict 
control by the Daubert standard established in Daubert.525 In Kumho526 it was established that 
Daubert also applies to testimony based on “technical” and “other specialized' knowledge”. 
The court stated in Daubert that, before an expert testimony is accepted as admissible, the 
court must make  
 
a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly 
can be applied to the facts in issue.527   
 
For acceptance, the  
 
overarching subject is the scientific validity--and thus the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability--of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, 
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate.528  
 
The court refused to give any definitive checklist or test to accept an expert opinion but 
provided some general factors for the court to consider. These are 
 
1. “whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact 
will be whether it can be(and has been) tested”. In this context, the court referred to 
the philosophy of science literature stating that “[s]cientific methodology today is 
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified”; 
2. “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”;    
3. “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider 
the known or potential rate of error”; 
4. finally, the court stated that “"general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the 
inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit 
                                                 
524 Federal Rules of Evidence rules 701 and 702.  
525 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
526 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae 526 U.S. 137. 
527 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
528 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a 
particular degree of acceptance within that community."[…].” 
 
Thus, the court requires relevance and reliability for expert evidence to be accepted as valid. 
Important factors in this context are the testability of the theory or technique, peer review and 
publication of the theory or technique, the potential rate of error if a particular technique is 
used, and the general acceptance of the theory or technique. Daubert refers to the science 
concept established by the philosopher of science Karl Popper.529 Popper stressed the 
possibility of falsification as imperative in determining whether something qualifies as 
science. The Daubert standard is now partially implemented in Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 702.  
Thus, the Daubert standard provides some restriction on the de facto power of experts 
to determine the facts.530 They must be experts of “real” science and not junk science. A 
justification is that it prevents decision makers, in particular, laymen jurors, being confused 
and giving weight to meritless expert testimony. Another justification for this screening is 
cost considerations, as it saves the costs associated with presenting meritless expert testimony. 
However, as the process surrounding a Daubert decision in many cases becomes quite 
extensive, it can be questioned how big these cost savings really are.531   
 The admissibility of expert evidence is not so strictly regulated in the enforcement by 
the European Commission and the associated judicial review as in the US. One explanation 
for this is that the professional decision makers in the EU Commission and the EU courts are 
better suited to distinguish junk science from science compared to the laymen jurors used in 
US jury trials. When it comes to the European Courts the use of court appointed experts 
makes the need for a special formal screening like the Daubert standard less relevant, as the 
court have control over the qualifications of the experts appointed. Still, there are steps taken 
to secure the scientific level in the use of economic expert evidence in the EU. As mentioned 
above, the Commission employs academic-level economists in the chief economist team. 
Furthermore, the Commission has produced best practices on the submission of economic 
evidence.532 These best practices are supposed to facilitate good methodology in the use of 
economics in evidence assessment. Furthermore, the courts seem to have been well suited, at 
                                                 
529 Popper (1959). 
530 The Daubert screening of testimony based on economic models will be discussed further in Chapter Six.  
531 See Werden (2008).  
532 DG Competition, Best Practices For The Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases 
Concerning the Application of Articles 101 And 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases, Staff Working Paper. 
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least in some cases, to challenge the European Commission if the Commission has not based 
its analysis on sound economic methodology. An example of that is the above-mentioned 
Airtours533 decision.534     
Despite strict requirements validity, there is still room for experts to exercise de facto 
power in determining the facts. Though the standards prevent experts going outside the 
borders of established science, there is still room for discretion by the experts on what models 
to use and which methods to rely on. The question is, then, if the procedural principles are 
arranged in a way that they prevent experts from exercising this power in conflict with 
rational evidence assessment.  
Possible biases in the appeal to expert knowledge  
As just described, experts shave some discretion within the Daubert standard. They can use 
discretion on what models to use and what methods to rely on. In this section some factors 
that may bias inferences based on expert knowledge in antitrust evidence assessment are 
presented. How this more precisely can be implemented will be discussed further in Chapter 
Six.535 
  The first apparent bias in the utilization of experts in antitrust evidence assessment is 
the selection problem (adverse selection). The parties in an antitrust case do not randomly 
select the experts to support them. Experts themselves are not free from personal points of 
view. Some are likely to be pro-plaintiff, and some are likely to be pro-defendant.536 A party 
would like to have an expert who speaks for his case. Thus, in an adversarial process, experts 
that are systematically pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff as a matter of professional opinion are 
likely to be involved. It is also likely to be a selection bias regarding experts who are hired on 
a regular basis in inquisitorial enforcement authorities, such as those who are hired in the 
chief economist team in the European Commission. Some economists are typically pro-
interventionist, while others are more skeptical to antitrust interventions. The European 
Commission is not likely to hire someone who is very non-interventionist. Such persons are 
not likely to have a strong desire to work there, either.   
 Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that the experts get paid by the parties they witness 
for. Ethical standards will prevent too strong economic incentives in the outcome of the 
                                                 
533 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities Case T-342/99 [2002].  
534 See Geradin and Petit (2010). The courts seem to have been keener to review the economic methodology 
applied by the commission in cooperation and merger cases, but not in abuse of dominance cases.  
535 See also Lianos (2010).  
536 See Posner (1999) and Schinkel (2008). 
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case.537 Still, it would not be good for the expert’s career to witness against his own client. 
Thus, experts might be argued to be “hired guns”, arguing for their client’s case regardless of 
professional opinion. A counterargument to this argument is that experts are repeat players.538 
This mitigates the biases from a desire to satisfy clients. If an expert becomes known to argue 
for anything at the cost of professionalism, this will reduce the credibility of the expert, which 
would reduce the demand for the expert and reduce the price that can be charged by the 
expert. Experts will regularly be met with previous statements and previous academic 
research. If their statement is inconsistent with such previous material, this will reduce their 
credibility. This reduces the potential for experts to credibly argue for anything at any time. 
Furthermore, lack of professionalism in an expert witness may also be destructive for the 
expert’s academic career.539  
In an adversarial procedure, the biases from the selection effects and the possible 
incentives to satisfy clients may be balanced by having biased experts on each side. Thus, if 
the decision maker hears the opinion of two biased experts on each side, this might be a 
substitute of a balanced opinion.540 It is probably not so easy, though. As will be argued 
further in Chapter Six, two biased opinions on each side will not necessarily qualify as one 
unbiased expert advice, because the sum of two biased analyses provide less information than 
the information of a neutral analysis. Furthermore, relying on competing experts on each side 
may lay the ground for rent-seeking biases. Hiring experts is costly and may favor the party 
with the deepest pockets. Due to the various failures associated with biases of experts in the 
adversarial procedure, Posner has suggested more use of court appointed experts.541 Using 
court appointed experts does not eliminate biases, as court appointed experts may still be 
subject to professional biases and confirmation biases. However, the selection bias will at 
least be mitigated. The use of neutral experts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.  
When it comes to an inquisitorial process, as in the EU, where the experts are hired by 
the inquisitor, the potential for a balance resulting from biased experts representing both sides 
is more limited. However, the above mentioned procedural reforms in the EU and the best 
practices on the submission of economic evidence are meant to create more balance between 
the European Commission and the experts representing the parties in a decision. However, 
                                                 
537 See Posner (1999) and Schinkel (2008). 
538 Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 837.  
539 Schinkel (2008).  
540 See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996). These will we explored further in the economic modeling of evidence 
assessment below. 
541 See Posner (1999, 1999b).  
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experts employed on regular terms by inquisitorial authorities, such as the European 
Commission, may be subject to confirmation biases, just as other employees. This may not 
make the particular suitable to neutrally assess the arguments that appear during the 
contradiction. This issue will be explored further in Chapter Six.  
 Another issue that has been pointed out in the literature, in particular when expert 
evidence is presented to a laymen jury, is that the rhetorical skills of an expert, rather than the 
scientific merits of the opinion, may be more determining for the weight given to the expert 
opinion.542 Thus, the experts who influence the decision makers most are not the ones 
presenting arguments with most merits, but the best rhetoricians. This is an argument for 
reconsidering the use of jury trials in antitrust cases that regularly involve expert opinions on 
complex economic evidence.543 A problem with this is that replacing the juries with too 
professional decision makers is that then the decision makers will be experts themselves, who 
may be vulnerable to professional biases. An intermediate solution would be to use normal 
judges as evidence decision makers, not experts in antitrust economics, but experts in 
revealing, filtering, and balancing biases. Various instruments to reduce the impact of biased 
experts will be discussed further in Chapter Six.      
A last point to make, though a full discussion is beyond the scope for this study, is 
possible biases associated with using the principles in Popper (1959) as a standard for what 
science is considered admissible as legal evidence. It will bias the experts’ opinions to the 
established paradigm of the science in question and towards theories that use quantifiable 
measures that can be tested empirically.544 It can be argued that the courts are not the place to 
develop science, though. This issue in the context of economic science is revisited in Chapter 
Six.    
Most of the possible biases discussed above are not systematic and will not necessarily 
favor either a finding of violation or not violation. They will just reduce some of the improved 
accuracy the use of experts is supposed to give. There are a few exceptions. It seems like 
expert biases due to selection biases and confirmation biases may systematically favor finding 
violation in inquisitorial expert organs like the European Commission. On the contrary, in the 
adversarial system, rent-seeking biases might be exaggerated by the possibilities of the parties 
                                                 
542 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 80 and Posner (1999).  
543 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 80 f. Posner (1999) is more positive to the use of juries.  
544 This can be illustrated by an example outside antitrust. According to the current paradigm of drug testing,   
experiments testing the effects of drugs involve two test groups where the test subjects are picked by random 
selection. The test subjects do not know if they get the real medicine or placebo. The reason is to find the 
genuine effect of the medicine. This testing principle provides a disadvantage for developers of drugs who claim 
that it is the drug together with the psychological impact that gives it its full effect.  
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to dig into their deep pockets to create an imbalance in the presentation of expert opinions. A 
result of this might be that experts might be instruments for strong interests, such as large 
firms benefiting from monopoly-rents, creating a bias toward findings of not violation.   
5.3.7 The impact of rhetoric and abuse of rhetoric   
Argumentation is an inherent part of the legal process. By the use of argument, the players 
involved in the legal process can communicate suggestions for inferences of the evidence to 
the decision makers. With rhetorical skills, the players can try to convince the decision maker 
what the best explanation of evidence is and, eventually, what other plausible explanations 
there are. Thus, the study of actual decision making in antitrust would be incomplete without 
some discussion on the impact of rhetoric on the actual evidence assessment. This will be 
provided in this subchapter.545   
Use and abuse of rhetoric principles in evidence assessment  
Rhetoric is about using arguments to convince and persuade another person or a third party. 
The study of rhetoric and methods of persuasion can be traced back to ancient Greece, with 
Aristotle as a seminal contributor. Early philosophers and famous rhetoric masters like Cicero 
have discussed the principles for good and bad argumentation and how rhetoric skills can be 
used and abused in the art of persuasion.546 More recently, Walton (2002)547 gives the 
following ideal requirements to characterize the correct use of rhetoric:     
 
(R1): The respondent accepts the premises as commitments. 
(R2): Each inference in the chain of argument is structurally correct.  
(R3): The chain of argumentation must have the proponent’s thesis as its ultimate 
conclusion. 
(R4): Arguments meeting (R1)–(R3) are the only means that count as fulfilling the 
proponent’s goal in the dialogue.   
 
                                                 
545 Here, the influence of verbal argumentation and rhetoric on the evidence assessment is discussed. As a 
practicing lawyer, the author has been on several seminars and lectures that address non-verbal “procedural 
techniques” to influence the decision makers. This involves such things as making artificial breaks in the 
argumentations at the right time, when to repeat what a witness just said, and so on. These techniques are 
probably valuable experiences from experienced lawyers in the art of “lawyering” that have some merits. 
However, these techniques would probably not survive a Daubert challenge to use a familiar term. Thus, the 
impact of such techniques will not be discussed here.       
546 See Graver (2008).   
547 Walton (2002) chapter 7. 
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 The master rhetorician will be one who, on the basis of premises accepted by the 
respondent, manages to convince the respondent as to the validity of the thesis it is argued for 
with valid methods of reasoning. The master in abuse of rhetoric will be able to convince 
anyone about almost anything by violating the requirements for correct rhetoric. If some 
argument violates the principles above it will be an abuse of rhetoric. Abuse of rhetoric in 
evidence assessment can most easily be illustrated by discussing how each of the 
requirements above may be violated. All the requirements may potentially be violated.  
(R1) is violated if an argument is based on premises the respondent does not share. The 
respondent in this context is the antitrust decision maker. If an argument is based on premises 
not accepted by the respondent, there is no value to the argument. Then it must first be argued 
for the premise itself. A typical wrong premise would be an argument based on a premise 
such as “if you like coffee, then you don’t like milk”. Evidence that you like coffee would 
then be presented as evidence supporting that you don’t like milk. This would not be valid 
however, because the premise is false. An antitrust example would be to build the argument 
on the premise that if some person did not have any intent to restrict competition by an action, 
then competition cannot be restricted by that action, when the decision maker does not accept 
such a premise. The presentation of evidence will not be very constructive for the decision 
maker if the parties involved argue on premises not accepted by the decision maker.   
The implementation of the rhetorical abuse is to base argument on false and concealed 
premises to confuse the decision maker to think that an argument is better than it is. In 
antitrust, this may be particularly relevant when economic models are used to aid the 
argumentation, eventually with the aid of economic experts. Economic models consist of 
various implicit and explicit assumptions. This will be discussed further in Chapter Six, which 
will also include illustrative examples. It will be particular confusing when the parties use 
different economic models based on different assumptions and it is not transparent for the 
decision maker as to what assumptions are used and which assumptions that are common or 
different in the economic models used. In the end, it might not be the merits of the economic 
model used that determines the probative force associated with the model, but the rhetorical 
skills of the one that presents it.548   
(R2) means that the one who argue only uses valid methods to infer from the evidence 
to the hypothesis. This means that the inferences must satisfy the principles of deduction and 
                                                 
548 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 80 and Posner (1999). 
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induction.549 A typical non-valid method of deduction is antithesis. If A causes B, this does 
not mean that if A is not present then B is not present. An antitrust example is that a lack of 
price correlation has contradictory probative force for the hypothesis that two products are in 
the same relevant market. However, a finding of price correlation has much less probative 
force for the hypothesis that two products are in the same relevant market. Thus, persuading 
the decision maker by the use of an antithesis argument to believe that price correlation has 
strong probative force for the hypothesis that two products are in the same market would be a 
violation of (R2).  
Valid methods of induction means that the principles of probative force explained in 
the subchapter on rational evidence assessment must be followed. More precisely, probative 
force must be assessed according to the laws of probability calculus. Abuse of rhetoric in this 
context would be to persuade the decision maker to assess evidence contrary to the laws of 
probability. In doing so, the abusive rhetorician can exploit the whole specter of imperfections 
and biases that influence the decision makers’ actual assessment of evidence, as described 
above. The rhetorician can try to exploit cognitive biases by presenting evidence in the wrong 
way.550 The rhetorician may exploit the base rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy. The 
rhetorician may exploit hindsight biases and the self-serving bias, the last one by presenting a 
more lovely alternative explanation of the evidence. The rhetorician might present strongly 
correlated evidence as independent evidence, hoping that the decision maker will be 
persuaded by the quantity of evidence rather than the quality of evidence. The rhetorician may 
use not-merit analogies and present experts that themselves are biased and masters in the 
abuse of rhetoric. The opportunities are limitless for rhetoricians to persuade decision makers 
as long as the decision makers do not see through the use of invalid methods of inference 
argued for.          
    Most are familiar with violation of (R3) in arguments. Most have probably experienced 
attempts to be persuaded on something that they agree upon as an argument for another 
conclusion. In political debates, this is particularly revealing. Most people agree that good 
health care is important. It is, therefore, not very relevant to discuss whether or not good 
health care is important as such, when the real argument is whether healthcare should be 
                                                 
549 Even if the inferences are done by other means than applying deductive and inductive reasoning directly such 
as the use of for instance analogy, the inference must be as if it was done directly by deductive or inductive 
reasoning.    
550 Framing effects is a source of a cognitive bias itself. Research has revealed that people may make different 
decisions in the same factual situation when they are presented with the same fact differently framed; see 
Farnsworth (2007) p. 224 f.  
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provided by public or private enterprises. Violation of (R3) is practical in antitrust evidence 
assessment. The argumentation may shift from argumentation on the merits of the case to the 
credibility of some expert or the validity of the use of some statistical method with minor 
importance of the case. In antitrust, the correct topic for the evidence assessment might easily 
be confused by irrelevant topics. If the relevant question is whether some alleged 
anticompetitive conduct promotes or discourages innovation, there is no point defending the 
action by arguing for all the benefits of innovation. First, it must be determined whether the 
conduct actually promotes innovation or not.           
As rhetoric is used to persuade a decision maker, it is apparent risk of the abuse of 
rhetoric in an adversarial trial. The adversarial procedure is provides an arena for masters in 
rhetoric, and masters in the abuse of rhetoric. A decision maker does not need to use rhetoric 
to persuade himself in an inquisitorial process. Still, an inquisitor may be challenged in 
judicial review, and is subject to scrutiny by the community. Thus, the abuse of rhetoric may 
be a valuable instrument for an inquisitor. Furthermore, when parties exercise their 
contradictory right, rhetorical skills and skills in the abuse of rhetoric may influence the 
inquisitorial decision maker. Thus, the inquisitorial process is not free from the abuse of 
rhetoric. In an adversarial procedure, there will be an opposing party to reveal and rebut the 
abuse of rhetoric by the other party. Thus, abuse of rhetoric must have a certain level of 
sophistication. The risk of non-merit influence due to the abuse of rhetoric is probably bigger 
in jury trials than when professional decision makers assess evidence. Professional decision 
makers are more likely to be able to distinguish meritorious arguments from abuse of rhetoric. 
The particular importance of abuse of rhetoric associated with economic expert evidence is 
discussed further in Chapter Six, which will also include examples.   
Narratives  
A successful rhetorical method of persuasion in the context of legal assessment of evidence 
has been claimed to be a matter of providing the most convincing narrative (story) consistent 
with the evidence.551 If the standard of proof is balance of probabilities, this is a matter of 
presenting the most plausible narrative. If the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, 
the job of the prosecution is to present a narrative that there is no reasonable reason to doubt. 
For the defendant, the challenge is to come up with a narrative plausible enough to establish 
reasonable doubt.   
                                                 
551 See Anderson et al. (2005) p. 150 f. See also Kolflaath (2007).   
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In a narrative approach, the evidence is merged with the hypothesis to create a holistic 
story explaining the evidence. A relevant question is whether there are more biases associated 
with relying on the most plausible narrative consistent with evidence than to assess evidence 
by hypothesis-testing. It can, at least, be argued that the use of narratives creates some 
additional opportunities to exploit cognitive biases to obtain an assessment that deviates from 
a rational assessment of evidence.552 The conjunction fallacy is an obvious cognitive bias that 
can be exploited in a narrative. A more detailed story might be perceived as more likely, even 
if the details involve assumptions that are not proved. Assume that the prosecutor wants to 
provide a more convincing case for a price conspiracy, and states that “the companies A and 
B wanted to increase their margins and saw the opportunity to achieve this by a price 
conspiracy”. A general desire to increase profits has hardly any probative force in support for 
a price conspiracy, but might still seem more convincing than “company A and B entered into 
a price conspiracy”. The supplementing statement provides an explanation that makes us 
believe the story more.  
Adding more detail might also have another biasing effect. If a story is very detailed, it 
might be perceived as unlikely that such a level of detail can be produced by pure 
imagination. Thus, a story can be made more convincing by adding detail.  
Using narratives also makes it possible to exploit the biases towards more lovely 
explanations that are objectively less likely.553 People might like better a story where the 
management of national firms join together to establish a strategy to fight ruthless foreign 
competition rather than coming together to fix prices. A narrative might include such 
undocumented details. The result is that probative irrelevant “story-fill” might affect the 
evidence assessment.     
The human brain memorizes in terms of associations. Observations are interpreted in 
light of the person’s experiences. Details that appeal to the right associations and experiences 
can be added to a narrative to make it more convincing, even if the details have no objective 
probative force in favor of the hypothesis the narrative is supposed to support. In a story about 
price fixers, it can be added to the story that the participants met in “dark rainy evenings” to 
trigger associations to the disguising of shady activities. Whether it was dark and rainy the 
evenings they met might have little probative force as such. It might be relevant if there were 
actions taken to cover up the activities, but then this should be addressed directly if there is 
                                                 
552 See Anderson et al. (2005) p. 280 f., discusses some fallacies associated with the use of narratives in the 
evidence assessment.  
553 Lipton (2004) p. 142 f and Kolflaath (2007).   
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evidence of such a cover up. Narratives facilitate the use of other linguistic manipulation 
techniques in addition to the one just mentioned. Words that trigger associations to something 
positive or negative can be repeated to reinforce their effect. For instance, the title and merits 
of some expert might be repeated every time his name is mentioned to reinforce the 
credibility status of the expert. It will be outside the scope of this study to go further into such 
techniques. 
As with the abuse of rhetoric in general, there is a risk of biases towards the party who 
performs best in creating a narrative rather than the one with the most meritorious case. This 
risk is probably larger in an adversarial procedure with a jury than in a process with 
professional decision makers.  
5.3.8 Some comments  
In this subchapter it was discussed how antitrust evidence assessment is actually performed 
and how this evidence assessment might deviate from rational evidence assessment. It was 
found that abductive reasoning is descriptive for actual antitrust evidence assessment in both 
the US and EU. Furthermore, both the EU and US systems, despite their differences, contains 
instruments of sequential decision-making, which in theory, makes it possible to implement 
rational sequential decisions. 
The likely imperfections and biases that are likely to create a divergence between 
actual and rational evidence assessment were analyzed. Institutional and cognitive biases are 
likely to influence the actual evidence assessment both in the US and EU. Important 
principles of abductive reasoning, such as analogical reasoning and appeal to expert opinion, 
are valuable informal methods of actual evidence assessment. However, the use of these 
methods also involves a risk of erroneous and biased decisions. Furthermore, there is a risk 
that rhetorical skills may trump the merits of the case.  
It was found that most of the imperfections and biases are not likely to affect evidence 
assessment to systematically favor violation or not violation. This means that they might bias 
the evidence assessment in a single decision, but not systematically favor violation or not 
violation. Many of these imperfections and biases are more likely to influence laymen jury 
decisions than professional decision makers as professional decision makers are more likely 
to be aware of, discover, and correct for the biases. Cognitive biases are likely to be well 
known to many professional antitrust decision makers. Furthermore, professional decision 
makers are likely to be aware of the risk of biased experts and are likely be better trained to 
avoid being persuaded by the abuse of rhetoric. Thus, many biases may be mitigated by 
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having more professional decision makers. This mitigation can be achieved either by 
abandoning the laymen jury or by making judges more active in the case administration.  
With more active case administration, the judges can prevent that the jury becoming biased by 
non-meritorious factors. However, there is a fine balance between such involvement the judge 
unduly influencing the jury.  
More professional decision makers are also associated with some problems. 
Professional decision makers may be subject to a bias towards priors generated by experience. 
The professional decision makers may be inclined to be biased towards these priors both 
because of the confirmation bias and because this will save assessment costs. If the decision 
maker is “too professional” in terms of being an antitrust expert himself, he might be subject 
to professional biases. A beneficial middle way might be to have professional, but not too 
professional, decisions makers. Generalist judges might offer such a middle way.       
With the basis in existing research, some sources of imperfections and biases that are 
likely to systematically bias the decisions towards violation were found. It was found that 
inquisitorial decision makers such as the European Commission are likely to be subject to a 
prosecutorial bias that will favor violation findings. The prosecutorial bias is a bias resulting 
from both incentive biases and cognitive biases.  
Some sources of imperfections and biases that might systematically favor findings of 
non-violations were also identified. As antitrust defendants often represent strong interests 
who want to protect monopoly profits. Rent-seeking from such interests may affect the 
decisions in the direction of not violation. This is of particular relevance for the complex 
antitrust violations involving testimony of experts. Rent-seeking can then be obtained by 
hiring high-profile economist experts in large numbers. Furthermore, the best lawyers and a 
team of rhetorical masters can be employed to achieve the desired results. The adversarial 
process is a playing field for such influence, which makes the adversarial system a better 
arena for such rent seeking. Jury trials probably extend the potential for exploiting this 
playing field. 
Some questions are now raised and some preliminary recommendations are provided. 
In the next subchapter these questions and preliminary recommendations will be informed 
further with an economic model of actual evidence assessment.  
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5.4 Modeling actual evidence assessment in antitrust 
5.4.1 Modeling actual evidence assessment  
In the last subchapter informal reasoning was used to address the rationality of actual antitrust 
evidence assessment. The actual method used by antitrust decision makers to assess evidence 
was identified as abductive reasoning and it was discussed how potential imperfections and 
biases may distort the evidence assessment away from a rational evidence assessment. 
Insights from various disciplines were used. In this subchapter the performance of actual 
antitrust evidence assessment will be informed further by economic modeling. Legal evidence 
assessment and the impact of the procedural framework on the performance of the evidence 
assessment have been studied with economic models in the field of law and economics.554 
These modeling efforts will be returned to throughout the discussion.  
Game theory is a central modeling tool in the economic models of actual evidence 
assessment. Game theory is a model framework for studying strategic interaction by 
optimizing agents. There is a debate on the capability of game theory to explain and predict 
strategic interaction. The title “The bounds of Reason: Game theory and the Unification of the 
Behavioural Sciences” of Gintins (2009) illustrates an optimistic view of game theory as a 
general modeling framework for optimizing interaction. However, statements like, “[t]his 
destines game theory to a fascinating footnote in some future text on the history of social 
theory”555 are less optimistic. Game theory happens to be one of the main components of the 
models economists use to study competition in markets, and serves as a theoretical framework 
for many models crucial to antitrust analysis. Thus, a principled discussion of the informative 
value of game theory models will be provided in Chapter Six.    
5.4.2 A model of actual evidence assessment in antitrust  
A relatively simple model will be used as a basis to analyze actual evidence assessment. To 
easily compare actual evidence assessment with rational evidence assessment the same basic 
framework that was used to study rational evidence assessment above will be used.  The 
model shares some similarities with existing models, but is of more a general character than 
models that address particular topics.  
                                                 
554 Posner (1999) is a seminal contribution. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) study the competition between 
advocates in general. Evidence competition in legal procedure is a special case. Spier (2007), Sanchirico (2007), 
Sanchirico (2012), and Froeb and Kobayashi (2012) give surveys on the law and economics literature on the 
topic. Parisi (2002) uses a model based on a continuous scale between inquisitorial and the adversarial process. 
See also Neven (2006), and Posner (2011), Chapter 22.  
555 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 122. 
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Assume for now that there is one judge (or juror) that will decide violation or not 
violation based on evidence e. The complications that follow from many judges or jurors that 
must somehow consent will be addressed below. Let HV be the hypothesis that there was a 
violation. Let e be the evidence available and pJ(HV|e) be the judge’s subjective probability 
assessment that there was a violation given evidence e. Furthermore, assume, as a starting 
point, that the judge is rational in the sense that he will maximize his own expected utility. Let 
UJV,V be the judge’s utility of deciding violation given that there was a violation,  UJV,NV is the 
utility of deciding violation when there was no violation, UJNV,NV is the utility of deciding not 
violation when there was no violation. Finally, UJNV,V is the utility of deciding not violation if 
there was a violation. It will be rational for the judge to decide violation if the expected utility 








By transforming this expected utility maximization into expected loss minimization, as 
described in Chapter Four, we get 
 
LJV=[UJNV,NV-UJV,NV] is the judge’s loss of wrongfully deciding violation (type-1 error) 
LJNV=[UJNV,NV-UJV,NV] is the judge’s loss of wrongfully deciding not violation (type-2 error) 
 
Thus, it will be rational for the judge to decide violation if the expected loss of deciding 
violation is less than the expected loss of deciding not violation, and rational to decide not 






ELJV=(1-pJ(HV|e))LJV and ELJNV=pJ(HV|e)LJNV.  
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Evidence assessment, including gathering evidence, also includes costs. As in the framework 
for rational evidence assessment, assume that Ētot is the potential amount of evidence that can 
be gathered. Ē is the evidence gathered, and e is the actual outcome of Ē.  Assume that the 
judge’s cost of assessing evidence is cJ(Ē), and that this cost is known a priori.556  
The expected a priori loss, which means before we know e, of a rational decision 








There are two minimization operations for the judge. Given that some evidence, e, is 
gathered, the rational judge will minimize expected loss. However, before the judge knows 
the outcome, he has to “average” over all possible outcome of Ē by taking the expectation 
when he is deciding to gather the evidence or not. This is the EĒ part. The MinĒ refers to that 
the judge optimize the evidence gathering with regard to both the amount and sequence, 
taking the cost of gathering evidence into account.  
The model framework for actual evidence assessment just presented can be compared 
to the framework for rational evidence assessment outlined above. All the elements of the 
decision problem are the same, except that the objective measures of probabilities, losses of 
errors, and costs are replaced with the corresponding subjective measures of the judge. The 
judge’s decision will correspond to the objective rational decision if the judge’s probability 
assessment corresponds with the objective probability assessment, which means that 
pJ(HV|e)=p(HV|e), if the judge’s measures of losses from errors correspond with the objective 
measures of these losses, which means that LJV=LV and LJNV=LNV. And, if the judge’s cost 
assessment corresponds with the social costs of assessing evidence, this that cJ(Ē)=c(Ē). If 
there is no such correspondence, the rational evidence assessment of the judge is likely to 
deviate from the objective rational evidence assessment, except for by pure coincidence.  
                                                 
556 In theory we could assume that there was some uncertainty associated with the costs, and then operate with 
expected values. This is a complication that will not be pursued in this study.  
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There might be many reasons that the judge’s probability assessments, loss 
assessments, and cost assessments might deviate from the objective ones. When it comes to 
probability assessments, the judge might have different priors than the objective correct 
priors.557 The judge might be subject to imperfections and biases in the assessment of 
evidence as described in the previous subchapter. Furthermore, there might be many reasons 
why a judge’s loss assessments might deviate from the objective one. A judge’s utility might 
be distorted by institutional biases such as political pressure, budgets contingencies, career 
opportunities, salary, and other factors, as described above. Finally, a judge’s cost assessment 
will be influenced by his own personal costs of assessing evidence, which may not correspond 
to the social costs.  
The insight on imperfection and biases discussed in informally in the previous 
subchapter will be used to inform the various components of the model. Thus, the interesting 
question for the present modeling efforts is whether the model can provide some additional 
insight on actual evidence assessment than what resulted from the informal discussion above.     
Since a judge’s probability assessments, loss assessments, and cost assessments are 
likely to depend on whether the system is inquisitorial or adversarial, the model is further 
discussed separately under the two systems. These two kinds of processes are discussed as a 
dichotomy, though the possibility of a sliding scale between the two types of procedure is 
noted.558  The inquisitorial system is used as a benchmark for the EU, while the adversarial 
system will be used as a benchmark for US antitrust procedure. Note, however, that with 
contradictory rights for the parties during the procedure and the possibility of judicial review, 
the EU system includes adversarial elements. In the US, the courts have the possibility to 
gate-keep the presentation of evidence, and to make sequential decisions as described above. 
Thus, there are some inquisitorial elements within the US adversarial procedure.   
5.4.3 Modeling evidence assessment in an inquisitorial process 
Assume now that the system is inquisitorial. The judge has the responsibility of gathering 
evidence, and later decides violation or not violation based on the evidence gathered.  
The judge will weigh the reduction in his subjective expected loss from error by 
gathering more evidence against his subjective costs of gathering more evidence. In the terms 
used above, the judge will weigh his personal decision value against his personal costs of 
                                                 
557 This is a point stressed by Posner (2008) p. 65 f. 
558 Parisi (2002) uses a model with a continuous sliding scale between the adversarial and inquisitorial 
procedure. This model will be returned to below.  
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gathering more evidence. The judge’s decision value of gathering more evidence depends on 
the judge’s personal probability assessment and the subjective losses of making errors. 
As described above, one source of systematic probability assessment bias in an 
inquisitorial procedure is the confirmation bias.559 This means that pJ(HV|e) is likely to 
become larger than the true p(HV|e). This increases the probability of a wrongful decision in 
the direction of finding violation. This wrongful assessment of p(HV|e) will also distort the 
judge’s assessment of the decision value of evidence that can be gathered. If new evidence 
that can be gathered is underestimated to have probative force in the direction of not violation, 
it is less likely to be gathered. Thus, it is likely that an insufficient amount of evidence 
contradictory to violation will be gathered.560   
 The inquisitor’s loss of errors depends on the incentive structure of the inquisitor. 
This can create biases. The inquisitor may favor certain interest groups due to political biases. 
As discussed above, it is likely that an inquisitor is rewarded more for visible action and has 
an incentive bias in favor of finding violations. Thus, the inquisitor’s utility of finding 
violation relative to finding not violation is likely to be larger than the objective relationship. 
This means that the inquisitor will assess the loss of type-2 errors (not finding violation when 
there was a violation) relative to the loss of type-1 errors (finding violation when there was no 
violation) as larger than the objective assessment of this relative loss. This has several effects. 
It will increase the subjective decision value of evidence that is likely to have probative force 
supporting violation, which may lead to an excessive search for such evidence. Thus, a 
preference for avoiding type-2 errors might lead to too much evidence gathered in the “hope” 
of finding evidence that may switch the decision from not violation to violation. This is 
dangerous in combination with the confirmation bias, because the assessment of probative 
force of any evidence found will be biased towards violation. The value of evidence with 
probative force in favor of violation will be exaggerated, and the probative force of 
contradictory evidence will be underestimated. Furthermore, the standard of proof applied by 
the decision maker will be too low as long as the decision maker has some flexibility in the 
standard of proof applied. The too low standard of proof applied will lead to findings of 
violation when not violation is the objective rational decision.       
                                                 
559 See Wils (2003) and Gerdin and Petit (2010).  
560 Note that a confirmation bias might also work in the opposite direction. If the inquisitor should have as their 
initial opinion that some conduct is not a violation, then p(HNV|e) is likely to be overestimated. In addition to the 
direct effect this has on a wrongful decision, it will discourage gathering evidence in favor of violation.   
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The inquisitor’s costs will be the costs the inquisitor experiences as his own costs 
associated with gathering evidence. This might include both personal efforts and the 
alternative cost due to the use of budget that alternatively might be used for other purposes. 
The inquisitor is not likely to take into account costs only born by others. This means, for 
instance, that he will not properly take into account the cost imposed on the investigated party 
to produce evidence. Thus, it might be desirable for the inquisitor to inefficiently switch the 
burden of proof to the investigated party, even if this party has a higher cost in providing the 
evidence.561 This means that cJ(Ē) will be considered as lower for the judge than real cost c(Ē) 
for evidence produced by the investigated party. This has several impacts on the evidence 
assessment. First of all, the procedure becomes inefficiently costly. Secondly, if the burden of 
proof becomes heavy enough, the investigated party will find it too costly to provide the 
evidence, even if it exists.562 This is dangerous in combination with the confirmation bias as 
the inquisitor then will give this failure of providing evidence too high probative force in 
favor of violation. Thus, the inquisitor will give too high probative force in support of 
violation from the failure of the investigated party to provide evidence. Assume, for example, 
that the inquisitor is assessing a vertical agreement. He uses his power to impose a burden of 
the parties to provide evidence of the efficiencies of the agreement. Assume that this requires 
that the investigated party needs some information prohibitively costly to gather, but that 
could be gathered by the inquisitor at lower cost. When the investigated fails to produce this 
evidence, the inquisitor will allocate too high probative force of this failure to provide 
evidence of efficiencies in favor of violation. Thus, on the contrary to Shin (1998), it is 
considered here that too much probative force is likely to be given to the non-presence of 
some particular evidence in an inquisitorial process.563 This is point is returned to when the 
adversarial and inquisitorial procedure are compared below.   
Insight from the previous subchapter has now been used as input to the model of the 
inquisitorial procedure. The question is, then, whether this modeling effort has provided some 
additional insight on the inquisitorial procedure. The answer appears affirmative. The 
characteristic of an inquisitorial system are “fitted” to a model that makes it easy to compare 
the inquisitorial procedure with rational evidence assessment. This has allowed studying the 
                                                 
561 Allowing the inquisitor to impose a burden of evidence production on the investigated party distinguishes the 
present model from many other economic models of inquisition such as Froeb and Kobayashi (1996).   
562 Then the presumptions will not work as signals as they are supposed to do, separating those who can provide 
the “truthful” evidence and those who must fabricate the evidence at a higher cost. See Sanchirico (2012) for a 
discussion, based on, inter alia, on Milgrom and Roberts (1986).  
563 A central premise for this disagreement with Shin (1998) is that is the assumption that the inquisitor can 
impose a burden of the parties to produce evidence.  
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impact of these characteristics on the rationality of evidence assessment taking dynamical 
considerations into account. The confirmation bias and the incentive biases are not only likely 
to yield a wrong decision from a static perspective, but will also distort the entire evidence 
gathering procedure. In particular, too little evidence that might be contradictory to finding 
violation will be gathered, while too much evidence in favor of violation will be gathered. A 
too low standard of proof will be applied. When the costs are taken into account, the model 
reveals that the presumptions imposed on the parties will be too harsh and yield a too costly 
evidence gathering procedure. Finally, too much probative force is likely to be given to the 
non-presence of evidence that is left to the party to produce by presumptions. These topics 
will be discussed further when the adversarial and the inquisitorial procedure are compared 
below.    
Finally, note that the impact of judicial review is not explicitly modeled. The judicial 
review will impose some limits on the impacts of the imperfections and biases associated with 
the inquisitorial procedure.564 The Airtours565 decision in the EU discussed above is an 
example of this. The impact of judicial review depends on the standard of review, as 
described in Chapter Two. Limits in the standard of review, such as the restricted standard of 
review in the assessment of complex economic evidence in the EU, leaves room for the 
imperfections and biases associated with the inquisitorial procedure in the EU. Furthermore, 
even when judicial review is possible, the burden to challenge the decision imposed on the 
parties creates room for inquisitorial imperfections and biases.        
5.4.4 Modeling evidence assessment in an adversarial process 
Let us now move to the adversarial system. The judge is now assumed to no longer have 






ELJV=(1-pJ(HV|e))LJV and ELJNV=pJ(HV|e)LJNV. 
 
                                                 
564 See Geradin and Petit (2010) for a study on the impact of judicial review in EU competition enforcement.  
565 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities Case T-342/99 [2002]. 
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Thus, the judge will find violation if the expected personal loss of finding violation is less 
than the expected personal loss of finding not violation for whatever evidence, e, is presented 
in the court by the parties. Thus, in an adversarial procedure, the direct costs of gathering 
evidence are irrelevant for the judge’s decision. This is consistent with the discussion above, 
which indicates that judges seem to pay too little consideration to costs in the evidence 
assessment. However, as discussed above, a judge has some costs associated with evidence. 
These are the costs of processing and assessing the presented evidence. The judge has an 
incentive to reduce those costs as described in the informal discussion above.566 This can be 
modeled as a bias in the assessment of pJ(HV|e), where too much weight is given to the a 
priori probability assessment pJ(HV). Since pJ(HV|e)=pJ(e|HV)pJ(HV)/pJ(e), this means that the 
judge will give too little weight to the information given by the evidence e. This is an 
argument for jury trials as juries are less experienced and will give more weight to the actual 
evidence in the case.567 However, the downside is, as discussed above, that jurors are more 
prone to biases as they are less experienced in handling biases and at revealing and filtering 
out biases. Furthermore, a juror will not have experience to form the same priors, and is likely 
to put more weight on p(e|HV)/p(e). Thus, jurors are more prone to the base rate fallacy, 
which is to ignore the informative value of priors.  
When it is comes to losses from errors, no good arguments were found that adversarial 
judges systematically prefer deciding violation to not violation. As mentioned above, 
independent judges might have biased preferences towards some interest groups due to the 
selection effect following from the preferences from the politicians who appoint them. Still, 
this preference bias could not be identified as systematically directed towards violation or not 
violation.568 Thus, it is likely that judges, as a starting point, are loyal to the given standard of 
proof that applies to the type of case in question. The standard of proof is supposed to reflect 
the assumed losses from errors of the type of case in question.  
We will now move to the modeling of evidence gathering by the parties. Assume that 
there are two parties: plaintiff (P) and defendant (D). Furthermore, split the evidence into the 
evidence gathered by the plaintiff favoring violation eP and the evidence gathered by the 
defendant favoring not violation eD. This means e={eP,eD}. Assume that it is in the plaintiff’s 
interest to provide evidence that can be argued to have probative force in favor of violation, 
                                                 
566 See Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 824 f.  
567 Posner (1999). 
568 Note that rent-seeking bias may favor monopoly rent-protection as a matter of opportunity and incentives to 
invest in rent-seeking. This is not the same as if the decision maker has a preference bias. Such rent-seeking 
biases will be discussed below.   
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while the defendant will provide evidence that can be argued to have probative force 
contradicting violation. Let cP(eP) be the plaintiffs cost function and cD(eD) be the defendant 
cost function associated with gathering and presenting the evidence. Both cost functions are 
increasing in the amount of evidence. Let UPV be the plaintiff’s utility if violation is decided, 
and let UPNV be the plaintiff’s utility if not violation is decided. Assume that UPV>UPNV. 
Similarly, let UDV and UDNV be the corresponding utilities for the defendant. Here we have 
UDV<UDNV. Furthermore, let pPV(eP,eD) and pDV(eP,eD) be the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
perceived probability, respectively, for the judge to decide violation given evidence eP and eD. 
Assume that both pPV and  pDV are increasing in eP and decreasing in eD. Furthermore, assume 
that the plaintiff and defendant either know the “truth” and thus the outcome of their own 
evidence gathering; alternatively, if the outcome of gathering evidence is unknown, only 
favorable outcomes will be presented in court. Fabricated or misleading evidence might be 
produced, but fabricating evidence involves both higher direct costs of production than if the 
same evidence was not fabricated and an additional indirect cost from the risk of sanctions 
associated with the presentation of fabricated evidence. It is natural to assume that arguing for 
the “truth” involves lower cost than arguing for some facts that contradict the underlying 
truth.569 
The plaintiff will choose eP so it maximizes its expected surplus from litigation. This 




Similarly, the defendant will maximize: 
 
 ESD(eP)=pDV(eP,eD)UDV+(1-pDV(eP,eD))UDNV-cD(eD),  
 
with respect to eD. 
The choice of evidence presented by the two parties can be modeled as a game. Each 
party optimizes its own amount of evidence, and the equilibrium amount of evidence is where 
no party has an incentive to change its amount of evidence given the other’s amount of 
evidence.570 This is illustrated in Figure 5.3: 
 
                                                 
569 See Posner (2011) p. 830 for the same point.  
570 This is the Nash-equilibrium. We will return to equilibrium concepts in game theory in Chapter Six.   
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In Figure 5.3, eP(eD) and eD(ep) are the reaction functions of the plaintiff and defendant, 
respectively. This is a function of how much evidence it is optimal to provide given the other 
party’s amount of evidence. The equilibrium amounts are eP* and eD*. In the equilibrium, no 
party has an incentive to increase its amount of evidence given the other party’s amount of 
evidence. The evidence process can be seen as a process where each party provides more and 
more evidence until equilibrium is reached. The evidence competition leads to an evidence 
race, facilitating too much evidence production as a result. Another way to see it is that a 
party’s gathering of evidence imposes an externality on the other party by increasing the other 
party’s value of gathering more evidence. This might result in overproduction.571   
The equilibrium amounts of evidence eP* and eD* are determined by 
 




∂ESD(eD*)/∂eD*=0  [∂pDV (eP*,eD*)/∂eD*](UDV-UDNV]=∂c(eD*)/∂eD* 
 
From these equations, we can see that the higher the stakes in the case, the more evidence it 
will be optimal for the parties to provide, everything else equal. If there is a correlation 
between objective losses of errors and the stakes in the case, this will be in correspondence 
with the rational benchmark, as the higher the losses of error are, the higher is the decision 
                                                 







 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
244 
value of more evidence that can influence the decision. However, if there are high personal 
stakes in the case, but low objective losses from error, the adversarial process may contribute 
to an overproduction of evidence.572   
 The adversarial process may result in duplicative evidence production. Assume that 
the plaintiff searches for some potential evidence that, dependent on the outcome, will have 
either probative force in support or in contradiction of a violation. Such evidence might, for 
instance, be an econometric analysis showing the degree of substitution between two products 
of merging parties in a merger investigation. If a high degree of substitution is found, it might 
support a violation, but low substitution might support a non-violation. Both parties might 
have an interest in performing this analysis, but only one have an incentive to present the 
result as evidence.573              
How the evidence is believed to affect the probability of the decision is crucial for the 
parties’ evidence decisions. For the plaintiff, the size of ∂pPV(eP,eD)/∂eP is positive, and the 
more positive, the higher is the gain from gathering evidence. Conversely, for the defendant, 
∂pDV(eP,eD)/∂eD is negative, and the more negative, the higher is the gain from gathering 
evidence. Thus, the higher the marginal value of gathering evidence on the perceived 
probability assessment of the judge, the more evidence it is rational to gather. If the parties 
believe that the judge rationally assesses evidence according to the principle of probative 
force, this will motivate the parties to gather evidence in correspondence with rationality. 
However, there might be attempts to disguise or mislead the probative force, exploiting 
imperfections, cognitive biases, and abusive rhetoric as described in the previous subchapter. 
As described above, this may, in particular, be effective in jury trials.  
Finally, the lower the marginal cost of producing evidence, the more evidence it is 
rational to gather. This means that if there are lower marginal costs associated with providing 
evidence for the truth, then this factor will contribute to more evidence in line with the 
truth.574  
We have now used the insights from the informal discussion of actual evidence in 
antitrust analysis above as inputs to a model of the adversarial procedure. The question is, 
then, whether the model has provided some additional insight. The answer appears to be 
affirmative. First, the model has confirmed the critique described above that judges do not 
                                                 
572 See Posner (1999) for a similar discussion.  
573 The parties may be mandated to present analyses performed in a discovery procedure. We will for now not 
complicate the issue by taking this possibility into account.  
574 See Sanchirico (2012). See also Farmer and Pecorino (2000) for the same point.  
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seem to take costs properly into account in their statements about evidence assessment. In the 
present model, this is because the judges do not have the proper incentives to take all costs 
into account as the costs are incurred by the parties. Furthermore, the evidence race predicts a 
too excessive amount of evidence and duplication efforts in the production of evidence. Thus, 
a plausible presumption is that an adversarial process will generate too much evidence 
gathering compared to rational evidence gathering. A consequence of this is that too high 
costs will be incurred on evidence gathering compared to the rational amount. Furthermore, 
the duplicative efforts will contribute to a too high cost level. An additional insight provided 
by the model above is that the amount of evidence gathered is heavily dependent on the stakes 
of the case. A divergence of the private stakes and the social stakes might contribute to either 
too much or too little evidence gathering. If the private stakes are higher than the social 
stakes, the evidence gathering is likely to be excessive. On the contrary, if private stakes are 
low, this will contribute to a too small amount of evidence gathering. If stakes are asymmetric 
it is likely to be an excessive amount of evidence in favor of the party with the higher stakes.  
The model also reveals an additional insight. If a party involved thinks that the judge 
is biased, the party that is negatively impacted has an incentive to compensate for this with 
providing more evidence. The reason is that more evidence is necessary to tip the decision in 
the favored direction. This will mitigate the effects of biased judges in an adversarial trial.575 
Assuming that the marginal costs of producing evidence for the underlying truth is lower than 
producing evidence for a desired fact not corresponding with the truth, there will be more 
evidence in favor of the truth, all else being equal. This will contribute to increased accuracy.               
5.4.5 Comparing the inquisitorial and adversarial model outcomes    
The model outcomes of both the inquisitorial and adversarial system are now analyzed. We 
can now compare their performances with rationality as an ideal standard. The various 
components of evidence assessment will first be compared. This will be followed by an 
overall assessment in the end.  
Losses from errors 
The first question is if the inquisitorial or the adversarial system performs best in aligning the 
decision makers’ personal losses from errors with the objective losses from errors. In other 
words, the question is which system is most incentive-compatible with rationality. Based on 
the discussion above, an inquisitor is likely to have excessive incentives to avoid type-2 errors 
                                                 
575 See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) and Farmer and Pecorino (2000) for a critique. See also Sanchrico (2012). 
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(finding not violation when there was a violation). This will bias the evidence assessment 
towards finding violations. In an adversarial process, there is no reason to believe that the 
decision makers’ have some systematic preferences for avoiding either type-1 errors or type-2 
errors. It is likely that the standard of proof will guide the error assessments. Although the 
standard of proof is determined by the type of case in question and not the losses from errors 
in the specific case, this is an approximation of the true losses from errors. Thus, it is likely 
that systematic incentive biases constitute a larger risk for irrational evidence assessments in 
the inquisitorial procedure compared to the adversarial procedure. Since the inquisitorial 
procedure is more descriptive for the EU competition law procedure, while the US procedure 
is more of an adversarial procedure, there is a larger risk for systematic incentive biases in 
evidence assessment in the EU. The result is that evidence assessments in the EU are more 
likely to be biased in favor of finding violations.   
Assessing probative force 
The next question is which system performs best in yielding rational assessments of probative 
force of evidence according to the rules of probability. The question is, more precisely, in 
which system pJ(HV|e) is most likely to correspond with p(HV|e).  
A confirmation bias towards finding violations is associated with the inquisitorial 
procedure. This means that it is likely that, when the inquisitorial decision maker has formed 
a belief that there was a violation, pJ(HV|e) is likely to be higher than p(HV|e).  
 When it comes to the adversarial procedure, the rationality of pJ(HV|e) is likely to 
depend on whether the decision maker is a judge or layman juror. To illustrate this, recall that 
pJ(HV|e)=pJ(HV)pJ(e|HV)/pJ(e). A judge who wants to save on his personal costs of processing 
the specific evidence of the case may rely too much on the prior probability pJ(HV) gained 
from experience with previous cases. The same may follow from a confirmation bias. This 
will result in path-dependence and a bias towards former similar cases he has handled. A juror 
will not be subject to the same priors, and is likely to put more weight on pJ(e|HV)/pJ(e). This 
means that a juror is more prone to the base rate fallacy. Furthermore, due to inexperience in 
assessing evidence, a juror is more likely to be impacted by imperfections in assessing 
evidence, such as cognitive biases and being persuaded by abusive rhetoric.  
 Thus, there are sources of failures in correctly assessing p(HV|e) in both the 
inquisitorial and adversarial procedures. While pJ(HV|e) is likely to be systematically high in 
an inquisitorial procedure, there is a risk of less accuracy in an adversarial jury trial. It has 
been pointed out in the literature that the competition between parties in an adversarial 
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process is likely to neutralize the impact from biased influences on each side.576 However, 
since the evidence are noisier, more evidence will then be required to reach an accurate 
decision. This requires that both parties have the proper incentives to provide sufficient 
evidence. This will be returned to below. Although the best compromise might seem to be an 
adversarial trial with professional decision makers, there will be a risk that too much weight is 
given to pJ(HV) in such trials. The reason is that professional decision makers rely too much 
on the priors to save personal processing costs rather than carefully scrutinizing the merits of 
the specific case.     
  Since the EU competition procedure is more of an inquisitorial character while the US 
procedure as a main rule is an adversarial process with jury trials, this means that pJ(HV|e) is 
likely to be systematically too high in the EU. In the US, pJ(HV|e) is more likely to not be 
associated with any systematic biases, but might still be wrong due to unsystematic 
imperfections in the assessment. More evidence will be needed to obtain accuracy by 
neutralizing the noise from assessment imperfections.       
Costs 
The cost of gathering evidence is also a component in the rational assessment of evidence. 
The decision value of gathering more evidence must be weighed against the cost. This 
tradeoff is returned to below. The efficiency in the amount of evidence will also be returned to 
below. Here the cost-efficiency of the production of a particular piece of evidence in the two 
systems will be discussed.  
An inquisitor will gather evidence himself and thus take into account his own costs of 
gathering evidence. In this process, the inquisitor can ask the parties investigated to produce 
evidence combined with some presumption that, if it is not provided, it will be presumed 
unfavorable to the parties. The inquisitor can use this mechanism to save his own costs. 
However, if it is the inquisitor who can produce this evidence at the lowest cost, this use of 
presumptions will be inefficient.    
  In the adversarial system, the parties provide the evidence. Thus, an adversarial judge 
will ignore the costs of gathering evidence. Still, the judge may have some incentives to 
reduce his own costs of processing evidence by declaring evidence inadmissible. However, 
instead of incurring the efforts of declaring evidence inadmissible, it might be easier to just 
ignore the evidence. The costs of gathering evidence will be incurred by the parties at each 
                                                 
576 Froeb and Kobayashi (1996, 2001). See Parisi (2002) for a discussion. 
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side. Duplication in the production of evidence will prevent efficiency in evidence production 
in an adversarial trial. As mentioned above, each side might have an interest in performing 
some analysis to see if it yields a favorable result, but only the party with the favorable result 
will present it. The evidence will still be produced by both parties. Note that the duplication 
will be partially mitigated by deposition rules that give the parties partial access to evidence 
in the possession of the other party.  
However, not all evidence is of such type that both parties will gather it. Whether it is 
the most efficient party that actually gathers the evidence will be dependent on how the 
parties believe it will be assessed. If the parties believe that the decision makers will use 
presumptions rationally in their assessments, they can lean back when they have produced the 
evidence that turns the presumption to their benefit and then wait for the attempt to rebut the 
presumption by the other party. As mentioned above, it is not likely that judges, and, in 
particular, jurors, will assess evidence rationally due to imperfections and biases. Thus, at 
least risk averse parties will rather produce too much than too little evidence. This means that 
evidence will be provided even if it would be more efficient for the opposite party to produce 
rebutting evidence based on a presumption. Thus, it is not likely that all the evidence will be 
produced by the lowest cost producer in an adversarial trial. 
 Thus, in both the inquisitorial and the adversarial systems there are imperfections that 
prevent evidence being gathered at the lowest possible costs. A benefit with the inquisitorial 
system is that it prevents the duplication in evidence production. When it comes to the use of 
presumptions throughout the process, the inquisitor is likely to impose too strong 
presumptions against the parties as the inquisitor saves his own costs by imposing burdens of 
evidence production on the parties. In the adversarial process, there are imperfections that 
prevent optimal presumptions. Still, the presumptions are not likely to systematically favor 
one of the parties. Based on this insight, we would likely observe stronger presumptions 
against the parties throughout the process in the EU, while in the US we will observe more 
duplication in the production of evidence. Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the use of 
presumptions by the decision makers in an adversarial process makes it likely that some 
evidence will be produced by parties even if the opposite parties could produce the evidence 
at lower cost.  
Decision value and costs  
Rational evidence gathering means that some evidence is gathered if the decision value 
exceeds the costs of gathering the evidence. The decision value is the expected reduced error 
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losses from gathering evidence. The decision value is a function of the changes in 
probabilities resulting from the evidence gathering and the error losses. The decision value is 
higher the more certain we are in finding evidence with strong probative force that makes it 
rational to change a decision to a decision associated with less expected error losses.577  
 The personal decision value of gathering evidence by an inquisitor depends on his 
personal probability assessment and personal error losses. The excessive preference from 
avoiding type-2 errors (not finding violation when there was a violation) will impact the 
decision value. The decision value of evidence that may make it rational for the inquisitor to 
change the decision from not violation to violation will be exaggerated. Conversely, the 
decision value of evidence that might change the decision from violation to not violation will 
be understated. This preference bias will be exaggerated by the confirmation bias as the 
probative force of evidence that supports violation will be exaggerated while the probative 
force of evidence that contradicts violation will be understated. The exaggeration of decision 
value for evidence with probative force in support for violation means that the inquisitor may 
find it viable to search for costly evidence in favor of violation even if the objective decision 
value does not justify the costs. Opposite, the inquisitor may not find it viable to search for 
costly evidence that contradicts violation even the objective decision value exceeds the cost.  
It was shown above that an inquisitor will have an excessive incentive to impose 
presumptions that shift the cost of evidence production to the parties investigated. The parties 
may not find it viable to produce this evidence, even if it exists. As also explained above, 
because of the confirmation bias, the inquisitor is likely to exaggerate the probative force of 
this lack of evidence production, and thus give this lack of evidence higher decision value 
than is objectively justified. Thus, and on the contrary to Shin (1998), it was found that the 
inquisitor is likely to not only give high weight to omitted evidence, but also give too high 
weight to such omission.578    
 In the adversarial process, the decision value of evidence for judges will, in principle, 
correspond to the rational one, as there is no reason to believe that the judges systematically 
favor one error to another in contradiction with rationality. However, since it is the parties 
that gather the evidence, the question will be whether they have incentives to provide 
evidence according to the decision value of evidence. As described above, parties will provide 
                                                 
577 Recall that gathering evidence only has positive decision value of there is a chance that an outcome of the 
evidence gathering will make it rational to change the decision.  
578 This is consistent with experimental evidence provided by Block and Parker (2004), who do not find support 
for the conclusion in Shin (1998). 
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evidence in a game where the incentive to provide evidence is dependent on the amount of 
evidence provided by the opposite party, the likely impact of the evidence on the decision, the 
private stakes, and the cost of producing evidence. Thus, there are several factors that 
determine whether it will payoff to gather evidence. The more evidence provided by the 
opposite party, the more likely it will pay off to gather evidence as it is more likely to have an 
impact on the decision. Furthermore, the more probative force a party think that the judge will 
give some evidence, the more they expect it will pay off to provide such evidence. This means 
that providing evidence that exploits imperfections and biases may pay off as much as 
evidence with real probative force.  
Finally, the higher the private stake for the party, the higher is the expected gain from 
providing more evidence. The private stakes may deviate from the social stakes in the case. 
From this, it is easy to see that there are many reasons why the parties’ payoff from providing 
evidence deviates from the rational decision value. The private payoff may be both larger and 
smaller than the decision value. However, if the stakes on both sides are higher than the social 
stake and not very asymmetric, the payoff to the parties of providing evidence is likely to be 
higher than the decision value.  
 Thus, the model predicts that, in both the inquisitorial and the adversarial systems, 
there will be other factors than the objective decision value and the objective social costs that 
determine whether some evidence will be gathered. In an inquisitorial procedure, there is a 
systematic effect of exaggerating the decision value of evidence supporting violation and 
understating the decision value of evidence that contradicts violation.579 In an adversarial 
process, there is not likely to be such a systematic effect. However, the private payoff of 
gathering evidence is likely to exceed the decision value in many situations, especially if the 
stakes are high and not very asymmetric. Note that if stakes are asymmetric we may observe 
excessive evidence in favor of the party with the higher stakes. The value of providing 
evidence will be higher for the party with the higher stake. This might bias the evidence 
gathered in favor of the party with the high stake.   
                                                 
579 This is consistent with Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), who predicts that an inquisitorial process yields more 
extreme results than an adversarial process, as the inquisitor is awarded more for a decision where they take a 
position rather than just making an intermediate decision that maintains the status quo. The result of this might 
be that an inquisitor is reluctant to gather more evidence, when he has evidence that supports taking a position, 
when there is a risk that more evidence will force him to take a decision that maintains the status quo. An 
experimental study by Block and Parker (2004) tend to support the conclusions in Dewatripont and Tirole 
(1999).   
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The amount of evidence 
The next question is which system performs best in gathering evidence in the right amount. A 
general lesson from law and economics is that the inquisitorial judge has stronger incentives 
to economize the gathering of evidence, while more evidence will be gathered in the 
adversarial system.580  
 This is just a starting point, however.581 The model framework shows that there might 
be reasons for an inquisitorial judge to excessively gather evidence. The excessive incentives 
to avoid type-2 errors are likely to create an excessive incentive to gather evidence that makes 
it rational to decide violation. Furthermore, the inquisitor is likely to take only his own costs 
into account. By transferring the cost of producing evidence to the parties investigated, the 
inquisitor is not likely to efficiently take the cost into account in the gathering of evidence. 
This might lead to an overproduction of evidence. Opposite, as the inquisitor has too weak 
incentives to gather evidence that contradicts violation, this might lead the inquisitor to gather 
a too little amount of evidence.  
 In the adversarial process, the evidence race, as such, is likely to yield excessive 
evidence gathering. Each party imposes an externality on the other party to produce more 
evidence when they gather evidence, which tends to give an equilibrium where too much 
evidence is gathered. This excessive amount of evidence can be exaggerated if the personal 
stakes for both parties are higher than the social stakes. In other words, rent-seeking is likely 
to create an excessive amount of evidence gathering.582 However, if the personal stakes of one 
of the parties are lower than the social stakes, the amount of evidence gathered may be too 
little compared to the rational amount. 
 Thus, there are reasons why there might both be too little or too much evidence 
gathered in both the inquisitorial and adversarial procedure. Because of the evidence race, it is 
likely that the amount of evidence gathering is generally excessive in the adversarial 
procedure. In the inquisitorial procedure, there are not likely to be such systematic effects; 
however, there is likely to be a systematic effect that too much evidence in support of 
violation is gathered. Thus, while it is likely that an excessive amount of evidence is gathered 
in US antitrust procedure, it is likely that there will be too much evidence that support 
violation gathered in the EU procedure.  
                                                 
580 See Posner (1999), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Parisi (2002). See also Spier (2007) and Posner (2011) 
p. 819 f.  
581 See Posner (1999) and Posner (2011) p. 819.  
582 See Parisi (2002) for a model that is informative for the amount of rent-seeking.  
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Sequential evidence gathering and decision making 
Evidence should not only be gathered in the right amount, but also in the right sequence. An 
excessive preference for avoiding type-2 errors and the confirmation bias associated with the 
inquisitorial procedure is likely to distort evidence gathering to the search for evidence that 
has probative force in support of violation and avoiding gathering evidence with probative 
force contradictory to violation. Furthermore, as the inquisitor is likely to impose the burden 
of producing evidence excessively on the party investigated to save his own costs the 
evidence gathering will be distorted.583 In addition to the direct inefficiency of such excessive 
burdens, the inquisitor also lacks the incentive to impose those burdens at the right stage in 
the evidence gathering. The inquisitor may impose a burden on the parties to produce 
evidence too early, to avoid the effort of asking for more evidence at a later level.      
 In the adversarial procedure, the evidence gathering is in the hands of the parties. As 
mentioned above, the production of evidence in adversarial trials is dependent on the 
presumptions they believe that the decision makers will apply. If the parties are risk averse 
they are likely to produce too much evidence to be on the safe side. This will distort the 
optimal sequence of evidence gathering. Furthermore, due to the procedural rules, most 
evidence must be produced before the trial. In the terms of the game theoretical model above, 
this means that this model should probably be extended by making the evidence gathered by 
the opponent a stochastic variable the party must adapt to. The parties must “safeguard” 
against eventualities that will appear in the process and may even produce evidence that will 
not end up being used. This is not explicitly captured by the model presented above. The 
actual evidence gathering in adversarial processes is likely to be path-dependent. Small details 
in the procedure may have a large influence on the evidence gathering. This can probably best 
be modeled as an agent-based system.584 It will be beyond the scope for this study to present 
such a model here. Thus, further predictions cannot be provided, other than stating that the 
rationality in the sequence of evidence gathering is dependent on whether the parties believe 
that the decision makers assess evidence rationally, which, again, is dependent on degree the 
decision makers actually assess evidence rationally. 
                                                 
583 An illustrative anecdotal example of this is merger control, where the parties are required to produce 
substantial information, inter alia, on the definition of the relevant markets. It can be questioned whether it is 
rational that the merging parties provide all this information.  
584 Agent-based modeling, also known as complex adaptive systems modeling or computational modeling, is 
based on algorithmic simulations of adaptive behavior. This modeling technique has become increasingly 
popular in economic modeling and can also be applied to the legal process. This is returned to in Chapter Six.  
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As described in the informal discussion in the subchapter on actual evidence 
assessment above, the EU procedure contains various instruments and stages that allow for 
sequential decision making. Even though this procedure provides a framework for rational 
sequential decision making, the evidence gathering is influenced by the imperfections that 
characterize an inquisitorial procedure, as explained above. The US adversarial system also 
contains some instruments for the courts to implement sequential decision making. The trial 
judge can use cost considerations to declare evidence inadmissible. By motions to dismiss, 
summary judgments, and judgments as a matter of law, the judge can decide upon evidence in 
the various stages of the process, as described above. These instruments can mitigate some 
excessive gathering characterized by the adversarial system. However, the question is whether 
the judges are properly informed and have the right incentives to apply these instruments 
rationally. As mentioned above, it requires efforts for the judge to declare evidence 
admissible for cost reasons, and it may be easier to just let it pass. Furthermore, the 
application of these instruments is, as a main rule, dependent on the parties requesting, them 
which reduce their applicability as an instrument for judges to implement rational sequential 
decision making.   
Overall assessment   
The discussion of what performs best of an inquisitorial or adversarial procedure has long 
traditions in the legal literature.585 The law and economics movement has provided substantial 
additional insight to this discussion the last decades. Contributions such as Posner (1973) and 
Posner (1988) advocate the adversarial system, while Tullock (1980) and Tullock (1988) 
endorse the inquisitorial system. The argument of Tullock is simplified based on the premise 
that the inquisitor is a truth-seeker who efficiently takes the costs into account in searching for 
the truth. The adversarial process, on the contrary, is a playing field for rent-seeing by agents 
arguing for the “truth” that suits them. Posner questioned both the incentives of the inquisitor 
and the performance of the inquisitorial process to illuminate the facts. This is consistent with 
the Chicago-school skepticism towards expanding the role of government in general. The 
adversarial process performs better according to Posner. Even if the parties in an adversarial 
trial speak for they own interest, the competition between the parties in providing evidence 
and finding flaws in each other argumentation, yield, as a starting point, an accurate 
assessment of evidence.  
                                                 
585 See Parisi (2002). 
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Several other seminal contributions have used economic models to illuminate the 
relative performance of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems.586 Many of these models are 
based on parties having asymmetric private information, and game theory is used to study 
which system performs best as a framework to bring forward information and in facilitating 
accurate decisions. Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Shin (1994, 1998), and Froeb and 
Kobayashi (1996, 2001) are examples of literature that, with various assumptions illuminate, 
how the adversarial procedure is superior to the inquisitorial procedure in revealing the facts.  
Dewatripoint and Tirole (1999) model the incentives of the decision makers. The 
authors assume that a decision can favor either one of the parties or maintain the status quo. 
The last decision gives the lowest payoff to the decision maker. The authors find that an 
inquisitorial procedure tends to bias the decisions towards one of the extremes as the decision 
maker has no incentive to search for contradictory evidence when he has evidence that favors 
one of the parties. Thus, when the parties cannot manipulate evidence the adversarial process 
is superior as a fact-finding mechanism. If evidence can be manipulated, the superiority of the 
adversarial process depends on whether errors resulting from manipulation are better than the 
extremism generated by the inquisitorial process. There are also various experimental studies 
that test the predictions of the just mentioned literature.587 Neven (2006) survey much of this 
literature in an antitrust context. An interesting contribution is Parisi (2002), who models a 
sliding scale between the inquisitorial and adversarial process and finds an optimal degree of 
inquisition. Much of this literature was commented upon above. Parisi (2002) will be returned 
to below. 
Accumulated research on actual evidence assessment is used as inputs in the model 
presented in this subchapter. It was shown how the imperfections and biases associated with 
the two systems of procedure are likely to affect the whole process of evidence assessment. 
The inquisitorial procedure is likely to be associated with a systematical bias in favor of 
finding violations. This not only affects the decision as such, but also what evidence is 
gathered, how much evidence is gathered, and in what sequence it is gathered. Thus, the 
imperfections and biases associated with the inquisitorial procedure are likely to be more 
extensive than it appears from a static perspective. When it comes to the adversarial 
procedure, the decision makers are not likely to be systematically biased in one or another 
direction. However, even if the decision makers are predictably biased, this is likely to be 
                                                 
586 Sanchirico (2012) surveys much of the economic literature on legal evidence.            
587 See Block and Parker (2004). 
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mitigated by the adaption of the parties.588 A party with a bias against him will have 
incentives to produce more evidence to compensate. Furthermore, assuming that the marginal 
cost of producing evidence on the side of the truth is cheaper than producing evidence for 
some non-meritorious facts, this will create a competitive advantage for the one arguing for 
the truth. It was, however, found that there is a risk that evidence production will be too 
excessive in the adversarial process. However, because evidence is noisier due to the possible 
exploitation of biases and rhetoric, the decision maker needs more evidence for an accurate 
result. If the stakes are very asymmetric, the evidence production may also be too low in an 
adversarial process, and there will be relatively more evidence provided by the party with the 
high stakes. If it is assumed that the highest stakes are likely to be associated with monopolies 
who want to protect their rents, this might create a systematical bias towards non-violation 
decisions.  
It cannot be deductively concluded from the discussion what system is best. This 
depends on whether the failures of the inquisitorial or adversarial procedures are worse. 
However, the analysis performed above tends to favor the adversarial system. Although the 
adversarial system is subject to weaknesses, it does not appear to be subject to the same 
systematic bias towards finding violations as the inquisitorial system is. Furthermore, the 
analysis has revealed that the evidence costs savings normally associated with the inquisitorial 
procedure are not as obvious as it appears when taking the biases into account. Too much 
evidence that favor violation is likely to be gathered in the inquisitorial procedure.  
However, despite the lack of robust conclusions, conclusions can be drawn on which 
system is likely to have the best potential to be improved. As noted above, there is a sliding 
scale between the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system. The inquisitorial system 
can be improved with adversarial elements by extending contradictory rights, including 
formal hearings, internal peer review, and by strengthening the judicial review. This is 
descriptive for the evolution of the EU competition procedure, as described above. On the 
other hand, the adversarial system can be made more “inquisitorial” by giving the judge a 
more active role in the evidence administration and by giving the judge more opportunities to 
take initiatives ex officio. By this, we can approach an optimal mix of adversarial and 
inquisitorial elements.589  
Based on the incentive structure, an improvement of the adversarial system seems to 
be the most promising to use as a basis for an improved system mixing adversarial and 
                                                 
588 See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996). See also Farmer and Pecorino (2000).  
589 See Parisi (2002).  
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inquisitorial elements. Even if the inquisitorial procedure is improved, this will not fully solve 
the intrinsic problems associated with the incentive structure. An inquisitorial enforcement 
authority is there to find violations, and its performance in doing so will govern the incentives 
in evidence assessments. Judicial review will discipline the inquisitorial decision makers, but 
the investigated parties have a disadvantage since they have the burden to prove that the 
decision in wrong. In this operation, the investigated party will have to battle an excessive 
amount of evidence that favors violation gathered by the inquisitor, while the evidence that 
favor not violation is not sufficiently explored.590      
In an adversarial system, it is not the incentives of the decision makers that are the 
main problem, but the failures associated with the evidence production of the parties and the 
risk of assessment failure due to the exploitation of imperfections and biases in the assessment 
of evidence. By extending the role of judges by increasing their role in demanding from the 
parties clear and explanatory statements on what inferences are supposed to be drawn from 
some evidence presented by the parties for evidence to be admissible, and by training the 
decision makers in handling possible assessment fallacies, the decision making can be 
improved. To facilitate this, requiring written assessments of the evidence assessment, 
including grounds on which inferences are drawn from the various elements of evidence will 
discipline the decision makers to analytically assess every piece of evidence and the 
inferences drawn from them. Furthermore, by enforcing the right to declare evidence 
inadmissible on the basis of cost considerations, the judge can mitigate both the problem of 
excessive evidence in general and excessive evidence from one party due to asymmetric 
stakes. More screening from judges will reduce the incentives for excessive production of 
evidence in the first place as it will be a less chance that the excessive evidence will be 
allowed into court. The problem is, however, that the judges do not have sufficient incentives 
to take the benefits of a more restrictive case administration fully into account. More 
administration requires more personal efforts by the judge. It seems likely that a stricter 
requirement of written evidence assessments may also help to mitigate this problem. After all, 
more evidence will extend the written decision that has to be produced, which also involves 
effort. This will give the judge an incentive for better evidence administration. Other 
procedural rules that increase the costs of providing excessive evidence and to balance the 
stakes in trial may also improve the adversarial system.591 Rules such as treble damages in US 
                                                 
590 See Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) for some similar arguments based on an analysis of antitrust enforcement in 
a model of collusion with private information.     
591 Other procedural rules are briefly discussed below. 
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Clayton Act, Section 4,592 increase the stakes for the plaintiffs relative to defendants, which 
can balance some of the asymmetric stakes due to monopoly rent protection. However, such 
rules must be used carefully to balance asymmetries in stakes and not exaggerate them. The 
impact of other procedural rules is briefly discussed below. 
Thus, the conclusion is that the adversarial procedure seems to be a better starting 
point for facilitating rational evidence assessment than an inquisitorial procedure. This is in 
line with the position of, and studies by, R. Posner and many of the game theoretical models 
presented above. This result also follows the general insight that a benevolent dictator 
theoretically performs best in obtaining optimality, though competition works best in practice, 
even if there are some extra costs involved.     
5.4.6 Some comments on model complications  
The impact of other procedural rules 
Procedural rules not directly regulating evidence assessment are also likely to have a 
substantial impact on the performance of the actual evidence assessment. Also general 
procedural rules influence evidence assessments. The law and economics of procedure 
include several studies on strategic adaption to procedural rules and the effects on this 
strategic behavior on the performance of the decisions.593 It will be beyond the scope of this 
literature to study the variety of procedural rules. This study will just briefly address a few 
topics to illustrate the impact of procedural rules on evidence assessment.  
Rules on settlements might affect the evidence competition. If some new evidence 
evidence is presented by a party, the other party can choose either to try to refute the inference 
that can be made from evidence by other evidence, or try to settle. The conditions for 
settlements will affect the attractiveness for settlements. If the settlement rules make it 
difficult to settle on some “intermediate” solutions, this is likely to discourage settlements. As 
a result, the party may prefer to gather more evidence instead of attempting to settle. Thus, the 
settlement rules will influence the amount of evidence that will be gathered.594   
Rules on the losing party’s duty to compensate the litigation costs incurred by the 
winning party may also affect the evidence collected.595 On the one hand, the requirement for 
the losing party to cover the cost of the winning party might boost the amount of evidence as 
stakes become higher. This rule might, however, also discourage the presentation of evidence 
                                                 
592 15 USC § 15. 
593 Spier (2007) and Sanchrico (2007) survey the literature. See also Posner (2011) Chapter 21. 
594 See Posner (2011) p. 763 f. for an economic analysis of settlements.  
595 See for, instance, Farmer and Pecorino (2000). 
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as presenting evidence encourages a response for the opposite party to gather more evidence 
which increases the potential costs that may have to be covered. The reason is that there is a 
risk that these costs must be covered in case of loss. Although the total effect is ambiguous, 
rules on compensating the winning party for his expenses are likely to affect the evidence 
gathering.  
 The rights to appeal also affect evidence decisions.596 If there is no right to appeal, 
stakes are higher in the first case, which increases the incentives to provide evidence. On the 
other hand, appeal rounds make the process bigger and longer, which probably increases the 
amount of evidence. Thus, even if the total effect is ambiguous, appeal rights are likely to 
affect the amount of evidence. Furthermore, the appeal possibilities are likely to affect the 
evidence assessment of the first instance decision makers because the first instance decision 
makers want to avoid their decision being declared void or overturned. This will discipline the 
evidence assessment in the first instance. This was partially discussed above in the context of 
how judicial review affects the evidence assessment of inquisitorial decision makers.     
A related topic to the analysis of strategic adaption to procedural rules is the inferential 
value of the litigation decisions as such. In other words, does the litigation conduct have any 
probative force as evidence? What probative force can, for instance, be inferred from the 
observation that a suspect refuses to give a statement in court? Does this have probative force 
in support of violation? Might it ever be rational for a non-guilty person to refuse to give a 
statement? What is the signal value of a decision to appeal? Has the decision to appeal 
probative force in favor of the appellant? If so, could such a decision be used strategically by 
an appellant with a non-merit case? These topics have also been studied in law and 
economics.597          
Multiparty decision making 
So far, the decision of one single decision maker has been the focus of the above modeling of 
actual evidence assessment. In legal evidence assessment, it is often not one single judge that 
assesses evidence, but many judges or jurors who must make the decision in concert. In legal 
cases, the decision makers will typically be judges in collegiums or commissions, and often it 
is a laymen jury that decides upon the facts.  
                                                 
596 See Posner (2011) p. 806 f. and Posner (2008) for economic analyses of appeals.  
597 See Sanchrico (2007). 
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Collective decision making is analyzed in the theory of social choice.598 Kenneth 
Arrow was awarded the Nobel memorial prize in economics in 1971 based on, inter alia, 
Arrow (1951) which derived the impossibility theorem of social choice.599 Simplified, Arrow 
(1951) showed that it is impossible to construct a social utility function based on, inter alia, 
majority voting which generally satisfies the assumptions of rationality. A utility function 
based on majority voting might, for instance, conflict with the transitivity assumption. 
Incorporating game theory and the possibility of strategic voting makes the study of social 
choice quite complex, even in simple situations. The theory of social choice has been used to 
study legal decision making involving several judges.600 This study will not include a detailed 
study the impact of multiple decision makers on antitrust evidence assessment. However, a 
simple example will be used to show how collective decision making affects the outcome and 
performance of legal evidence assessment and may disturb the rationality of evidence 
assessment.   
Assume that there are three alternative possible ways to assess evidence: assessment 
A, assessment B and assessment C. In an antitrust context, it can, for instance, be that some 
conduct can be seen as anticompetitive, anticompetitive but with counterweighing consumer 
gains, or pro-competitive (A, B, and C, respectively). For simplicity, assume that there are 
three judges that must decide on the evidence assessment together: Judge 1, Judge 2, and 
Judge 3. Judge 1 prefers assessment A, then B and then C. Judge 2 prefers assessment B, then 
C, and then A. Judge 3 prefers assessment C, then A, and then B. Thus, the three judges rank 
the evidence assessments in the following order:           
 
Judge 1: A๎B๎C 
Judge 2: B๎C๎A 
Judge 3: C๎A๎B 
 
Note that it is easy to see that the preferences are not transitive with majority voting. With 
majority voting, A would trump B, B would trump C, but C would trump A. Thus, an 
                                                 
598 See Binmore (2008) for a short introduction.  
599 Further developed by another winner of the Nobel memorial prize in economics, Amartya Sen. See Sen 
(1970, 1995, 1999). 
600 See, for instance, Easterbrook (1982, 1984b) and Kornhauser (1992a, 1992b). See Rubin (2000) for a review 
of the literature. 
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aggregate utility function based on majority voting would not satisfy the transitivity axiom of 
rationality.   
Assume that assessment A means that the law is violated, while B or C means that the 
law is not violated. The rules for voting determine if it is decided violation or not. Assume 
that the decision makers only have the option to choose between A and B. There are no 
incentives for strategic voting, only to vote the preferred alternative. Both Judges 1 and 3 
prefer A to B, while Judge 2 prefers B to A. The result with majority voting would be 
assessment A. Thus, violation would be decided in a majority vote between A and B. In a 
requirement of unanimity on A for A to win, assessment B would win. Now assume that the 
decision makers only can choose between A and C. Both Judges 2 and 3 prefer C to A, and C 
would win majority voting. Thus, not violation would be decided in the majority between A 
and C. C would also obviously win with a requirement of unanimity on A for A to win. Thus, 
we can see that the alternative rules of voting determine whether violation or not violation is 
decided.  
Assume now that the two alternatives to vote for are violation and not violation. Now 
there is room for strategic voting. It is not a majority for finding violation (A), but finding 
violation is better than B for Judges 1 and 3. Assume now that it is first voted for violation or 
not violation. If not violation is found, it is voted for B or C as the ground for not violation. 
An example could be that the court first decides violation or not violation, and then, after that, 
vote for who will write the opinion. Judge 3 prefers violation to B. This means that if Judge 3 
believes that the result of a vote between B and C will be B, it is better to vote for violation in 
the first place. We will not go into the further game theoretic analysis here, but the optimal 
vote dependents on the voters belief of the preference order of the other voters. The same 
applies if we assume that the votes are done in opposite order. If it is first voted between C or 
B as the grounds for deciding not violation, and then violation is voted against on this ground, 
the optimal vote of each judge will depend on their beliefs of the preferences of the other 
judges.         
We see that the order and alternatives of voting are crucial when there are multiple 
decision makers. By trying to influence the alternative hypotheses that are subject to voting 
the result can be manipulated. Trying to manipulate the decision maker’s alternative 
hypothesis in the assessment of evidence is, of course, also important with only one decision 
maker as this might mislead the decision maker to choose the most probable hypotheses 
among the alternatives as the most probable hypothesis overall, even if there exists another 
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even more probable competing hypothesis. However, a rational decision maker cannot be 
manipulated in this way. With collective decision making, the choice of alternatives can affect 
the outcome even if all of the decision makers are individually rational. It is the social choice 
that becomes irrational. 
The irrationality of social choice has relevance for both inquisitorial and adversarial 
decision making as long as it is multiple decision makers who have to make the decision. 
There are no grounds to say that the nature of collective decision making works 
systematically differently in the two systems. However, in an adversarial system, the parties 
in the process have a better opportunity to exploit the multi-party nature of the decision 
making in the procedure. From this, it is natural to assume that irrationalities due to multiple 
decision makers more easily can be exploited in the US than in the EU. Jury trials are likely to 
increase this opportunity as juries come together ad hoc and do not interact with each other 
repeatedly.  
Another difference between the EU and US that is related to collective decision 
making is the possibility of dissenting opinions in the US. The possibility of dissent may 
mitigate the rationality failures of collective decision making as each judge may deliver their 
own opinion, or at least decide if they are with the minority or majority. This means that 
fewer compromises have to be made.601 This has only a limited relevance for evidence 
assessment, because the evidence assessment in the US, as a main rule, is made by a jury who 
does not deliver grounded evidence assessments or dissenting opinions. Still, in those 
situations where judges conduct actual evidence assessment as described above, the 
possibility of dissent may mitigate some of the irrationality that may follow from collective 
decision making.    
5.5 Conclusions 
The chief research questions addressed in the beginning of this chapter were: How should 
antitrust evidence be rationally assessed? Do the assessment principles and procedures in 
antitrust analysis promote rational evidence assessments? How can the assessment principles 
and procedures used in antitrust analysis be improved to promote rational evidence 
assessments? These questions are addressed in turn below. 
                                                 
601 For a law and economics based analysis of dissents, see Epstein et al. (2011).     
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How should evidence be rationally assessed? 
On the question of how evidence should rationally be assessed, this chapter started by citing 
Beckner and Salop (1999), who stated that “[t]he court first should gather information that is 
least expensive, resolves the most uncertainty, and is most likely to affect its decision”. Using 
a model of rational evidence assessment, more content was added to this statement. Rational 
evidence assessment is about minimizing the sum of the expected loss of errors from making 
a wrong decision and the cost associated with gathering evidence. 
A piece of evidence should be gathered if its decision value exceeds the cost of 
gathering the evidence. The decision value of evidence is the evidence’s ability to reduce the 
expected loss from errors. It will only have a decision value to gather some evidence if there 
is a chance that the outcome of the evidence gathering makes it rational to change the 
decision. In other words, gathering evidence only has decision value if there is any chance 
that gathering the evidence will influence the decision. The decision value of evidence 
depends on the probative force of evidence and the losses from errors. The probative force of 
evidence is the extent the evidence influences the probability of a hypothesis. In rational 
evidence assessment, the laws of probability determine the probative force. The decision 
value is higher, the higher the chance that gathering evidence will have as an outcome that we 
with strong probative force are right in changing our decision to a decision associated with a 
less expected error.   
The costs of gathering evidence should be as low as possible. This means that 
evidence should be gathered by the one who can gather it at the lowest costs. This can be 
implemented by the use of presumptions that disfavor the low cost producer. This will give 
the party who has the lowest cost in producing the evidence the incentive to provide the 
evidence.  
Evidence should be gathered in the right amount and in the right sequence. The 
tradeoff between decision value and cost facilitates the gathering of a right amount of 
evidence. By gathering evidence in the right sequence, a rational decision can be taken at each 
stage. One can then rationally decide whether it is efficient to gather more evidence or to 
decide upon the evidence already available. The rational sequence of evidence gathering 
depends on both decision value and costs. The cheapest evidence with the highest decision 
value should be gathered first. However, dynamical programming is necessary to determine 
the right sequence of gathering evidence.  
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Do the assessment principles and procedures in antitrust analysis promote rational evidence 
assessment? 
Antitrust decision makers are not likely to formally use probability theory and expected loss 
minimization in their overall assessment of evidence. The formal use of probability theory 
might, however, appear in elements of the evidence assessment, such as when statistical and 
econometric evidence is evaluated. Rather, the overall assessment of antitrust evidence can 
better be described as abductive reasoning, where the one that assesses evidence searches for 
plausible explanations of the evidence to ultimately find a best explanation. Abductive 
reasoning includes the use of informal methods such as presumptions, analogical reasoning, 
and appeal to expert knowledge. All these elements are crucial to actual evidence assessment 
in both the US and EU. Presumptions are an important instrument in antitrust evidence 
assessment. Antitrust decision makers regularly use analogy by referring to evidence 
assessments in previous decisions. Expert knowledge, in particular economic expert 
knowledge, has a crucial role in informing antitrust decisions.     
  It has been argued in the literature that abductive reasoning, as a starting point, gives 
the correct evidence assessment. The question is whether there are imperfections and biases 
that distort the evidence assessment out of being correct. There are several sources of 
imperfections and biases that are likely to distort antitrust evidence assessment. The decision 
makers are maximizers of utility subject to institutional incentives, the decision makers can be 
influenced by cognitive biases, there is a risk of errors associated with the use of analogies, 
experts might be biased, and rhetoric can be abused by the parties in the argumentation. The 
impact of these imperfections and biases is likely to be dependent on whether the procedural 
system is inquisitorial or adversarial.  
When it comes to inquisitorial systems, empirical research and literature have 
suggested that an inquisitorial decision maker is subject to a prosecutorial bias that 
systematically favors the evidence assessment in favor of violation. Some of this literature 
directly addresses antitrust and, in particular, the enforcement of the European Commission. 
The prosecutorial bias is a result of both incentive biases and cognitive biases. Since an 
inquisitorial enforcement authority is awarded for what it does, it is likely to be subject to an 
incentive bias in favor of finding violations. The inquisitor is also likely to be subject to a 
confirmation bias, which is a cognitive bias. According to the confirmation bias, people tend 
to assess evidence in a way that confirms already established beliefs which means to confirm 
a belief of violation in the context of a prosecutorial bias.  
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By using economic modeling, it was found that the prosecutorial bias has additional 
consequences for the rationality of evidence assessment beyond the pure static effect in terms 
of a wrong evidence assessment. The inquisitor has an incentive to excessively search for 
evidence that has probative force supporting violation and to search too little for evidence that 
have probative force in contradiction of violation. In addition to the prosecutorial bias, the 
inquisitor has an incentive to save his own cost by transferring the burden of producing 
evidence to the investigated parties by the use of presumptions. This will lead to inefficiency 
in the gathering of evidence.  Combined with the confirmation bias, the inquisitor is likely to 
give too strong probative force to the failure of the parties to produce evidence. Thus, the 
incentives to reduce costs reinforce the effects of the prosecutorial bias. Since the EU 
competition procedure is best characterized as inquisitorial, the conclusion is that the 
evidence assessment in the EU competition law enforcement is likely to be systematically 
biased, favoring violation. Furthermore, evidence is not likely to be gathered rationally. There 
will be an excessive search for evidence that has probative force supporting violation. 
Furthermore, the cost of gathering evidence is not likely to be efficient because the European 
Commission has an excessive incentive to impose a burden on the parties investigated to 
produce evidence.  
When it comes to the adversarial procedure, the decision makers are not likely to be 
subject to systematical biases towards either finding violation or finding not violation. This 
does not mean that the decision maker cannot be biased, just that there is no reason to believe 
that the decision makers have some systematic preferences for violation or not violation. 
However, the adversarial procedure is characterized by the parties (represented by lawyers) 
arguing for their own interest. The parties are likely to try to exploit cognitive biases and 
argue on the basis on analogies without merits if it benefits their case. Furthermore, since the 
main rule is that the parties choose their own experts to support their arguments, there is 
likely to be a biased selection of experts with professional preferences supporting the party 
appointing them. Furthermore, even if experts are repeat players and have a reputation to 
maintain, it cannot be ignored that the experts will do efforts in satisfying their paying clients, 
which will bias the expert opinions away from the purely professional. The parties are also 
likely to abuse rhetoric in influencing the decision makers. These imperfections are likely to 
be exaggerated in laymen jury trials, as juries are not experienced in filtering out and 
adjusting for imperfections and biases. Thus, there is likely to be more noisy evidence in an 
adversarial trial. The more noisy evidence, the more evidence is needed for an accurate 
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decision. The model developed in this chapter along with insight from other modeling efforts 
were used to gain further information on performance of the adversarial trial. A beneficial 
effect of the evidence competition in an adversarial trial is that if a party believes that the 
decision maker is subject to some systematic bias, he has an incentive to mitigate this by 
evidence production. Furthermore, if we assume that providing evidence on the side of the 
truth is cheaper than fabricating evidence, the party with the truth on his side has a 
competitive advantage. Thus, this is an argument that biases, if they are present, are not as 
harmful in the adversarial procedure as in the inquisitorial procedure.  
However, the adversarial process facilitates an evidence race that tends to lead to 
excessive evidence production. This is exaggerated by high stakes in the case. Thus, there is a 
potential for rent-seeking. However, if the private stakes are low compared to the social stakes 
too little evidence may also be produced. If stakes are asymmetric, it is likely to be an 
imbalanced amount of evidence in favor of the party with the high stakes. Thus, if we make 
an assumption that we are likely to observe asymmetric stakes in cases where a defendant 
wants to protect its monopoly profits, then there might be a systematic bias towards findings 
of not violation in these cases.        
Thus, there are likely to be deviations from rationality both in the inquisitorial EU 
system and adversarial US system. Which system that performs best depends on whether the 
failures of the inquisitorial or adversarial procedure are worst. However, the analysis 
performed in this chapter tends to favor the adversarial system. Although this system is 
subject to weaknesses, it does not appear to be subject to the same systematic bias toward 
finding violations as the inquisitorial system. Furthermore, the analysis has revealed that the 
evidence costs savings normally associated with the inquisitorial procedure are not as obvious 
as it appears, taking the biases into account. Too much evidence in favor of violation is likely 
to be produced in the inquisitorial system. Although the evidence is noisier in the adversarial 
system, the absence of a systematically biased evidence assessment in one direction and the 
excessive amount of evidence is likely to facilitate a more accurate decision as long as the 
stakes are not too asymmetric.  
 Since there is no clear answer as to which system performs best, the answer is 
dependent on which systems are most promising for being improved. This will follow next.  
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How can the assessment principles and procedures used in antitrust analysis be improved to 
promote rational evidence assessments? 
There is a sliding scale between the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system. The 
inquisitorial systems can be improved with adversarial elements by extending contradictory 
rights, including formal hearings, internal peer review, and by strengthening the judicial 
review. This is descriptive for the evolution of the EU competition procedure as described 
above. On the other hand, the adversarial system can be made more “inquisitorial” by giving 
the judge a more active role in the evidence administration and by giving the judge more 
opportunities to take initiatives ex officio. By this, we can obtain an optimal mix of 
adversarial and inquisitorial elements. 
Based on the incentive structure, an improvement of the adversarial system seems to 
be the most promising starting point for better antitrust procedures. Even if the inquisitorial 
procedure is improved by instruments such as increased contradictory rights and peer review 
mechanisms, this will not fully solve the intrinsic problems associated with the incentive 
structure. An inquisitorial enforcement authority is there to find violations, and its 
performance in doing so will govern the incentives in evidence assessment. Judicial review 
will discipline the inquisitorial decision makers, but the investigated parties will be in an 
inequality of arms when it has the burden to prove that the decision is wrong. In this 
operation, the investigated party will have to combat an excessive amount of evidence 
favoring violation while evidence contradictory to violation is not properly explored.  
In an adversarial system, it is not the incentives of the decision makers that are the 
main problem, but the failures associated with the evidence production of the parties and the 
risk of assessment failures due to the exploitation of imperfection and biases in the assessment 
of evidence. By extending the role of judges in demanding from parties clear statements as to 
what inferences are supposed to be drawn from some evidence presented for evidence to be 
admissible, and by training the decision makers in handling possible assessment fallacies, the 
decision making can be improved. To facilitate this, requiring written evidence assessments, 
including grounds on what inferences that are drawn from the various elements of evidence, 
will discipline the decision makers to analytically assess every piece of evidence and the 
inferences made from them. Furthermore, by being able to declare evidence inadmissible on 
the basis of cost considerations, the judge can mitigate both the problem of excessive 
evidence in general and excessive evidence from one party due asymmetric stakes. 
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 More screening from judges will, in itself, reduce the incentives for excessive 
production of evidence in the first place as there will be less chance that excessive evidence 
will be allowed into court. The problem is, however, that the judges do not have sufficient 
incentives to take the costs fully into account. More evidence administration requires more 
personal efforts by the judge. A stricter requirement of written evidence assessments may help 
also to mitigate this problem. After all, more evidence will extend the decision that has to be 
written, which also involves effort. This will give the judge a stronger incentive in the 
evidence administration to weigh the benefits of additional evidence against the costs. Other 
procedural rules, such as rules that increase the costs of providing excessive evidence and 
tend to balance the stakes in a trial, may mitigate some of the problems associated with an 
adversarial procedure. Rules such as treble damages increase the stakes for the plaintiffs 
relative to defendants, which can balance some of the asymmetric stakes due to monopoly 
rent protection. However, such rules must be used carefully to balance the asymmetries of the 
stakes and not to exaggerate the asymmetries.  
Thus, the conclusion is that there is room for improvements that facilitate more 
rational evidence assessments. An adversarial procedure supplemented by some 
“inquisitorial” elements seems to be the best starting point for better evidence assessments, 
rather than an inquisitorial procedure supplemented with “adversarial” elements.  
As a final remark, note that the appeal to expert knowledge, in particular the economic 
expert knowledge, is an essential feature of antitrust evidence assessment. Thus, rationality in 
the assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis is imperative in obtaining rational 
evidence assessments in antitrust analysis. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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6 Rationality in the assessment of economic models in 
antitrust analysis 
6.1 Introduction and motivation  
The use of economic models is a central feature of antitrust analysis. Inferences based on 
economic models are both used directly by the antitrust decision makers and with the aid of 
economic experts involved in the specific cases. Thus, rationality in the assessment of 
economic models is a crucial element in obtaining rational antitrust analyses.   
This chapter will first describe economic models and how economic models are utilized 
in antitrust analysis. Then, the decision theoretic framework established in Chapter Three is 
further developed to include directions for how to make rational inferences based on 
economic models. After this, it is discussed whether the assessment principles and procedures 
used in antitrust analysis are likely to facilitate a rational assessment of economic models. 
This includes questions such as whether the most informative economic models will be 
brought to the table and whether the models will be assessed according to their informative 
value. Critique and suggestions for improvements will be presented throughout the 
discussion. 
The chief research questions of this chapter are: How should economic models be 
rationally assessed in antitrust analysis? Do the antitrust assessment principles and 
procedures applied in antitrust analysis facilitate a rational assessment of economic models? 
How can the rationality in the assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis be 
improved? 
6.2 Economic models in antitrust analysis  
6.2.1 What is a model? 
Instrumentalism versus realism 
A model used for inference can be described as some assumptions on the structural links 
between phenomena or events, including causal links. The terms “models” and “theories” are 
often used interchangeably in science. The term model is mostly used in this chapter, although 
the term theory might also appear. Before going into details on what a model is, the difference 
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between realism and instrumentalism in modeling should be clarified.602 In realism, the goal 
of modeling is to establish true links between phenomena. For instance, a realism-based 
model can be used to explain the true cause of some consequence. In instrumentalism the goal 
of modeling is to make models that can predict. The separation between realism and 
instrumentalism is important. Different models can be good or bad, depending on whether 
they have a realistic or instrumentalist purpose. A model that gives a good description of what 
we think is reality, but performs poorly for predictions might still be preferred by a realist. 
Conversely, a person with an instrumentalist purpose might prefer a model that is known to 
not describe reality, as long as it gives good predictions. Assume, for example, that we flip a 
fair coin that can land on heads or tails. A model of the outcome of the flip is that it lands on 
heads with probability 0.5. For a realist, this might be a bad model. Unless we incorporate 
quantum level uncertainty, there is no genuine uncertainty associated with the outcome of the 
flip; thus, genuine uncertainty is not a good explanation for the outcome of the flip. By 
knowing the starting position of the coin, and all the forces that act upon the coin, we can 
provide a realistic model of the outcome of the flip. We can then with the help of natural laws 
explain why the coin landed on heads. However, for an instrumentalist knowing that the coin 
is fair, a model assuming that the probability of heads is 0.5 would make correct predictions 
in 50 percent of the flips on average and provide good predictions on the number of heads we 
are likely to observe after large number of flips. A more complex but realistic model may not 
perform better within operational frames, at least not without probative costs. Even genuine 
uncertainty does not affect the outcome of the flip, assuming so works for predictions.  
In economics, the distinction between instrumentalism and realism, and perhaps the 
failure to acknowledge this distinction, has triggered extensive debates. In the current 
neoclassical paradigm, the agents are often modeled as rational in the economic models. This 
has been subject to criticism. This critique might be justified against those who, on the basis 
of realism, defend the current neoclassical paradigm. Research by Nobel laureates in 
economics603 has shown that a person’s actual behavior might deviate substantially from what 
is considered rational behavior. However, if the defense of the current neoclassical paradigm 
in economics instrumentalism-based, the question of whether models are good or bad is a 
question of the models’ ability to predict economic outcomes.604                    
                                                 
602 See for instance Sober (2008) p. 96 f. See also Lianos (2010).   
603 This will be described in more detail in the subchapter on economic models below. 
604 The instrumentalist approach to economic modeling is stressed by the Nobel laureate economist Milton 
Friedman; see, for instance, Friedman (1953). McKenzie (2010) is a recent contribution that defends the current 
neoclassical paradigm of economics in the basis of instrumentalism.  
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Instrumental and realistic models are not mutually exclusive. Models can contain 
elements of what we believe the truth is and still be used for prediction purposes. Most 
models are often simplified and idealistic representations of the true links between 
phenomena. Models screen out some single links that are necessary for analysis that is 
performed. For instance, assuming that the earth is a perfect sphere might work for some 
analysis purposes, but not for others.  
Models can be seen as information. Knowledge of a model reduces the uncertainty by 
not knowing the full reality.605 Thus, a model has information value. This study is concerned 
with using models in antitrust analysis. This means that a model’s value is dependent on its 
ability to make antitrust decisions better. This will be discussed further below.            
The representation of a model 
Some vague ideas of what a model is are now presented. A model is some simplified 
representation of links between phenomena or events that can be used to explain and predict. 
There are many ways to represent and express a model. For instance, a map is a model of a 
geographical area, and a metro guide is a model of the metro system. In the context of 
antitrust analysis, we are concerned with the economic links between phenomena. A model of 
the economic links between phenomena can be expressed verbally. The sentence: “if price 
increases the supply increases” express a model of the link between prices and supply 
verbally. The verbal model can also be expressed in more logical terms of the type: if price 
increases then supply increases. Models can also be expressed by graphs or figures. The 
relationship between supply and price level is illustrated in figure 6.1: 
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In Figure 6.1, the supply, S, measured in units increases as the price, p, increases. Models can 
also be expressed by mathematical graph theory as illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
 




   
 
 
The graph in Figure 6.2 illustrates that the supply of company i, Si, is dependent on the market 
price, p, the technology of company i, Ti, and other factors, Ui, not captured by the model.  
Verbal, logical, and graphical representations of a model might provide intuition and 
may be illustrative of the links between phenomena and events. However, for more exact 
measurements of the links between phenomena and events, we need mathematical models. 
The phenomena and events that are linked with the model then become variables in an 
equation. For instance, we can write a model of supply in a market as 
 
Y=S(p,c).      
 
The supply, Y, is linked to the price, p, and the marginal cost, c. By assuming that S’(p)>0 
and S’(c)<0, the supply is increasing in price and decreasing in marginal cost. The model 
illustrates the link between supply, price, and cost. How can we take into account all other 
factors that affect supply? In statistical modeling, other factors can be described by a 
stochastic residual term, ε. That means that all other factors except the explicit modeled 
variables are captured by ε. This means that the model of supply can be written as    
 
Y = S(p,c,ε).      
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Y = β0+β1p+β2c+ε. 
 
Statistical analysis can be used to estimate the parameters β0, β1, and β2. This will be 
discussed further below. If Y is the variable we seek to explain or predict based on p and c, Y 
is the response variable while p and c are explanatory variables.  
So far, the causality issues have been avoided; the relationship between variables has 
been described by the more vague term “link”. The link might capture both a causal 
relationship and third variables that link variables together somehow.  In practice, we are 
often concerned with causality, and we want to use models to assess casual relationships. 
Does a medical treatment really work? What will happen to supply if the costs increase? Does 
a conduct under antitrust scrutiny cause anticompetitive effects?  Causality and modeling is a 
complicated issue that will be explored in more detail below.       
Models calibrated with data 
Assume as above that we operate with a model of the type Y=β0+β1p+β2c+ε. If we have some 
real world data on the combinations of y, p, and c, we can use statistical methods to calibrate 
the parameters β0, β1, and β2 with real world data. This is a simple example illustrating the 
principles of statistical regression. Econometrics is the use of statistical methods in the 
context of economic models.    
The calibration of the model to data consists of finding estimators for the parameters 
β0, β1 and β2 that best fits the model and apply the given data to these estimators to get 
estimates. An intuitively appealing method of finding estimators is the method of least 
squares. This is one of many methods to derive estimators to find estimates that fit as good as 
possible with the observations (data).  
Assume that we have the n observations (y1,p1,c1)…(yn,pn,…cn) which combines 
various observations of the response variables with observed combinations of the explanatory 
variables. The least squares method consist of finding estimators β0^, β1^ and β2^ for the 
parameters β0, β1 and β2, respectively, that minimize the sum of the squares of the differences 
between observed and estimated values. This means that β0^, β1^, and β2^ is determined by 
solving     
 
min Σi(yi-(β0^+β1^pi+β2^ci))2 with respect to β0^, β1^, and β2^. 
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By derivation of Σi(yi-β0^+β1^pi+β2^ci)2 with respect to β0^, β1^ and β2^, we get estimators of 
β0^, β1^ and β2^ as functions of (y1,p1,c1)…(yn,pn,cn).  
Note that β0^, β1^, and β2^ are just estimators providing an estimate for the true 
parameters, β0, β1, and β2. Even the model is “correct” in meaning that this is the true model 
that generated the data, the estimates are not necessarily equal to the true values β0, β1, and β2. 
If Y was not influenced by the residual ε, we would be able to infer the true parameters as 
long as we had more observations than parameters to estimate. The residual ε creates a 
random variation in data.  
As long as the residuals (the ε’s) for each observation are independent of the other 
explanatory variables, independent of each other, have zero expectation, and a have a constant 
variance σ2, the random variation created by the ε’s cancels each other out in the long run in 
deriving least squares estimates. The expectation of the least squares estimates of the 
parameters is the true values of the parameters (unbiased estimators) as long as the 
assumptions hold. Furthermore, the estimators are consistent. With a large enough amount of 
data, the probability that the estimate is different than the real value can be arbitrarily small as 
long as the model assumptions are correct.   
The method of least squares is a simple, intuitive method of deriving estimators. 
However, there are many other more advanced principles for determining estimators and 
estimates. Different methods of estimation have different properties. Some may perform in 
terms of being unbiased, while other performs better in terms of lower variance. It will be 
beyond the scope of this study to give a survey of these methods.  
Nevertheless, maximum likelihood estimation will be briefly described with the same 
model Y=β0+β1p+β2c+ε as an important method of deriving estimators. If we assume the ε’s 
are identically and independently distributed, and that the ε’s are independent of the 
explanatory variables (exogenous), the probability density for Y1,…,Yn can be written as 
follows    
 
fY1, ..,Yn(y1,…,yn|p1,…,pn,c1,…,cn;β0,β1,β2)=ПifY(yi|pi,ci;β0,β1,β2).  
 
We can multiply the probabilities since the ε’s are independent and the c and p’s are 
exogenous, which makes Y1,…,Yn independent of each other. Thus, the simultaneous 
distribution of Y1,…,Yn is according to the product rule of independent probabilities, the 
product of the probability of the individual Yi’s. The likelihood function L(β0,β1,β2) is  
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L(β0,β1,β2)= fY1, ..,Yn(y1,…,yn|p1,…,pn,c1,…,cn; β0,β1,β2)=ПifY(yi|pi,ci;β0,β1,β2).  
 




The maximum likelihood estimators can be considered as those estimators that maximize the 
likelihood of the observations. If we consider observations as evidence, we can say that the 
maximum likelihood estimators are those estimators that make the model most consistent with 
the evidence. It can be shown that if the ε’s are independent and normally distributed with 
expectation 0 and variance σ2, then the maximum likelihood estimators and the least squares 
estimators coincide.606   
 Calibrating models to data is, in practice, to force the parameters of a model to fit as 
much as possible with the data, regardless of the true mechanisms that generated the data. If 
the model is far from the true mechanisms that generated the data, the model is not likely to 
be very good as an instrument to explain and predict the observed data. With statistical 
inference, we can make inferences on the parameters and the models as such. By exploiting 
the assumed probabilistic nature of observations, we can test, for instance, whether the 
observations are likely given certain assumptions of the parameters, for instance, that a 
parameter is zero. We can also calculate the information value of a model as such by testing 
how well a model explains and predicts data. These issues are returned to in the discussion of 
rational model-based inferences below.  
Models and causal inferences  
A general description of models was given above. In this section it is discussed how to utilize 
models to assess causal connections. Economic models will inspire the examples, but the full 
discussion on the logic and structure of economic models will be returned to in the next 
subchapter.  
Model-based causal inferences can be illustrated by a simple example. The effect Y is 
dependent on two explicit variables A and B. The residual, U, captures circumstances, other 
                                                 
606 See Wasserman (2003) p. 212 f. 
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than A and B, that influence Y. The model can be written as Y=f(A,B,U). In a graph, this 
model might look as in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3: graph for simple casual analysis. 
 





In the graph in Figure 6.3, it is assumed that A and B, together with U, determines Y. Both A 
and B are exogenous. This means that it is no third variable that influences Y both through A 
and by another path. The same applies to B. To figure out if a cause is necessary, we can 
manipulate on the variable representing what we want to check if is a necessary cause. 
Assume that we want to investigate whether some agreement has an anticompetitive effect. 
We can let A be the agreement, so A=true means that the agreement is present and A=false 
means that the agreement is not present. To investigate the anticompetitive effect, we can 
compare Y1=f(A=true,B=b,U=u) with Y2=f(A=false,B=b,U=u), where Y is some measure on 
the degree of competition. If Y in the first case is lower than in the last case, we can conclude 
that the agreement has an anticompetitive effect within the model.  
A complication would be to introduce a confounding variable, C. This would make the 
graph look like in Figure 6.4.   
 
Figure 6.4: causal analysis with confounding variable 
 









In the graph in Figure 6.4, A and B are no longer exogenous. The exogenous variable is C. C 
affects Y both via A and B. This makes the counterfactual analysis more complicated. If we 
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A in the model, we will not get the same answer as if the same A were determined 
endogenously. This means that if we counterfactually insert A=a in the model by holding the 
other variables fixed, we will not get the same value of Y as if A was determined by C. The 
reason is that by directly setting A=a, A is decoupled from C. C affects A and B, and 
determines the A’s and B’s that are “consistent” with each other. In other words, A and B are 
correlated. As an antitrust example, we can assume that C is an agreement on price between 
competitors. This has the following effects on the consumer surplus Y: a negative effect by 
increased prices (A) and a positive effect from increased competition in various non-price 
dimensions (B) such as quality. Assume that we want to assess the effect of the agreements by 
putting the counterfactual competitive price into the model, holding all other variables 
constant. This means to use a model f(A,U) and compare f(A=conspiracy prices,U=u) with 
f(A=competitive prices,U=u), holding everything else equal. This is likely to overstate the 
negative effects of the agreement, as the benefit from non-price competition is not taken into 
account. A real counterfactual analysis of the presence of the agreement must include its 
effect on Y, both via A and via B. The manipulated variable has to be exogenous for a correct 
counterfactual analysis. The exogenous variable is C. For counterfactual analysis we should 
compare f(C=agreement,U=u) with f(C=no agreement,U=u).      
Exogeneity might also be disturbed by a confounding variable C that affects both the 
explicit modeled variables and U. This is illustrated in Figure 6.5.  
 









In the model illustrated with the graph in Figure 6.5 it is a third variable C that affects both A 
and U. This endogeneity raises the same problems discussed above. In statistical analysis, it is 
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In a model of causality, we might both have direct and indirect effects. This is 
illustrated in Figure 6.6. 
 









In the model illustrated by the graph in Figure 6.6, A affects Y in two ways: directly and 
indirectly, via B. In some circumstances, one may only be interested the direct effect and in 
other circumstances only the indirect effect, while yet in other circumstances, in the total 
effect. The various effects can be isolated in a model, if one, for instance, only wants to assess 
the direct effects. The model in the graph in Figure 6.6 can be written mathematically as 
Y=f(A,B(A),U).  In this model B, is a function of A, so we might have written Y=f(A,U). By 
using f(A,B(A),U), B can be held fixed and we can assess the direct effect of A. Normally, it 
is the total effect we are interested in for the counterfactual assessment. A model only 
capturing the direct effects will give wrong inferences in a counterfactual analysis where the 
total effect should be taken into account. Assume, for instance, that we want to assess the 
effects of a merger. The arrow between A and Y is the direct effect of the merger on the 
market, everything else equal. This means that if a merger is prohibited status quo will 
prevail, while if the merger is consummated the rest of the market is assumed to remain 
identical. This ignores substantial indirect effects. If the merger is prohibited, this might lay 
the grounds for other mergers. If the merger is cleared, this might create a merger wave. 
Taking into account these effects is essential for a correct assessment of the effects of 
prohibiting the merger. 
So far, the model-properties of U are neglected. Assume that U is modeled as 
stochastic. This makes the inferences from the model probabilistic. More precisely, 
Y=f(A,B,U) becomes random since it is dependent on U, which is random. If we, for 
simplicity, assume that Y is binary (Y=true or Y=false), we can talk about p(Y=true|A,B). We 
can, for instance, assume that Y is true if competition is restricted. It was shown above that, if 
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and B are exogenous. This means that if we assume A and B are exogenous and equal to a and 
b, we can use P(Y=true|A=a,B=b) for the counterfactual analysis.607 By using the formula for 
the probability of necessary cause derived in Chapter Five,608 and assuming monotonicity,609 
we can find the probability that A=a is a necessary cause for Y to be true. This is 
 
p(A=a necessary for Y to be true)=  
[p(Y=true|A=a, B=b))-p(Y=true|A=not a,B=b)]/p(Y=true|A=a,B=b) 
 
The probability of A=a being a necessary cause for Y to be true is the excess risk of Y being 
true given a. Let A=a be the presence of an alleged anticompetitive agreement. Even the 
anticompetitive agreement was not entered into, there might be some probability that the same 
anticompetitive effects would follow anyway, for instance, if all firms except one firm in the 
market would go bankrupt and disappear from the market. In that case, the agreement would 
not have any anticompetitive effect. Thus there might be some outcomes of other 
circumstances, U, that will eliminate the necessity for the agreement to be anticompetitive. 
6.2.2 Economic models  
The neoclassical paradigm 
Economics is a behavioral science. The basis for economic models is the decisions of 
individuals. The main domain for economics has traditionally been the study of market 
behavior; however, the domain of economic analysis has now expended to all areas involving 
decisions when resources are scarce. The use of decision theory in this study to study antitrust 
analysis when information is scarce is an example of this.  
The aggregated outcome of interaction between individual persons can be used to 
study group behavior and even macroeconomic measures. Economic analysis can be positive, 
which is the study of actual behavior and outcomes, or normative, which give normative 
implications, for instance, for how a market should be regulated. Efficiency, welfare, and 
distribution are possible standards for the normative analysis.  
The current paradigm in economic modeling is the neoclassical framework. The 
neoclassical approach has its origins from the classical economists. The classical economists 
include Adam Smith (1723-1790), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and Jeremy Bentham 
                                                 
607 See Pearl (2009) p. 65 f. and Sloman (2005) p. 5 for a more intuitive approach.  
608 Chapter 5.2.4. Based on Pearl (2009).  
609 Y is monotonic relative to A=a means that A=a cannot be a cause of Y=false See Pearl (2009) p. 291 f. This 
was also described Chapter 5.2.4 above.   
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(1748–1832). Smith (1776) is probably the most seminal and famous classical contribution to 
economics. Adam Smith is famous for introducing the concept of an invisible hand that 
directs commercial self-interested agents in their competition for profits to also serve the 
society’s interest in welfare and wealth.  The neoclassicists, such as Jevon (1871), Menger 
(1971), Walras (1874), and Marshall (1890) formalized the theories of the classical 
economists with mathematical models. The mathematical models lay the grounds for the 
“marginal revolution”, which means to use marginal measures in economic analysis. An 
imperative tool for this analysis was the differential calculus developed a century earlier.   
The neoclassical approach was developed further in the 20th century. Contributions such as 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Stigler (1952), and Friedman (1953) are seminal in 
the evolution towards the axiomatic rational choice models used in economics today. von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is known, inter alia, for establishing modern game theory, 
which is crucial for modern neoclassical analysis. 
 Models based on rational choice decision making do not mean that economists 
believe that these models are descriptive for the actual decision making of individuals when 
used in positive analysis. It is an instrumental approach to predict behavior and outcomes.610 
The rational choice approach to positive analysis has been critically addressed by behavioral 
economists, who have revealed that actual behavior deviates substantially from behavior 
predicted by the models of rational choice. Behavioral economics is returned to below.             
Equilibrium 
Deriving equilibriums is an imperative feature of the neoclassical paradigm. Based on the 
assumptions on the agents’ behavior and the exogenous variables, one can deductively 
calculate the equilibrium outcome of an economic model or the possible equilibriums if there 
are several potential equilibriums. For now, assume that we have made enough assumptions 
to single out a unique equilibrium. We will get back to the problem of several equilibriums in 
the discussion of game theory below. The equilibrium outcome is determined by the adaption 
of all the agents in interaction, and might be multidimensional. The equilibrium of a market 
model may consist of the equilibrium price, the equilibrium quantity, equilibrium profits, and 
so on. Different equilibrium concepts will be returned to below. For now, the equilibrium is 
pragmatically considered as a balanced state, and that without any outside “shocks” this state 
                                                 
610 See Friedman (1953). See McKenzie (2010) for a recent discussion. 
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remains. This means that without any outside “shock”, no agents have an incentive to deviate 
from their adaption to the current state.  
A balanced state does not mean that there are no changes or dynamics, just that the 
state is stable. For instance, in equilibrium a firm might produce 100 units per year or it might 
increase its production by 10 percent per year. The equilibrium is simply what we get when 
we solve equations representing the behavioral assumptions and the exogenous variables. 
Thus, the equilibrium is found by solving the mathematical equations that models the 
behavior. When all equations are simultaneously satisfied, we have the equilibrium.  
An equilibrium can be stable or unstable. In a stable equilibrium, the dynamics will 
lead us back to the equilibrium if we, for some reason, are outside equilibrium. This means 
that if there is some outside “shock”, we might be outside equilibrium for a period; however, 
eventually we will get back to the equilibrium. An unstable equilibrium means that dynamics 
will not necessarily lead us back to the equilibrium if we happen to be outside the 
equilibrium. The determination of the equilibrium in an economic model is illustrated Figure 
6.7.          
 







   
 
 
The basic assumptions of an economic model include, inter alia, the rationality assumptions.  
In addition to the basic assumptions, model-specific assumptions have to be made. This is 
necessary to obtain a manageable and solvable amount of equations and to isolate and idealize 
the situation we want to model. The model specific assumptions might, for instance, consist 
of assumptions on the customers’ preferences, firms’ production technology, that there will be 
no entry of new firms, and so on. The assumptions in economic models consist of the explicit 
assumptions done; however, there might also be lot of implicit assumption that stand without 
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mentioning. Such implicit assumptions might be that property rights are respected, that 
agreements are respected, that there is no fraudulent behavior, and so on. Sometimes, it might 
appear coincidental which assumptions are made explicit and the ones that are implicit. 
Assumptions that are central for the analysis are usually made explicit and clear. If, for 
instance, asymmetric information is central to the analysis, assumptions concerning how the 
information is asymmetric are made explicit. If the possibility of fraud is central to the 
modeled situation, there will be explicit assumptions as to how the fraud might be performed 
and so on.         
The variables that are determined within the models are the endogenous variables. By 
comparative statics, one can analyze the effects of changes in exogenous variables. This is 
what we do when we use economic models for counterfactual and hypothetical scenarios 
analysis in general. This was described above in the general discussion on the use of models 
for causal analysis. For instance, one can study the equilibrium effects that follow from 
changed input prices. The same method can be used to study the effects public interventions 
and private interventions in the market, such as a cartels and other anticompetitive conduct, as 
long as they can be described by exogenous variables.    
A typical equilibrium in economic analysis is the equilibrium between supply and 
demand. From the equilibrium between supply and demand, we get an equilibrium price and 
an equilibrium quantity. The well-known perfect competition model based on the assumptions 
of, inter alia, atomistic price taking agents, full information, well defined property rights and 
no transaction costs, predicts an equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity determined by the 
aggregate demand equaling aggregate competitive supply. Thus, the endogenous equilibrium 
price p* is determined by D(p)=S(p), where D(p) is aggregate demand and S(p) is competitive 
supply. The equilibrium quantity, X*, is the demand and supply at the equilibrium price, 
which means X*=D(p*)=S(p*). On the other end of the competition scale is the simple 
monopoly model where the firm maximizes profits subject to the demand and its costs. 
Assuming constant marginal costs c, this means that the firm maximizes π=(p-c)D(p), where π 
is the profits .   
With imperfect competition and strategic behavior, the models will be more advanced, 
and calculating the equilibrium will be more complicated. The outcome will depend on the 
assumption made on strategic interaction between the firms. In this context game theory is a 
central tool to derive the equilibrium. Game theory and models of imperfect competition are 
returned to below.  
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Models of partial equilibrium can be separated from models of general equilibrium. 
The equilibrium in a market is a partial equilibrium. In a partial equilibrium, many of the 
variables outside the market in question are considered exogenous. These exogenous variables 
might be prices of products outside the markets, such as input prices, and the incomes of 
customers. In a general equilibrium, the equilibriums in all markets are determined 
simultaneously. From a realism point of view, general equilibrium models might be better 
because the prices in different markets are not independent of each other. Everything is 
connected to everything. Many of the exogenous variables in the partial equilibrium model 
are made endogenous in a general equilibrium model. However, to study the general 
equilibrium with models, one has to impose so many assumption and simplifications that they 
might be worthless for inferences at a sophistication level required to be informative for 
antitrust analysis. Analysis of competition in a market is usually done partially, as these 
models provide better explanation and prediction than general equilibrium models do. 
However, this means that variables are considered exogenous for the analysis although they, 
more realistically, are endogenous. If, for instance, the price of some product which is a close 
substitute or is complementary to the product in the market we study is considered exogenous, 
the effects of some competitive changes in the market we study might be very imprecisely 
predicted.  
Game theory and equilibrium modeling  
Game theory is about how optimizing agents adapt in the interaction with other optimizing 
agents. Game theory has been referred to as a unified theory of social science.611 Titles like 
“The bounds of Reason: Game theory and the Unification of the Behavioural Sciences”612 
express an opinion that that game theory can be used as unified model framework in studying 
behavior and interaction. However, statements like ”[t]his destines game theory to a 
fascinating footnote in some future text on the history of social theory”613 are not equally 
optimistic. Game theory is established as a framework for analyzing behavior and strategic 
interaction in economic models. Game theory is imperative in the contemporary models of 
imperfect competition.  
An equilibrium can be understood as a solution of a game. The equilibrium is a state 
where no players have anything to gain from playing a different strategy. There are many 
                                                 
611 See for instance Aumann and Hart (1992). If it is assumed that units even at quantum level pursue some goal 
oriented behavior, game theory could even be considered as a general theory of everything.    
612 Gintis (2009). 
613 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 122. 
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equilibrium concepts in game theory; the most famous is probably the Nash-equilibrium.614 In 
games with incomplete information, the Nash equilibrium is also referred to as Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium.615 In Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to change strategy given the 
other players’ strategies. A game might have many equilibriums. One of the main challenges 
of game theory is to predict which of the many equilibriums is the most likely. Thus, in 
addition to the importance of equilibrium concepts as such in game theory are theories to 
determine what equilibrium is most likely when a game has many equilibriums. As a game 
may have many Nash-equilibriums, various equilibrium refinement concepts narrow the 
number of Nash-equilibriums. Such equilibrium refinement concepts include equilibrium in 
dominating strategies,616 trembling hands equilibrium,617 sub-game perfect Nash-
equilibrium,618 and sequential equilibrium.619 
Some equilibrium concepts are based on more assumptions than other equilibrium 
concepts. For one who is going to assess model based inferences based on game theoretic 
equilibriums, it is important to know what assumptions those equilibriums are based on. The 
foundations for modern game theory established in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
were based on rational choice in correspondence with neoclassical economics. The Nash-
equilibrium is based on rational choice. Evolutionary game theory, on the contrary, is based 
on assumptions based on evolutionary dynamics, including natural selection. This section will 
first briefly discuss the assumptions behind rational choice based game theory, and then 
evolutionary game theory is returned to.       
In the rational choice based game theory, the basic axioms of rationality are obviously 
important assumptions. The basic assumptions of rationality are complete preferences, 
reflexivity, and transitivity.620 Furthermore, the rationality assumptions include consistent and 
coherent assessments of probabilities according the laws of probability. This means that a 
rational decision is the decision that maximizes expected utility. These assumptions were 
described in detail in Chapter Three.  
                                                 
614 After Nash (1950). 
615 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 85 f. Usually it is assumed that players can be of different 
types with different payoff functions associated with the different types in Bayesian games. Bayesian games 
include so-called signaling games that can have pooling and separating equilibriums.    
616 This is not really an equilibrium refinement concept, but an equilibrium concept on its own. If there is an 
equilibrium in strictly dominating strategies there is a unique equilibrium which will also be a Nash-equilibrium. 
See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 52 f. And Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) p. 61.  
617 After Selten (1961). See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 81 f.  
618 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p.92 f.  
619 After Kreps and Wilson (1982). See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 96 f.  
620 Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 8 and Varian (1992) p. 95 f. 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
284 
For some equilibrium concepts, the basic assumptions of rationality are not enough to 
secure the equilibrium. An assumption that is important for the Nash-equilibrium is the 
assumption of common knowledge of rationality (CKR). Common knowledge of rationality 
means that all the players in the game know that the other players are rational. CKR is 
sometimes divided into different degrees. CKR of degree 1, means that each player knows 
that the other players are rational. More technically, CKR of degree 1 means that any player, 
i, knows that another player, j, is rational. CKR of degree 2 means that any player, i, knows 
that another player, j, is rational, and, in addition, knows that player j knows that player i is 
rational. CKR of degree n means that each player knows that the other players are rational and 
knows that the other players know that the first player is rational, who again knows ….to the 
n’th degree.621 This can be continued ad infinitum. Normally, when CKR is assumed it means 
CKR of infinite degree, which in practice means that all players are rational and know about 
each other’s knowledge of rationality. Related to CKR is the assumption of consistently 
aligned beliefs (CAB). CAB means that a rational player who knows that the other player is 
rational can expect the other person to draw the same inferences from information as himself. 
This assumption is important in finding Bayesian equilibriums in Bayesian games.     
In evolutionary game theory, the assumptions of rationality are not necessary. In 
evolutionary game theory, it will be “genes” that determine a player’s strategy. New strategies 
evolve. Evolution may result from combining existing strategies and mutations. Strategies 
survive by natural selection. This means that the strategies that have higher payoff have 
higher survival rates than those with lower payoffs. Thus, the strategies that give the highest 
payoffs, or highest expected payoffs in the presence of uncertainty, are more likely to survive 
natural selection. Evolutionary game theory might provide better model framework for 
behavior where the agents are so simple that it would be absurd to talk about rational 
behavior, such as interaction between animals, microorganisms and even micro particles. 
However, it might also explain human behavior, as much of human behavior is based on 
heuristic and intuition not subject to conscious rational considerations. Evolutionary game 
theory might also be informative of firms’ behavior since firms’ behavior often as well can be 
described as a trial and failure process as calculated rational decision making. Smith (1982) 
has a similar role to the development evolutionary game theory as von Neumann and 
Morgestern (1944) has for the game theory based on rational choice.   
                                                 
621 Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 48 f. 
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An important equilibrium concept used in evolutionary game theory is evolutionary 
equilibrium, which is an equilibrium in evolutionary stable strategies. Simplified, we can say 
that an evolutionary equilibrium is an equilibrium of strategies that survives the evolutionary 
process. A question is if evolutionary game theory can tell us what equilibriums are more 
likely than other. A Nash-equilibrium that gives all the players a strictly better payoff than 
playing alternative strategies is also an evolutionary equilibrium. This means that a symmetric 
equilibrium in strictly dominating strategies is an evolutionary equilibrium. A Nash-
equilibrium that is not an evolutionary equilibrium will typically be unstable in the 
evolutionary dynamics. This means that if a mutation suddenly appears, we might start 
moving towards another equilibrium or towards an eternal alternating process, never reaching 
any equilibrium.622  
A serious challenge to the use of game theory as a modeling framework is the problem 
of multiple equilibriums. Even if there are equilibrium refinement concepts and additional 
assumptions that reduce the number of Nash-equilibriums we might still be left with a 
substantial amount of possible equilibriums in a game. The validity of additional assumptions 
needed to refine the number of equilibriums or to single out a unique equilibrium can often be 
questioned. If a game theoretic model is used to predict the effects of some change in an 
exogenous variable, the prediction of a large amount of probable equilibriums will reduce the 
instrumental value of this model. However, in many models it is only one equilibrium, and 
game theory models might be more informative for such situations. This applies to many 
models relevant for antitrust analysis. In many situations, we are not so interested in which 
equilibrium materializes, but rather what equilibriums may materialize.623 This will also be 
the case in many situations where game theory is used in antitrust analysis. In this context, 
game theory might be instrumentally informative, despite the multiple equilibriums issue.     
Game theory based on rational players raises many of the same problems raised 
against neoclassical economics, as the rationality assumptions might be in serious conflict 
with realism. Studies in behavioral economics, as mentioned above, have shown that people 
often make decisions contrary to what seems rational. Experiments have shown that 
deviations from rationality might give outcomes of games that do not coincide with the 
equilibrium predicted by the equilibrium concepts in game theory, such as the Nash-
equilibrium. Experiments have revealed that players might be concerned with fairness 
                                                 
622 Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 223 f. 
623 However, possibility models may impose a problem for game theory models to be admissible as evidence in 
US according to the Daubert-standard. This will be discussed below.   
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trumping objective rationality.624 There have also been experiments where the test-subjects 
play a prisoners’ dilemma game where it is not rational to cooperate. Cooperation still occurs 
in the experiments.625                     
Just from the two points made above, one is inclined to believe that the future is not 
very bright for game theory as a modeling framework. Not only might a large number of 
potential equilibriums reduce the instrumental value of models based on game theory, but the 
actual outcomes might very well also contradict with the equilibriums predicted by game 
theory. Luckily, new research and advances in game theory contribute to a brighter future for 
game theory. By explicit modeling preferences for fairness, unfair equilibriums can be 
eliminated from the likely equilibriums. Furthermore, “altruistic” preferences might also be 
incorporated in the utility function of the players.626 Evolutionary game theory might help us 
find the equilibriums that are robust to the rationality assumption. This can be used to derive 
equilibriums that incorporate and accommodate the cognitive limitations addressed by 
research in behavioral economics. Furthermore, computer simulation of adaptive systems 
might help us determine which strategies and equilibriums are more likely to occur.627 For 
instance simulations have shown that the tit-for-tat strategy has a tendency to emerge in 
repeated prisoners’ dilemma games.628 When evolutionary game theory and other methods are 
used to supplement the rationality-based game theory in deriving more robust predictions on 
equilibrium outcomes, we can put more confidence in the inferences derived from game 
theoretical models. This improves the decisions based on such inferences. Most text books in 
game theory now cover both the rational approach and evolutionary approach to game 
theoretic modeling.629             
Performance and welfare 
In economic modeling we are not only interested in modeling economic behavior and finding 
equilibriums. We also want to assess the outcomes. In antitrust analysis, we are, for instance, 
not only interested in the new equilibrium in the market following from some conduct under 
antitrust scrutiny, but also whether this new equilibrium is desirable or not. Economists use 
welfare analysis to assess the performance of an outcome. Welfare is a general performance 
measurement that can be decomposed into more precise measurements.  
                                                 
624 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 162 for further references. 
625 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 202 f. for further references.  
626 See Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 267 f. 
627 Computer simulation of adaptive systems will be returned to below. 
628 Axelrod (1984). See also Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004) p. 191 f.  
629 See, for instance, Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2004).  
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A central concept for assessing welfare in an economic context is efficiency. One of 
the first efficiency concepts introduced to economics students is Pareto-efficiency, named 
after the economist and social scientist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). A state is Pareto-
efficient if no Pareto-improvements are possible. A Pareto-improvement is a change, for 
instance a redistribution of goods, which has the result that some individuals are better off, 
while no individuals are worse off. Pareto-efficiency means that it not possible to reallocate 
goods making somebody better off, without making some others worse off. A Pareto-
improvement requires that if some are better off due to some change, they are so much better 
off that they could compensate those who eventually are worse off, and still be better off after 
the compensation. A Pareto-improvement also requires that those who are worse off are 
actually compensated. To actually compensate those who are worse off might not be possible 
in many cases. If a river is dammed up for electricity generation, this might be a potential 
Pareto-improvement, but it might be impossible to compensate all those who remotely derive 
some utility from the river. To implement a potential Pareto-improvement without necessarily 
providing full compensation to those who lose is often referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.                    
Efficiency can be decomposed to different components. It is usual to divide efficiency 
into consumption efficiency, production efficiency, and efficiency in the composition of 
consumption and production, also known as allocation efficiency. Efficiency in consumption 
means that goods are consumed by those that derive highest utility from the consumption, 
measured by willingness to pay. This means that it is no potential Pareto-improvement 
associated with redistributing consumption from one person to another. Normally, efficiency 
in consumption will follow when prices are uniform and there are no restrictions on buying, 
which means that all consumers face the same price. All who have a willingness to pay higher 
than the price of the good will then consume it, and it will not be possible to obtain some 
efficiency gains from redistribution. Efficiency in production means that the production is 
performed at efficiently as possible. This means that it is not possible to realize an efficiency 
gain by producing the good in another way, for instance, by another composition of inputs, by 
choosing another available technology, or by moving the production to another producer. 
Production efficiency is not necessarily the same as low costs. If, for instance, the costs are 
reduced by reducing the salaries of the employees, this is not an efficiency gain. The 
employees are worse off, and it is a redistribution from the employees to the producer. 
Allocation efficiency means that the right products are produced in the right amount taking 
into account the costs of production and the consumers’ utility. It means, for instance, that 
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there is a right amount of cars produced relative to planes. The composition of consumption 
and production will be efficient if price equals marginal costs in all markets, as long as the 
marginal cost reflects the true alternative cost of production.  
Sometimes, static efficiency is distinguished from dynamic efficiency. Static 
efficiency refers to efficiency at a given point of time. Static efficiency is usually used to 
assess static models such as the perfect competition equilibrium discussed above. Some 
models include dynamics, which mean that adaption over time is explicitly modeled. In 
dynamic models dynamic efficiency can be assessed. Dynamic efficiency is efficiency over 
time, including efficiency in investment decisions.            
Lack of efficiency involves waste of resources. As a result welfare could be improved. 
Efficiency means that as much surplus as possible is generated, which can be distributed in 
the desirable way. “Welfare” in economic analysis has a more precise content than the use of 
the word in daily language. For a consumer, the welfare from purchasing a good is the 
increased utility of buying the good minus the incurred resources to buy the good, which, 
normally, is the price. The difference between marginal willingness to pay and price is the 
consumer surplus of buying an additional unit of a good.630 The consumer surplus is an 
approximation of consumer welfare.631 For the producer the surplus is the price received from 
the good minus the resources incurred to make it. This is in other words, the profits. The 
producer surplus is a measure of producer welfare. The total welfare is the sum of consumer 
welfare and producer welfare, which is the utility generated from producing a good minus the 
resources incurred to produce the good. The sum of the consumer and producer surplus is the 
total surplus, which approximate total welfare. Efficiency is necessary to maximize total 
welfare. If somebody can be made better off without anybody else becoming worse off, it is 
possible to increase the total welfare.         
                                                 
630 More precisely consumer surplus is the accumulated differences between marginal willingness to pay and the 
price paid. This is the area between the demand curve and the price.  
631 The consumer surplus is just an approximation of the surplus of consuming this particular good. Changes in 
the consumer surplus serve as a measure for the consumer’s valuation of both price increases and price 
reductions. Price changes also have an income effect that must be taken into account to get a correct measure of 
the consumer’s valuation of a price change. To get a correct measure of the consumer’s valuation of a price 
increase, one could assess how much reduction in income would be equivalent to the increase in price for the 
consumer to be at the same utility. This is called equivalent variation (EV) in income. This is how much the 
consumer would be willing to pay for the price not to increase. We could also ask how much the consumer had 
to be compensated in income for a price increase to stay at the same utility level. This is called the compensating 
variation (CV) in income and is a measure of how much the consumer must be compensated at current prices to 
be equally well of after the price increase. In case of a price increase we will have ΔCV≥ΔCS≥ΔEV. Thus, ΔCS  
is not an exact measure of the loss to the consumer due to a price increase. A price increase will make the 
customer a little poorer, which is not fully taken into account. Varian (1992) p. 160 f. provides more details on 
the relationship between consumer surplus, compensating variation in income, and equivalent variation in 
income. 
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Partial equilibrium models can be used for partial welfare analysis. The efficiency and 
welfare properties of the simple monopoly model are illustrated in Figure 6.8.  
 













In Figure 6.8, c’ is the marginal cost of the monopoly, while D(p) is the demand curve.632 In 
the outcome of the simple monopoly model, the price, p, is above the marginal cost. The 
reason is that the monopolist, by increasing the price above marginal cost, will earn more per 
unit, which will outweigh the loss from reduced quantity sold. By increasing prices, the 
monopolist will transfer some consumer surplus (CS) to itself as producer surplus (PS). This 
is a distribution effect. When the price is higher than the marginal cost, we will not obtain 
allocation efficiency;633 there are consumers with a marginal willingness to pay higher than 
the marginal cost. This “sum” of these losses is called the deadweight loss from monopoly, 
and is illustrated by DL in the Figure 6.8. Increasing production would be a potential Pareto-
improvement. If the monopolist could, he would have sold to more customers as long as this 
would not affect the price charged to the other customers. However, in the simple monopoly 
                                                 
632 The demand curve is how much that will be demanded at a given price, which also measures the marginal 
willingness to pay at a given price. 
633 According to the theory of second best after Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) we cannot really know if there is 
allocation efficiency by looking at one market alone. If there are distortions in other markets then a non-
competitive price may contribute more to allocation efficiency that the competitive price does. It is the relative 
prices which are important for efficient allocation of production of different goods. If, for instance, the prices of 
oranges are supra-competitive, then the “second-best” to competitive prices in all markets might be that also 
prices of apples are supra-competitive to facilitate an optimal allocation in the production of oranges and apples. 
This shows some of the problem inferring from partial equilibrium models. See Østbye (2008) p. 47 f. for a 
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model we assume that such price discrimination is not possible. This assumption can be 
relaxed in more advanced models, which will be returned to below.  
Thus, monopoly leads to allocation inefficiency according to the simple monopoly 
model. Too little is produced. Furthermore, with monopoly, the competitive forces will not 
create a selection mechanism towards the most efficient firms in the market. This selection 
mechanism promotes production efficiency. Thus, monopolies are exposed to so-called X-
inefficiency,634 as long as the capital market is not sufficient to secure efficiency in 
production.635 However, since the price is uniform in the simple monopoly model, we will 
have efficiency in consumption.636  
Conversely to the monopoly model; in the perfect competition model briefly discussed 
above, there will be efficiency. The competition will force the price to equal marginal cost, as 
anyone charging a higher price will be undercut by rivals who will make profits at a lower 
price. Inefficient firms will be forced out of the market by efficient firms, so there will be 
efficiency in production. Since all consumers pay the same competitive price, there will be 
efficiency in consumption. Since prices equal marginal costs there will be allocation 
efficiency.           
Above it was performed welfare analysis of the simple monopoly model and the 
perfect competition model. The same can be done by more complicated models of 
competition. We would have to calculate the equilibrium and assess the welfare generated in 
the same way as for the perfect competition model and the monopoly model. As explained 
above game theory is used to calculate equilibrium in many models of imperfect competition.  









                                                 
634 From Liebstein (1966). 
635 Owners would normally want efficiency in production to generate as much profit as possible. The capital 
markets will in theory channel firms to owners who can improve efficiency in production.    
636 This might change with price discrimination. 
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As described above, the equilibrium is derived from the basic assumptions; the model specific 
assumptions and the exogenous variables. The welfare, as illustrated above, is assessed with 
the basis in the equilibrium of the models. This means that it is the equilibrium outcome that 
is used to assess the welfare. It is not so interesting to assess the welfare outside the 
equilibrium as any state outside the equilibrium is unstable and will last only minimum time. 
Furthermore, as the process towards the equilibrium outside the equilibrium is not explicitly 
modeled in most models, we will not know what outcome to use as the basis for a welfare 
analysis outside equilibrium. One of the critiques of the current neoclassical regime is that 
there are always shocks in the economy meaning that we are always outside equilibrium. This 
critique is addressed further below. If this critique is correct, one can ask what the value is to 
use the equilibrium as the basis of the welfare analysis.  
It should also be noted that the model assumptions not only affect the welfare through 
the equilibrium. Assumptions might directly affect how the welfare is assessed. If it, for 
instance, is made explicit assumptions on the utility function of the customers and the 
production technology of the firms, these assumptions will also be of relevance to assess 
welfare.  
Manipulations of exogenous variables can be used to assess effects on equilibrium in a 
counterfactual analysis, as described above. This can, in turn, be used to assess effects on 
welfare.  






Principles to assess 
welfare  
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Other model assumptions and principles of economic modeling   
The discussion of the basic framework and assumptions for economic modeling above was 
based on the current neoclassical paradigm of using models of rational choice as an 
instrumental approach. The neoclassical paradigm has been under attack from many 
directions. The Austrian school has criticized the neoclassical school’s use of equilibriums as 
a basis for the assessments. The Austrian school stresses the importance of dynamics in 
economics, which is also the focus of economists advocating evolutionary modeling and 
biologically inspired models as a basis of economic modeling. Behavioral economics has 
addressed the lack of realism in using rational choice to model behavior. In this section some 
of this critique against the neoclassical paradigm and its implications for economic modeling 
is discussed.        
Dynamical aspects of the economy have a central place in the Austrian school of 
economics. The Austrian school can be traced back to economists such as Carl Menger (1840-
1921), Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914), and Friedrich von Wieser (1851-1926), who 
all were associated the Vienna University before World War I. Other seminal representatives 
are Ludwig Von Mises (1881-1973) and the Nobel laureate, Friedrich von Hayek (1899-
1992).637 For Austrian economists the uncertainty and complexity is in focus. Agents do not 
adapt to certain circumstances, but must all the time adapt in a world of uncertainty, 
complexity, and continuous changes. Competition is about being best to adapt. Static 
efficiency, as described above is of less interest to Austrian economists. Because of 
continuous shocks and dynamics, the markets are out of equilibrium most of the time anyway. 
There will always be outside shocks to the markets that prevent the equilibrium to be reached. 
Those agents who succeed are those who innovate by improving production or introducing 
new products. The Austrian school has not evolved into a formal system of models like the 
neoclassical school. This is partly due to the fact that the Austrians themselves did not 
consider economic science as a framework to give good predictions on the micro-level. Such 
predictions involve too much uncertainty as the agents’ behavior is being governed by too 
many subjective elements. Austrian economists are more concerned with “general 
patterns.”638  
The economist Joseph Schumpeter was educated by the Austrian school, but is usually 
not categorized as an Austrian economist. It is more usual to speak of Schumpeterian 
                                                 
637 See von der Fehr (1995). 
638 McKenzie (2010) p. 93 f. 
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competition almost as a separate philosophy of competition. One of Schumpeter’s most 
seminal and a well-known contribution is Schumpeter (1943). Schumpeter did not reject 
neoclassical static analysis, but thought that it was given too much weight. For Schumpeter, 
monopolies were a prerequisite for innovation by awarding success. Through “creative 
destruction”, old monopolies are replaced by new monopolies. Schumpeter is also known to 
have stressed the importance of monopolies, or at least market power, to promote innovation. 
In his early works, Schumpeter was concerned with the innovation by individual 
entrepreneurs,639 but was later concerned with the innovation in firms. The argument was that 
monopoly profits are important to finance innovation and to exploiting economies of scale 
and scope in innovation. In modern neoclassical terms this argument can be explained by 
imperfect capital markets making monopoly profits a more efficient source of capital for 
innovation. Capital markets are characterized by asymmetric information, which is the source 
of a risk premium that is not required if the capital is acquired internally.             
A direction that is closely related to Austrian economics and Schumpeterian thinking 
is evolutionary economics. In the 1980s, this direction boosted even evolutionary models as 
an inspiration for economic models can be traced back to Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). It can 
even be argued that evolutionary thinking originated from economics and inspired Charles 
Darwin’s revolutionary ideas in biology (and not opposite). Darwin was inspired by the 
evolutionary thinking central to the economic and demographical studies of Thomas Malthus 
(1766-1834). In evolutionary economics, a firm might be viewed as a set of routines (genes). 
Those with the best routines survive the competition (natural selection). New sets of routines 
evolve from mutations (new ideas) and mergers. Nelson and Winter (1982) is a seminal 
contribution to evolutionary economics.  
Complexity and complex adaptive systems are closely related to evolutionary 
economics.640 Complex adaptive system can be seen as a method to model evolutionary 
processes, with more algorithmically-oriented models than those used in evolutionary 
economics. The complexity research is interdisciplinary and it covers commonalities of all 
adaptive systems that are subject to evolutionary dynamics, including economic dynamics.641 
The theory of complex adaptive systems has, inter alia, been researched at the Santa Fe 
Institute since the 1980s. In complex adaptive systems, agents adapt according to different 
behavioral rules, and those behavioral rules that perform best will survive the evolutionary 
                                                 
639 Schumpeter (1911). 
640 Complex adaptive system is also referred to as agent based modeling.  
641 See Holland (1996). 
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process. Other agents might adapt by mimicking those most successful. New behavioral rules 
are evolved both by combining existing behavioral rules (pairing) and by mutation, which 
means that new behavioral rules are, partially, evolved according to a random process. 
Modeling the interactive dynamics of thousands or millions of adaptive agents is very 
complex and much more computing-intensive than the simple idealistic models of 
neoclassical economics. However, the introduction of cheap processing power and new 
computer technology over recent decades has increased the possibilities to model and 
simulate complex adaptive systems. Thousands of iterations can be run in a computer 
simulation within a short amount of time.   
The analytical model framework used in complex adaptive systems is not necessarily 
in competition with framework to the neoclassical modeling framework. Kenneth Arrow who 
was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics and who is a seminal contributor to neoclassical 
economic theory in the 20th century has, in many contexts, endorsed the insight from 
complex adaptive systems.642 While the neoclassical equilibrium outcomes can be considered 
the result of an economic process, complex adaptive systems can be used to study the process 
towards these equilibriums. By analyzing the complex dynamics, we might also find factors 
that can explain why neoclassical models sometimes do not give good predictions of 
equilibriums, and, as a result of this, wrong predictions of the outcomes. Both in complex 
adaptive systems and in neoclassical models, competition is the fundamental force for 
development. In complex adaptive systems competition for resources is a prerequisite for 
cooperation and specialization. The agents cooperate to achieve an advantage over other 
cooperative units. As a biological application, the human body can be seen as a gigantic 
cooperation between cells to achieve a competitive advantage in the battle with other 
organisms for resources. On a higher level, humans cooperate in families, firms, countries and 
other units to gain a competitive advantage.                        
Another theory closely related to the evolutionary thinking, but that shed some light of 
imperfections associated with the evolutionary process is the so-called theory of path-
dependence, with Arthur (1988, 1989) as seminal contributions. Path-dependence is also 
known in the biological literature as inertia.643 Arthur was associated with the Santa Fe 
Institute, and his contributions on path-dependence theories can be seen as a part of the 
research on complex adaptive systems. Path-dependence provides a theory of how inferior 
solutions might result from evolutionary processes. Economies on either the supply side 
                                                 
642 See for instance the preface in Holland (1996). 
643 See Sober (2008) p. 243 f.  
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(economies of scale) or demand side (such as network effects644) may result in a lock-in to 
inferior solutions. Solutions that once were a result of optimal adaption due to historical 
circumstances are no longer optimal, but inertia creates a lock-in.645 The QWERTY keyboard 
was once developed to prevent jam in mechanical typewriters, a property not important for 
keyboards today. The switching costs associated with changing to an optimized keyboard 
system for today’s needs might create inertia towards an inferior keyboard construction that 
was once superior.  
Behavioral economics is related to the evolutionary and adaptive modeling in 
economics. As explained above, the instrumental approach in the “mainstream” neoclassical 
paradigm of economic modeling is rational choice. The rationality assumption in mainstream 
economic modeling has developed from more vague assumptions, such as “maximization 
behavior” in Friedman (1962) to formal axioms of rationality used in the mainstream 
approach today.646 These axioms were explained above. Behavioral economics address, inter 
alia, the empirical support of the axioms of rationality. Behavioral economics studies 
cognitive biases that lead persons to make decisions contrary to what objectively appears 
rational. The psychologist, mathematician, and economist Daniel Kahneman (1934-) was 
awarded the Nobel prize in economics for his work in behavioral economics. Much of this 
work was done together with the psychologist, mathematician, and economist Amos Tversky 
(1937-1996).647  
Many empirical studies in behavioral economics have shown how people’s behavior 
systematically deviates from the behavior predicted by the theory of rational choice. 
Examples of biases are the failure to take alternative costs fully into account, the endowment 
effect, and a propensity to assess probabilities systematically wrongly.648 Some of the 
cognitive biases relevant for assessing evidence were discussed in the previous chapters of 
                                                 
644 The study of network externalities in economics boosted in the 1980s as industries characterized by network 
externalities and platforms became more important in the economy. Network externalities has now been fully 
integrated into neoclassical models. Network externalities can be direct in the meaning that the customers’ utility 
of a product increases as more customers use the product. Examples are telephony and Internet. Network 
externalities can also be indirect in the meaning that as more people use the products, there will be developed 
more complementary products, which benefits the consumers. An example is that the more people who use a 
computer operating system the more programs and applications will be developed it. The last example is also an 
example of a platform good, also called two sided markets, where customers and producers “meet” on the 
platform (the computer operating system). Early works on network externalities are David (1985), Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) and Farell and Saloner (1985), See also Liebowitz and Margolis (1998). See Rochet and Tirole 
(2003) and Evans (2002) for two sided markets.        
645 The remnant of a tail in the human body is a biological example. 
646 McKenzie (2010) p. 1 f.  
647 Amos Tversky would probably have received the Nobel Prize in economics together with Daniel Kahneman, 
had Tversky still been alive.   
648 McKenzie (2010) p. 113 f. 
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this study. A link from evolutionary models to behavioral economics is that cognitive biases 
can be considered as a result of evolution because such biases increase the chance of survival. 
In this argument, cognitive biases are resulting from evolutionary rational irrationality.649 
Brain activity and decision making are subject to resource constraints. More brain activity is 
costly both in terms of energy and time. Cognitive biases might be considered as a tradeoff 
between the increased expected loss of a less informed choice and resources saved by 
deciding on heuristics rather than rational calculations. For instance, one could imagine the 
energy and time that had to be incurred to apply the completeness assumption of rationality in 
actual decision making. This would mean that a person had to rank all possible decision 
alternatives for every decision. The brain, neurologically, works in a way that some brain 
processes are automated in the meaning heuristic methods can be exploited for many choices. 
In this way the human decision activities as such are subject to an economic optimization 
process.650 The studies in behavioral economics have resulted in an extensive debate among 
economists. Contrary to what many non-economists, and even some economists, seem to 
think, this is not a debate over whether people actually are rational according to the theory or 
not, but over what degree rational choice is a sound instrumental basis for economic 
modeling. Even the most conservative neoclassical economists will probably agree that 
humans do not always act according to what might, objectively, seem rational. The debate is 
over which models that are instrumentally best to explain and predict behavior. Let us say that 
the firms who act most in correspondence with rational choice survive competition. Even if 
firms’ behavior is just a result of adaption, and the “invisible hand” or natural selection 
eliminate those who adapt less rationally, the theory of rational choice might give a good 
prediction of which firms survive in the market.651 However, in other modeling contexts, such 
as trying to model the outcome of a legal evidence assessment process, taking into account the 
insight from behavioral economics might provide a better explanation and prediction of the 
outcome.              
A question is if there is some theory that can unite evolution-inspired models and 
neoclassical models of rational choice. If both these model frameworks have instrumental 
value and can be used to explain and predict, it seems intuitive that it should be possible to 
unite the theories in some way. The neoclassical models of rational choice model the 
                                                 
649 McKenzie (2010) chapter 7 and 8.  
650 The field “Neuronomics” studies the function of the brain in an economic context. However the brains ability 
to economize decisions in a tradeoff between better decisions and use of resources was pointed out by Austrian 
economists before the neurological construction of the brain was known, see McKenzie (2010) p. 141 f.   
651 See McKenzie (2010) p. 35 f.  
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interaction between rational agents, while evolutionary models model the outcome after a 
natural selection of those who adapt best (survival of the fittest). If those who survive are 
those who adapt closest to rational behavior, we should expect the same outcome. As 
described above, game theory seems to have found ways to unite rationality based models and 
evolutionary models. Game theoretic equilibriums based on adaption of rational agents often 
coincide with the equilibriums predicted by evolutionary game theory. This indicates that 
game theory as a model framework for modeling interaction among optimizing agents can 
serve as a unifying model framework from supporters of different approaches to model 
economic behavior.  
A brief history of economic models used in antitrust analysis 
When the Sherman Act was new, the neoclassical modeling framework was also quite new 
and far less developed than today. The lessons from the classical economist were definitely 
established, including Adam Smith’s seminal reflections on the invisible hand leading self-
interested suppliers in competition to act in the interest of society. Furthermore, the 
neoclassical “marginal revolution” was established. The efficiency and distributional aspects 
associated with monopoly and cartels were also known at the time.  
The good properties of competition predicted by the perfect competition model were 
known to the US antitrust authorities and the perfect competition model was probably a 
guiding model for the early application of US antitrust law. As explained in Chapter Two, the 
introduction of the Sherman Act was motivated by various factors. The high prices and 
market power due to cartels and monopolies, such as the powerful railway cartels at that time, 
is pointed to as one motivation. Small businesses’ fear of big and potentially more efficient 
business is another motivation.652 The benefit of small, independent, competing suppliers as 
assumed in the perfect competition model accommodates both those motivations as a guiding 
model for the application of antitrust law. Low barriers of entry and small independent 
businesses should be promoted if the model of perfect competition should guide antitrust 
enforcement.  
However, the benefits of an atomistic structure as assumed in the perfect competition 
model were not uncritically accepted as a guiding model for antitrust enforcement. In the late 
19th and early 20th century, the exploitation of economies of scale was a popular topic 
amongst the contemporary economists, and big companies and trusts were seen by leading 
                                                 
652 See Hovenkamp (2005) p. 48 f.  
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economists as a solution to exploit economies of scale.653 Some more advanced models of 
competition were also available already during the early enforcement of antitrust law. The 
Cournot-model of oligopoly was developed by Cournot (1938) and was criticized by Bertrand 
(1883). Both of these models utilize methods that were later formalized in game theory. Both 
the Cournot-model and Bertrand models are still influential in antitrust analysis. The model of 
a dominant firm with a competitive fringe was discussed already in Forchheimer (1908) and 
continues to inform antitrust.654   
The model of perfect competition, the monopoly model, the Cournot and Bertrand 
oligopoly models, and the model of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe were 
theoretical bases for the so-called SCP-paradigm, also called the SCP-model. The SCP-
paradigm was the established mainstream theory applied in antitrust analysis for a long 
period, until it finally came under substantial critique by the Chicago School in the 1970s. 
SCP is an abbreviation for Structure-Conduct-Performance. The SCP-model has the basis in a 
one way causal link from structure to conduct to performance. The structure determines the 
conduct, which, again, is determining for the performance. Extensive empirical research was 
done from the 1940s onwards to shed light on and to develop the SCP-model further. Seminal 
contributions were made by the economist Joe Bain, including Bain (1968). A more 
theoretical contribution, but still within the SCP-paradigm, was made by Chamberlin (1933). 
Chamberlin used the Cournot-model as a modeling framework, but is also known for 
introducing models of monopolistic competition. This model use differentiated products as a 
basis, and it predicts the establishment of new differentiated products as long as it contributes 
to increased profits. The suppliers of new differentiated products become a “monopoly” for 
their own differentiated products, and entry will occur as long as this monopoly profit is 
positive and covers the fixed costs. Chamberlin also suggested the introduction of time in the 
analytical framework, which would allow for tacit collusion between competitors. Tacit 
collusion allows higher prices than non-cooperative prices do. This was later shown formally 
in models using modern game theory. This is further addressed below. It should be noted that 
the EU competition policy entered into force during the SCP-paradigm. The SCP-paradigm 
was an established framework that was ready to be applied in the EU enforcement of 
                                                 
653 See Hovenkamp (2005) Chapter 2.1 and 2.2. 
654 Blair and Kaserman (2009) relies on this model to inform antitrust analysis. The model is, however, normally 
given scarce attention in the contemporary industrial organization literature. 
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competition law. It should be noted, however, that ordo-liberal ideas,655 usually associated 
with the Freiburg School, had a strong influence on the German competition laws developed 
concurrently with the EU competition rules.656 This is likely to have had some influence on 
the theoretical economic foundation of EU competition policy in addition to the SCP-
paradigm imported from US.                 
The theoretical direction of microeconomics, which developed simultaneously with 
the SCP-paradigm, flourished together with the general research on the theory of rational 
choice and game theory such as von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Economists 
associated with the University of Chicago pioneered this research. This theory did not get a 
foothold in the economic modeling framework applied in antitrust analysis at the time. This, 
however, was about to come to an end with the Chicago school critique.  
Many of the most influential economists of the 20th century were associated with the 
University of Chicago. Chicago economists are known for advocating free markets with 
minimal public interventions. This can be traced back to, inter alia, Knight (1921). Nobel 
laureate in economics, Milton Friedman, worked both on the theoretical foundation for 
microeconomics and advocated liberal ideas. Seminal works include Friedman (1953, 1962). 
The Nobel laureate in economics, George Stigler (1911-1991), was also associated with the 
University of Chicago. Like Friedman, Stigler worked on the theoretical foundation of 
microeconomics in addition to seminal contributions in political economy and the theory of 
regulation. Stigler’s textbook in price theory came in first edition in Stigler (1952) with 
extensive revisions through to the last edition in Stigler (1987).657 The Nobel laureate in 
economics, Ronald Coase (1910-), and the Nobel laureate in economics, Gary Becker (1930-), 
who were also associated with University of Chicago, are seminal contributors, if not 
founders, of the field of law and economics.658 Becker is probably best known for extending 
the neoclassical model framework of rational choice outside the market context such as in 
law, regulation and politics. Coase is best known for the economic analysis of property rights 
and transaction costs. This, particularly, includes the Coase theorem, which says that, with 
                                                 
655 Ordo-liberalism emphasizes the role of government in preserving competition to limit growth of concentrated 
power. This was particular a reaction to the former Nazi government whose power was partially built on an 
industrial-government complex of concentrated powers. See for instance Lyons (2009).      
656 See Lyons (2009).  
657 Another early Chicago-school contribution is Director and Levi (1956).  
658 The much earlier utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was also concerned with topics coinciding with 
modern law and economics.  
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well-defined property rights and no transaction costs, efficiency will result independently of 
the initial distribution of property rights.659  
The Coase theorem tells us that it is not lack of competition and other deviations from 
the assumptions of the perfect competition model that are the source of inefficiency in the 
economy. It is improperly defined property rights and transaction costs. This can be illustrated 
by the monopoly model. Monopoly is not a problem as such, but transactions costs are. The 
monopoly has an incentive to sell to all customers who have a marginal willingness to pay 
higher than marginal costs. The problem is that it is too costly to negotiate terms with every 
single customer. When the monopoly has to set one price for all customers, it will be optimal 
to set the price higher than marginal cost with the deadweight loss as a result as shown above. 
The same applies to other inefficiencies following from the lack of competitive pressure. 
Owners are interested in as much profits as possible, and thus in efficient production, even if 
they are owners of a monopoly. The problem is that transaction cost makes it difficult to make 
perfect contracts giving the proper incentives for the management and other employees to 
produce efficiently. The management and employees have incentives to keep as much surplus 
from the production themselves. This incentive problem is a basis for X-inefficiency.              
The Chicago-school’s skeptical attitude towards public regulations, including antitrust 
interventions, and the lesson from Coase on the impact of well-defined property rights and 
transaction costs were probably important factors behind the substantial critique of the 
contemporary application of antitrust laws that came from Chicago school, which started in 
the 1960s and peaked in the middle of the 1970s.660 Seminal contributions include Posner 
(1976) and Bork (1978). One main issue of critique was the contemporary application of 
antitrust laws towards vertical agreements and vertical mergers, which are restraints between 
firms on different levels on the production chain. Examples of vertical agreements are 
exclusive dealing, exclusive distribution agreements, and vertical restrictions on price, such as 
retail price maintenance. The argument of the Chicago-school was that there is only one 
monopoly profit to gain. A monopoly producer cannot increase its monopoly gains by, for 
instance, integrating with a purchaser or giving a purchaser exclusivity. In fact, a monopoly 
producer gains from competition on the distribution level. Competition limits the 
opportunities for the distributor to keep the monopoly profits for himself. Efficiency explains 
                                                 
659 Coase (1960). 
660 This is sometimes referred to as the second Chicago-school as a further development of the first Chicago-
school developed by the economists of the University of Chicago from the 1940s, cf. Martin (2007). In antitrust 
contexts the term Chicago-school is often associated with the Chicago-school critique in the 1970s.   
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why a producer would sacrifice the benefit of competition by vertical integration and vertical 
restraints according to the Chicago-school critique. The Chicago-school pointed at the 
possibility of vertical integration and vertical restraints as tools to repair efficiencies due to 
improperly defined property rights and transaction costs. For instance, competition between 
retailers might chill the retailers’ incentives to promote a product as the promotion might 
partly benefit other retailers of the same product. This might result in an inefficient amount of 
product promotion. If a retailer is given exclusive rights to distribution in an area, this retailer 
will achieve all the gains at retail level from promotion in this area. Thus, a “property right” 
to the gains from investments in promotion is established. The Chicago school also 
challenged one of the cores of the SCP-paradigm, which is the casual chain from structure to 
conduct to performance. A firm may succeed and becomes large due to superior efficiency 
and innovation. In this case, it is the performance that determines the structure.              
The message from the Chicago-school is that markets perform best with minimal 
intervention. Regulations restrict competition, including most antitrust interventions.661 The 
role of the government should be to provide for well-defined and enforceable property rights, 
and to reduce the size of transaction costs. The Chicago-school has had a great impact on US 
antitrust policy from the 1970s and onwards,662 especially the antitrust policy of republican 
regimes. It also had an impact, albeit to a lesser extent, on the application of EU competition 
laws. The ordo-liberal influences on the foundations for European competition policy have 
probably influenced the inertia for the acceptance of Chicago-school economics.      
The critique from the Chicago-school showed that there was a need for revising and 
updating the models used to aid inferences in antitrust analysis. The problem was not the lack 
of theory. The theoretical direction of microeconomics had, for a long time, developed 
advanced models on industrial organization based on rational choice and game theory. Major 
contributors were economists associated with the University of Chicago, as explained above. 
An example is Stigler (1968). The problem was that this theory was not adopted in applied 
antitrust analysis, and was not the approach in the mainstream industrial organization 
literature. This changed in the 1980s. Economists who were educated in this new theory 
started to dominate academic positions and academic journals. The economists hired by the 
antitrust authorities were of this new school.663 The articles and textbooks applying rational 
                                                 
661 The title ”The Antitrust paradox: A policy at war with itself” of Bork (1976) is illustrative. The antitrust laws 
themselves, at least if they are applied incorrectly, restrict competition.     
662 A seminal decision in this context is Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).   
663 See Kobayashi (1996).  
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choice and game theory to industrial organization and antitrust economics grew substantially. 
One of the first textbooks that had a focus on game theory and rational choice in industrial 
organization was Tirole (1988). The Chicago-school arguments were modeled and analyzed. 
Models utilizing game theory showed that the Chicago-school had to be modified and that 
some of the old lessons from the SCP-paradigm had merits, despite the Chicago-school 
critique. Game theoretical models showed, for instance, that vertical restraints and vertical 
integration might have anticompetitive effects depending on the circumstances.         
Thus, from the late 1980s, the rational choice and game theoretical models started to 
dominate the mainstream industrial organization theory and were used as the theoretical 
modeling framework informing antitrust analysis. This is sometime referred to as the post-
Chicago approach.664  Earlier models such as the models of Cournot (1838) and Bertrand 
(1883) were formulated and developed further within a formal game theoretical framework. 
Only imagination was the limit for antitrust-relevant problems and situations that were 
scrutinized by this model framework. A survey of the various models applicable for antitrust 
analysis can be found in the text-book literature in industrial organization and antitrust 
economics.665        
Despite disputes between economists concerning the realism and instrumental value of 
the different models of competition discussed above, they are all within the neoclassical 
modeling framework. Critiques from other economic schools have not had a substantial 
impact on antitrust analysis, even though other schools have given more weight to dynamical 
aspects and innovation than the neoclassical school (although ordo-liberal ideas had some 
influences on the foundations of EU competition policy as mentioned above). Since the 
neoclassical school does not provide such clear explanations and predictions on dynamical 
aspects as on static aspects, one should believe that other theories would have been more 
welcomed to assess dynamic aspects relevant for antitrust analysis. Nevertheless, such 
influence has been limited. This may be about to change. Newer theories have shown merits 
in unifying neoclassical economic models with other theories. 
The Austrian school of economics described above has not to a significant extent 
found its way as a model framework for applied antitrust analysis. This is partly due to the 
fact that the Austrian economists themselves consider economics as a discipline unsuitable to 
give predictions at the micro level. Austrian economists are more concerned with general 
                                                 
664 See, for instance, Kobayashi (1996) and Lipsky (2003).  
665 See, for instance, Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). 
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patterns.666 The Austrian economics approach to antitrust would probably be to be reluctant to 
interfere in the economy with antitrust interventions because there are no good micro-level 
theories identifying which interventions that would improve performance. The risk that 
beneficial dynamical competition is altered is substantial. If interventionist prudence for 
dynamical reasons is credited to the Austrian school, then the Austrian school has had some 
influence, as many influential scholars have advocated such prudence for dynamical 
reasons.667 Schumpeter’s arguments and theories, which are closely related to the Austrian 
school, have found their way to applied antitrust analysis and have probably had some 
influence on the application of antitrust law. Schumpeterian arguments on economies of scale 
in innovation are repeatedly alleged as a defense in merger control.668       
Evolutionary models and complex adaptive systems modeling were described above as 
complementary ways of modeling economics to the neoclassical framework. It is difficult to 
say what implications it would have for antitrust analysis to increase the use of evolutionary 
models and complex adaptive system as a basis for model based inferences. An evolutionary 
implication of antitrust analysis would be to preserve the diversity, but still not prevent 
desirable evolution. As a recognized failure of evolutionary dynamics is undesirable path 
dependence, and the competition rules have a role in preventing this. An example is that the 
problem of network externalities is recognized in antitrust analysis, and this theory has 
informed many cases such as the Microsoft cases in the US and EU.669 It should be mentioned 
that network externalities has now been fully integrated into neoclassical models.  
The competition models used for antitrust analysis today are mainly based on rational 
choice. Insight from behavioral economics has not yet had a major impact on industrial 
organization models applied in antitrust analysis. This might, however, be changing.670 
Taking into account insight from behavioral economics might improve the information value 
of models relevant for antitrust analysis. This might, in particular, be relevant in assessing 
competition aspect where the consumers processing of complex information is especially 
relevant for consumer decisions, for instance, where advertisement is important for consumer 
choice.671  
                                                 
666 McKenzie (2010) p. 93 f. 
667 See for instance Easterbrook (1984).  
668 See Whish (2009) p. 802 f. See also EU horizontal merger guidelines op.cit. Section 81 and US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines op.cit. Section 10.   
669 See Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) p. 581 f.  
670 See, for instance, Stucke (2007).  
671 See for instance Tor (2004). 
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One area where behavioral economics can be said to have some impact on antitrust 
analysis is in the area of product bundling. Some firms have been considered to have a 
dominant position in after-markets despite tough competition in the original markets.672 Both 
US antitrust law and EU competition law recognize the possibility of market power in the 
aftermarket, despite competition in the original market.673 A theoretical example of such 
markets might be the game-console markets where the competition between console 
producers might be tough. After the purchase, the consumer is locked in to proprietary games. 
A rational consumer would rationally take the possibility of being locked in and exploited into 
account at the original purchase. If so, the possibility of exploiting market power in the after-
market would be competed away in the original market.  
For an antitrust decision maker, it is probably smartest to be pragmatic to economic 
models. The neoclassical framework is the current paradigm for models in antitrust analysis. 
However, if other models have higher informative value, it would be a waste to not utilize the 
informative value of these models to produce more accurate antitrust decisions. Those who 
apply non-standard models will probably have to overcome skepticism and must be prepared 
to give a good explanation as to why their models provide a higher informative value than the 
standard models do. In the US, the first barrier for presenting economic analysis is to pass the 
Daubert standard to be admitted as evidence in court. The Daubert standard applied to 
economic models will be discussed in more detail below.   
6.2.3 Inferences from economic models in antitrust analysis 
This subchapter offers a brief description of the roles of economic models in making 
inferences in antitrust analysis. Thus, it will be described how economic models can support 
the actual components of antitrust analysis. How the economic models are actually assessed in 
antitrust analysis will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.     
Economic models in the determination of rules 
Economic models are central to all aspects of antitrust law. Antitrust analysis, as defined in 
this study, consists of the determination of antitrust law and the assessment of evidence. It 
was described how economic models have had a strong impact on the determination of 
                                                 
672 A US example is Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). An EU example is Hugin 
v Commission Case 22/78 ECJ (1979). 
673 For a description of US antitrust law, see Hovenkamp (2005) p. 402 f. For an EU law approach see Whish 
(2009) p. 727 f. It should be noted that the rationality argument has been argued by defendants in after-market 
antitrust cases. In both US and EU law there must be some circumstances that at least complicate the rational 
calculations when buying the original product. Thus, behavioral economics has not been applied in these cases 
without careful considerations.     
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antitrust rules in Chapter Four. An example from the US is the influence of the Chicago 
School on the development of the presumption rules applied in the US. A landmark decision 
is GTE Sylvania,674 where the Supreme Court expressed a new direction in the handling of 
vertical restraints, and also in establishing the pursuit of consumer welfare as a goal of 
antitrust. Another example is Leegin,675 where the Supreme Court abandoned the per se 
treatment of minimum resale price maintenance. In the EU it is also not difficult to find 
examples of how economic models have been decisive in the determination of rules. An 
example is the Airtours676 decision, where the court established a treatment of collective 
dominance more aligned with economic theory. Another EU example, though at the 
legislation level, is the substantial revision of the merger regulation framework leading to the 
present merger regulation (EMR), which entered into force 1 May, 2004.677 In the new 
regulation, the standard was changed from the dominance test to the SIEC-test (Significant 
Impediment of Effective Competition). A reason was that the dominance-test was alleged to 
not include mergers between non-dominant companies that still were likely to be harmful 
from an oligopoly theory point of view.678 
 Economic experts are normally not allowed to provide witness testimony about what a 
rule is.679 An economic expert is, for instance, not allowed to offer witness opinion on 
whether price fixing is per se prohibited or not. This means that judges, in principle, must rely 
on their own knowledge of economics when economic models are used in the determination 
of rules. This is a truth with modification, though. As described in Chapter Three, it is often 
not a clear distinction between the determination of rules and the assessment of evidence in 
antitrust analysis. An example of this is the use of presumption rules both to distinguish per se 
and rule of reason in US antitrust law, and conduct that restrict competition by its object and 
according to its effects in EU competition law. Presumptions are a mechanism of evidence 
assessment. It is also often not a clear distinction between the determination of rules and the 
assessment of evidence when some particular conduct, such as a vertical restraint, is 
scrutinized in antitrust analysis. Both the legal methodology applying precedence and analogy 
and an economic assessment of the specific conduct, can be used to scrutinize the legality of 
the agreement. It is not obvious where the determination of the rule ends and the assessment 
                                                 
674 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  
675 Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
676 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities Case T-342/99 [2002].  
677 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) Official Journal L 24, 29.01.2004, p. 1-22.  
678 See Whish (2009) p. 853  
679 Posner (1999b) 
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of evidence starts. Thus, even if economic experts are called upon to provide opinions on the 
economic impact of the conduct in question as a matter of evidence assessment, their opinions 
are also likely to influence the decision makers’ determination of the rule to be applied.                         
Economic models in the assessment of antitrust evidence 
The second component of antitrust analysis is evidence assessment. Model based inference is 
central in the assessment of antitrust evidence. As explained in Chapter Three and Chapter 
Five, economics has a particular role as a forensic science in antitrust cases.680 This means 
that economic expert knowledge is used to assess the facts of the case. When economic 
models are used as a forensic tool in antitrust evidence assessment, the models are often 
calibrated with real world data. The economic models are then supported by statistical and 
econometrical methods in providing inferences.  
Economic expert knowledge can enter its way to antitrust evidence assessments in 
various ways.681 The decision makers may refer to external expert knowledge to support their 
differences. This might include reference to economic theories with or without reference to 
relevant journal articles. A US example is Bell Atlantic,682 where the Supreme Court stated 
that  
 
[t]he inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, 
mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in 
line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally 
prompted by common perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact 
from Fantasy, Related Publication 06–08, pp. 3–4 (2006) (discussing problem of “false 
positives” in §1 suits.683  
 
Here, the court refers to economic research to support their argument. Moving to EU an 
illustrative decision is the decision of the European Commission in Microsoft684, where the 
Commission, inter alia, makes references to contemporary research on network effects. This 
theory is also discussed in the court decision.685  The economic expert knowledge may also be 
provided by economists that are included procedure as expert witnesses, or in other ways 
                                                 
680 See also Schinkel (2008) and Lianos (2010).  
681 See Lianos (2010).  
682 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
683 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly  550 U.S. 544 (2007) at 254. 
684 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft [2004], 
685 Microsoft Corp v. Commission, Case T-201/04, CFI, [2007]. However, the court did not cite academic 
authorities explicit. This is not usual for the EU courts, see Lianos (2010). 
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provide advice to the courts.686 The use of economic experts in antitrust procedure will be 
discussed further below.   
Economics models can assist antitrust evidence assessment in two major ways. Firstly, 
economic models can as assist in assessing the effects of some undisputed conduct, for 
instance a merger or an agreement between companies. Other evidence, such as market 
shares, can then be used as inputs to the models. By applying the evidence as input in the 
model we can use the model to predict effects. This is illustrated in Figure 6.10. 
 





Secondly, models are also relevant to assess the likelihood of some unknown illegal 
conduct, such as a secret cartel. A model can be used to assess the likelihood of some specific 
evidence given the two alternative hypotheses that the illegal conduct happened and that the 
illegal conduct did not happen. An example is that it is observed parallel conduct from two 
companies over long time. A model of the market can help is assess whether the parallel 
conduct is more consistent with some illegal coordinated behavior than not. In other words, 
we can assess the probative force of some evidence within the model. This is illustrated in 
figure 6.11.  
 





Thus, by the terms used in the beginning of this chapter models are both used to 
explain and predict in the assessment of antitrust evidence. When models are used to assess 
whether the evidence is more or less consistent with some illegal conduct or not a model is 
used to explain the evidence. It is then assessed as to whether the evidence present is likely to 
be explained by a model of the conduct under scrutiny. For instance, if we observe parallel 
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behavior we can see how well this evidence is explained by a model of illegal coordinated 
behavior compared to models that do not involve such illegal behavior. If models are used in 
this sense, the models applied must necessarily be based on realism. That some model of 
illegal behavior is instrumentally able to predict evidence is not enough. If a model of illegal 
behavior explains some evidence better than other models, then the underlying truth must also 
be that the evidence is more consistent with illegal behavior. When economic models are used 
together with real world data, econometric methods can be employed to make statistical 
inferences about how consistent data are with the hypothesis of illegal behavior. One can, for 
example, analyze whether some parameter representing illegal behavior is statistically 
significant. The use of statistical inference is further discussed below in the subchapter on 
rationality in model-based inferences.         
 When models are used to predict the consequences of some conduct, instrumentalism 
is a major role of the models. A model that more accurately predicts the effects of some 
conduct is more useful than a more realistic model that predicts the consequences less 
accurately. This means that checking the empirical validity of the assumptions are less 
important as long as the model predicts well.687 If, for instance, an assumption of individual 
rationality can be questioned on empirical grounds, this model may still work well if 
individuals, on average, behave rationally. If models used for prediction are calibrated with 
data the consequences can be predicted quantitatively. This means that the parameters are 
estimated, and the estimates are used for prediction.  Thus, in addition to the statistical testing 
of the parameters of the model, the statistical testing of the prediction itself becomes 
important. One can, for instance, test whether some prediction of anticompetitive effects is 
statistically significant. Statistical testing is discussed further below in the subchapter on 
rationality in model-based inferences.  
Dealing with models in antitrust   
As described in the introduction to this chapter, models can be more or less informative. A 
model is a more or less good substitute for knowing the truth. Many models can be applied on 
the same evidence. Competing models may yield different inferences. Thus, there is 
uncertainty related to the use of models. This means that a decision maker must take into 
account the uncertainty associated with models. Just picking a model that seems suitable 
might lead to disastrous results. The subchapter on rational model-based inferences below 
                                                 
687 Stressed by Friedman (1953). See also McKenzie (2010) and Lianos (2010).  
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will deal with the question of how to rationally address uncertainty to obtain rational model-
based inferences. This will be used as a benchmark to assess the performance of the actual 
assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis.  
The analysis that follows will focused on the use of models in antitrust evidence 
assessment. However, the determination of antitrust rules is, to a large extent, about the 
determination of presumption rules, as explained in Chapter Four. The determination of 
presumption rules belongs analytically to evidence assessment. Thus, the discussion in the 
rest of this chapter is also relevant for the determination of antitrust rules.         
6.2.4 Economic models and the Daubert standard 
The Daubert standard 
In US antitrust trials, economic experts are often involved in the litigation as expert witnesses. 
This means that economists provide an expert opinion in the court based on their economic 
expert knowledge. This involves, inter alia, providing testimony on inferences based on 
economic models to support the assessment of evidence. In the US experts may, unlike lay 
witnesses, present inferences from evidence (opinions).688 This power to testimony on 
inferences based on expert knowledge is under control by the Daubert standard established in 
Daubert.689 The court stated in Daubert that, before an expert testimony is accepted as 
admissible, the court must make  
 
a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly 
can be applied to the facts in issue.690  
 
 For acceptance, the  
 
overarching subject is the scientific validity--and thus the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability--of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, 
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate.691  
 
                                                 
688 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 701 and 702.  
689 Established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert was about 
scientific evidence. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae 526 U.S. 137 it was established that Daubert also applies to 
"testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge". 
690 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
691 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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The court refused to give any definitive checklist or test to accept an expert opinion but 
provided some general factors for the court to consider. These are: 
 
1. “whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact 
will be whether it can be(and has been) tested.” In this context, the court referred to 
the philosophy of science literature stating that “[s]cientific methodology today is 
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified”; 
2. “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”;    
3. “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider 
the known or potential rate of error”; 
4. finally, the court stated that “"general acceptance" can yet have a bearing on the 
inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit 
identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a 
particular degree of acceptance within that community."[…].” 
 
Thus, the court requires scientific validity for expert testimony to be accepted. For this 
relevance and reliability is required.  Important factors in this context include the testability of 
the theory or technique, peer review and publication of the theory or technique, the potential 
rate of error if a particular technique is used, and the general acceptance of the theory or 
technique. Daubert refers to the science concept established by the philosopher of science 
Karl Popper.692 Popper stressed the possibility of falsification as imperative in determining 
whether something qualifies as science. Daubert was about scientific evidence. In Kumho693 it 
was established that the principles established in Daubert also applies to testimony based on 
“technical” and “other specialized' knowledge”. Thus, regardless of whether the application of 
economic models is considered scientific or not, the Daubert standard guides the admissibility 
of such evidence. The Daubert standard is now partially implemented in Federal Rules of 
Evidence Rule 702.  
The Daubert standard for expert testimony to be admissible has several justifications.   
The Daubert standard is a barrier for “junk science” to enter the court.694 A primary 
justification is that it prevents decision makers, in particular laymen jurors, being confused 
                                                 
692 Popper (1959). 
693 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae 526 U.S. 137 
694 See Posner (1999, 1999b) and Lianos (2010). 
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and giving weight to meritless expert testimony.695 For laymen jurors, it might be difficult to 
distinguish “junk science” from “real science”, and there is a risk of being persuaded by false 
experts who do not deserve to have the privilege to provide opinion as experts. The Daubert 
standard can also be justified by cost considerations as it saves the costs associated with the 
presentation of meritless expert testimony. However, such a justification can be questioned as 
substantial resources may be involved in the procedure surrounding the Daubert motion.696  
However, the Daubert standard can also be criticized. At a post-modernistic superior 
level, “general acceptance” can be said to protect the application of the established sciences 
and hence the ruling powers in the application of law. At least the standard can be said to 
protect the established paradigm of a science, for instance the established paradigm of 
economics.697 Note, however, that “general acceptance” is not an absolute requirement, but a 
factor to take into account. This was, in fact, one of the main issues in Daubert, as the earlier 
standard from Frye698 was based on general acceptance as a requirement.699 Furthermore, the 
reliance on Popper’s concept on testability and falsification can create a distortion towards 
those sciences that are testable. This implicates a preference for sciences that can be tested 
with standard methods of statistical inference. “Holistic sciences” relying on the influence of 
a number of interconnected factors where each factor cannot be tested independently, will 
have a disadvantage.700 An interesting observation by Lianos (2010) is that Popper’s concept 
of science does not itself satisfy the Daubert standard. Thus, the courts rely on a concept of 
science that does not satisfy the criteria for being a science itself.        
 The admissibility of expert evidence is not so strict regulated in the EU Commission’s 
enforcement of the competition rules as it is in the US. An explanation with relevance for 
proceedings in the EU courts is that the EU courts mainly rely on court-appointed experts that 
can be screened before they are appointed.701 A more general explanation is that the 
                                                 
695 Posner (1999, 1999b). See also Lianos (2010). 
696 See for instance Werden (2008).  
697 See also Lianos (2010) for a discussion.  
698 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
699 See Kaye (2001) for a discussion. 
700  This can be illustrated by an example outside antitrust. According to the current paradigm of drug testing,   
experiments testing the effects of drugs involve two test groups where the test subjects are picked by random 
selection. The test subjects do not know if they get the real medicine or placebo. The reason is to find the 
genuine effect of the medicine. This testing principle provides a disadvantage for developers of drugs who claim 
that it is the drug together with the psychological influences that gives it its effect 
701 701 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19 June 1991 (OJ L 176 of 
4.7.1991, p. 7, and OJ L 383 of 29.12.1992 (corrigenda)) article 47 and Rules of Procedure of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities of 2 May 1991 (OJ L 136 of 30.5.1991, p. 1, and OJ L 317 of 
19.11.1991, p. 34 (corrigenda)) article 70. See Lianos (2010). See also the discussion on the use of neutral 
experts below. 
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professional decision makers in the EU Commission and the EU courts are better suited to 
distinguish junk science from science compared to the laymen jurors used in US jury trials. 
Nevertheless, steps have been taken to improve the scientific level in the use of economic 
expert evidence in European Commission. The Commission employs PhD-level economists 
in the chief economist team. Thus, if there ever was a time where the economics expertise of 
the European Commission were lawyers with sufficient self-confidence to appear as 
economists, this time is gone. Furthermore, the Commission has produced best practices on 
the submission of economic evidence.702 These best practices are supposed to facilitate good 
methodology in the use of economics in evidence assessment. These guidelines are revisited 
in the discussion on the actual assessment of economic models below. Furthermore, the courts 
seem to have been well suited, at least in some cases, to challenge the Commission if the 
Commission has not based its analysis on sound economic methodology. An example of that 
is the Airtours703 decision discussed in Chapter Five.704     
The nature of economic models and Daubert   
There is a growing body of literature addressing the application of Daubert standard to the use 
of economic experts in antitrust cases.705 The question is what is required for an economic 
expert testimony to satisfy the Daubert standard. This literature addresses the compatibility of 
the Daubert standard with the nature of economic models as such, and issues related to the use 
of econometrical and statistical methods. This section addresses the topics related to the 
nature of economic models as such, while econometrical and statistical issues will be returned 
to in the next section. After this a discussion will follow.  
 A characteristic of economic models is that they are of a deductive character. Based on 
the model assumptions and some exogenous variables, one equilibrium or several possible 
equilibriums can be deducted. On its face, this is just mathematics. It is easy to “test” whether 
valid methods of deduction have been applied. The potential rate of error of the model as a 
mathematical exercise can easily be calculated. If the model is deductive without any 
probabilistic elements, then there are no errors, and if the model includes stochastic variables, 
the probability of different outcomes can be calculated. Furthermore, the deductive methods 
                                                 
702 DG Competition, Best Practices For The Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in Cases 
Concerning the Application of Articles 101 And 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases, Staff Working Paper. 
703 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities Case T-342/99 [2002].  
704 See Geradin and Petit (2010). The courts seem to have been keener to review the economic methodology 
applied by the commission in cooperation and merger cases, but not in abuse of dominance cases.  
705 See, for instance, Blair and Herndon (2000), Werden (2008), Coate and Fischer (2009) and Lianos (2010). 
See also Hovenkamp (2005b).  
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used in mathematics are generally accepted. Thus, prima facie it seems that economic models 
should have no problems passing the Daubert standard. It is mathematics, after all, the most 
exact of all sciences.  
It is not so easy, though. It has been argued that mathematics is not science in the 
Popper sense and thus not complies with the Daubert standard.706 The reason is that 
mathematics as such is not falsifiable. The requirement of testability and knowledge of the 
potential rate of error requires something more than that the models are mathematically 
correct. The models must be valid and thus reliable and relevant for informing the facts in 
question. Expert evidence must, as all evidence, be relevant. This means that the one who 
wants to provide economic expert evidence also must show that the economic model applied 
by the expert has relevance in informing the particular case. The requirements for expert 
knowledge to be relevant for informing the case have been a returning issue in practice. The 
relevance issue will be discussed further below.  
A usual attack on economic models is the use of assumptions. There have been cases 
where economic expert testimony has been rejected because the model was based on 
assumptions not relevant for the case. An example is American Booksellers Association707 
where the appeal court found that the expert testimony was inadmissible because the 
economic model used to assess damages was speculative contained too many assumptions and 
was not supported by real-world evidence.708 Although, such assumptions are likely to have 
influenced the validity of the testimony in this case, the attack on assumptions is interesting 
on general grounds. The logic of attacking a model for its assumptions is dependent on the 
purpose of the modeling effort. If the purpose of the model is to explain evidence, then the 
realism of the model is important. Then, the assumptions must have some real world 
justification for what it explains at least if the explanation is sensitive to the assumption.709 
However, it is in the nature of economic modeling to make simplifying assumptions, and 
attacking assumptions for lack of realism is not necessarily meritorious if the purpose of the 
model is instrumentalism. Models based on the assumption of rational behavior may be 
informative for predictions, even if it can be proven that there are deviations from rationality 
in the real world.  When the purpose is prediction it should be evidence of the model’s 
instrumental value, which means that it must be evidence of the model’s ability to predict the 
                                                 
706 See Lianos (2010) for the discussion.  
707 American Booksellers Association Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (2001). 
708 See Lianos (2010) for a discussion.  
709 This is a question of robustness that will be returned to below. 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
314 
relevant variables. Thus, in applying Daubert on the expert testimony based on economic 
models, the purpose of the modeling should be taken into account. To the author’s knowledge 
the difference between realism and instrumentalism in economic modeling is not well 
explored in legal practice regarding the application of the Daubert standard.    
A challenge for economic expert testimony based on inferences from economic 
models has been alleged to be the possibility nature of economic models. This is related to the 
multiple equilibrium issue of economic models. This, in particular, applies to the use of game 
theory.710 A merger model might, for instance, state an increased possibility of oligopolistic 
coordination as an equilibrium outcome. Coate and Fischer (2009) stress the challenges 
associated with testing and eventually falsifying possibility models. Without testing the 
relevance of these models to a particular market, the models boil down to pure mathematics. 
Thus, Coate and Fischer (2009) seem to mean that the informative power of these models 
must be empirically tested in the marked studied in each case to comply with the Daubert 
standard. On the other hand, the authors seem to mean that the basic neoclassical models, 
which mean those not based on game theory such as the monopoly model, have more 
empirical support, and can be applied more generally. 
 Coate and Fischer (2009) are criticized by Lianos (2010). Lianos points out that the 
basic neoclassical models of competition and monopoly do not have the general empirical 
support alleged by Coate and Fischer (2009). Furthermore, Lianos (2010) points out that 
Coate and Fischer (2009) seem to confuse “tested” with “testability”, where the last part is 
essential for some theory to qualify as science in a Popperian sense. It is not necessary that the 
model actually has been tested for the case in question for its application in the specific case. 
It must be testable, though. The distinction between testable and tested was an issue for the 
appeal court in United States v. Mitchell711  that seems to apply a testable-standard based on 
the grounds that testability is necessary for the possibility of cross-examination.712  
Lianos’ position in this debate seems correct. The main requirement for qualification 
as a science according to Popper is testability and not whether a theory actually has been 
tested on the facts in question. However, the theory becomes stronger as it survives more and 
more falsification attempts. The validity of an economic model can normally not be 
completely verified. The informative power of a model is partially dependent on what 
alternatives we have for making inferences. A model that has not been empirically tested on 
                                                 
710 See Kobayashi (1997) and Coate and Fischer (2009). 
711 United States v. Mitchell 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
712 See Kaye (2005) for a discussion.  
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the facts of the case in question is better than no model at all. What is important is that it is 
provided some justifications that the model is relevant to inform the case. It would not be 
rational to base a decision on absolute ignorance just because the model has not been fully 
empirically tested. What is required for a model to be relevant to inform the case is returned 
to in the discussion below. 
Statistical and econometric analysis and Daubert 
The use of statistical and econometrical methods raises particular questions regarding the 
compliance with the Daubert standard.713 Statistical methods are, as such, mathematics. The 
statistical methods are based on the basic principles of calculus and the probability calculus 
that can be derived from the axioms of probability in Kolmogorov (1950). By making some 
assumptions on the properties of stochastic variables, the statistical properties of some 
statistics can be calculated. A statistic is a combination of stochastic variables. The current 
paradigm of statistical testing is frequentism, although Bayesian methods are also applied.714 
The frequentistic approach means that inferences about parameters are based on the likelihood 
of observations under some particular assumptions on the statistical properties on the 
observations. Simplified, the frequentistic methods of testing are based on the principle that if 
some observations are too unlikely given some model assumptions and some assumptions on 
the parameters tested, then the assumptions of the parameters are rejected. For instance, if we 
toss a coin 100 times and get heads 100 of the times, this will be such an unlikely outcome of 
a fair coin that we reject a hypothesis that the coin is fair. In frequentistic methods, 
conventions have been established as to how unlikely the observations must be before some 
assumption is rejected.715 The rationality of these conventions will be discussed in the 
rationality of model-based inferences below.716 A point to make here is that the statistical 
methods are themselves mathematics and the validity of the conventions applied to reject 
hypotheses are themselves not testable. This means that the statistical methods as such used 
for testing, falsification, and to find error rates are not themselves suitable to be tested against 
the Daubert standard. Still, the basic methods of statistics, such as multiple regression analysis 
                                                 
713 An in depth study is Kaye (2001).  
714 See Sober (2008), Chapter 1 and Gilboa (2009) Chapter 4. 
715 Such as 5 or 10 percent significance levels. 
716 In Bayesian methods, we are allowed to assign a priori statistical properties to the parameters as such, and 
new observations are used to update the probability distribution of the parameters. The problem is then how the 
subjective a priori element in the calculation is determined. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
subchapter on rationality in model-based inferences below. 
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have been accepted as established reliable methods.717  Thus, it is the application of these 
methods on facts in the case that must pass the Daubert standard, not the statistical methods as 
such.  
 There have been several situations where statistical and econometrical analyses have 
been declared inadmissible according to the Daubert standard in antitrust cases. One example 
is Lanctec718 where an expert testimony was declared inadmissible inter alia on the grounds of 
unreliable data. Another example is Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation 719 where the 
expert testimony was rejected because the regression analysis failed to address the causality 
issue at question. The main task of the application of the Daubert standard seems to be to 
declare inadmissible statistical and econometrical analyses that are based on unreliable data or 
where statistical methods are applied in a way that do not inform the case. Even if, for 
instance, multiple regression is admissible as an applicable method, an analysis based on this 
method is inadmissible if it does not properly address the issue it is supposed to inform.    
 A particular issue is to separate methods and conclusions in the application of the 
Daubert standard to statistical and econometric analyses. It is the methods that are subject to 
Daubert screening and not the conclusion. Kaye (2001) suggests that the Daubert-standard 
applies to the major premise in a chain of inference, while the minor premise is a conclusion. 
This is easiest to illustrate outside antitrust. Assume that a statistical analysis is used as 
evidence for a substance’s harmful effect on persons. A general statistical analysis showing 
the harmful effect of the substance on persons would be the major premise that is subject to 
the Daubert standard. However, using this analysis as evidence that using the substance 
resulted in the harmful effect on person A would be a conclusion. This analytical approach 
may work well as a general rule, but it is not hard to see that this will not solve the problems 
associated with the application of the Daubert standard on statistical analyses. A question is 
for instance how close the link between the major premise and the minor premise should be. 
Is an experimental study showing effects on rats sufficient as a major premise to conclude 
effects on humans?720 Furthermore, as pointed out by Kordana and O’Reilly (2001), 
distinguishing the major premise and minor premise is particularly difficult in econometrical 
analysis. Where is the border between the general analysis of data as a major premise and the 
application of the model to a specific market, which would be a conclusion? Thus, 
                                                 
717 See for instance City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998). 
718 Lantec, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2002) 
719 Re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation, 893 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1995) 
720 This was an issue in General Electric. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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distinguishing between method and conclusion may not be very informative in applying the 
Daubert standard to econometric analysis. Probably, it is better if the judge applies the 
Daubert standard to the entire analysis and decides if the analysis is sufficiently linked to the 
case to have any informative value. The requirement of such a link between a model and the 
specific case will be discussed in the next section.                     
Some comments on the application of the Daubert standard to economic expert testimony 
The major role of The Daubert standard applied to expert testimony based on economic 
models in antitrust cases is to provide a check that the expert testimony has some relevance to 
resolve the case, and that it is reliable in doing so. In Daubert it was established that it must be 
established that it is a “fit” between the testimony and the facts of the case.721 This is also 
established in FRE Rule 702, which states the requirement that “the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case”.  This connection between the 
facts of the case and the testimony was qualified by the US Supreme Court in General 
Electric:  
 
nothing in either Daubert or the federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to 
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between 
the data and the opinion offered.722 
 
Thus, expert testimony based on economic models must be linked to the specific facts 
of the case. If a model is not calibrated with data in an econometric analysis, it must at least 
be established that the model has some relevance in being informative for the case. An 
economic expert testimony based on an economic model not being calibrated with case-
relevant data might still be admissible as long as the relevance for the case can be established. 
An economic model presented as a pure tautology would not be admitted, though. In other 
words, a mathematical model with tailored assumptions to yield a desired result would not be 
admitted. However, if it can be demonstrated that the assumptions of a model are relevant for 
the case and it is informative for the decision makers, for instance, how rational agents are 
likely to adopt in a certain situation, there seems to be no problem in admitting such 
testimony as long as it is clear what the testimony is about. For instance, if the party can 
demonstrate that a model of oligopoly is informative for the case under scrutiny, and this 
                                                 
721 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) at 591. 
722 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) at 146 
 RATIONAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS  
 
 © Peder Østbye 2013 
 
318 
model reveals that some conduct facilitates a multiple of coordination equilibriums among 
rational players, it is difficult to see that this evidence should be excluded as long as it is clear 
what this evidence is supposed to demonstrate. Some assumptions are probably efficient to 
apply without requiring testing in the specific case for being admissible, as they provide the 
best default that best can be refuted by the opposite party if they do not apply. If, for instance, 
a model is based on the assumption that a firm under scrutiny maximizes profits, this is such a 
reasonable default that it should be up to the other party to justify that this assumption is not 
likely to give valid inferences for the case in question. 
When econometric evidence is presented, the Daubert standard seems to be suitable in 
distinguishing junk from science. If the data used are not representative, the Daubert standard 
seems to be applicable to screen out the testimony based on this data.  If the methods applied 
are not informative for what it is supposed to be informative for, but, for instance, an attempt 
to make correlation appear as causation, the Daubert standard also seems applicable to screen 
out this evidence. Thus, the courts seem to be applicable to address both of the two major 
issues that influence the relevance and reliability of quantitative analyses: the data and the 
application of the quantitative methods on the specific case.       
The risks associated with the Daubert standard are that it screens out relevant evidence 
that should be admitted or fails to screen out evidence that is not relevant. The general 
impression from some leading antitrust commentators seems to indicate that the problem is 
that too much passes the Daubert standard rather than too little.723 The literature refer to 
several cases where non-meritorious economic expert evince have passes the standard, where 
a prominent example is the Conwood724 decision, which will be discussed in more detail 
below.725     
However, there that also been arguments that the Daubert-standard is too strict. As 
mentioned above the standard can be criticized for favoring established paradigms. Lianos 
(2010) points out that the Daubert standard may exclude evidence based other theories of 
competition not based on the neoclassical framework. This not only has the effect that 
theories with potential merits may be excluded, but also distorts the development of 
economics as an academic discipline. It is hard to fully agree with Lianos (2010) on this point. 
It seems unlikely the Daubert standard constitute a major obstacle for the development of 
alternative economic theories as such. In fact, the model framework applied in antitrust today 
                                                 
723 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 84 f. 
724 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co, 290 F. 3d 768 (6th. Cir 2002). 
725 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 84 f. and Kaye (2001). 
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was developed even the SCP-paradigm was the prevailing model framework used in antitrust 
at the time of development.726 Furthermore, disciplines such as behavioral economics have 
evolved and gained acceptance despite of the Daubert-standard. As described in the section on 
economic models above, Nobel Prizes in economics have been awarded for advances in 
behavioral economics. That a model is based on behavioral economics is no intrinsic obstacle 
to passing the Daubert-standard in antitrust cases.727 Rather, behavioral economics is on the 
way into the courtroom in antitrust cases.728 Note, however, that empirical testing is in the 
nature of behavioral economics, which probably make behavioral economics particularly 
suitable to pass the Daubert standard. Thus, the Daubert standard seems to not provide a 
major barrier for new knowledge of economics to enter the courtroom as long as the new 
knowledge is testable and has gained some general acceptance.729  
Understanding the informative value of models seems imperative for the application of 
the Daubert standard to have any value. The standard should facilitate the admittance of 
economic models that are informative and that are likely to contribute to a more accurate 
decision, while confusing analyses that increase the noisiness of evidence should be screened 
off. This should be an overarching principle guiding the application of the Daubert standard. 
The rest of this chapter will provide guidance on this issue. The determinants for an economic 
model to be informative will be identified, and directions for how this informative value 
rationally should be taken into account will be provided. It will also be discussed when 
argumentation based on economic models are likely to be confusing and non-informative, in 
particular by the means of abuse of rhetoric.     
6.3 Rational model based inferences in antitrust analysis 
6.3.1 Decision theoretic framework for rational model-based inferences 
The decision theoretic model framework for rational model-based decisions presented in this 
chapter builds on the model framework derived in Chapter Three and the extension of this 
framework presented in Chapter Five. For the sake of completeness, the model framework for 
                                                 
726 However, it should be mentioned that the current framework entered antitrust before the Daubert decision. 
727 See Stucke (2007) for a discussion. 
728 Stucke (2007).  
729 As a note, the Daubert standard may, rather, be a benefit for the development of competing economic 
theories. If the proponents of such theories want the theories to be applied in legal decision making, they must 
demonstrate that their models are operational and informative in supporting actual decision making. Forcing the 
research in this direction might facilitate a beneficial gravity of the theories to be operational and informative for 
decision making. To improve economic decision making is, after all, one of the major roles of economic science.    
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rational evidence assessment is briefly recapped here, as incorporating model-based decisions 
is a direct expansion of this framework.    
  From Chapter Three, it follows that a rational decision is the decision that maximizes 
expected utility, which is the same as minimizing expected loss.730 It is rational to decide 
violation if the expected loss of wrongfully deciding violation is less than the expected loss of 
wrongfully deciding not violation.731 Let LV be the loss of wrongfully deciding violation 
(type-1 error). LNV is the loss of wrongfully deciding not violation (type-2 error). pV is the 
probability that the law was actually violated, and pNV=1-pV is the probability that the law was 
not violated. This means that the expected loss of finding violation is ELV=(1-pV)LV. This is 
the expected loss from type-1 error. The expected loss of not finding violation is 
ELNV=pVLNV. This is the expected loss from type-2 error. The rational decision is to decide 
violation if ELV<ELNV and not violation otherwise.732 This means that it is rational to decide 
violation if (1-pV)LV<pVLNV. The expected loss is then EL=min[ELV,ELNV]=min[(1-
pV)LV,pVLNV]. The precise content of these losses was discussed Chapter Three.  
As explored in Chapter Five, evidence can be introduced into the model framework 
above. We can think of assessing evidence as hypothesis testing. Let HV be the hypothesis 
that the law is violated. This means that the probability of violation can be written as pV=p(HV 
is true)=p(HV). The probability that the law is not violated can be written as pNV=p(HV is 
false)=p(HNV). Since pNV=1-pV, we have pNV=1-p(HV).  
Let ĒTot be the total amount of potential evidence that can be gathered. Let Ē be the 
evidence that is gathered, and let e be the evidence actually observed. This means that e is the 
outcome of Ē. When we gather evidence Ē we can both choose what evidence to gather and in 
what sequence to gather the evidence. If e is relevant evidence, it affects the probability 
assessment of HV. p(HV|e) is the probability we assign to HV given evidence e. In an antitrust 
context e might for instance be some e-mail from company A to company B on planned price 
changes, and HV is the hypothesis that it has been an illegal agreement on price. 
                                                 
730 This can be derived from the axioms of rational behavior. An intuitive explanation is that this is the decision 
rule that minimizes losses in the long run.    
731 As explained in Chapter Three, two extreme decisions are assumed: violation and not violation. This is a 
simplification. Both violation and not violation might consist of many decisions. Violation can constitute a 
continuous space of decisions. If deciding violation involves fines or other sanctions, every possible size of the 
fine or sanction is a separate decision. When it comes to deciding not violation, this might also involve many 
decisions. This can involve an acquittal, which just means that a violation is not found according to the standard 
of proof. However, the decision maker can also in some circumstances state explicitly that the conduct in 
question is not a violation. The binary decision framework is chosen for simplicity. This will, most of the time, 
be illustrative for the study of rationality. If this framework is deviated, this will follow clearly from the text.    
732 More precisely it is rational to decide violation if and only if ELV≤ELNV. However, if we assume that if the 
expected loss of deciding violation and not violation is equal, then not violation will be decided.   
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 We do not know the outcome of the evidence gathering before it is gathered. If for 
instance e is written communication of prices we can search for this evidence. If we find this 
evidence, it might boost our probability assessment of HV. Not finding the evidence might 
also have some impact on our probability assessment of HV, but not so much as if we found 
the evidence of written communication. In line with rational decision theory, we assume that 
we know the a priori the probability of finding such evidence if we search for it. This means 
that we know the probability distribution for p(Ē) for all possible subsets of ĒTot. Even if we, 
for instance, don’t know if we will find communication if we search for it, we at least know 
the probability of finding such evidence. We also know how this evidence potentially affects 
our probability assessment of HV. This means that, for a given outcome of evidence e, we can 
calculate p(HV|e). 
For some given evidence e, it will be rational to find violation if ELV(e)<ELNV(e).  
Given evidence e we have that ELV(e)=(1-p(HV|e))LV and ELNV(e)=p(HV|e)LNV which makes 
it rational to find violation if (1-p(HV|e))LV<p(HV|e)LNV. The expected loss of a rational 




Gathering evidence is also associated with costs. It is assumed that the cost of 
gathering evidence is c(Ē) and this cost is known a priori.733 A rational decision which 
includes evidence gathering minimizes the sum of all costs. This is the sum of the expected 
losses from errors and the costs of gathering evidence. The minimization of the sum of the 
expected loss from errors and costs of gathering evidence can then be written as:  
 
MinĒ EĒ(EL(Ē) + c(Ē)). 
 





The idea behind this formula is simple although it might appear complicated. There are two 
minimization operations. Given that some evidence, e, is gathered, the rational decision maker 
                                                 
733 In theory we could assume that there was some uncertainty associated with the costs, and then operate with 
expected values. This is a complication that is not pursued in this study.  
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will minimize expected loss. But before the evidence is gathered, he has to “average” over all 
possible outcomes of Ē by taking the expectation when he is deciding to gather the evidence 
or not. This is the EĒ part. The MinĒ refers to the decision maker having to optimize the 
evidence gathering, taking the cost of gathering evidence into account. Evidence should be 
gathered if its decision value exceeds the costs, as explained in Chapter Five. 
Now models can be introduced into the framework.734 Assume that a model, M, is 
used to make inferences about p(HV|e). We let p(HV|e,M) be the probability of violation, 
given that model M is “true”. Thus, if we assume that model M is “true”, we can state our 




The model determines the probative force of evidence, the expected loss of error, and, 
following from that, the evidence that should be gathered. If it, for instance, is assumed that a 
Bertrand oligopoly model of differentiated products is the model that describes the market in 
question, then this model will guide the evidence assessment. This model will determine the 
probative force of evidence, the decision value of evidence and the optimal gathering of 
evidence. Note that, in principle, models are also used to assess the loss of errors as pointed 
out in Chapter Three. This complication is not pursued here. Models can also be used to 
assess the costs of gathering evidence, which is also a complication not pursued here.    
The problem, now, is that the decision is model dependent. Different models might 
give different rational decisions. By choosing the model, we can choose the expected errors 
from our decision and, in practice, choose which decision minimizes expected loss. As will be 
described further below, this might be convenient for a person who argues for a particular 
decision, but not for making a rational decision. To accommodate the problem of model 
dependence, we have to take into account model uncertainty to make rational decision based 
on models. Taking into account model uncertainty gives us the following expected loss and 




                                                 
734 See Parmigiani and Inoue (2009) p. 209 f. and Sober (2008) p. 78 f. for a more detailed description of the 
framework use here.    
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p(Mi) is the probability that model Mi is the “true” model. “True” is written in apostrophes 
because what a true model is depends on whether we have a realism or instrumentalist 
approach to modeling. How we should interpret p(Mi) is a part of an extensive philosophy of 
science debate not fully described here.735  In a realism approach, we can think of p(Mi) as the 
probability that Mi is the actual model that generated the data. In an instrumentalist 
perspective, we can think of p(Mi) as the probability that Mi is the most informative model 
among the i candidate models. This topic is returned to below. 
The model-dependent expected loss of the decision should be averaged over all 
models to make a rational decision. The probability that a hypothesis is true averaged over all 
models is p(HV|e)=∑ip(HV|e,Mi)p(Mi). If models disagree in the probability of HV given e, 
which means that the probative force is sensitive to the model, and if there is no model that 
appears much more likely to be true than the others, the expected loss of error increases. The 
reason is that this will create a tendency for ∑ip(HV|e,Mi)p(Mi) to neither be very high nor 
very low. Thus, our decision becomes better if models “agree” upon the probative force of 
evidence.  
In the next two sections of this subchapter, the rational assessment of p(Mi) is 
discussed. The first section discusses qualitative methods, while the next section address 
quantitative methods of assessing p(Mi). Thus, it is discussed what weight to rationally give 
competing models. We will also touch upon the assessment of p(HV|e,Mi) although p(Mi) is 
the main focus. However, the rational assessment of p(HV|e,Mi) follows the principles 
discussed in Chapter Five. The purpose of this subchapter is to provide a rational benchmark 
for the discussion of the actual assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis that will 
follow later in this chapter. 
6.3.2 Qualitative assessment of the informative value of models 
Principles for qualitative assessment of models 
One question is if it is possible to say anything general and qualitative about which models 
are good and which models are not good, or even bad. Below, this issue is approached with 
quantitative statistical methods. However, we can say something in general about which 
models are good or bad on qualitative grounds.  
In philosophy of science Occam’s razor, also called the principle of parsimony, is a 
guide to model assessment and model selection. Applying Occam’s razor is to choose the 
                                                 
735 See Sober (2008) p. 78 f.  
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simplest model in the choice between two models equally (or almost equally) consistent with 
observations.736 Models are equally consistent with observations when they explain or predict 
the observations equally well. The simplest model is normally the one with the fewest 
explanatory variables. The reason behind Occam’s razor is that, with enough explanatory 
variables, almost any model can fit the evidence. By making sufficient assumptions ad hoc, 
almost any model can fit the observations.  
Note that Occam’s razor also can be considered as a tradeoff. Fewer variables might 
weigh up for less consistence with observations. This means that even if the simpler model 
performs a little worse in fitting observations than a more complicated model, the simplicity 
of the simple model might make it better overall. The quantitative techniques to formally 
weigh explanatory and predictive power against parsimony in variables will be discussed in 
the discussion of quantitative methods below.    
Another way to qualitatively assess the goodness of models is to qualitatively assess 
the robustness of the model. A model is robust if its explanatory power and predictive power 
is insensitive to the assumptions made. If the model’s explanatory and predictive power is 
heavily dependent on some assumptions, it is not robust with respect to those assumptions. 
The point is that if the model is sensitive to such assumptions and we are using it to predict or 
explain in a situation where we do not know if these assumption are satisfied, the model is not 
very reliable. However, if the model is not so sensitive to those assumptions, we do not need 
to worry so much if the assumption is satisfied. Thus, all else being equal, parsimony in 
assumptions is better. Examples and the quantitative aspects of robustness are returned to 
below. 
Qualitative assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis 
As described in the subchapter on economic models above, the use of an economic model to 







                                                 
736 See for instance Pearl (2000) Chapter 2; MacKay (2003) Chapter 28; Sober (2008) p. 78 f.; and Gilboa (2009) 
p. 21 f.  This is in line with Albert Einstein’s famous quote “Make it as simple as possible, but not simpler”.   
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The basic assumptions will typically include fundamental assumptions such rational choice. If 
game theory is used to model the behavior, the assumptions of rational choice may be 
supplemented by assumptions such as common knowledge of rationality and consistently 
aligned beliefs.  From these assumptions, we can derive basic behavioral implications such as 
profit maximization and utility maximization. Basic assumptions also include implicit 
assumptions on the economic framework, such as protection of property rights, enforceable 
contracts, and so on. The basic assumptions are often implicitly given, and are not stated 
explicitly, unless it is the impact of a basic assumption as such that is explicitly studied in the 
model. For instance, the possibility of fraud is often assumed away in the models of 
competition relevant for antitrust analysis. In addition to the basic assumptions we have 
model-specific assumptions. These are assumptions that delineate and idealize the issue we 
want to study. These are typically assumptions about consumers’ preferences, firms’ costs, 
the structure of value chain, and the information available to the different agents and how 
soon the actions of other agents can be observed. These can also be assumptions related to 
how negotiations are performed. In competition models, assumptions related to the possibility 
of entry by new firms are important. 
In addition to the basic assumption and the model-specific assumptions, assumptions 
regarding exogenous variables are necessary to determine equilibrium. In competition models, 
this might typically be the number of firms in the market. There is no waterproof distinction 
between assumptions and exogenous variables. It can, for instance, be assumed that the cost 






Principles to assess 
welfare  
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associated with establishing a firm in the market is E. This is a model-specific assumption. 
The size of E becomes an exogenous variable. When we perform a counterfactual analysis of 
effects and analyze hypothetical scenarios in general, it is the exogenous variables we 
manipulate. We might, for instance, analyze the effects of a reduction of the number of firms 
from N1 to N2. It might also be assumed that each firm, i, has a marginal cost of ci. ci is then 
an exogenous variable that can be manipulated.         
From the basic assumptions, the model-specific assumptions and the exogenous 
variables, we can deduct possible equilibriums, or the equilibrium, if it is possible to deduct a 
single equilibrium. As stressed in the discussion of game theory above, multiple equilibriums 
might substantially reduce the model’s informative value in explaining and predicting an 
outcome. This is particularly important to take into account when we want to predict a 
particular outcome, but might not reduce the informative value if we want to use the model to 
make inferences on possible outcomes. As discussed above, we might, for instance, not be as 
interested in the particular equilibrium outcome in antitrust analysis as in the possible 
equilibriums. For instance, if we wonder if some conduct facilitates coordination among 
competitors, we are more interested in whether conduct makes coordination a more likely 
outcome rather than the particular coordinated outcome. The equilibrium is, together with the 
basic assumptions and model-specific assumptions, the basis for the welfare analysis. The 
model-specific assumptions are important for the welfare analysis because the assumptions 
concerning, inter alia, costs and utility, influence welfare. By manipulating the exogenous 
variables, we can analyze the effects on welfare. We can find out how a counterfactual value 
of an exogenous variable affects equilibrium and welfare. In a model, we can, for instance, 
analyze whether a merger causes a reduction in total surplus or consumer surplus by 
comparing a model where the two firms not merge by a model where the two firms merge.  If 
the total welfare and/or the consumer welfare decreases under the model where the two firms 
are merged compared to when they do not merge, we can infer that within the model 
framework that the merger will reduce welfare and/or consumer welfare.  
From an Occam’s razor perspective, economic models that explain or predict the data 
that are based on fewer assumptions should be preferred to models based on more 
assumptions. However, all the implicit assumptions in economic models make a “counting” of 
assumptions difficult, and in many situations, almost meaningless. The simple monopoly 
model illustrates this problem. This model is simple in the sense that the monopolist is 
assumed to set one profit maximizing price in the market. However, by taking all implicit 
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assumptions into account, the simple monopoly model is not so simple anymore. It is assumed 
that the monopolist is not subject to potential competition, with the result that strategic 
behavior is not complicating the model. It is also assumed that the monopolist is not able to 
price discriminate. This also includes the assumption that the monopolist will not reduce the 
price after he has sold to those who are willing to pay the high price. Other models have 
shown that altering this assumption changes the prediction of the monopoly outcome 
dramatically.737 Thus, decision makers should be careful in applying Occam’s razor 
qualitatively as a method to assess the informative value of a model. One can easily be misled 
by all the implicit assumptions that underpin an apparently simple model.   
Robustness is about the sensitivity of the assumptions on the inferences made from the 
model as described above. The informative power of an economic model might be sensitive to 
both the basic assumptions and the model-specific assumptions, including assumptions 
concerning the variables that are assumed exogenous. Assumptions on exogeneity might be 
determining for the model prediction. There are different ways to cope with assumptions. One 
way is to compare the assumptions with corresponding aspects of the actual situation we are 
modeling. If an assumption is in line with reality, the assumption is justified. However, it is 
not always so easy to check the assumptions’ compliance with reality because of observation 
problems. For instance, it is relatively difficult to check that the rationality assumptions are 
satisfied. In this case, we can check the models’ sensitivity to the assumptions. If the 
prediction of the model is not very sensitive to the assumption, real world evidence on 
presence of the assumption is not so crucial. This can be illustrated by the perfect competitive 
equilibrium model. If there is strong competition, inefficient firms who do not adapt rationally 
will be eliminated by the competition from competitors who behave like they are rational. 
This follows from models of evolutionary game theory, as described above. If the 
equilibriums based on the assumption of rational players are also equilibriums based on 
evolution-inspired assumptions, the models are robust for the rationality assumptions. Note 
that if the purpose of the modeling effort is instrumentalism, the compliance with the 
assumptions is not crucial as long as the model is informative in predictions.                       
A critique against neoclassical economic models, especially addressed by the Austrian 
school, is the use of equilibriums for comparative analysis, as discussed above. It can be 
                                                 
737 See Coase (1972). The monopolist has an incentive to reduce the price when all with high willingness to pay 
has purchased the good. The customers know this, and will wait until the price is reduced.  A durable goods 
monopolist who cannot credible commit to not reduce prices in the future will then be forced to price at marginal 
costs from the start. However, if the customers are impatient, the producer may exploit this impatience to charge 
higher prices in the start. See von der Fehr and Kuhn (1995).     
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considered as an assumption as such that equilibrium outcomes can be used to assess the 
effects of conduct. This assumption might be robust or not robust, depending on the 
circumstances. If we believe that the economy most of the time is out of equilibrium, what 
informative value is there to compare equilibriums to assess effects? Given that we, most of 
the time, are out of equilibrium the process towards equilibrium becomes more important. 
This means that we should not only assess what effect some action has on equilibrium 
outcome, but the effect on the process towards equilibrium as such. If we, for instance, 
believe that competition facilitates a more efficient process towards an unknown long-run 
equilibrium, this should be taken into account as such. This is central to antitrust analysis as 
its purpose is as much about protecting the competitive process as protecting the competitive 
equilibrium.  
This section compromised a qualitative assessment of the informative value of 
economic models used in antitrust analysis. The next section will discuss how econometrics 
and statistics can be used to more precisely quantitatively assess the informative value of 
models.   
6.3.3 Quantitative assessment of the informative value of models 
The quantitative assessment of the informative value of economic models requires the use of 
statistical and econometrical methods. It will be beyond the scope of this study to provide a 
general survey and review of statistical and econometric methods. The discussion will be kept 
to how quantitative methods can be used, and are used, to assess the informative value of 
quantitative model based inferences, with emphasis on econometric models applied in 
antitrust analysis. It will be relied upon on the general statistics and econometric literature, as 
well as specialized literature on the use of statistical and econometrical methods in litigation 
in general738  and antitrust in particular.739   
Testing model assumptions  
An element of the quantitative assessment of models is testing the assumptions and the 
sensitiveness of the assumptions crucial for the validity for the inferences made. Such 
assumptions include everything from technical statistical properties of the residuals740 to 
crucial structural properties of the models. Such crucial structural properties of the model 
                                                 
738 Seminal contributions on statistics in the courtroom include Kaye (1986) and Kaye (2001). See also Kaye and 
Freedman (2000). A seminal contribution on econometrics in the courtroom is Rubinfeld (1985). See also 
Rubinfeld (2000).   
739 See, for instance, ABA (2005). A recent textbook treatment is Garcés and Davis (2009) 
740 Such as if the residuals follow a normal distribution. 
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include checking the exogeneity assumptions and causality assumptions made in the model. 
The exogeneity assumption includes that there are no dependencies between the explanatory 
variables of the model and the unexplained factors captured by the residuals. Tests for 
exogeneity include checking correlation between the explanatory variables and residuals, and 
visual methods, such as residual plots. Lack of exogeneity is likely to yield biased estimators, 
with the result that the estimates are not likely to yield the true dependency between the 
explanatory variable and the variable to be explained or predicted.741  
Establishing exogeneity is a crucial element in establishing a causal link. However, 
identifying causal connection requires far more than testing for independence between 
explanatory variables and residuals. We still do not know the direction of an eventual 
causality, or if the dependency is due to a correlation with another explanatory variable in the 
model. There is a substantial body literature on checking causality assumptions and 
identifying causal connections.742 However, it will be beyond the scope of this study to 
provide a detailed study of quantitative techniques in identifying causality.             
Testing basic model assumption provides information as to whether we are likely to 
obtain reliable estimators and estimates which are important for the informative merits of the 
model. However, testing the model assumptions gives scarce information on the relative 
informative power of competing models complying with the basic assumptions. Thus, more 
advanced tools are necessary to test the relative merits of competing models. Rather, the 
validity of the assumptions can be seen as a prerequisite for the reliability of the inferences 
made from the models.  
Testing significance of model parameters and other methods of parameter inference 
After validating assumptions, a question remains as to whether the identified dependencies in 
the model can be concluded with sufficient confidence. If we are not sufficiently confident 
that there is an explanatory link between a variable and the response variable, it might be 
better to exclude it from the model according to the principle of parsimony.  
By using the laws of probability, one can derive approximate probability distributions 
for the estimators and other combinations data that includes the true parameter. This means 
that it is possible to calculate probabilities of the outcome of estimates and other test statistics 
under the assumption that the parameters have specific values and that the model as such is 
                                                 
741 See, for instance, Rubinfeld (1985), Kaye (1986), Davis and Garcés (2009) p. 65 and Wasserman (2003) p. 
209 f.   
742 See, for instance, Davis and Garcés (2009) p. 89 f. See also Wasserman (2003) p. 251 f.  
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“true”.743 Assuming that the model as such is true means that it is assumed that the other 
assumptions associated with the model are valid.744 Below, the informative value of the 
statistical tests will first be briefly addressed assuming the validity of model assumptions. 
After this, the problems associated with the invalidity of model assumptions below will be 
returned to.  
A way to assess the confidence in the dependency between the explanatory variable 
and the dependent variable is testing statistical significance by hypothesis-testing. This is one 
of the most common methods used to make inferences about parameters in legal evidence.745 
A usual test is to test a null hypothesis that a parameter is zero, against the alternative 
hypothesis that a parameter is different from zero.746 However, other hypotheses can be 
tested, such as for example that a parameter is “5”, or any other value, or that two parameters 
are equal.  
The question in hypothesis testing is whether we can reject the null hypothesis with 
significance level x. If we can reject the hypothesis, this is often referred to as the parameter 
being statistically significant747 different from zero, with a significance level x (assuming the 
null hypothesis is that the parameter is zero). We reject the null hypothesis with significance 
level x if there is less than x percent likely to observe the test-data or more improbable test 
data given that the null hypothesis is true.748 For instance, if we operate with a five percent 
significance level, a rejection means that there is less than five percent chance of observing 
the test-data or more improbable test data given that the null hypothesis is true. Since there is 
less than five percent chance of observing the test-data, or a more improbable test data, when 
assuming that the null hypothesis is true we reject the hypothesis.749 
If we are not able to reject the null hypothesis, this only means that we cannot infer 
that the parameter is significantly different from zero with significance level x. It might still 
be much more likely to get the observed data given that the parameter is different from zero 
                                                 
743 True in the sense that the model truly describes the process that generated the data. See for instance Rubinfeld 
(1985).  
744 See Kaye (2001).  
745 See Kaye (1986), Kaye (2001) and Greenland and Poole (2011).  
746 If we for instance want to make inference about a parameter β1, the null hypothesis is H0:β1=0 and the 
alternative hypothesis H1:β1≠0. This is a two-sided test. One can also operate with one sided tests which means 
to for instance test the null hypothesis is H0:β1=0 against the alternative hypothesis H1:β1>0. Here we will 
operate with two-sided tests.  
747 Statistical significance is different from numerical significance. The possibility of confusing these measures, 
and the possibility of exploiting this confusion in abuse of rhetoric, is returned to below.     
748 See Sober (2008) p. 54 and Kaye (1986).  
749 This can be illustrated with an example. Assume that we flip a coin. Our hypothesis is that the coin is fair 
which means that the probability of head p is 0.5. We flip the coin 20 times and obtain 17 heads. The question is 
then if getting 17 heads or more is so improbable given that p=0.5 that we reject the hypothesis that p is 0.5.   
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than if the parameter is zero. In other words, the alternative hypothesis might still be more 
likely than the null hypothesis, even if we cannot reject the null hypothesis with significance 
level x. This reveals a fundamental philosophical problem of using significance tests for 
inference. Even if we cannot reject the hypothesis that the parameter is zero, the hypothesis 
that the parameter is, for instance, “5”, or some other value different from zero, might be 
much more likely.750 This is of crucial importance when statistical inference is used in as legal 
evidence. While being able to reject a hypothesis might have high inferential value in refuting 
a non-dependency, not being able to reject is by no means a proof of non-dependency. A 
dependency might still be up to infinitely more likely than non-dependency. If we, for 
instance, instead tested whether the parameter is “5”, we might not be able to reject this 
hypothesis either. This illustrates the importance assessing a hypothesis against a proper 
alternative hypothesis.751 Let us say that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a parameter is 
zero with significance level x. The data might still be 100 times more consistent with the 
parameter being, for instance, “5” than being zero. One way to address this problem is to test 
the likelihood ratio between the hypotheses rather than just testing the parameter. In this way, 
one could, for instance, test if the likelihood ratio752 between that the hypothesis that the 
parameter is zero and the hypothesis that the parameter is, for instance, “5” is significantly 
greater than one.753      
Another fundamental problem is the choice of significance level x. According to the 
theory of rational decisions, the consequences in terms of expected error costs should 
determine the optimal choice of making type-1 errors. This means that, from a decision 
theoretic point of view, the usual choice of significance level of five or ten percent might be 
arbitrarily, and not in line with a rational decision taking the relative costs of type-1 errors and 
type-2 errors of the particular case into account.754 Kaye (2001) traces the convention of using 
five percent test-levels back to the British statistician, Sir R.A Fisher, who was one of the 
founders of modern frequentistic statistics. Posner (1999b) points out that using the five or ten 
percent level of significance level for testing is a convention that origins from screening due 
                                                 
750 See Sober (2008) p. 54 f. Assume that we flip a coin. Our hypothesis is the coin is biased and that the 
probability of head p is 0.4. We flip the coin 20 times and get 11 heads. Even if we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that p=0.4 with these observations, it is relatively more probable to obtain the data if p=0.5.  
751 See Kaye (2001) for a discussion. See also the European Commission Best practices on the submission of 
economic evidence, op. cit., paragraph 18. 
752 As described above the likelihood-function is the likelihood of data given model and parameter assumptions. 
The likelihood ratio is then the ratio between the likelihood functions under different assumptions on the 
parameters.   
753 See, for instance, Greenland and Poole (2011). 
754 See also Rubinfeld (1985) and Kaye (1986) for making the same points.  
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to scarce space in scientific journals.  This issue is returned to in the discussion of Bayesian 
methods below. 
Significance testing continues to be extremely important in statistical inference 
including the use of statistics and econometrics in antitrust analysis.755 Despite the lack of 
rationality justifications for the significance levels, the conventions for statistical significance 
levels are crucial in determining whether a parameter is included in the models used for 
inferences. Significance-testing favors a null hypothesis in the sense that a null hypothesis 
may not be rejected even where an alternative hypothesis is more probable. This might be 
exploited by the parties in litigation by trying to formulate a null hypothesis in their favor. 
This will be explored further in the discussion of actual assessment of economic models in 
antitrust analysis below. 
Significance testing is one of many methods of making inferences about parameters 
given the validity of the model assumptions. In addition to hypothesis-testing, p-values and 
confidence intervals often appear in statistical parameter inference. A p-value is simply the 
probability of obtaining the test data or more improbable test data, given that the null 
hypothesis is true. A 1-x percent confidence interval of a parameter is an interval which in 1-x 
percent of the times it is constructed from test-data will cover the true parameter. Thus, if we 
construct a 95 (x is 5) percent confidence interval, we are 95 percent “confident” that this 
entails the true parameter.756 The wider a confidence interval is, the less certain is the 
estimate. If zero is in the confidence interval, this means that we cannot reject with 95 percent 
confidence that there is no dependency. The p-value, hypothesis-testing and confidence 
intervals are all related. Assume that the p-value is p. If p is less than x then the null-
hypothesis will be rejected on an x percent significance level. If the null-hypothesis is that a 
parameter is equal to zero, and this hypothesis is rejected at significance level x, this means 
that the 1-x percent confidence interval for the parameter does not entail zero.  
Both p-values and confidence intervals provide more information than a significance 
test. With a significance test, we only know if the parameter is significant at the specified 
significance level, while the p-value provides information on exactly how probable it is to get 
the observations and more extreme observations. Thus, it has been suggested that p-values 
should be reported in litigation rather than just the result of a significance test.757 Confidence 
                                                 
755 See for instance Davis and Garcés (2009) and ABA (2005).  
756 Note however that this does not mean that the probability that the parameter is in this interval is 1-x. For this 
misconception and other misconceptions associated with the use of statistics in litigation, see Greenland and 
Poole (2011).  
757 See Kaye (1986) and Greenland and Poole (2011). 
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intervals also provide more information than just a test of significance because we can make 
an assessment of where our estimate is situated within the confidence interval. Still, the 
complex statistical theory that underpins confidence intervals and the risk for non-trained 
decision makers to misunderstand the concept may reduce its value in litigation contexts. 
Thus, p-values are probably more suitable for litigation.758         
At mentioned above, it should be noted that, in addition to the assumption regarding 
the parameter tested, the assumptions associated with the model itself are also assumed to be 
valid in the testing of significance and the derivation of p-values and confidence intervals.759  
This is an additional source of uncertainty. This means that inferences made on the 
parameters may not be valid if the model assumptions are not valid. Failing to find a 
parameter significant may happen because the parameter is not significant or because the 
model assumptions are wrong. Thus, testing parameters have limited value if not the 
assumptions, or at least the sensitiveness of the assumptions, are tested, as described above. 
Furthermore, finding a parameter significant does not mean that the model is good. By the 
parametric inference described above, we are not testing the model as such. We are testing 
properties of the parameters, given the model. If the model as such is bad, an issue we will get 
back to just below, the inference value of finding a parameter significantly different from zero 
might be low. 
Assessing the models’ informative value 
Testing the validity of assumptions and making inferences on parameters has limited value in 
assessing the informative value of models. Testing model assumptions is a prerequisite for the 
validity of inferences. Standard parametric inferences give information on the parameters, 
given the validity of assumptions. In addition to testing the assumptions of a model and the 
significance of its parameters, statistical inference can also be employed to test the goodness 
of models as such. These tests more directly address the probability of a model, p(Mi), that 
was discussed in the beginning of this subchapter. The most probable model is presumably 
the one that explains or predicts data best dependent on the purpose of modeling.  
A basic test statistics used to test the goodness of a model is R2 (R-squared) and R2adj 
(adjusted R-squared). R2 and R2adj are basic measures that often appear when regression is 
                                                 
758 See Greenland and Poole (2011) for a discussion of possible misconceptions associated with confidence 
intervals.  
759 See for instance Rubinfeld (1985) and Greenland and Poole (2011).    
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used in litigation.760 R2 is a measure of how well the variation in data can be explained by the 
model. Before R2 is described more precisely, some other statistics are necessary to aid the 
understanding. SStot is the total variation in the response variable, y.761 SSerr is a measure on 
how much the model errs in explaining the variation in y. In mathematical terms, these 





yi^ is the value of y that is predicted by the model using the explanatory variables 
corresponding to yi. R-squared is defined as R2=1-SSerr/SStot. The better the model explains 
the variation in data, the less is SSerr. By dividing SSerr by SStot, we get the model error as a 
share of the variation in the data. SSerr/SStot is always between zero and one. If the model 
perfectly explains the variation in the data meaning that SSerr=0, then R2 reaches its maximum 
value of one. The poorer the model is in explaining the data, the closer SSerr will be to SStot, 
and the closer R2 is to zero.  
A problem associated with R2 is that it can reward coincidences in the data as 
explanatory power. The more explanatory variables we have, the more likely it is that a model 
appears to have high explanatory power due to coincidences. If we have as many independent 
explanatory variables as observations, the model might appear to have perfect explanatory 
power. Assume that we roll a die every day of a week. Monday we get two eyes, Tuesday 
four eyes, and so on. If we use day as an explanatory variable, meaning that x1=1 if it is 
Monday (and 0 else) until x7=1 if it is Sunday (and 0 else), then day will appear to perfectly 
explain and predict what number of eyes shows up on what day. Thus, using day as a model 
to predict the number of eyes will appear to perfectly explain the number of eyes that will 
appear on the die. R2 will be one. Still, it is obvious this model would not do very well in 
predicting the outcome of a similar exercise the week after. Thus, parsimony in variables 
should be rewarded, as explained above. R2adj (adjusted R-squared) rewards parsimony in 
variables by punishing a high number of explanatory variables relative to observations. 
Mathematically, R2adj is           
                                                 
760 See Kaye (2001). R2 appeared for instance in the EU Ryanair/Aer Lingus Case No COMP/M.4439 – Ryanair / 
Aer Lingus [2007] upheld by the court in Cases T-342/07 and T-411/07 Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus 
Group plc v Commission [2010]. See de la Mano et al. (2007).    
761 The variable to be explained or predicted.  
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n is the number of observations and k is the number of explanatory variables.762 We can see 
that, all else being equal, R2adj is bigger the less k is relative to n. A model with fewer 
explanatory variables is rewarded, and a simple model with lower R2 might give a higher R2adj 
than a more complicated model with higher R2. It should be mentioned that R2adj does not 
have the exact same intuitive explanation as R2, and R2adj is not always better than R2 as a 
statistics to assess models.763 As n becomes sufficiently large relative to k, R2 and R2adj 
coincide.  
A problem with tests like R2adj and other tests that are based on testing whether 
predicted values yi^ are close to the observed yi is the bias following from testing the 
goodness of the model on the same data that are used for the estimation. SSerr=Σ(yi-yi^)2 is 
influenced by the fact that the estimated parameters that are used to calculate yi^, are 
estimated with the basis in the yi’s and their associated explanatory variables. Ideally, the 
models should be used to predict some other data than the ones used in the estimation. Using 
days to predict the outcome of a die in the example above is an extreme example. The 
predictions would appear perfect if they are used on the same data used for the estimation, but 
the calibrated model would perform quite poorly if it were used to predict other data than 
those used in estimation (it would, on average, predict correctly 1/6 of the times). This is an 
extreme example since the number of explanatory variables was the same number of 
observations, but the principle also applies in other situations. Ideally, separate data should be 
used for estimation and for testing the goodness of the model. This means that some 
observations should be used to estimate the parameters a, a1,…,ak, and then some other 
observations should be used to test the predictive power of the model. For instance, if we have 
n observations, half of the observations (by drawing randomly n/2 of the observations) could 
be used to estimate the parameters, and the other half could be used to test the fit of the 
model, for instance, by calculating SSerr=Σ(yi–yi^)2. There are developed several statistical 
tests for testing the explanatory and predictive power of the model on other data than those 
used for estimation.764                 
                                                 
762 SSerr/(n-k-1) and SStot/(n-1) are unbiased estimators for the variance of the errors and observations, 
respectively.  
763 R2adj is better than R2 when the test is for a representative sample of the population and not the whole 
population.  
764 This is known as cross validation. See Wassermann (2003) p. 218 f.  
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R2 and R2adj are simple statistics used to assess the goodness of the models. These 
statistics appears in all standard statistical packages. The merits of two competing models can 
to some limited extent be compared by using R2adj. However, this is not considered as a 
suitable method to formally test the relative merits of models.765 There are more powerful 
statistical tools to test the relative merits of models. It will be beyond the scope of this study 
to give a survey of such methods. However, it should be mentioned that there are developed 
methods that can be used to directly calculate model probability p(Mi). These methods 
employ information theory. AIC is short for “an information criterion” and can be used to 
calculate model probabilities.766 AIC is a measure that should be as low as possible and 
awards a model’s consistency with data and parsimony in variables. 767 We can calculate 
                                                 
765 See for instance Gujerati (1995) p. 207 f. 
766 Anderson (2008) p. 56. 
767 Assume that f is the “reality”, or, more precisely, the information in knowing reality. The more uncertainty in 
what the reality is, the more information is gained from learning the reality. Assume that g is a model with 
parameters θ. The information value of a model can be seen as the distance between the information in the model 
and the information in knowing reality. If f is the reality and g is the model, this distance can be written as I(f,g). 
This is the Kulbach-Leibler (K-L) information of g, see Anderson (2008) p. 53. I(f,g) is the information lost by 
relating to the model instead of reality. We want this distance to be as little as possible.  Let S(R) be the 




This uncertainty is the so-called entropy of reality, R. Assume that the world may have two possible outcomes 
with probabilities p1 and p2=(1-p1). The entropy is then E=S(R)=-[p1log p1+(1-p1)log(1-p1)]. The reality might, 
for instance, be the outcome of tossing a coin. The more uncertain the outcome is, the more information there is 
in observing the actual outcome (the reality). Assume that the coin is fixed making the probability of heads 99 
percent. If we know this, we are quite certain that the outcome will be heads, so it is not so much information of 
observing the actual outcome. With a fair coin where the probability of heads is 50 percent, there will be 
maximal uncertainty. The function E above will be maximized when there is maximal uncertainty. This means 
that it is maximized when p1=1/2. For more theory on entropy, see MacKay (2003) p 22 f. and Anderson (2008) 




where x are the possible outcomes of reality. We want S(R)-S(R|g) as large as possible because we want g to 
reduce uncertainty as much as possible. This is the same as wanting -[S(R)-S(R|g)] as small as possible. The less 
we know about reality ex ante, the less is required for a model to have information value. For a model to have 
value, it must reduce uncertainty. Thus, the right question as to whether a model is good or not is not whether it 
gives a good description of reality, but how much it reduces the uncertainty of reality. This highlights the 
instrumental value of models. If our goal is to predict something it does not matter if the model is a good 
description of reality as long as it performs well in the prediction. I(f,g) can be written as    
 
I(f,g)=-[S(R)-S(R|g)]=∫f(x)logf(x)dx -∫f(x)log[g(x|θ)dx =C-E(log[g(x|θ)]),  
 
where C is a constant not depending on θ that we can ignore. Since we want I(f,g) as small as possible, this is the 
same as wanting -E(log[g(x|θ)]) as small as possible. We cannot calculate the true -E(log[g(x/θ)]), since this 
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AICi, which is the AIC of model i. Thus, the lower the AIC, the better is the model. This is 
not a statistical test in the meaning that we can derive statistical properties, though. This 
measure works well if the number of observations is much larger than the number of 
parameters. If this is not the case, it has been shown in statistical theory that AIC should be 




where n is the number of observations and k is the number of parameters. We can see that 
when n increases relative to k, AICCi approaches AICi. Assume that z is the available model 
with the lowest AICC, with value AICCz. The distance between this model and some other 
model, i, is   
 
Δi=AICCi-AICCz   
 
Δi says something about how good a model is in comparison to the best available model. We 
can use Δi to create weights, wi, for the different models we have investigated. Such a weight 





wi can be interpreted as the probability that model i is the model that has the highest 
information value of the models investigated.769 This means that we can interpret wi as 
wi=p(Mi|data). p(Mi|data) is, in this context, not exactly the probability that a model is true, 
but the probability that model i is the model with the  highest information value among the 
investigated models. This can be used as a substitute for p(Mi). This probability is highest for 
                                                                                                                                                        
where lg(θ^g) is the maximum log likelihood value for model g. This means that the maximum likelihood 
estimates are inserted in the log likelihood function. K is the number of parameters to be estimated. Thus, we 
want -lg(θ^g)+K as small as possible. A model is awarded for a high maximum log likelihood value, which 
means consistency with observations, and a low number of parameters (parsimony). The reason is, as explained 
above in the main text, that a high number of parameters increase the chance for coincidental consistency with 
data without any informative merits. With high K, there is, in other words, a chance that the model fit well with 
data, but still does not explain or predict well, such that the information value is low. For historical reasons 
AICg=-2lg(θ^g)+2K is used as the measure we want as low as possible instead of -lg(θ^g)+K, which means that 
the last is multiplied by 2. Since this is only a positive linear transformation this has no impact on the 
assessment. 
768 Anderson (2008) p. 60 f.  
769 Anderson (2008) p. 88. 
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the model with the lowest AICC. For this model, Δi=0. How much better this model is than 
the other models is dependent on the distance to the other models. To the author’s knowledge, 
the use of information theory to assess model information has not so far had a major role in 
the use of statistics in antitrust litigation.  
The reason for bringing this rather technical issue into the text is to illustrate that there 
are methods to quantitatively assess the informative value of a model in terms of probabilities. 
However, to calculate this probability, one needs certain information for all models. One 
needs the AIC (or more precisely, AICC) for all models that are employed for model-based 
inferences. This intuition is crucial in the discussion of the actual assessment of economic 
models below. The question will then become whether the antitrust procedure generates the 
information necessary to assess the relative merits of models and if there are anybody who 
will provide this extra information by assessing the relative merits of all models presented.     
Note that, in addition to being interpreted as a probability of which model is best, the 
wi’s can be used as weights in so-called multi-model inference. If alternative models give us 
different estimates or predictions, the estimate or prediction from each model can be weighted 
by their respective wi’s.770 This can be used both in prediction and in inferences about 
parameters. Assume, for instance, that we have three different models that give different 
predictions of the effect on price of some antitrust-relevant conduct. Instead of choosing the 
prediction of the best model, we can weigh the predictions of each model by their weight wi, 
to get a weighted average prediction. When it comes to inference about parameters, we can, in 
the same way, weigh the estimates of a parameter from different models.  
The Bayesian approach 
The statistical methods of parameter estimation, parameter testing, and model testing 
discussed above are so-called frequentistic methods. The inferences on parameters are based 
on consistency with data. Frequentistic methods have often been contrasted to Bayesian 
methods of statistical inference.771 In frequentism, parameters are not considered stochastic. A 
parameter has some objective true value and is not a random variable. We cannot, for 
instance, say that the probability that a parameter is positive is 50 percent. We can, however, 
say something about the probability of data under various assumptions of the parameter and 
the model itself. This enables us to do significance tests and apply other methods of statistical 
                                                 
770 Anderson (2008) p.105 f.  
771 See Wasserman (2003) p. 175, Cox (2006) p. 194, Sober (2008), Chapter 1 and Gilboa (2009) p. 40 f. for 
discussions. 
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inference, such as calculating p-values and constructing confidence intervals. These can be 
used to make inferences about the parameter. The inferences are based on the principle that if 
the observed data are too unlikely given the assumptions, we reject the assumptions. If, for 
instance, the observations are very unlikely under an assumption that a parameter is zero, we 
use this to reject the assumption.772  
In Bayesian statistics, we are allowed to talk about the probability of parameters, and 
we can use Bayesian methods to state the probability that a parameter has a specific value or 
is within some interval. For this, we need both an a priori distribution of the parameters and a 
model of the probability of data, given the parameters.773 The a priori probability assessment 
might be based on previous experiences and previous data collection, or just a hunch. We 
might also use a so-called non-informative prior limiting the impact of a priori “prejudices” as 
much as possible. With a non-informative prior, it is typically assumed that any possible value 
of a parameter θ is equally probable. In this way, the a priori assessment gets as little 
influence on the a posteriori distribution as possible, which means that the a posteriori 
probability distribution is mainly determined by data. Parametric inferences from Bayesian 
and frequentistic methods often converge in these situations.774 Observations have the role of 
updating the a priori assessment. The actual observations are used to rationally correct our a 
priori beliefs of the probabilities.775 Bayesian methods seem to be a nice fit to legal 
                                                 
772 We might, for instance, assume that p is the probability of heads when flipping a coin. In frequentism p is not 
stochastic. Inferences on p are based on consistency of data with p. If we flip the coin 50 times and get 3 heads, 
this will probably lead us to reject a hypothesis that p is 1/2 as the observations are very unlikely given that p is 
1/2.    
773 Bayesian statistical inference has got its name from its application of Bayes’ rule. Assume that f(θ) is the a 
priori probability distribution for the parameter, θ. Furthermore, assume that f(y1,…,yn|θ) is a probability density 
for the data y1,…,yn, given θ. This coincides with the likelihood function used in frequentism. From these 




We can use f(θ|y1,…,yn) to make updated probabilistic inferences about θ. We might for instance find the 
probability that θ is greater than θa (θ>θa). This is  
 
P(θ>θa)= ∫θ>θa f(θ|y1,…,yn)dθ. 
774 Wasserman (2003) p. 181 f. 
775 In Bayesianism, we can, for example, allow the probability p of heads when flipping a coin to be a stochastic 
variable. Our a priori belief, might, for instance, be that p is 0.8 with 80 percent probability and 0.2 with 20 
percent probability. When we flip the coin many times, we get observations that we can use to modify a prior the 
probability distribution using Bayes’ rule. Assume that we flip the coin 50 times and get 45 heads. These 
observations would update our beliefs and increase the probability that p is 0.8 as the data is more consistent 
with p being 0.8 than p being 0.2. We can reduce the impact of the a priori belief by so-called non-informative 
priors. Our a priori assessment of p might for instance be that p is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.       
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assessments.776 In fact, this was the approach in Chapter Five of this study. Prior knowledge 
and legal presumptions can be interpreted as the basis for an a priori probability that can be 
updated by evidence (observations).  
In Bayesian statistics, decision theory can be used to derive estimators and estimates. 
This means that we find estimators that minimize expected loss in line with the decision 
theory discussed in previous chapters of this study.777 A loss function is used to assess the 
consequences of having wrong estimates, and the estimators are determined so that the 
expected loss is minimized.778 This means that, if the consequences of having wrong 
estimates on one side are worse that the consequences of a wrong estimate on the other side, 
then this will influence the estimators.   
Despite frequentism being the mainstream approach in statistical analysis, the 
Bayesian approach has many advocates, especially among philosophers of science.779 The 
Bayesian approach is more in line with the principles of rational decision theory. The 
statistical analysis can be tailored to the decision problem it is supposed to be used for. The 
estimate can be rationally optimized to the error losses in the specific situation. The choice of 
significance levels in frequentistic tests may be poorly suited for the specific decision 
problem in question, as described above. A decision where a parameter is assumed zero, 
because it is not found to be significantly different from zero, might be a bad decision 
according to the rationality standard. More generally, the choice of hypotheses to test in 
frequentistic methods might not be in line with rational decisions. When Bayesian methods 
are used, these imperfections do not constitute the same problem, as we can speak of the 
probability of parameters directly. One major criticism of Bayesianism is its dependency on 
subjective priors. The subjective element of the Bayesian approach can be minimized by 
using non-informative priors, as mentioned above. Another way to get around the prior is to 
adhere to likelihoodism. In likelihoodism, all inferences are based on the likelihood ratio 
                                                 
776 Bayesian methods seem to be endorsed by many influential contributions on the use of statistical methods in 
litigation. See Rubinfeld (1985) and to some extent Kaye (1986). A recent textbook treatise is Taroni et al. 
(2010).  
777 See Wasserman (2003) p. 193 f. 
778 A loss function L(θ^,θ) is the loss of using θ^ as estimate when the true parameter is θ. The expected loss 
using the a posteriori probability distribution for θ is:     
 
EL(θ^,θ)= ∫θL(θ^,θ)f(θ/y1,…,yn)dθ.   
 
The loss of using an estimate is dependent on the specific decision the estimate intended to be used. For instance, 
there could be a much greater loss associated with a too high estimate than a too low estimate. There are some 
“standard” loss functions. Such a loss function is the quadratic loss function, meaning that L(θ^,θ)=(θ^-θ)2. With 
this loss function, we have E(θ^|y1,…,yn)=θ. See Wasserman(2003) p. 198. 
779 See Sober (2008), Chapter 1.  
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between hypotheses. Likelihood ratios were explained in the context of evidence assessment 
earlier in this study, and were briefly discussed in the context of hypothesis testing above.780 
Basing the inferences on likelihood ratios means that all inferences are based on the relative 
merits of competing hypotheses. This means that all inferences are relative.781   
Another advantage of Bayesian methods is the possibility to directly assess model 
probabilities. Assuming some a priori probability assessment of a model, we can derive the a 
posteriori probability of a model. Assume that D is the actual observations. We can calculate 








Calculating the probability ratio eliminates the need for calculating the unconditional 
probability of data, p(D). Still, the Bayesian methods do not fully solve the problem of 
calculating probabilities for models as we still need the a priori probabilities for the models. 
However, the a posteriori probabilities can be approximated directly by the use of the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).    
BIC is the Bayesian version of AIC.782 The BICi can be calculated for a model i.783 In 
terms of calculation, BIC is not very different from AIC and AICC. The correction for the 
number of parameters is different, though, and will punish more parameters harder than AIC 
and AICC. The distance between a model, i, and the best model, z, becomes 
 
Δi=BICi-BICz.   
 
                                                 
780 See also Sober (2008) p. 8 f.  
781 Using the coin example again is to assume that we have two hypotheses: either that the probability of heads p 
equals 0.5 or that it equals 0.8. Likelihoodism would then be to only make inferences on the relative merits of 
these two hypotheses.    
782 See Anderson (2008) p. 160 f. and Wasserman (2003) p. 220 f.  
783 The BIC for model i is BICi=-2li(θ^i)+klog(n). li(θ^i) is the maximum log likelihood function, k is the number 
of parameters and n is the number of observations.  
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Δi says something about how good a model is compared to the best model, which is the one 
with the lowest BIC. Δi can be used to calculate weights for the various models. The weight of 




where wi is an approximation to the a posteriori probability of a model i. This can be used in 
the calculation of p(Mi) which is the probability that a model is true. Thus, it can be applied to 
give a model weight in making a rational decision based on models. Furthermore, as with AIC 
and AICC, the wi’s can be used as weights in multi-model inference. 
Some comments on data issues 
Above quantitative methods for assessing the informative value of models were discussed. 
When data is used to assess the informative value of models the quality of data is as important 
as the methods applied. Inferences based on poor data are likely to be poor even if the best 
methods are employed. Some failures associated with the data are partially discovered by the 
methods described above. Statistical methods will reveal whether the data do not correspond 
with the assumptions made. Furthermore, if, for instance, there is an insufficient amount of 
data, the estimates will become more uncertain, which will be reflected in the significance-
testing. However, this insufficiency of data may make it less likely that the null hypothesis 
will be rejected. Thus, for someone interested in the null hypothesis to not be rejected this 
lack of data might be “beneficial”.  
 The data should be representative. Statistical methods might not reveal that data are 
not representative if there is no check of the informative value of the model on representative 
data. Even subtle issues may affect the representativeness of data. Assume that to you want 
find out what the customers consider to be the nearest alternative to some grocery store under 
antitrust scrutiny. A data collector stands outside the shop and ask the customers what shop 
they alternatively would have gone to if this shop was not available. Firstly, the answer may 
depend on the alternative location the responders put themselves into. If they assume that they 
came to the shop and found it closed, they would choose another alternative than if they made 
the decision at home. This can, however, be corrected for in the questioning. Furthermore, 
assume that the data is collected outside the shop on Monday between 1200 and 1300. The 
average customer arriving the shop at this time might have very different relative preferences 
for prices and distance to home than the customers arriving, let us say, between 1800 and 
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1900. For those arriving between 1200 and 1300, the best alternative might, on average, be a 
discount grocery store further away than a closer non-discount grocery store. For the 
customers arriving between 1800 and 1900, it might be opposite. This non-representativeness 
can be utilized to bias the outcome of the statistical analysis even when the best methodology 
is applied in analyzing the data. 
 An issue related to the representativeness of data is the issue of outliers and 
abnormalities in the data. An outlier is a typical extreme observation in data far beyond the 
general trend. For instance, if we observe the price development for a product over a long 
time period, we might find that the price increase on average is five percent a year. However, 
the observation in one particular month may be far beyond that trend. We might, for instance, 
observe that the price is $100 in one month, and then $250 the month after, and then being 
back at a “normal” level at $101 the month after that. An outlier may have many explanations. 
It might be a mistake in the registration of the data. It might also be that the outlier is due to 
some abnormal situation, for instance, a temporarily shortage due to a crisis situation or 
weather conditions. The question is what to do with such outliers. If the outlier is due to a 
mistake in registration, it should definitely be taken out. If an outlier can be traced to some 
particular but repeating event, a dummy variable for the occurrence of the event might be a 
solution. If the outliers are not properly taken into account and have a big impact on the 
estimates of the parameters, one can say that the model is not robust as one or a few 
observation might have excessive influence on the estimates.784 Outliers might also be used 
strategically to manipulate the parameter estimation. The effect of this can be exaggerated by 
data selection. This has happened in actual antitrust cases.785 This will be discussed further 
below.           
6.4 Actual assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis   
6.4.1 Actual evidence assessment and economic models 
Inquisitorial versus adversarial procedure 
Chapters Two and Five offered a description of the antitrust procedure and how antitrust 
evidence is actually assessed. It was found that the enforcement of EU competition law is 
mainly public and that the enforcement of the European Commission best can be 
characterized as inquisitorial. However, the system is not purely inquisitorial. The parties 
                                                 
784 Advanced methods can be used to test the sensitivity of inferences to single observations and to derive 
estimators that are robust to outliers. See for instance Kaye (2001) and Kaye and Freedman (2000).   
785 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co, 290 F. 3d 768 (6th. Cir 2002). See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 81 f.  
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have contradictory rights and the decisions are subject to judicial review, though subject to 
some limits that are particularly relevant for the present chapter, namely in the review of 
complex economic evidence. Furthermore, it was explained that to address some of the 
critique against the inquisitorial nature of the EU enforcement, additional steps have been 
taken to improve the procedure. Most relevant for this chapter is the improvement of the 
economic expertise of the European Commission by the establishment of a Chief Economist 
supported by a team of PhD-level economists to increase the quality of the economic 
analyses. Furthermore, the European Commission has issued best practices on the submission 
economic evidence.786  
The enforcement of the antitrust rules in the US is mainly adversarial, and most of the 
enforcement is private. Thus, it is the parties that have the role of providing evidence, 
including providing economic expert witnesses that provide expert testimony. However, the 
role of the judges is not completely passive. The judge has the power to declare evidence 
inadmissible inter alia on the grounds of relevance787 and waste of time788. Thus, the judge 
has a role as a gatekeeper. Especially relevant for the assessment of economic models in 
antitrust analysis is the power of the judges to declare economic expert evidence inadmissible 
according to the Daubert standard, as described above.789 The judges also have the possibility 
to appoint neutral experts to assist the decision making.790           
Abductive reasoning  
It was concluded in the Chapter Five that antitrust decision makers are not likely to formally 
use probability theory and expected loss minimization in their overall assessment of evidence. 
The formal use of probability theory might, however, appear in elements of the evidence 
assessment, such as when statistical and econometric evidence is evaluated. When experts 
present econometric evidence, probabilities occur, inter alia, when significance levels are 
applied to make inferences about model parameters. This expert evidence is an input to the 
overall assessment of evidence.  
It was further found in Chapter Five that the overall assessment of antitrust evidence 
can best be described as abductive reasoning, where the one that assesses evidence searches 
                                                 
786 DG Competition, Best practices for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in cases 
concerning the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in merger cases, Staff working paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/best_practices_submission_en.pdf. 
787 Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rule 402. 
788 FRE 403. 
789 FRE 702.  
790 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26a. 
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for plausible explanations of the evidence to find a best explanation. Abductive reasoning 
includes the use of informal methods such as presumptions, analogical reasoning, and appeal 
to expert knowledge. All these elements are crucial to actual evidence assessment in both the 
US and EU. Presumptions are an important instrument in antitrust evidence assessment. 
Antitrust decision makers regularly use analogies by referring to evidence assessments in 
previous decisions. Expert knowledge, in particular economic expert knowledge, has a crucial 
role in informing antitrust decisions. This means that inferences based on models argued by 
experts are crucial in informing antitrust decisions as an element of abductive reasoning.     
Literature suggests that abductive inference as a starting point yields a correct 
evidence assessment.791 Even if abductive reasoning as a starting point gives the correct 
evidence assessment, the presence of imperfections and biases may distort the evidence 
assessment from being correct. There are several sources of imperfections and biases that are 
likely to distort antitrust evidence assessment. The decision makers are utility maximizers 
subject to institutional incentives, the decision makers can be influenced by cognitive biases, 
there is a risk of errors associated with the use of analogies, experts might be biased, and 
rhetoric can be abused by the parties in the argumentation. The impact of these imperfections 
and biases is likely to be dependent on whether the procedural system is inquisitorial or 
adversarial.  
Imperfections associated with the inquisitorial procedure  
It was explained in Chapter Five that empirical research and literature have suggested that an 
inquisitorial decision maker is likely to be subject to a prosecutorial bias that systematically 
favors an evidence assessment in favor of violation. Some of this literature directly addresses 
antitrust and, in particular, the enforcement of the European Commission. The prosecutorial 
bias entails both incentive biases and cognitive biases. Since an inquisitorial enforcement 
authority is rewarded for what it does, it is likely to be subject to an incentive bias in favor of 
finding violations. The inquisitor is also likely to be subject to a confirmation bias as an 
element of the prosecutorial bias. The confirmation bias is a cognitive bias. According to the 
confirmation bias, people tend to assess evidence in a way that confirms already established 
beliefs. This means that an inquisitor is likely to assess evidence in a way that confirms 
violation if this is the established hypothesis of the inquisitor. 
                                                 
791 See Lipton (2004), which was discussed in more detail in Chapter Five of this study. 
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By using economic modeling, it was shown that the prosecutorial bias has additional 
consequences for the rationality of evidence assessment than the pure static effect of wrong 
evidence assessment. The inquisitor has an incentive to excessively search for evidence with 
strong probative force in support of violation and to search too little for evidence that has 
probative force in contradiction of violation.  
These features associated with the prosecutorial bias are also likely to influence the 
use of economic models in evidence assessment. In the presence of a prosecutorial bias, the 
inquisitor is likely to search for data that support their bias, economic models that support 
their bias, and to apply statistical inference methods that support their bias. The influence of 
the prosecutorial bias on the generation of models and the inferences made from models will 
be explored in more detail below.    
In addition to the prosecutorial bias, the inquisitor has an incentive to save his own 
costs by transferring the burden of producing evidence to the investigating parties by the use 
of presumptions. This will lead to inefficiency in the gathering of evidence. Combined with 
the confirmation bias, the inquisitor is likely to give too strong probative force to the failure 
of the parties to produce evidence. Thus, the incentives to reduce costs reinforce the effects of 
the prosecutorial bias. This incentive to reduce costs is also likely to affect model-based 
inferences. Presumptions are likely to be based on simple models favoring violations. The 
details of these mechanisms will be explored in more detail below.  
Imperfections associated with the adversarial procedure  
When it comes to the adversarial procedure it was found in Chapter Five that the decision 
makers are not likely to be subject to systematical biases towards either finding violation or 
finding not violation. This does not mean that the decision maker cannot be biased, just that 
there is no reason to believe that the decision makers have some systematic preferences for 
violation or not violation. However, the adversarial procedure is characterized by the parties 
(represented by lawyers) arguing for their own interest. The parties are likely to try to exploit 
cognitive biases and other assessment imperfections to the benefit of their case. These 
imperfections are likely to be exaggerated in laymen jury trials, as juries are not experienced 
in filtering out and adjusting for imperfections and biases. A crucial topic in this context is 
how laymen juries are likely to assess economic models and how abusive methods of rhetoric 
are likely to be exploited to encourage the jury to make wrong inferences from economic 
models.   
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Furthermore, since the main rule is that the parties normally choose their own experts 
to support their arguments, there is likely to be a biased selection of experts, where each party 
chooses experts with professional preferences that support their case. In addition, even if 
experts are repeat players and have a reputation to maintain, it cannot be ignored that the 
experts will make efforts in satisfying their paying clients which will bias the expert opinions 
away from the purely professional. These biases are likely to influence the data gathering, the 
models argued for, the methods argued for, and, thus, the model-based inferences. This will 
be discussed in more detail below.  
The adversarial process facilitates an evidence race that tends to lead to excessive 
evidence production. This is exaggerated by the high stakes of the case. Thus, there is a 
potential for rent-seeking. One way to implement rent-seeking is to employ high profile 
economic experts turning the courtroom into a battlefield of experts. This is likely to 
influence the generation of economic models and the model-based inferences. The dynamics 
and possible failures associated with the battle of experts will be discussed in more detail 
below.  
However, if the private stakes are low compared to the social stakes, too little evidence 
may also be produced. If stakes are asymmetric it is likely to be an imbalanced amount of 
evidence in favor of the party with the high stakes. If we make an assumption that we are 
likely to observe asymmetric high stakes in cases where a defendant want to protect its 
monopoly profits, then there might be a systematic bias towards findings of not violation in 
these cases. No matter the reason for the imbalance of the stakes, the asymmetry is likely to 
influence the inferences from economic models. It will mean that one party has stronger 
incentive to provide economic expert evidence and present economic models in their favor. 
This will also be discussed in more detail below. 
The way to proceed 
Having repeated some of the main insights and conclusions from Chapter Five and discussed 
the relevance of these insights and conclusions in the discussion of the actual assessment of 
economic models in antitrust analysis, the remaining part of this chapter will address the 
actual assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis. As described in Chapter Five 
there is a literature focused on identifying sources of imperfections and biases that are likely 
to facilitate a wrong assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis. Furthermore, as 
described earlier in this chapter, there is a literature addressing misconceptions in the use of 
economic models, econometrical analyses and statistical analyses in litigation. An aim of this 
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chapter is to link this literature by discussing more precisely how the imperfections on biases 
associated with antitrust decision making are likely to influence the inferences based on 
economic models, including econometric and statistical analyses. This means discussing how 
these imperfections are likely to influence the economic models generated in the procedure 
and the inferences made on the basis of these models. In other words, it will be discussed 
whether the antitrust procedure is able to bring the right models to the table and whether the 
models generated in the procedure are likely to be assessed rationally according to their 
informative value. Ideas and suggestions for improving the assessment of economic models in 
antitrust analysis will be incorporated in the discussion. 
6.4.2 Are the right models generated? 
What are the right models? 
Before proceeding with the discussion of whether the right models are generated in the 
antitrust procedure, it is worthwhile to spend a few words on what the right models to be 
generated are. To answer this question it is necessary to recap the discussion of rational 
evidence assessment above and in Chapter Five. Beckner and Salop (1999) stated that ”[t]he 
court first should gather information that is least expensive, resolves the most uncertainty, 
and is most likely to affect its decision”. Chapter Five offered more content to this statement. 
Rational evidence assessment is about minimizing the sum of the expected loss of errors from 
making a wrong decision and the cost associated with gathering evidence. 
A piece of evidence should be gathered if its decision value exceeds the cost of 
gathering the evidence. The decision value of evidence is the evidence’s ability to reduce the 
expected loss from errors. Gathering evidence will only have a decision value if there is a 
chance that the outcome of the evidence gathering makes it rational to change the decision. In 
other words, gathering evidence only has decision value if there is any chance that gathering 
the evidence will influence the decision. The decision value of evidence depends, inter alia, 
on the probative force of evidence. The probative force of evidence is the extent to which the 
evidence gathered influences the probability of a hypothesis. In rational evidence assessment, 
the laws of probability determine the probative force. The decision value is higher the higher 
the chance gathering evidence will have as an outcome that we with strong probative force are 
right in changing our decision to a decision associated with a less expected error.   
Evidence should be gathered in the right amount and the right sequence. The tradeoff 
between decision value and cost facilitates the gathering of the right amount of evidence. By 
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gathering evidence in the right sequence, a rational decision can be taken at each stage. One 
can then rationally decide whether it is efficient to gather more evidence or to decide upon the 
evidence already available. The rational sequence of evidence gathering depends on both 
decision value and costs. The cheapest evidence with the highest decision value should be 
gathered first. However, dynamical programming is necessary to determine the right sequence 
of gathering evidence. 
These principles of the rational gathering of evidence also apply to economic expert 
evidence. Thus, the decision of whether to generate a specific economic model depends on its 
ability to resolve uncertainty and costs. A model should only be generated in the procedure its 
decision value exceeds the cost. The decision value of a model is, inter alia dependent, on its 
informative value, which was discussed in detail above. This informative value is about the 
models ability to explain or predict, depending on the purpose of the modeling. The costs can 
be divided in to several components. There is a cost associated with constructing the model. It 
will, for instance, usually be more costly tailor a model specifically for the circumstances of 
the case, than to pick an “off the shelf” standard text-book model.  There are some processing 
costs associated with applying the model, where more complex models are more costly to 
process. Furthermore, there are costs associated with gathering the data that are necessary to 
apply the model.        
Model generation and selection in an inquisitorial system 
The inquisitorial system is characterized by a prosecutorial bias in evidence assessment. The 
question is how the prosecutorial bias is likely to affect the models generated in antitrust 
analysis. A prosecutorial bias means that there is a bias in favor of finding violation. There are 
many ways the prosecutorial bias can affect the generation of economic models.  
An incentive to favor violations is likely to influence the experts tasked to generate the 
models to apply in the case. There is likely to be a selection bias influencing the economists 
hired as experts in the European Commission, as explained in Chapter Five.  Economists are 
subject to priors, where some are likely to be more pro-intervention than others. Due to the 
prosecutorial bias, it is likely that the European Commission has an incentive to hire 
economists that are more pro-interventionist, and thus have a preference for models that yield 
pro-interventionist inferences.   
  The incentive element of the prosecutorial bias is likely to influence all stages 
associated with economic modeling, which thus can be altered to favor finding violation. As 
described above, the prosecutorial bias is likely affect what evidence is gathered. The 
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inquisitor can facilitate the finding of violation in the data gathering. The data gatherer may 
try to find a biased selection of data that will support models that favor violation. In the 
judicial review of Tetra/Laval,792 the court found that the Commission had misconstrued the 
meaning of the available evidence in the reliance on estimates of market growth to reach 
inaccurate conclusions.793 This is an example on the selection of desirable data to reach the 
desirable conclusion.  
Even with representative data, the prosecutorial bias can be implemented by the 
generation of models and the inferences based on the models. The inquisitor can choose 
models with suitable assumptions that are more likely to yield inferences favoring violation. 
Assume that evidence reveals that some products are strong substitutes. The inference based 
on a one period Bertrand model of competition would be that the competition is almost 
perfect. However, a game theoretical model of tacit collusion indicates that a near-monopoly 
outcome is possible. Thus in assessing a merger using model of tacit collusion is more likely 
to yield a desirable inference than assuming a model of single-period Bertrand competition. 
As a model of tacit collusion seems more complicated than a model of Bertrand 
competition,794 the default inference should, rather, be Bertrand competition than tacit 
collusion in the choice of the most probable among the two models. Thus, the conditions for 
tacit collusion should be proved. An example where the court found that the European 
Commission had failed to provide sufficient evidence for using such a more complicated 
model of tacit collusion was in the Airtours795 case.  
Both in the Tetra/Laval case and the Airtours case, the flaws of the European 
Commission where corrected upon judicial review. These cases are likely to have had some 
influence on the procedural reforms in the European Commission addressed above. More 
recent decisions involving complex economic analysis have been upheld by the courts. One 
example is Ryanair/Aer Lingus.796 It is more difficult to identify obvious examples of 
prosecutorial bias in this decision. It is not unlikely that the merger was, in fact, anti-
competitive and that there was no need for a prosecutorial bias to find violation. Nevertheless, 
biases cannot be excluded. Testing the impact of the presence of one of the companies on the 
                                                 
792 Commission v. Tetra Laval Case T-5/02. Upheld by ECJ in C-12/03 [2005] 
793 See Venit (2011) for a discussion.  
794 The number of implicit assumptions makes it difficult to assess which model is most complicated. However, 
theory suggests that quite a number of conditions must be satisfied for tacit collusion to be an outcome. See for 
instance Garces-Tolon et al. (2009). 
795 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities Case T-342/99 [2002]. 
796 Case No COMP/M.4439 – Ryanair / Aer Lingus [2007] upheld by the court in Cases T-342/07 and T-411/07 
Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc v Commission [2010] 
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other company’s pricing was an important element of the economic analysis of the 
Commission. The inferences based on such an analysis are dependent whether this is a real 
impact or just correlation. This is dependent on what variables are exogenous. As pointed out 
by Commission representatives themselves,797 there are issues regarding the quantitative 
methods applied in the case that may bias the result, such as assumptions of exogeneity. The 
decision can also be criticized for using ad hoc variables to support their argument. The 
Commission argued, for instance, for the presence of non-price competition between Ryanair 
and Aer Lingus, such as quality competition, when it was not able to prove a price effect. 
Such introduction of ad hoc variables may be argued to reduce the reliability of the inferences 
made.     
Although, the prosecutorial bias is an intrinsic feature of the inquisitorial procedure, 
the judicial review of the European Commission decisions in cases such as Airtours and 
Tetra/Laval has disciplined the Commission. This means that the discretion of the European 
Commission in implementing the prosecutorial biases has been reduced. Since the judicial 
review is restricted when it comes to the assessment of complex economic evidence, it is 
likely that it is in the context of complex economic evidence that the prosecutorial bias will be 
found. The use of “data rooms” and other measures suggested in the Commission best 
practices on the submission of economic evidence imposes additional constraints on the 
implementation of prosecutorial biases.798 Failures in the data gathering, assumptions imposed 
on the data, or the use of basic models based on assumptions without merits in the facts of the 
case are likely to be discovered and to be quickly sanctioned by the courts within the standard 
of judicial review. Thus, it is more likely that the Commission will use models that cannot 
easily be falsified.  
One obvious candidate for implementing the prosecutorial bias is in the use of game 
theoretical models. If there is nothing to object on the use of model assumptions as such and 
their basis in the real world data, the European Commission is likely to favor or exaggerate 
the risk of anticompetitive equilibriums outcomes. It is hard to challenge the discretion used 
in the determination of the likelihood of different possible equilibriums. An interesting 
observation in this context is that game theory-models seem to be more influential in areas 
where they are likely provide inferences of anticompetitive effects, such as horizontal 
agreements and mergers than in the study of unilateral behavior. Game theory-based models 
                                                 
797 De La Mano et al. (2007) 
798 See the European Commission Best practices on the submission of economic evidence, op. cit., Paragraph 47. 
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seem to be influential both in the guidelines of horizontal cooperation agreements,799 and in 
the horizontal merger guidelines.800 For instance are the coordination aspects of information 
exchange given careful attention in the guidelines of horizontal cooperation, as an instrument 
to facilitate coordination. Models of tacit collusion are given substantial attention in the 
merger guidelines. In the study of unilateral behavior, game theory tends to question the 
rationality of the anticompetitive motivation of certain behavior, such as predatory pricing, 
bundling, or exclusive dealing. An exclusive dealing agreement, may, for instance, at first 
sight seem anticompetitive. However, a careful scrutiny taking into account the incentives of 
all parties involves may reveal that the customers will not accept an exclusivity agreement if 
it is anticompetitive unless certain assumptions are satisfied.801  Therefore, it is interesting to 
observe that game theory models do not seem to be very influential for the European 
Commission in informing the effects of these kinds of conduct.802 A premium example is 
perhaps the doctrine of predatory pricing, based on cost-based tests.803           
Thus, the prosecutorial bias is likely to bias generation of models in the inquisitorial 
procedure. Thus, it is not only the informative value of the models and the costs that govern 
the models generated in the procedure, but also a bias towards finding violation. Models that 
tend to favor violation will likely be explored first, while models that are likely to contradict 
violation will be underexplored. Thus, the prosecutorial bias is likely to prevent the most 
informative models to be generated for inference, to the benefit for those models that most 
satisfy the prosecutorial bias. It is not possible to say that this bias, generally, will also 
increase the costs associated with evidence gathering. In some situations, models favoring 
violation will be more complex, and thus more costly to process and apply. This will typically 
apply in the generation of complicated models of coordination that favors violation. In other 
                                                 
799 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements  
Official Journal C11, 14.1.2011, p. 1. 
800 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03). 
801 See, for instance, Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen et al. (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000), and 
Ordover et. al (1990). New literature in antitrust economics and industrial organization usually surveys models 
of exclusionary practices. See, for instance, Motta (2004), Church and Ware (2000), Carlton and Perloff (2005), 
and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010).  
802 See also Tomra ASA and others v. European Commission Case T-155/06 [2010]. Upheld by the ECJ in Case 
C-549/10 P [2012] concerning rebates. See also Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7–20, where game theoretical models don’t seem to have a 
prominent role.  
803 See Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings OJ C 45, 
24.2.2009, p. 7–20 
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situations, simpler models are more likely to support violation, and more costly models are 
not likely to be explored, even they have informative merits. This will typically apply in 
models of exclusionary behavior, as described above.  
Model generation and selection by in an adversarial procedure with party experts 
From a decision theoretic point of view, models should be gathered to resolve uncertainty at 
as low costs as possible, as explained above. There are several reasons why the models 
generated in an adversarial procedure are likely to deviate from those models that should be 
generated from a decision theoretic point of view. An adversarial system is characterized by 
each party advocating their own interests. The models are not generated to objectively resolve 
uncertainty. They are generated to provide favorable inferences for the parties. It is the stakes 
of the parties that are determining for whether a model is generated and not the social value of 
the model’s capability to resolve uncertainty. Thus, it is not an objective assessment of 
decision value against costs that determines the generation of models. There is a risk of 
several biases when models are presented by experts hired by parties on each side. Experts are 
subject to both a selection bias and incentive bias. Both these biases are likely to influence the 
models generated in the litigation. 
 A party is likely to select an expert both on the basis of an expert’s priors and how the 
evidence of the specific case is likely to be interpreted by the expert. These two issues are, of 
course, interrelated, as the data will be interpreted in light of the priors. The expert is both 
selected on the basis of his general a priori attitude towards the conduct in question and on 
how the expert has interpreted evidence in similar cases earlier. Some experts are likely to be 
pro-plaintiff and some are likely to be pro-defendant.804 A question is how such selection 
biases actually influence the models generated in the procedure. One way the selection bias 
may influence the generation of models is the choice of assumptions that underpin the models 
chosen. Some economists tend to make assumptions that have the result that the market fixes 
itself without government intervention.805 Some economists may, for instance, tend to impose 
stronger restrictions on the rationality of all parties involved and emphasize how rational 
agents are likely to adapt to certain conduct in a way that mitigates competitive problems. An 
example of this is the analysis of vertical restraints as described above. An example of such 
vertical restraint is exclusive dealing where game theoretical models indicate that exclusive 
                                                 
804 See Posner (1999b).  
805 See for instance the discussion on the Chicago-school in the discussion of economic models in antitrust 
analysis above.  
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dealing is harmful to consumer welfare under very special circumstances. Furthermore, even 
if experts agree upon the right model to apply for inferences, they may disagree on the likely 
equilibrium of the model. This means that the experts may rely on different refinement 
assumptions that are determining for the equilibrium. Pro-plaintiff experts are likely to favor 
anticompetitive equilibriums, while pro-defendant experts are likely to favor pro-competitive 
equilibriums.    
 If experts, in addition to the selection bias, have strong incentives to satisfy the client, 
they have several opportunities in doing so. An expert may use several instruments to 
generate economic models yielding the desirable inferences. An expert may search for models 
and yield the desirable inference, for instance, by making suitable assumptions. The expert 
can, for instance, strategically choose what variables to consider as exogenous. If the expert 
uses quantitative methods a range of possibilities opens to make suitable inferences. The 
expert may try to find a biased data set that is more likely to support desirable models. The 
expert may strategically choose what hypothesis to test. Assume, for instance, that the expert 
wants to testify that a market is wide. He might then formulate a test hypothesis based on a 
wide market that cannot be rejected at a five percent significance level and then argue for a 
wide market. Assume, instead, that the expert wants to test that a market is narrow. He might 
then base a hypothesis on a narrow market that cannot be rejected. Both these tests may be 
consistent with the same data and even the same methodology. The only difference is the 
underlying “model” used for inference. It is the logic used in the inferences argued for that is 
wrong. The expert may also utilize data mining techniques to find out exactly what models 
that will give the desirable result. The opportunities are almost endless.  
An example of the utilization of such methods is Conwood806. In this case Conwood 
accused the competitor, US Tobacco, to exclude Conwood by various anticompetitive 
methods and claimed damages.  In this case, the plaintiff expert used quantitative analysis to 
argue for the impact of some alleged anticompetitive behavior. The expert “proved” a 
statistical trend of Conwood’s market shares to have decreased. The problem was, however, 
that the conclusion was dependent on one outlier. If this outlier was taken out the conclusions 
could have been the opposite.807 The analysis of the plaintiff expert has later been proven to 
be substantially flawed.808 The outlier problem was not the only flaw. The expert argued for 
an inference that the growth in market share was positively correlated with the market share 
                                                 
806 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co, 290 F. 3d 768 (6th. Cir 2002). 
807 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 80 f. and Kaye (2001).  
808 See Kaye (2001) for a technical discussion.  
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was evidence for anticompetitive behavior. However, this had no grounding in economic 
theory. Besides, this evidence alone does not establish any causal link to the alleged 
anticompetitive behavior.809  
The application of the Daubert standard is supposed to screen off extreme instances of 
flawed model-based inferences. Several examples indicate that that the Daubert standard has 
partially succeeded in doing so. However, experiences have also revealed that the Daubert 
standard has failed in screening off flawed models.810 One example is the Conwood case just 
mentioned.  
After the Daubert standard screening has been performed, the decision maker is likely 
to face two or more models that are reliable and valid enough to have passed.  The decision 
maker will incorporate all the model-based inferences from the various models in a holistic 
assessment of evidence based on a search of the best explanation. The actual assessment of 
the informative value of models will be discussed below. However, a question that can be 
addressed already here is whether the decision maker, de facto, has the information of the best 
model present when he has been presented with a bundle of models that all incorporate the 
elements that should be in the best model. As discussed in Chapter Five, it has been pointed 
out in the literature that the competition between parties in an adversarial process is likely to 
neutralize the impact from biased influences on each side.811 Does the adversarial procedure 
produce biased economic models that, in the end, give the same information as a “neutral” 
unbiased economic model? The answer to this is generally, no. There is likely to be more 
information in analyzing two or more models together than the separate information contained 
in the two models. This can be illustrated with a simplified example. Assume that a plaintiff 
uses the following model for inference:  
 
P = α0+α1D+ε. 
 
P is the price, and D is a dummy indicator for the presence of some illegal action. The 
defendant may, however, rely on the following model to explain price changes:   
 
P = β0+β1c+ε. 
                                                 
809 See Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 80 f. and Kaye (2001). 
810 Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 84 f. 
811 Froeb and Kobayashi (1996, 2001). See Parisi (2002) for a discussion. A recent experimental study is 
Boudreau and McCubbins (2008).  
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Here, c is the cost. It might be that both α1 and β1 are significant and that both of these models 
are informative as both cost and the illegal action explain the price level. However, an 
analysis of these two models separately does not provide the same information as an analysis 
of the combined model:       
 
P = γ0+ γ1D+γ2c+ε 
 
Analysis of this model makes it possible to check the interdependence between γ1 and γ2 and 
whether each parameter is significant in the presence of the other. The predictive and 
explanatory power of this model is also likely to be stronger than each of the models 
independently.  
Posner (1999b) suggests several measures to deter party-appointed expert witnesses 
from providing biased opinions. Posner suggests a system to keep track of economic experts 
and their testified opinions and make them public. In this case, it will be easier revealed if the 
experts adjust the opinions to satisfy their clients. It is hard to fully agree with the 
appropriateness of this measure to address biases. It may mitigate the incentive bias, but not 
the selection bias. Under this system the, expert has to be consistently biased which may 
segregate the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant experts even further. It could also be argued that 
this arrangement will make it easier for the parties to find experts who will provide the 
opinion they want. 
The discovery procedure in US civil procedure812 is also likely to play a deterrent role. 
According to the discovery rules, much of the economic analyses done by the parties pre-trial 
will be available to the opposite party during discovery. This will reduce the incentive for 
parties to shop for expert opinions to find a preferable one. Posner (1999b) suggests an 
extension of this pre-trial obligation to also notify what experts that have been asked to 
provide expert opinion for a party, but refused. There are reasons to be skeptical to expand 
discovery obligations even further in such a way. Involving experts is a part of planning the 
legal strategy. A too strong obligation may easily interfere with the benefits associated with 
the attorney-client privilege. This might discourage the use of experts. If one believes that the 
use of experts, despite its deficiencies, contributes to more accuracy, the result of such 
obligations may be less accuracy of antitrust decisions. More research on the law and 
                                                 
812 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26a.  
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economics of discovery obligations to reveal expert opinions in antitrust litigation would 
probably pay off in terms of enlightening this issue.            
Model generation and selection in the presence of neutral experts  
In the US, the courts have the power to appoint neutral experts.813 The expert may be 
appointed both on a motion of one of the parties or on the initiative of the court. The 
opportunity to appoint neutral experts has traditionally rarely been used in antitrust cases, 
although there has been an increasing trend in using it the last decades.814 Court-ordered 
expert reports are the general instrument of including experts in the judicial review in the EU 
courts.815 This is rarely used in EU competition cases. However, it has been used in a few 
occasions.816 Expert reports were for instance ordered in Woodpulp817 and ICI.818 Experts may 
be examined by the parties in both the US and EU. The question is whether the model 
generation in antitrust procedure is improved if neutral experts are given the task to provide 
the models, compared to the situation where the models are provided by an inquisitor or by 
the parties in an adversarial procedure.  
Neutral experts appointed by the court are not subject to the systematic biases 
associated with experts employed by an inquisitor or party appointed experts in an adversarial 
trial. This lack of bias should be an argument for neutral experts. However, the lack of 
systematic biases in the use of neutral experts does not mean that the expert is not biased. 819 
The neutral expert is likely to be subject to several biases. Even if an expert is not selected on 
the basis of a bias, he might still be subject to the same professional bias. The chosen expert 
may be subject to pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant biases. Still, a neutral expert does not have 
the same incentive to satisfy its principal as a party-appointed expert. Furthermore, the ability 
of the parties to object to the appointment of a particular expert and the possibility to cross-
examine the expert may reveal and mitigate the influence of biases. However, a problem is 
that, on the contrary to the party-appointed experts, it is more difficult to predict the bias of a 
neutral expert. The eventual bias of the expert must be derived from various factors, such as 
                                                 
813 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 706.  
814 See Posner (1999b) and Lipsky (2003).  
815 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19 June 1991 (OJ L 176 of 
4.7.1991, p. 7, and OJ L 383 of 29.12.1992 (corrigenda)), Article 47, and Rules of Procedure of the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities of 2 May 1991 (OJ L 136 of 30.5.1991, p. 1, and OJ L 317 of 
19.11.1991, p. 34 (corrigenda)), Article 70. See Lianos (2010).  
816 See Lianos (2010).   
817 Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125–129/85, Ahlström & Others v. Commission [1993] ECR I 
818 Case 48/69, ICI v. Commission [1973] ECR 619 
819 See Bernstein (2008) for a discussion. See also Lianos (2010).  
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previous research and statements, and the possible biases of the judge who appointed the 
expert. Economic models of litigation show that parties can at least mitigate some influence 
of biases by presenting arguments and evidence.820 Thus, if the parties know the bias of a 
person advising the court this can be partially mitigated by the parties. However, this will be 
more difficult for the parties if they cannot predict the direction of the bias of the neutral 
expert.  
Besides the eventual professional biases of the expert, the neutral expert may not have 
the correct incentives aligned with rationality in weighing the decision value of applying a 
model against the costs. This depends on the award mechanisms. The expert is normally 
awarded directly by hourly payment. This hourly payment is likely to be standardized and not 
dependent on the public stakes of the case. Thus, the expert’s incentives are not likely to be 
perfectly aligned with the public interests. The expert is also subject to indirect awards. An 
influence on the experts’ academic merits may be one such indirect award. If so, the expert 
would probably be more interested in showing his capacity in applying and developing 
advanced methods than mechanical data gathering. Thus, there might be a bias towards the 
use of advanced methods based on assumptions rather than simple, but data intensive 
methods.821 If the neutral expert is an expert that also regularly testifies as an expert witness, 
this might also affect the incentives. The expert may have some interest in signaling special 
capabilities in applying some special methods. Thus, although neutral experts may seem to be 
less biased, this may not be the case. The bias is less systematic though. Still, even if the 
expert should be less biased, the bias may still have a greater impact on the decision. The 
reason is that the decision maker may rely more on the expert and be less critical to the expert 
opinion under the belief that since expert is neutral he is also unbiased.  
Although there are potential problems associated with neutral experts, the use of 
neutral experts to supply expert witnesses in antitrust has been advocated by some of today’s 
leading antitrust scholars.822 To mitigate the selection bias, it has been suggested that each 
party could write a list of acceptable experts, and then the expert appointed should be one that 
appear on both lists.823 The role of the expert may not necessarily be to generate economic 
                                                 
820 See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) and Farmer and Pecorino (2000) for a critique. See also Sanchrico (2012). 
This was discussed in more detail in the chapter on rationality in evidence assessment.  
821 Note that this is not a general tradeoff. While advanced methods in some instances can substitute the need for 
data, advanced methods may also be very data intensive.    
822 Posner (1999b) and Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 89 f. 
823 See Rubinfeld (1985) and Posner (1999, 1999b). This idea is supported by Hovenkamp (2005b) p. 90. 
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models, but to provide an opinion based on the economic analysis provided by the parties.824 
An expert opinion could be produced after the main presentation of economic evidence by the 
parties, and then be subject to contradiction on the parties. Such an arrangement would 
impose a strong time-pressure on the neutral expert as the neutral expert not only must take 
into account the pre-trial evidence, but also the oral presentations of the party experts. Still, 
the job is less than to actually produce the evidence, as the task is to provide a critique of the 
evidence presented. A possible task to give the neutral expert may also be to generate full 
models based on the partial models generated by the party-appointed experts as explained 
above. Then the decision makers are likely to benefit from models that provide more 
information. Furthermore, the expert could have a role in advising the court on what 
presumptions that should be based on the models generated. It would then be up to the parties 
disfavored by the presumption to generate better models. The opinion of the neutral expert 
should, preferably, be a separate public document that is amended to the decision. If the legal 
decision includes a written assessment of evidence, as recommended in Chapter Five in this 
study, it would be possible to see the extent the decision makers’ have relied on the report of 
the neutral expert and how the contradiction by the parties on this report has influenced the 
evidence assessment.    
Some comments on model generation  
It is now discussed how various mechanisms of incorporating economic experts under various 
procedural arrangements are likely to influence the economic models generated. The 
prosecutorial bias in an inquisitorial procedure and the use of party-appointed expert 
witnesses in the adversarial procedure are likely to bias the models generated away from those 
models that should be generated based on a tradeoff between decision value and costs. 
Furthermore, it was shown that the sum of the information value of models generated by the 
parties in an adversarial process is less than the information value of a model combining the 
insight of the two models. It was discussed whether the use of neutral experts performs better 
than party appointed experts. On this issue it was found that neutral experts may mitigate the 
systematic selection bias, but that this does not eliminate the professional bias. Furthermore, it 
can be questioned as to whether the award mechanism of neutral experts aligns the neutral 
expert incentives with the incentives compatible with the rational generation of models. It can 
also be questioned whether eventual biases will have greater impact if experts are neutral, 
                                                 
824 Posner (1999b) and Hovenkamp (2005b)  p. 90 f. 
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because the decision maker will be less critical to the expert report under the belief that 
neutrality also means to not be biased.   
Still, the use of neutral experts is recommended by leading antitrust scholars and 
measures to limit the bias of the neutral expert are suggested. Such measures includes 
mechanisms such as appointing an expert agreed upon by both parties and limiting the role of 
the neutral expert to assess the expert evidence already provided by the parties. The report of 
a neutral expert could be provided after the presentation of economic expert evidence by the 
parties and be subject to contradiction by the parties. By a requirement of the judges to 
provide grounds on the evidence assessment, it could be monitored if the decision makers 
have assessed the expert report properly taking the results of contradiction into account.   
  Model generation in antitrust procedure is now discussed. The rationality of the weight 
the decision maker actually gives to the models generated by the procedure depends on the 
decision makers’ incentives and abilities to assess models according to their informative 
value. The problem of biased models becomes bigger if the decision makers actually give too 
high an information value to the wrong models or too low an information value to the right 
models. This will be the topic next.          
6.4.3 Will models be assessed according to their informative value? 
Models in abductive reasoning 
In Chapter Five, it was found that abductive reasoning is descriptive for the actual assessment 
of antitrust evidence.825 Abductive reasoning is a holistic, informal method of searching for 
plausible explanations of evidence in the ultimate search for the best explanation of evidence. 
The use of presumptions, analogies and expert knowledge, are all crucial elements of 
abductive reasoning. Inferences based on economic models are in the category of expert 
knowledge. Inferences based on economic models are just elements of the holistic assessment 
of evidence. A statement by Alexander Italianer, Director General of the Directorate for 
Competition in the European Commission, is illustrative. Italianer stated that  
 
[w]e take into account quantitative and qualitative information to put together a 
coherent story […] We need to tell a story where economic evidence and analysis 
validates these presumption.826  
 
                                                 
825 See also Lianos (2010).  
826 Alexander Italianer, "Quantity" and "quality" in economic assessments, Charles River Associates Annual 
Conference 7 December 2011, Brussels. 
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Thus, the analysis based on economic models is a component of a holistic assessment of 
evidence in establishing a coherent story. The role of the models is to support and validate the 
presumptions based on other evidence.  
 Lipton (2004) concludes that a holistic inference to the best explanation of evidence as 
a main rule yields a correct assessment of evidence. The question is whether there are 
imperfections and biases distorting the evidence assessment. This principle must also apply if 
the evidence includes inferences based on economic models. In fact, Lipton (2004) is a 
philosophy of science treatise, and the main context of his study is the assessment of scientific 
evidence. The question is, then, whether there are imperfections and biases associated with 
the assessment of antitrust evidence having the result that the antitrust decision maker makes 
wrong inferences from economic models. Such imperfections and biases in general were 
discussed in Chapter Five. This included, inter alia, how institutional biases may affect 
evidence assessment, how evidence assessment may be distorted by cognitive biases, and how 
abuse of rhetoric may be utilized to influence the decision makers to make wrong inferences 
from the evidence. Here it will be discussed how these imperfections in particular are likely to 
lead to an assessment of economic models contrary to the true informative value of the 
models. The previous subchapter discussed the generation of economic models in antitrust 
procedure. In this section, the question is whether correct weight will be given to these 
models according to their informative value.              
Imperfections in model assessments in an inquisitorial systems 
Above it was discussed how the prosecutorial bias affects model generation in an inquisitorial 
system. The next question of whether the models are assessed according to their informative 
value almost becomes almost superfluous. If the inquisitor made a correction for the reduced 
informative value following from the influence of the prosecutorial bias on the generation of 
models, there would be no prosecutorial bias.  
The prosecutorial bias can be divided into incentive biases and cognitive biases. If the 
bias is a cognitive bias, the decision maker does not intentionally assess the evidence wrong. 
He is just subject to some cognitive failures. A main component of the prosecutorial bias is 
the confirmation bias, which in the context of the prosecutorial bias means that evidence is 
interpreted in favor of violation. In the context of assessing the informative value of models, 
this means that a model with inferences supporting violation will be given too high weight, 
while models that contradict violation will be given to low weight compared to the correct 
informative value. By using the terms of Alexander Italianer referred to above, the inquisitor 
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is likely to prefer models that put together a coherent anticompetitive story. The confirmation 
bias may not only affect the weight given to competing models, but also the weight given to 
the various equilibriums predicted by a model. If, for instance, a model applied has several 
equilibriums, some competitive and some anticompetitive, too much weight is likely to be 
given to the likelihood of the anticompetitive outcome. As discussed above, the inquisitor is, 
for instance, likely to give excessive weights to coordinated equilibriums in models of 
oligopoly if this supports intervention.    
 The prosecutorial bias also consists of an incentive bias. The incentive bias follows 
from an excessive preference for finding violation relative to finding not violation. The reason 
is, inter alia, that an inquisitor is awarded more for visible actions than for non-visible actions. 
In the pursuit of this preference, the inquisitor has an incentive to give higher weight to 
models that provide desirable inferences in support of violation. However in performing this 
task, the inquisitor must take into account that the weight given to the models must survive 
the scrutiny of judicial review and that of the audience in general. In the EU, the limited 
review on the assessment of complex economic evidence might induce the European 
Commission to give high weight to desirable inferences based on complex economic models, 
as the judicial review is restricted on this matter. A deliberate attempt to convince the decision 
maker to give too high weight to the inferences following from a specific model would 
involve the abuse of rhetoric in model-based inferences. The abuse of rhetoric in the 
argumentation for inferences based on economic models is returned to below.        
Imperfections in model assessments in an adversarial procedure 
In the adversarial process, it is the parties supported by their expert witnesses or, eventually, a 
neutral expert, which present the economic models and argue for the inferences based on 
these models. The decision makers, who might be judges or jurors, decide what weight to give 
to these models.  
 The decision maker may be subject to some incentive biases in assessing models that 
are not likely to systematically favor violation or non-violation. Understanding complex 
economic models and, especially, advanced econometric models requires much effort. Thus, 
instead of incurring the effort of understanding the complex model, the decision maker has an 
incentive to give less weight to complex models than easier, understandable models. 
However, note that it could also be argued for the opposite. If the decision maker does not 
understand the model, he might give weight to the conclusions according to the credentials of 
the experts, and not the model as such. This might result in a too high weight given to the 
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inferences supported by the model. Experiences seem to indicate that the first argument 
applies better to judges.827 This means that if judges do not understand the logic behind the 
inferences based on a complex economic model, this will simply not be taken into account or 
at least not be given much weight.  
Reducing the costs of assessing complex evidence is an argument for better trained 
decision makers. Some empirical studies seem to indicate that economic training of judges 
produces better antitrust decisions.828 However, if the decision maker is too trained, in terms 
of being an antitrust expert himself, he might be subject to professional biases, in particular, a 
professional confirmation bias. The decision maker would then be likely to give more weight 
to models that are on terms with his own research. Thus, to promote a rational assessment of 
economic models it is probably a case for having better trained decision makers, but not too 
trained decision makers. It should also be noted in this context that economic experts may 
have an advantage in assessing complex economic evidence. However, assessing antitrust 
evidence also involves assessing regular issues such as the credibility of non-expert witnesses, 
the validity of documents, and the state of mind of the persons involved. The economic expert 
is not likely to have any advantage in assessing these kinds of evidence. The expert may, in 
this case, rely too much on the economic models in the total evidence assessment and 
understate the informative value of other evidence. This is an additional argument against 
using experts in antitrust economics as decision makers.    
 The decision makers are also likely to be subject to cognitive biases in the assessment 
of economic models. Chapter Five presented and discussed a range of cognitive biases that 
are likely to influence evidence assessment. Most of the types of cognitive biases are relevant 
for the assessment of economic models. The base rate fallacy means to not give sufficient 
weight to priors. In the application of frequentistic statistical methods the base-rate fallacy is 
particular present. As explained above, many of the frequentistic methods are based on the 
probability of observations given a hypothesis. Making inferences on the probability of 
observations alone given the hypothesis, and not taking the base rates into account, is what 
the base rate fallacy is about. Thus, if the decision maker gives weight to models based on 
frequentistic tests not taking base rates properly into account, there is a risk of base rate 
fallacy. The conjunction fallacy means to believe in a hypothesis with more assumptions since 
the assumptions provide more understanding, although a hypothesis with less assumption is 
more probable. The conjunction fallacy is also relevant for the assessment of economic 
                                                 
827 OECD (2008). 
828 See Baye and Wright (2011).  
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models. It is in the nature of modeling to make assumptions. If an expert uses a model with 
more explicit assumptions that seems to provide more understanding than a model with fewer 
assumptions, then the first model is likely to be given more weight than the second according 
to the conjunction fallacy. Still, the second hypothesis is more likely. The hindsight bias is 
also relevant for economic models. Assume the there is a question regarding the possibility of 
a company to foresee the anticompetitive effects of some actions that actually materialized. It 
is established that the company could have used two economic models to predict the 
consequences of its behavior. The hindsight bias tells us that the decision maker is likely to 
exaggerate the ex-ante weight that the company should have been given to the model that 
predicted the anticompetitive effects. Also the self-serving bias may have some impact in the 
assessment of the models. The model that is more in line with what the decision maker wants 
to believe is, according to the self-serving bias, also likely to be given excessive weight. 
 As discussed in Chapter Five, jurors are likely to be more apt to be influenced by 
cognitive biases than experienced decision makers. However, when it comes to the 
assessment of complex economic models jurist judges without training in scientific methods 
may be as susceptible to cognitive biases as jurors. A financial expert or a physicist among 
the jurors may be equally qualified in assessing complex economic models as a jurist judge. 
Furthermore, empirical studies seem to indicate that, although training judges in economics 
improves the decisions in antitrust cases involving normal economic evidence, training in 
basic economics does not seem to be of much help when the economic evidence is 
complex.829 As an alternative to training in economics, it would have been interesting to see 
how training in philosophy of science and basic statistics would help to improve the decision 
making in the presence of complex economic evidence. Training in basic economics does not 
necessarily provide much training in the assessment of statistical and econometrical methods. 
Training in basic statistics would probably be more beneficial than training in basic 
economics when it comes to the assessment of econometrical and statistical methods.     
 The adversarial procedure provides an arena for rent-seeking. The parties have 
incentives to use abuse of rhetoric in the argumentation for inferences based on economic 
models to exploit imperfections and biases in the decisions makers. The abuse of rhetoric in 
the argumentation for model-based inferences will be discussed just below.     
                                                 
829 See Baye and Wright (2011).  
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Abuse of rhetoric and model based inferences   
As stated above, both the inquisitorial decision makers and the parties in an adversarial 
process have an incentive to abuse rhetoric in the argument for inferences based on economic 
models. The inquisitor may want to convince the general audience, and, in particular, the 
courts that their model-based inferences are correct in case of review. In an adversarial 
process, the parties want to convince the judges or jurors. This section provides a discussion 
of how abuse of rhetoric may be utilized to convince the decision makers to assess the 
inferences of economic models on the contrary to its information value.  
Recall from Chapter Five that the following ideal requirements characterize the correct 
use of rhetoric830:     
  
(R1): The respondent accepts the premises as commitments 
(R2): Each inference in the chain of argument is structurally correct  
(R3): The chain of argumentation must have the proponent’s thesis as its ultimate conclusion 
(R4): Arguments meeting (R1)–(R3) are the only means that count as fulfilling the 
proponent’s goal in the dialogue   
 
A party that convinces a decision maker by means that violates (R1)-(R4) has abused rhetoric.   
(R1) means that the decision maker as the respondent must accept the premises used by 
the one who present the argument. Trying to confuse the decision maker to accept 
assumptions the decision maker has not accepted would be an abuse of rhetoric. This is, in 
particular, relevant in the application of economic modeling. As described above, an 
economic model consists of some explicit assumptions and an almost infinite set of implicit 
assumptions. The decision maker is not likely to be aware of all these assumption, and might 
well not accept an assumption that is crucial for the outcome of the model. The Conwood831 
case discussed above is illustrative. Here, the plaintiff expert’s model was based on the 
assumption that a higher growth in market shares in markets where the market share already 
was high was evidence of the effects of the alleged anticompetitive behavior of the defendant. 
The assumptions for this to be a valid inference are not in line with standard economic theory. 
If the assumptions for this inference to be valid were explicit stated, the inference would 
probably not be accepted by the decision makers.   
                                                 
830 Walton (2002), Chapter 7. 
831 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co, 290 F. 3d 768 (6th. Cir 2002). 
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When the models are calibrated by data by econometric methods, even more 
assumptions are imposed as econometric analysis requires assumptions regarding the structure 
of the data. The methods of statistical parameter inference described above are based on the 
assumption that the rest of the model is true, as explained above. The stated uncertainties 
associated with the inferences associated with standard methods such as significance testing 
and deriving p-values, usually do not take into account the uncertainty associated with the 
model as such. This is an additional uncertainty the decision makers are not likely to be aware 
of. This can be exploited by those who present the analysis giving an impression that the 
inferences are more accurate than they are.  
Thus, expert testimony based on economic models provides, as a starting point, an 
ideal playground for abuse of rhetoric. In the US adversarial procedure, the admissibility 
screening according to the Daubert standard is a first-line defense against the abuse of rhetoric 
by the means of dubious assumption. Later, the competing argumentation of the opposing 
parties is supposed to reveal attempts to use hidden assumptions to yield accurate results. 
However, hidden assumptions may not always be revealed. Sometimes, qualified economists 
who are experts on the relevant area are necessary to reveal such hidden assumptions. Thus, 
the revelation of hidden assumptions requires that the stakes for the opposing party are so 
high that they find it valuable to hire experts to reveal the fallacies and flaws in the 
opponent’s economic analysis. If the stakes are very asymmetric, the party with the high 
stakes may have an incentive to overwhelm the court with expert testimonies, which will 
reduce the chance that the opposing party will reveal the hidden assumptions.  
In an inquisitorial procedure, there is not an opposite party to the same extent as in the 
adversarial procedure; however, the investigated parties are involved in the contradiction. The 
best practices on the submission of economic evidence in the EU have improved the use of 
economic analysis in the process. For instance, the use of data rooms makes it possible to 
check the validity of assumptions made on the data.832 Still, the European Commission has 
discretion in interpreting the data and the choice of models. Furthermore, the judicial review 
of complex economic evidence is restricted. This makes it possible for the European 
Commission to exaggerate the weight of model-based inferences despite of hidden dubious 
assumptions.                  
 (R2) means that the inferences based on economic models must be logically valid. 
Above, several examples were presented on how inferences based on economic models 
                                                 
832 See the European Commission Best practices on the submission of economic evidence, op. cit., Paragraph 47.   
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argued for do not need to be valid. The party may try to exploit cognitive biases in the 
decision makers to give a wrong information value to a model. A party may, for instance, try 
to develop a model which includes some assumptions that are not necessary for the modeling 
but still appear to provide more understanding for a decision maker by exploiting the 
conjunction fallacy. One could, for instance, add some assumption to a model that the 
potential participants in an alleged conspiracy had low margins for a long period. This 
assumption may bring nothing to the model in terms of different inferences,833 though it may 
appear as a better model for the decision maker because the assumption provides more 
understanding. Thus, adding an assumption, which all equal else reduces the informative 
value of the model, will make the model to look more informative to the decision maker.  
The party may also exploit methods of statistical inference in violation of (R2). Recall 
from the description above that statistical significance testing is asymmetric. Finding some 
parameter significant at significance level x means that the probability of the observations or 
more extreme observations are less than x percent given that the parameter is zero and that the 
rest of the assumptions behind the model are valid. However, not finding significance does 
not mean that it is 100-x percent chance that the parameter is zero. It might be much more 
probable that the parameter is positive than that the parameter is zero, as described above.  
Thus, it would be logically incorrect to argue that a failure to find significance is strong 
evidence that a parameter is zero. Testing significance is, at best, informative for the rejection 
of a hypothesis, but not its confirmation. Still, this basic distinction may be difficult to 
understand by untrained decision makers. Such an assessment fallacy could be exploited by 
the parties. As it is more difficult to reject a hypothesis than to fail to reject a hypothesis, a 
party could support a weak argument by formulating a favorable hypothesis that cannot be 
rejected, and use this to argue for the truth of the hypothesis.  
A remark that is almost too obvious to be mentioned is the difference between 
statistical significance and numerical significance. That a parameter is significantly different 
from zero does not mean that the numerical value of the parameter is “significant”. Thus, an 
argument based on an inference from statistical significance to numerical significance would 
be invalid. However, experiences seem to indicate that even this crucial distinction is likely to 
be misunderstood in courts.834  
                                                 
833 However, it is not unthinkable that it is possible to construct models where low margins for a long time have 
some influence on the likelihood of a price conspiracy. It might, for instance, be that if a firm had low margins 
for a long time then it has fewer assets that could be subject to fines. However, if this assumption is used and is 
crucial for the inference, the validity of the assumption should be proved.    
834 See Greenland and Poole (2011). 
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As described above, finding parameters significant is not very informative in the 
determination of informative value of the model. It is, rather, assumed that the model is 
informative. A model where one or more parameters are significant does not need to be very 
informative for explanation and prediction. In fact, a parameter may be found significant in a 
model with low informative value. If the decision maker gives the predictions from the model 
high weight just because parameters are found significant, then this would be a fallacy.     
(R3) is also likely to be violated when it comes to argumentation based on economic 
models in antitrust analysis. Economic models are used in proving that the legal conditions 
are satisfied. As described above, models are used to inform the antitrust decision maker as to 
whether some action was anticompetitive or that some action has anticompetitive effects. 
Often, one cannot directly model the anti-competitive effects, but something else that the 
decision maker is supposed to use as evidence to infer anticompetitive effects. For instance, in 
the EU Ryanair/Aer Lingus835 case, the economic evidence did not directly prove that the 
merger had competitive effects. However, economic models and econometric analysis was 
used as evidence that the merging parties were likely to discipline each other’s price. This was 
used as evidence to infer that the merger had anticompetitive effects. This is normally no 
problem, as long as there is an established theory leading from what is proved to what is 
going to be proved, which there was in this case. However, one could use economic analysis 
to prove something else and then abuse rhetoric to confuse the decision maker into making 
the wrong inferences. Thus, an expert may present some results and confuse the decision 
maker to make the desirable inferences from it. The Conwood836 case is probably an 
illustrative example of this. In this case, the plaintiff’s economics expert proved that the 
plaintiff’s market share had a tendency to grow less when its market share was low compared 
to when it was high. This was supposed to be evidence in support of exclusion. It is difficult 
to know whether the expert actually believed this had probative force in favor of violation, but 
on its face it seems to be an attempt to prove “something” with advanced methods with a hope 
that the decision maker was confused into concluding that since advanced methods are used 
by an expert, it must prove something.  
The discussion above has shown that argumentation based on inferences from 
economic models is a good arena for the abuse of rhetoric. All elements necessary for 
                                                 
835 Case No COMP/M.4439 – Ryanair / Aer Lingus [2007] upheld by the court in Cases T-342/07 and T-411/07 
Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc v. Commission [2010] 
835 De La Mano et al. (2007). 
836 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co, 290 F. 3d 768 (6th. Cir 2002). 
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establishing logically valid arguments could potentially be violated. This is an additional 
argument for better trained decision makers in antitrust cases. Some might argue that this is 
also an argument for the inquisitorial procedure to prevent the rent-seeking associated with 
the possibility of abusing rhetoric. It is, however, hard to be confident that this would be a 
good solution. As follows from above, an inquisitor is also subject to imperfections and is 
likely to abuse rhetoric to obtain a desirable result. An example is the Tetra/Laval case 
mentioned above, where the European Commission went far in manipulating the economic 
analysis to achieve desirable results. One of the main roles of the parties in an adversarial 
procedure is to reveal and refute fallacies and flaws in the opponent’s arguments. Although 
parties can perform some of the same function during the contradiction, this will not be the 
same as an adversarial procedure on equal terms with an external decision maker. 
Furthermore, limits in the judicial review give the inquisitor a margin to pursue desirable 
inferences. Thus, mitigating the risk of abuse of rhetoric is a poor argument for an 
inquisitorial procedure.      
6.5 Conclusions 
The research questions stated at the beginning of this chapter were: How should economic 
models be rationally assessed in antitrust analysis? Do the antitrust assessment principles 
and procedures applied in antitrust analysis facilitate a rational assessment of economic 
models? How can the rationality in the assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis 
be improved? These questions will now be addressed in turn.   
How should economic models be rationally assessed in antitrust analysis? 
This chapter started by giving a description of what models are. Models are assumptions on 
the structural links between phenomena and events, including assumptions on causality. 
Models are often simplifications or idealizations of reality to single out some circumstances to 
study. Models can have an instrumental purpose, where the only role of the model is to 
provide predictions to improve the decisions. However, models can also pursue realism by 
explaining reality, which improves a decision maker’s ability to make a decision on the basis 
of the correct facts. In antitrust, models are used both to explain evidence and as an 
instrument to predict the effects of some action. Models can be purely theoretical abstractions, 
or the parameters of the models can be more or less fitted or calibrated with relevant data.  
 A model is something that improves the decision by having informative value. Models 
reduce the uncertainty of not knowing the truth. Models allow us to explain evidence better 
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than by not having any model, or to perform predictions that are better than by not having any 
model. Models provide explanations and predictions, and their informative value is about 
their ability to do so accurately.  
 Rationality in model-based inferences means that the uncertainty associated with the 
model-based inference is rationally taken into account. Model-based inferences should be 
adjusted for the probability of the model. Often, there are many competing models, and the 
competing models should be given weight according to their probability. This means that if 
there, for instance, are two competing models that are used to aid a decision of antitrust 
violation, the probability of the two models should be taken into account in the loss 
minimization decision. 
 There are both qualitative and quantitative methods that can be used to determine the 
informative value of models. Besides the models’ ability to explain and predict observations, 
parsimony in variables and robustness are criteria in determining the informative of a model.          
Do the antitrust assessment principles and procedures applied in antitrust analysis facilitate a 
rational assessment of economic models?  
In antitrust, the models used for inference is generated by the legal procedure. The decision 
maker decides the weight to give the economic models generated by the procedure as a part of 
an overall assessment of evidence that also includes other evidence, such as assessing the 
credibility of non-expert witness statements and analyzing the validity of documents.   
 There are many factors that bias the model generation both in the inquisitorial 
procedure associated with the EU and in the adversarial procedure associated with the US. 
Case-based experiences and theory seem to indicate that the prosecutorial bias affects the 
model generation in the EU inquisitorial system. This prosecutorial bias seems, however, to 
have been partially mitigated by procedural reforms and some reversals due to judicial review 
over the last years. Since the judicial review is restricted only when it comes to complex 
economic evidence, some degree of sophistication is required in the intentional pursuit of 
prosecutorial bias. The generation of economic models to argue for desirable inferences in the 
case in question is an opportunity to do exactly so.  
In the US, the model generation is strongly influenced by the fact that models as a 
main rule are generated by expert witnesses appointed by the parties. This is likely to generate 
biased models that favor the party that present the model. Two biased models are likely to 
have less informative value together than one neutral model that incorporates the information 
in the two biased models.  
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A way to mitigate the bias following from the use of party-appointed expert witnesses 
is the use of neutral experts. The use of neutral experts has been endorsed by leading antitrust 
scholars. There are, however, several problems associated with neutral experts as well. The 
absence of selection biases and incentive biases associated with the party-appointed experts 
does not mean that the neutral expert is not subject to any biases. The expert is likely to be 
subject to professional biases. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether the award 
mechanism aligns the neutral expert’s incentives with the incentives required for rational 
generation of models. The neutral experts are subject to incentives that may not coincide with 
the incentives necessary to generate the right models. It can also be questioned whether 
experts’ biases will have greater impact if experts are neutral, because the decision maker will 
be less critical to the expert opinion under the belief that neutrality also means to not be 
biased.  
To reduce the impact of biased expert witnesses, it has also been suggested to increase 
the disclosure requirement by requiring the parties to reveal what experts that have been 
contacted in the process of finding an expert witness. However, too much disclosure of pre-
litigation activities is a dangerous path, as one risks losing some of the benefits associated 
with the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, this might make the impact of selection bias 
even stronger as it becomes more important for the parties to attract the right expert in the 
first place. It has also been suggested to impose a requirement to have a system of public 
disclosure of all the former statements of an expert to facilitate consistency in the experts’ 
statements. This might reduce some of the incentive bias, but not the selection bias. One could 
argue that such a requirement could increase the impact of the selection bias as it will be 
easier to find an expert with the correct bias. 
 All in all, the discussion showed that it is difficult to safeguard against biases in the 
generation of economic models in antitrust procedure. Thus, it is important to have 
mechanisms that facilitate a correct assessment of the informative value of models. If the 
decision makers are able to correctly assess the informative value of models, it will be hard 
times for those who want to present biased models associated with low information value.
 This chapter included an assessment on whether models are likely to be assessed 
according to their informative value in antitrust analysis. It was found that in the inquisitorial 
procedure the prosecutorial bias is likely to affect the assessment of the informative value of 
models. The judicial review and mechanisms of contradiction will, however, impose some 
constraints on the inquisitor’s ability implement the prosecutorial bias. Nevertheless, when it 
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comes to the intentional implementation of the prosecutorial bias, abuse rhetoric can be used 
to implement the prosecutorial bias, in particular if this is done within topics that are subject 
to restricted judicial review.  
In the adversarial procedure, there are many imperfections that are likely to distort the 
rational assessment of the informative value of models. As making the inferences from 
complex economic models requires effort, decision makers are likely to give more weight to 
simpler models that are easier to understand. This is an argument for better trained decision 
makers, as the assessment of complex economic models requires less effort the more trained a 
person is in assessing such models. However, the decision maker should not be so well 
trained that he is an expert himself in the field, as he then may be subject to professional 
biases. Furthermore, the inferences from economic models are parts of a holistic body of 
evidence, including other evidence such as non-expert witness statements and documents. An 
economics or econometrics expert is not likely to have any advantage in analyzing these kinds 
of evidence. Cognitive biases are also likely to disturb the correct assessment of the 
informative value of models in an adversarial procedure. This can be exploited by the parties 
by abuse of rhetoric. The adversarial process can be argued to be an ideal playground for 
abuse of rhetoric, which, in particularly, is likely to be exploited by the party with the highest 
stakes. Leading antitrust scholars have even pointed out that rhetorical skills are likely to 
trump over professional merits in the presentation of expert testimony.    
 In this chapter it was also discussed how rhetoric can be abused in the argumentation 
for model-based inferences in antitrust analysis. It was found that argumentation for 
inferences based on economic models provides playing field for the abuse of rhetoric. The 
parties can exploit the use of assumptions that underpins the economic analysis in their 
arguments. The parties can exploit models to create desirable cognitive biases. Furthermore, 
the parties may abuse rhetoric in the argumentation associated with statistical methods, in 
particular, the conventional methods of significance testing, to confuse the decision makers. 
In an adversarial procedure, the role of the competition between parties is to reveal and refute 
fallacies and flaws in each other’s argumentation. There might, however, be failures that limit 
the other party’s ability to do so. If the stakes are asymmetric, one party might find it 
profitable to overwhelm the other party with expert evidence that the other party does not find 
profitable to try to refute. Below follows some suggestions to mitigate the abuse of rhetoric.         
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How can the rationality in the assessment of economic models in antitrust analysis be 
improved? 
This chapter has presented various suggestions to improve the rationality in the assessment of 
economic models in antitrust analysis. A first obvious recommendation is for the decision 
makers to adhere to the principles of rationality in determining the informative value of 
models as described in this chapter. Both qualitative and quantitative principles of assessing 
the informative value of economic models were provided in this chapter. Some basic training 
of decision makers, not necessarily in economics, but in philosophy of science and the 
fundamentals of statistical inference, would probably be useful for decision makers who want 
to improve their performance in the assessment of the informative value of economic models 
and scientific evidence in general.  
However, it is not very realistic to believe that general decision makers can be 
sufficiently trained to fully assess the informative value of complex models used in antitrust 
analysis. Furthermore, to use decision makers that have this knowledge would introduce other 
problems. Decision makers that are experts themselves are likely to be subject to professional 
bias. Furthermore, experts in assessing economic models do not necessarily have any 
advantage in assessing other evidence, such as non-expert witness statements, documents’ 
validity and other types of evidence that are crucial in the assessment of antitrust evidence. 
Thus, although there is a case for better trained decision makers in antitrust analysis, this does 
not mean that the decision makers should be experts in antitrust economics and econometrics.  
 Argumentation based on inferences from economic models is a playing field for abuse 
of rhetoric. All elements necessary for establishing logically valid arguments could potentially 
be violated in arguing for model-based inferences. This is an additional argument for better 
trained decision makers in antitrust cases. Some might argue that this is also an argument for 
the inquisitorial procedure to prevent the rent-seeking associated with the possibility of 
abusing rhetoric. This is not likely to be a good solution. As follows from the discussion in 
this chapter, an inquisitor is also subject to biases and is also likely to abuse rhetoric to obtain 
a desirable result. One of the main roles of the parties in an adversarial procedure is to reveal 
and refute fallacies and flaws in the opponent’s arguments. Although parties can perform 
some of the same function during the contradiction, in an inquisitorial procedure this will not 
be the same as in an adversarial procedure, where the parties are on equal terms and where the 
decision maker is external to the case. Furthermore, limits in the judicial review give the 
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inquisitor a margin to pursue desirable inferences. Thus, the risk of abuse of rhetoric is a poor 
argument for an inquisitorial procedure. 
 The question that remains, then, is what improvements can be made in the adversarial 
procedure to improve the ability of the competition of the parties to yield a rational 
assessment of the economic models. Leading antitrust scholars have suggested the 
involvement of neutral experts. This chapter presented some counterarguments to the 
superiority of the performance of neutral experts. In line with the suggestions of other 
commentators, the neutral experts’ role should be limited to assess the evidence presented by 
the parties. The neutral experts may point at fallacies in the argumentation of the parties and 
may try to generate some of the additional informative value that follows from incorporating 
two biased models into one model. The neutral expert may also be useful in determining 
which of the parties should benefit from a presumption and thus encouraging the party that 
does not benefit from a presumption to clarify issues. The report of the neutral expert could 
beneficially be provided after the presentation of economic expert evidence by the parties. 
This report should be subject to contradiction by the parties. In line with the recommendation 
in Chapter Five of this study, decision makers should be required to provide written grounds 
on the evidence assessment. Then, it can be monitored as to whether the decision makers have 
assessed the report of the neutral expert properly, including taking the arguments generated by 
the contradiction into account. Furthermore, as also pointed out in Chapter Five, measures to 
balance the stakes of the parties would probably be beneficial. Then, each party has balanced 
incentives in finding the fallacies and flaws in each other’s arguments.  
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7 Conclusions  
In the introduction to this study some superior research questions were asked: What is a 
rational antitrust analysis? Do the assessment principles and procedures applied in antitrust 
analysis facilitate rational antitrust decisions? How can the assessment principles and 
procedures applied in antitrust analysis be made more rational? This chapter will address 
each of these questions in turn. The chapter will be concluded with some final comments. 
What is a rational antitrust analysis? 
Chapter Three established what antitrust analysis is. It is the determination of antitrust rules 
and the assessment of evidence in antitrust cases. After this, it was established what a rational 
antitrust analysis is. For antitrust analysis to be rational, it must satisfy the axioms of 
rationality established in modern decision theory. Then, the resulting decision will be rational. 
Adhering to the basic axioms of rationality is equivalent to maximizing expected utility of 
antitrust decisions, which again is equivalent to minimizing expected loss.  
The axioms of rationality impose quite strong assumptions regarding the presence of 
precise probabilities. It was briefly explored whether alternative theories of rational decisions 
that do not impose such assumptions provide better normative guidance on rational decisions, 
but it was not found that they do so at the moment. There is potential, however, for alternative 
decision theories to be applied when they become more operational for legal analysis. Despite 
the lack of the presence of precise probabilities, a decision theory based on such presence may 
serve as normative guidance. The assessment principles and procedures can ideally be 
designed in such a way that the resulting decisions are as if exact probabilities were present.  
Furthermore, Chapter Three addressed whether there is some objective standard of 
rational antitrust analysis as both the probability assessments and the utilities involved may be 
of a subjective character. It was found that by using objective methods in assessing evidence 
and using economic welfare as a utility measure, we come close to an objective standard for 
rational antitrust analysis.  
Chapter Three also addressed the question of whether rationality can and should guide 
antitrust analysis. It was argued that it can. The lack of knowledge of precise probabilities 
does not prohibit antitrust analysis from being rational. As just mentioned, assessment 
principles and procedures can facilitate rational decisions based on such knowledge of exact 
probabilities, even if no one actually knows these probabilities. Furthermore, it is possible to 
use objective measures of probabilities and utilities to approach an objective standard for 
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rational antitrust decisions. It was also found that there is nothing intrinsic in the legal 
framework that the antitrust analysis is performed within that prohibits antitrust analysis from 
being rational. The wide and general antitrust statutes combined with economic welfare as 
one of the major purposes of antitrust law, provide a good substantive legal framework for 
rational analyses. The challenge is to establish assessment principles and procedures that 
facilitate rational analyses. 
The question of whether rationality should guide antitrust analysis this was also answered 
in the affirmative. Rational antitrust analyses will maximize the expected economic welfare 
from antitrust decisions, and, in the long run, maximize the economic welfare from having 
antitrust laws. Furthermore rationality promotes a system of coherent and consistent antitrust 
rules. Finally, it might be argued that rational decisions are more predictable and thus increase 
legal certainty.           
Chapter Five offered more precise directions for how antitrust evidence should be 
rationally assessed. The chapter started by citing Beckner and Salop (1999) who stated that 
“[t]he court first should gather information that is least expensive, resolves the most 
uncertainty, and is most likely to affect its decision”. A model of rational evidence assessment 
was developed to give more content to this statement. Rational evidence assessment is about 
minimizing the sum of the expected loss of errors from making a wrong decision and the cost 
associated with gathering evidence. 
A piece of evidence should be gathered if its decision value exceeds the cost of 
gathering the evidence. The decision value of evidence is the evidence’s ability to reduce the 
expected loss from errors. There will only be a decision value from gathering some evidence 
if there is a chance that the outcome of the evidence gathering makes it rational to change the 
decision. In other words, gathering evidence only has decision value if there is any chance 
that gathering the evidence will influence the decision. The decision value of evidence 
depends on the probative force of evidence and the losses from errors. The probative force of 
evidence is the extent to which the evidence influences the probability of a hypothesis. In 
rational evidence assessment, the laws of probability determine the probative force. The 
higher the chance gathering evidence will have as an outcome that we with strong probative 
force are right in changing our decision to a decision associated with a less expected error, the 
higher is the decision value.   
The costs of gathering evidence should be as low as possible. This means that 
evidence should be gathered by the one who can gather it at the lowest costs. This can be 
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implemented by the use of presumptions that disfavor the low cost producer. This gives the 
party who has the lowest cost in producing the evidence the incentive to produce the 
evidence.  
Evidence should be gathered in the right amount and in the right sequence. A tradeoff 
between decision value and cost facilitates the gathering of a right amount of evidence. By 
gathering evidence in the right sequence, a rational decision can be taken at each stage. One 
can then rationally decide whether it is efficient to gather more evidence or to decide upon the 
evidence already available. The rational sequence of evidence gathering depends on both 
decision value and costs. The cheapest evidence with the highest decision value should be 
gathered first. However, dynamical programming is necessary to determine the right sequence 
of gathering evidence.  
Chapter Six explicitly incorporated the rational use of economic models in antitrust 
analysis, with a particular focus on evidence assessment. Models are assumptions on the 
structural links between phenomena and events, including assumptions on causality. Models 
are often simplifications or idealizations of reality, made to single out some circumstances to 
study. Models can have an instrumental purpose, where the only role of the model is to 
provide better predictions to improve the decisions. However, models can also pursue realism 
by explaining reality to improve a decision’s basis in the correct facts. In antitrust, evidence 
assessment models are used both to explain evidence and as an instrument to predict the 
future effects of some action. Models can be purely theoretical abstractions or the parameters 
of a model can be more or less fitted or calibrated with relevant data.  
 A model is something that improves the decision by having informative value. Models 
reduce the uncertainty of not knowing the truth. Models allow us to explain evidence better 
than by not having any model, or to perform predictions that are better than by not having any 
model. Models can provide more or less good explanations and predictions, and their 
informative value is about their ability to do so accurately.  
 Rational inference from models means that the uncertainty associated with a model-
based inference is rationally taken into account. Model-based inferences should be adjusted 
for the probability of the model. Often, there are many competing models and the competing 
models should rationally be given weight according to their probability. For instance, this 
means that if there are two competing models that are used to aid a decision of violation, the 
probability of the two models should be taken into account in the loss minimization decision. 
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 There are both qualitative and quantitative methods that can be used to determine the 
informative value of models. Besides the models ability to explain and predict observations, 
parsimony in variables and robustness are criteria that are awarded in determining the 
informative of a model.                
Do the assessment principles and procedures applied in antitrust analysis facilitate rational 
antitrust decisions?   
Chapter Four discussed rationality in the determination of antitrust rules. In the discussion of 
rationality in the determination of antitrust rules, it was analyzed how to rationally choose 
between rules and standards how to rationally choose the precision level of rules. It was found 
that the assessment principle in both the US and EU seems to have converged on presumption 
rules, which means that all conduct is assessed according to a standard. Presumption rules 
generate some of the benefits of rules, though, by mitigating the need to perform a full 
analysis in each case. A question then becomes how precise these presumption rules should 
be.  
The confidence in anticompetitive effects is used to determine the presumption rules in 
both the US and EU. The more confidence in the anticompetitive effects in the case in 
question, the less is the need for an inquiry of the actual circumstances of the case. In other 
words the higher the a priori probability of anticompetitive effects, the less is the need for 
case-specific evidence to confirm this a priori assessment. At a superior level, probability of 
errors, error costs, costs of formulation, and costs of application should all be taken into 
account in determining the rules. This requires a broader assessment than just assessing the 
likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question. Thus, antitrust decision makers 
should take more criteria into account when they determine the rules. Because the criteria 
used to determine rules seems to be too narrow both in the US and EU, it cannot be concluded 
that the presumption rules are likely to be rational.  
A potential indicator of the irrationality of antitrust rules might be the divergence of 
certain presumption rules used in the US and EU. The argument would be that if US and EU 
use different rules, they cannot be rational at the same time. This would be a too hasty a 
conclusion, though. The procedural frameworks in the US and EU are different, and the 
different benefits and costs of various rules may not be equal in the two systems. Still, taking 
into account that the confidence of the anticompetitive effects is the criterion used in the 
determination of presumption rules in both systems makes it peculiar that the presumption 
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rules are as different as they are. The differences are likely to be explained by other factors, 
such as the organization of the procedure and the incentives of the parties involved 
In Chapter Four, it was also discussed whether we are likely to observe an evolution 
towards rational antitrust rules. This involved analyzing two aspects relevant for such 
evolution. The first aspect was whether the principle of precedence is an obstacle to the 
evolution of rational antitrust rules. One potential obstacle associated with the principle of 
precedence is path-dependence. The principle of precedence seems to facilitate a selection of 
cases that reinforce strong precedence-based rules but do not phase out weak precedents. To 
avoid, this there should be mechanisms providing litigators with incentives to challenge weak 
precedence based rules. It was shown in Chapter Four that, in the US, the private stakes 
resulting from the benefits of some irrational precedence-based rule may almost paradoxically 
contribute to the abandoning of such a rule. If, for instance, a precedence-based rule is likely 
to be weak due to new understanding and knowledge, the private interest associated with such 
a rule may provide the courts with cases that give the courts a chance to abandon that rule. If, 
for instance, some private party has an interest in litigating for the private benefits associated 
with a per se prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance, this gives the court the chance 
to abandon such a rule if it is not justified anymore due to new economic understanding. This 
is one of the benefits following from the important role of private enforcement in the US. If 
there was no such private enforcement, the courts in the US may not have got the chance to 
abandon, for instance, the per se prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance. In EU 
competition law, which relies more heavily on public enforcement, the correction of 
undesirable precedence-based rules is less likely. If the European Commission does not see 
the merits of enforcing a rule, the precedence will be there until it becomes so old that this as 
such is enough for the rule to be considered abandoned. To avoid undesirable path-
dependence, there should be some correction mechanisms. Private enforcement is one such 
mechanism. The enforcement authorities may also, as a matter of principle, challenge rules 
likely to be abandoned in courts, to check if courts actually are ready to abandon the rules.  
Analogical reasoning is used to complement the principle of precedence as no cases 
are identical. Analogical reasoning constitutes a possible obstacle to the evolution of rational 
antitrust rules. Using analogical reasoning and not properly taking into account the relevant 
circumstances may yield rules that are not rational. An antitrust rule derived by analogy from 
another antitrust rule should always be checked against the underlying antitrust standard and 
purpose to check if the analogy-based rule actually has merits according to the underlying 
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antitrust standard and purpose. Thus analogies can serve as a start in deriving a rule, but not 
as an end. It was shown in Chapter Four that a problem of using analogies might particularly 
arise if the analogy is based on a rule where the purpose is unclear. If the purpose of some 
antitrust rule is ambiguous, then how can we know if an analogy derived from the same rule is 
rational? By analogical reasoning, a non-meritorious rule can expand to cover more and more 
practices, thereby creating more and more harm. The risk of such expansion can be 
considered as higher in the EU than in the US as the amount of rules not serving any clear 
purpose can be argued to be higher in EU. Thus, a recommendation is for antitrust decision 
makers to be careful in the application of analogical reasoning and in accepting analogy-based 
argument presented by the parties. As just stated, analogy should be the start and not the end 
in determining an antitrust rule. This means that antitrust decision makers should always 
complement analogical reasoning with the underlying antitrust standard. Furthermore, 
analogies should not be derived from rules that themselves have no merits according to the 
antitrust standard.   
A last point addressed related to the principle of precedence was the point that 
precedence-based rules can more or less intentionally contribute to the circumvention of the 
standard of proof. As more and more practices are considered or presumed anticompetitive as 
a matter of rule, there is a risk that the uncertainty associated with the anticompetitive effects 
is not properly addressed when the rule is applied. By this argument, the antitrust rules can 
expand into condemning practices not very likely to be anticompetitive. Antitrust decision 
makers should be careful in deciding a case on the basis of presumption rules without 
properly taking into account the uncertainty associated with the presumptions as such.  
The second aspect analyzed associated with the evolution of antitrust rules was the 
impact of institutional factors and the incentives of the decision makers on the evolution of 
rules. It was found that rent-seeking and utility maximizing behavior of the decision-makers 
are likely to bias the evolution of rules away from rationality.  The decision-makers will 
maximize their own net utility subject to the incentives provided them by their principals and 
the system. According to the efficiency hypothesis, the adversarial system with independent 
courts facilitates efficient rules. Some theories even predict that this evolution of efficient 
rules in the adversarial system is robust to the preferences of the judges. The interest group 
theory predicts that politically supervised inquisitorial enforcement authorities are likely to be 
influenced and biased by interest group influence in their determination of rules. In addition 
to this, the decisions are likely to be biased by the preferences of the utility maximizing 
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bureaucrats. Thus, according these theories we should expect more rational rules in the US 
which mainly follows an adversarial system, while the rules in EU competition law 
enforcement should be biased both due to interest group influence and bureaucratic behavior 
resulting from the inquisitorial character of the EU procedure.  
However, other theories predict a superiority of the inquisitorial system relative to the 
adversarial system in facilitating efficient rules. The argument is that the inquisitorial decision 
makers are likely to pursue the truth in a cost efficient way in the decision making, while rent-
seekers have the opportunity to spend almost unlimited resources on deceptive argumentation 
in an adversarial court. Without deciding which theory is most likely to apply, it was 
concluded that rent-seeking and decision maker incentives are likely to disturb the rationality 
of rules in both the inquisitorial and adversarial system. Avoiding the influence of rent-
seeking and biased incentives in the determination of rules is partially a question of promoting 
rationality in evidence assessment to prevent the evolution of precedence based on 
epistemologically wrong decisions.  
Chapter Five analyzed the rationality of evidence assessment in antitrust. It was found 
that antitrust decision makers are not likely to formally use probability theory and expected 
loss minimization in their overall assessment of evidence. Rather, the overall assessment of 
antitrust evidence can better be described as abductive reasoning, where the one that assesses 
evidence holistically searches for plausible explanations of the evidence to ultimately find a 
best explanation. Abductive reasoning includes the use of informal methods such as 
presumptions, analogical reasoning, and appeal to expert knowledge. All these elements are 
crucial to actual evidence assessment in both the US and EU. Presumptions are an important 
instrument in antitrust evidence assessment. Antitrust decision makers regularly use analogy 
by referring to evidence assessments in previous decisions. Expert knowledge, in particular 
economic expert knowledge, has a crucial role in informing antitrust decisions.     
  It has been argued in the literature that abductive reasoning as a starting point gives 
the correct evidence assessment. The question is whether there are imperfections and biases 
that distort the evidence assessment away from being correct. It was found that there are 
several sources of imperfections and biases that are likely to distort antitrust evidence 
assessment. The decision makers are maximizers of utility subject to institutional incentives, 
the decision makers can be influenced by cognitive biases, there is a risk of errors associated 
with the use of analogies, experts might be biased, and rhetoric can be abused by the parties in 
the argumentation. The impact of these imperfections and biases is likely to be dependent on 
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whether the procedural system is inquisitorial or adversarial. Thus, the impact of these 
imperfections and biases is likely to differ in EU and US.  
When it comes to inquisitorial systems, empirical research and literature has suggested 
that an inquisitorial decision maker is subject to a prosecutorial bias that systematically favors 
the evidence assessment in favor of violation. Some of this literature directly addresses 
antitrust and, in particular, the enforcement of the European Commission. The prosecutorial 
bias is a result of both incentive biases and cognitive biases. As an inquisitorial enforcement 
authority is awarded for what it does, it is likely to be subject to an incentive bias in favor of 
finding violations. The inquisitor is also likely to be subject to a confirmation bias, which is a 
cognitive bias. According to the cognitive bias, people tend to assess evidence in a way that 
confirms already established beliefs, which means to confirm a belief of violation in the 
context of a prosecutorial bias.  
By using economic modeling, it was found that the prosecutorial bias has additional 
consequences for the rationality of evidence assessment than the pure static effect in terms of 
a wrong evidence assessment. The inquisitor has an incentive to excessively search for 
evidence that has strong probative force supporting violation and to search too little for 
evidence that has probative force in contradiction of violation. In addition to the prosecutorial 
bias, the inquisitor has an excessive incentive to save his own cost by transferring the burden 
of producing evidence to the investigated parties by the use of presumptions. This will lead to 
inefficiency in the gathering of evidence. Combined with the confirmation bias, the inquisitor 
is likely to give too strong probative force to the failure of the parties to produce evidence. 
Thus, the incentives to reduce costs reinforce the effects of the prosecutorial bias. Since the 
EU competition procedure is best characterized as an inquisitorial procedure, the conclusion 
is that the evidence assessment in the EU competition law enforcement is likely to be 
systematically biased, favoring violation. Furthermore, evidence is not likely to be gathered 
rationally. There will be an excessive search for evidence that has probative force supporting 
violation. Furthermore, the cost of gathering evidence is not likely to be efficient because the 
Commission has an excessive incentive to impose a burden on the parties investigated to 
produce evidence.  
When it comes to the adversarial procedure, the decision makers are not likely to be 
subject to systematical biases towards either finding violation or finding not violation. This 
does not mean that the decision maker cannot be biased, though, just that there is no reason to 
believe that the decision makers have some systematic preferences for violation or not 
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violation. The adversarial procedure is characterized by the parties (represented by lawyers) 
arguing for their own interest. The parties are likely to try to exploit cognitive biases and 
argue on the basis of analogies without merits if it benefits their case. Furthermore, since the 
main rule is that the parties choose their own experts to support their arguments, it is likely to 
be a biased selection of experts with professional preferences that support the case of the party 
they represent. Furthermore, even if experts are repeat players and have a reputation to 
maintain, it cannot be ignored that the experts will undertake efforts in satisfying their paying 
clients, which will bias the expert opinions away from the pure professional. The parties are 
also likely to abuse rhetoric in influencing the decision makers. These imperfections are likely 
to be exaggerated in laymen jury trials, as juries are not experienced in filtering out and 
correct for imperfections and biases. Thus, the evidence is likely to be noisier in an 
adversarial trial. The more noisy evidence the more evidence is needed for an accurate 
decision.  
The model developed in Chapter Five and insight from other modeling efforts were 
used to gain further information on performance of the adversarial trial. A beneficial effect of 
the evidence competition in an adversarial trial is that if a party believes that the decision 
maker is subject to some systematic bias, he has an incentive to mitigate this by evidence 
production. Furthermore, if we assume that providing evidence on the side of the truth is 
cheaper than fabricating evidence, the party with the truth on side has a competitive 
advantage. Thus, these are arguments that biases, if they are present, are not as harmful in the 
adversarial procedure as in the inquisitorial procedure.  
The adversarial process facilitates an evidence race that tends to lead to excessive 
evidence production. This is exaggerated by high stakes in the case. Thus, there is a potential 
for rent-seeking. However, if the private stakes are low compared to the social stakes, too 
little amount of evidence may be produced. If stakes are asymmetric, there is likely to be an 
imbalanced amount of evidence in favor of the party with the high stakes. Thus, if we make 
an assumption that we are likely to observe asymmetric stakes in cases where a defendant 
wants to protect its monopoly profits, then there might be a systematic bias towards findings 
of not violation in these cases.        
There are likely to be deviations from rationality in the evidence assessment both in 
the inquisitorial EU system and the adversarial US system. Which system performs best 
depends on whether the failures of the inquisitorial or adversarial procedure are worst. 
However, there are arguments in favor of the adversarial system in US. Although this system 
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is subject to weaknesses it seems not to be subject to the same systematic bias towards finding 
violation as the inquisitorial system is. Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter Five revealed that 
the evidence costs savings normally associated with the inquisitorial procedure are not as 
obvious as it appears taking the biases into account. Too much evidence in favor of violation 
is likely to be produced in the inquisitorial system. Although the evidence is noisier in the 
adversarial system, the absence of systematically biased decision makers and the excessive 
amount of evidence is likely to, as a main rule, facilitate a more accurate decision as long as 
the stakes are not too asymmetric.  
A particular feature of antitrust decision is the use of economic models to inform the 
decisions. This was discussed in Chapter Six. The models used for inference in antitrust cases 
are generated by the legal procedure. The decision maker decides the weight to give the 
economic models generated by the procedure as a part an overall assessment of evidence that 
also includes other evidence, such as assessing the credibility of non-expert witnesses and 
analyzing the content of documents.   
 There are many factors that bias the model generation both in the inquisitorial 
procedure associated with the EU and in the adversarial procedure associated with the US. 
Case-based experiences seem to indicate that the prosecutorial bias affects the model 
generation in the EU inquisitorial system. This prosecutorial bias seems, however, to have 
been partially mitigated by procedural reforms and some reversals after judicial review over 
the recent years. Since the judicial review is restricted only when it comes to complex 
economic evidence, some degree of sophistication is required in the intentional pursuit of 
prosecutorial bias. The generation of economic models to argue for desirable inferences in the 
case in question is an opportunity to do exactly that.  
In the US, the model generation is strongly influenced by the fact that models as a 
main rule are generated by expert witnesses appointed by the parties. This is likely to generate 
biased models that favor the party that presents the model. Two biased models are likely to 
have less informative value taken together than one neutral model that incorporates the 
information in the two biased models.  
A way to mitigate the bias following from expert appointed witnesses is the use of 
neutral experts. The use of neutral experts has been endorsed by leading antitrust scholars. 
There are, however, several problems associated with neutral experts as well. The absence of 
selection biases and incentive biases associated with the party-appointed experts does not 
mean that a neutral expert is not subject to any biases. The expert is likely to be subject to 
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professional biases. It can also be questioned whether the award mechanism aligns the neutral 
expert incentives with the incentives compatible with rationality in the generation of models. 
The neutral experts are subject to incentives that may not coincide with the incentives 
necessary to generate the right models. It can also be questioned whether experts biases will 
have greater impact if experts are neutral, because the decision maker will be less critical to 
the expert opinion under the belief that neutrality also means to not be biased. Neutral experts 
do not, however, need to replace the party experts but rather complement them. The role of a 
neutral expert does not need to be to generate models, but to assess the models generated by 
the parties and to try to rationally extract the information that lies in combining the models 
presented by the parties.  
To reduce the impact of biased experts, it has also been suggested to increase the 
disclosure requirements by requiring the parties to reveal what experts have been contacted in 
the process of finding an expert witness. However, it can be argued that too much disclosure 
of pre-litigation activities is a dangerous path, as one risks losing some of the benefits 
associated with the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, this may make the impact of 
selection bias even stronger as it becomes more important for the parties to attract the right 
expert in the first place. It has also been suggested to impose a requirement to have a system 
of public disclosure of all the former statements of an expert to facilitate consistency in the 
experts’ statements. This might reduce some of the incentive bias, but not the selection bias. 
One could argue that such a requirement could make the selection bias even more influential 
as it will be easier to find an expert with the correct bias.   
 It is difficult to safeguard against biases in the generation of economic models in 
antitrust procedure. Thus, it is important to have mechanisms that facilitate a correct 
assessment of the informative value of models. If the decision makers are able to correctly 
assess the informative value of models, it will be hard times for those who want to present 
biased models associated with low information value. Chapter Six discussed whether models 
are likely to be assessed according to their informative value in antitrust analysis. It was found 
that in the inquisitorial procedure the prosecutorial bias is likely to affect the assessment of 
the informative value of models. The judicial review and mechanisms of contradiction will, 
however, impose some constraints on the inquisitor’s ability implement the prosecutorial bias. 
However, when it comes to the intentional implementation of the prosecutorial bias, the 
possibility to abuse rhetoric can be used in the argumentation to implement the prosecutorial 
bias, especially if this is done within topics that are subject to restricted judicial review.  
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In the adversarial procedure, there are many imperfections that are likely to distort the 
rational assessment of the informative value of models. As making inferences from complex 
economic models requires effort, decision makers are likely to give more weight to simpler 
models that are easier to understand. This is an argument for better trained decision makers as 
the assessment of complex economic models requires less effort the more trained a person is 
in assessing such models. However, the decision maker should not be so well trained that he 
is an expert himself in the field, as he then may be subject to professional biases. 
Furthermore, the inferences from economic models are parts of a holistic body of evidence, 
including other non-expert witness statements and documents. An economics or econometrics 
expert is not likely to have any advantage in analyzing these kinds of evidence. Cognitive 
biases are also likely to disturb the correct assessment of the informative value of models in 
an adversarial procedure. This can be exploited by the parties in the abuse of rhetoric. The 
adversarial process can be argued to be an ideal playground for abuse of rhetoric, which, in 
particular, is likely to be exploited by the party with the highest stakes. Leading antitrust 
scholars have even pointed out that rhetorical skills are likely to trump over professional 
merits in the presentation of expert testimony.  
 Chapter Six included an analysis of how rhetoric can be abused in the argumentation 
for model-based inferences in antitrust analysis. It was found that argumentation based on 
inferences based on economic models provides a playing field for the abuse of rhetoric. The 
parties can exploit the use of assumptions that underpins the economic analysis in their 
arguments. The parties can exploit assumptions to create desirable cognitive biases, and the 
parties may abuse statistical methods, in particular, the conventional methods of significance 
testing, to confuse the decision makers. In an adversarial procedure, the role of the 
competition between parties is to reveal and refute fallacies and flaws in each other’s 
argumentation. However, there might be failures that limit the other party’s ability to do so. If 
the stakes are asymmetric, one party might find it profitable to overwhelm the other party 
with expert evidence that the other party does not find profitable to try to refute.  
How can the assessment principles and procedures applied in antitrust analysis be made 
more rational? 
In Chapter Four some suggestions were made to promote more rationality in the 
determination of rules. The antitrust decision makers should take more criteria into account 
when they determine the rules. The presumption rules in both the US and EU are determined 
by the confidence in the anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question. At a superior 
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level, probability of errors, error cost, costs of formulation, and costs of application should all 
be taken into account. This requires a broader assessment than just assessing the likely 
anticompetitive effects of the conduct in question. 
To cope with the problem of path-dependence associated with the principle of 
precedence, a system should contain incentives for parties and enforcement authorities to try 
out precedence-based rules that are likely to be overturned by the courts, so that they actually 
can be overturned. A system of private enforcement facilitates this. Thus, the work to promote 
private enforcement of EU competition law should continue. Enforcement authorities, such as 
the European Commission, may also enforce these rules to give the rules a chance to be 
challenged in the courts.  
To deal with the imperfection associated with the use of analogies associated with the 
principle of precedence, the decision makers should be careful in applying analogies as an end 
in legal interpretation. Analogies can be used as a source of inspiration for what a rule should 
be, but this suggested rule should be checked against the underlying antitrust standard and 
purpose. Thus, analogies should be used very carefully when they are based on rules with an 
ambiguous purpose.  
It was also identified a risk of the circumvention of the standard of proof associated 
with the principle of precedence. To avoid that the principle of precedence is used to 
circumvent the standard of proof, there rests a responsibility on antitrust decision makers to 
not uncritically turn facts from previous cases into a precedence-based rule. The probative 
force of a presumption rule as such should be taken properly into account in the question of 
whether the presumption rule is rebutted.   
It is more difficult to provide good suggestions as to how avoid biases on rules from 
interest group influence and personal preferences of the antitrust decision makers. However, a 
crucial element of avoiding such biases is to promote rationality in evidence assessment 
which will prevent the evolution of precedence based on epistemologically wrong decisions.  
Measures to improve the rationality in assessment of evidence were addressed in 
Chapter Five. There is a sliding scale between the adversarial system and the inquisitorial 
system. The inquisitorial systems can be improved with adversarial elements by extending 
contradictory rights, including formal hearings, internal peer review, and by strengthening the 
judicial review. This is descriptive for the evolution of the EU competition procedure, as 
described in this study. On the other hand the adversarial system can be made more 
“inquisitorial” by giving the judge a more active role in the evidence administration and by 
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giving the judge more opportunities to take initiatives ex officio. By this, we can obtain an 
optimal mix of adversarial and inquisitorial elements. 
Based on the incentive structure, an improvement of the adversarial system seems to 
be the most promising starting point for antitrust procedures that better facilitate rational 
decisions. Even if the inquisitorial procedure is improved by introducing instruments such as 
more extensive contradictory rights, better peer review mechanisms, and strengthened judicial 
review, this will not fully solve the intrinsic problems associated with the incentive structure. 
An inquisitorial enforcement authority is there to find violations, and its performance in doing 
so will govern the incentives in evidence assessment. Judicial review will discipline the 
inquisitorial decision makers, but the investigated party will be subject to an inequality of 
arms when it has the burden to prove that the decision in wrong. In this operation, the 
investigated party will have to battle an excessive amount of evidence favoring violation 
while evidence contradictory to violation is not properly explored.  
In an adversarial system, it is not the incentives of the decision makers that are the 
main problem, but the failures associated with the evidence production of the parties and the 
risk of assessment failures due to the exploitation of imperfections and biases in the 
assessment of evidence. By extending the role of judges in demanding from parties clear 
statements on what inferences are supposed to be drawn from some evidence presented for 
evidence to be admissible, and by training the decision makers in handling possible 
assessment fallacies, the decision making can be improved. To facilitate this, written evidence 
assessments should be required, including grounds on which inferences are drawn from the 
various elements of evidence. This will discipline the decision makers to analytically assess 
every piece of evidence and the inferences made from them. Furthermore, by being able to 
declare evidence inadmissible on the basis of cost consideration, the judge can mitigate both 
the problem of excessive evidence in general and excessive evidence from one party due 
asymmetric stakes. More screening from judges will, in itself, reduce the incentives for 
excessive production of evidence in the first place as it will be a less chance that excessive 
evidence will be allowed into court. The problem is, however, that the judges do not have 
sufficient incentives to take the costs fully into account. More evidence administration 
requires more personal efforts by the judge. A stricter requirement of written evidence 
assessment may help also to mitigate this problem. After all, more evidence will extend the 
decision that has to be written, which also involves effort. Furthermore, it will force the judge 
to incur the effort to assess the evidence. This will give the judge a stronger incentive in the 
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evidence administration to weigh the benefits of additional evidence against the costs. Other 
procedural rules, such that rules that increase the costs of providing excessive evidence and to 
balance the stakes in a trial, may mitigate some of the problems associated with an adversarial 
procedure. Rules such as treble damages increase the stakes for the plaintiffs relative to 
defendants, which can balance some of the asymmetric stakes due to monopoly rent 
protection. However, such rules must be used carefully to balance the asymmetries of the 
stakes and not to exaggerate the asymmetries.  
Thus, the conclusion is that there is room for improvements that better facilitate 
rational evidence assessment. An adversarial procedure supplemented by some “inquisitorial” 
elements seem to be the best starting point for better evidence assessments, rather than an 
inquisitorial procedure supplemented with “adversarial” elements. This conclusion seems to 
correspond with contemporary research in law and economics. 
In Chapter Six several suggestions to improve the rationality in the assessment of 
economic models in antitrust analysis were presented. A first obvious recommendation is for 
the decision makers to adhere to the principles of rationality in determining the informative 
value of models. Both qualitative and quantitative principles of assessing the informative 
value of economic models were given in Chapter Six. Some basic training of decision makers, 
not necessarily in economics, but in philosophy of science and the fundamentals of statistical 
inference, would probably be useful for decision makers who want to improve their 
performance in the assessment of the informative value of economic models and scientific 
evidence in general. However, it not very realistic to believe that general decision makers can 
be sufficiently trained to fully assess the informative value of complex models used in 
antitrust analysis. Furthermore, to use decision makers that have this knowledge would 
introduce other problems. Decision makers that are experts themselves are likely to be subject 
to professional bias. Furthermore, experts in assessing economic models do not necessarily 
have any advantage in assessing other non-expert witness statements, documents’ validity, or 
other aspects that are crucial in the assessment of antitrust evidence. Thus, although there is a 
case for better trained decision makers in antitrust analysis, this does not mean that the 
decision makers should be experts in antitrust economics and econometrics.  
 The court is a playing field for abuse of rhetoric in argumentation based on inferences 
from economic models. All elements necessary to establish logically valid arguments could 
potentially be violated in arguing for model-based inferences. This is an additional argument 
for better trained decision makers in antitrust cases. Some might argue that this is also an 
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argument for the inquisitorial procedure to prevent the rent-seeking associated with the 
possibility of abusing rhetoric. It is not likely that this would be a good solution. As follows 
from the analysis in Chapter Six, an inquisitor is also subject to biases and is also likely to 
abuse rhetoric to obtain a desirable result. One of the main roles of the parties in an 
adversarial procedure is to reveal and refute fallacies and flaws in the opponent’s arguments. 
Although parties can perform some of the same functions during the contradiction in an 
inquisitorial procedure this will not be the same as in an adversarial procedure, where the 
parties are on equal terms and where the decision maker is external to the case. Furthermore, 
limits in the standard of judicial review give the inquisitor a margin to pursue desirable 
inferences. Thus, the risk of abuse of rhetoric is a poor argument for an inquisitorial 
procedure. 
 A question is what improvements that can be done in the adversarial procedure to 
improve the ability of the competition of the parties to yield a rational assessment of the 
economic models. Leading antitrust scholars have suggested the involvement of neutral 
experts. Some counterarguments to the superiority of the performance of neutral experts were 
presented in Chapter Six as described above. In line with the suggestions of other 
commentators it is desirable that neutral experts’ role should be limited to assess the evidence 
presented by the parties and their experts. The neutral experts may point at fallacies and flaws 
in the argumentation of the parties and may try to generate some of the additional informative 
value that follows from incorporating two or more biased models into one model. The neutral 
expert may also be useful in determining which of the parties should benefit from a 
presumption and thus encouraging the party that does not benefit from a presumption to 
clarify issues. The report of the neutral expert could beneficially be provided after the 
presentation of the economic expert opinions of the parties. Furthermore, the report of the 
neutral expert should be subject to contradiction by the parties. In line with the 
recommendation in Chapter Five, decision makers should be required to provide written 
grounds on the evidence assessment. Then, it can be monitored if the decision makers have 
assessed the expert report of the neutral expert properly, including taking the results of the 
contradiction into account. Furthermore, as was also pointed out as a general measure in 
Chapter Five, measures to balance the stakes of the parties would probably be beneficial. 
Then each party has balanced incentives in finding the fallacies and flaws in the other’s expert 
opinions.  
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Some final comments 
Rationality in the application of antitrust law has been subjective to extensive research. 
Seminal contributions in antitrust law and economics have contributed to deeper 
understanding of rationality in antitrust analysis. The research has covered legislative and 
interpretative issues on the determination of antitrust law, where issues such as rules versus 
standards and the optimal precision of rules are central issues. Furthermore, the scientific 
approach to rational assessment of evidence has been studied in the context of antitrust 
analysis, including methods of systematically weighting the probative force and decision 
value of evidence against the cost of gathering evidence. Research has also been informative 
as to how to improve the procedure to facilitate a rational antitrust analysis. This study is a 
contribution to this research. 
The scarce statutory precision of antitrust laws forms the basis for a pragmatic 
consequence-oriented interpretation and application of antitrust rules. This is an almost ideal 
legal framework to promote rationality. Decision theory and rationality has, indeed, guided 
the evolution of rules and utilization of presumptions in the application of the law. This is 
illustrated by the Leegin case in the US.  Research on the rational tradeoff between the 
information value of evidence and the cost of gathering evidence has provided guidance for 
enforcement authorities and courts. Procedural reforms and practices have been informed by 
law and economics research. The use of economic models to guide inferences in antitrust 
analysis has been improved as the reflective level on the informative value of economic 
models has increased. Trial and failure on quantitative techniques in actual cases has 
corrected overoptimistic views on the evidentiary potential of costly advanced quantitative 
methods.  
Nevertheless, antitrust analysis can be made more rational. We still find areas where 
the antitrust rule applied might not appear as a very rational rule, where irrelevant factors, 
rather than decision value and costs, guide the evidence gathering where the assessment of 
evidence is not very much in correspondence with the information content of the evidence, 
and where there is not much reflection on the information value on the models relied on for 
inferences. Hopefully this study can contribute to the promotion of more rationality in 
antitrust analysis. 
The debate between rule and standards is in no way settled. The appropriate use of 
presumptions in antitrust rules is briskly debated There are on-going debates as to what 
evidence provides most information value and is most cost-efficient in assessing antitrust 
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issues, such as what the decision value of market shares in antitrust analysis is and if 
information exchange is pro-competitive or anti-competitive. It is debated which economic 
models that are most informative and how economic expertise should be incorporated in the 
procedure. The appropriate standard of proof in antitrust cases is a debated issue. The 
organization of procedure is also a hot topic. Many favor the US adversarial system, while 
others defend the inquisitorial system in Europe, at least if it is modified. Some topics 
addressed by this study have still not been scrutinized properly in an antitrust context. In areas 
that have been subject to research, there is still a long way to go for this research to be 
implemented in the practical application of antitrust law. This study has hopefully provided 
valuable insights to these debates and many other contemporary debates.  
The inquiry into the rationality of antitrust analysis in this study has come to an end. 
The differences between the inquisitorial EU system and US adversarial system, and the cases 
produced by the two systems, have provided this study with a natural experiment. The cases 
generated in these two systems together with theoretical research, have been informative in 
reaching conclusions on the rationality of antitrust assessment principles and procedures. Still, 
it appears that this study has only been able to address the tip of iceberg. An almost unlimited 
amount of cases already decided and to come in the future will inform the topic further. In 
addition, ongoing theoretical research is also likely to inform the topic further. Although the 
conclusions in this study are supported by reasons, this study also contains a range of testable 
hypotheses that could benefit from further testing. This provides the author with an inspiration 
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